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LA RÉDEMPTION DANS LES LIVRES D'ADAM *)

PAR

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Rome

Nous avons eu ailleurs ¹⁾ l'occasion de souligner l'importance de l'apocryphe juif sur la vie d'Adam et d'Eve (tel qu'il peut être rétabli sur la base de l'Apocalypse de Moïse' et de la *Vita Adae et Evae*) ²⁾ pour la sotériologie et l'anthropologie du judaïsme (et indirectement du christianisme et du gnosticisme): il s'agit de thèmes comme ceux du rapport de l'homme avec les anges; de la 'connaissance' d'Adam, du rôle de la femme, de la nature du mal. Nous nous proposons ici de faire ressortir certains aspects des mêmes textes pour le thème de l'histoire du salut' en tant que contexte où sont insérés le premier péché, la mort, l'histoire, la résurrection. De ce point de vue, nous nous proposons aussi une comparaison de l'apocryphe juif et de la thématique paulinienne de I *Cor.* 15: on aura ainsi l'occasion de remarquer quelques notions partiellement comparables, d'autant plus compréhensibles si l'on tient compte du fait que I *Cor.* 15 polémique contre un certain 'spiritualisme' gnostisant des Corinthiens, qui menace d'évacuer les éléments concrets de la sotériologie et de l'eschatologie chrétiennes, fondées sur ce que l'apôtre a reçu et transmis: *ὅτι Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν. . . καὶ ὅτι ἐτάφη, καὶ ὅτι ἐγήγερται τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ. . .* (v.3 s.). Ces événements du Christ sont considérés en relation à une 'fin', qui coïncidera avec la destruction de la mort, la victoire du Fils et l'établissement du Royaume (vv. 24-28).

On admet en général que le livre d'Adam et d'Eve est dans son fonds

*) Ce texte, lu au colloque de Jérusalem, n'a pas été inséré, pour des raisons matérielles, dans les actes. Nous sommes heureux de pouvoir le publier dans la revue de la I.A.H.R.

C. J. B.

1) Kairos, N. F., XI (1969), Heft 1.

2) R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, vol. II, pp. 123-154.

un texte judaïque. Il n'est devenu chrétien qu'après coup. Plus tard le livre juif d'Adam et d'Eve a donné le pas à toute une littérature d'Adam ^{2bis}, dont nous rappellerons brièvement les pièces principales seulement pour les distinguer clairement du livre qui nous intéresse. Cette littérature est formée, on le sait, par la Caverne des trésors syriaque, le Conflit d'Adam éthiopien, deux livres chrétiens de contenu non-agnostique; puis par les fragments du Testamentum Adae ³⁾ qui ont semblé à Renan teints d'un certain gnosticisme, par les livres arméniens d'Adam, qui aux dires de Preuschen le sont aussi, et finalement le livre mandéen d'Adam, qui est un classique de la littérature gnostique, et l'Apocalypse d'Adam trouvée parmi les textes gnostiques de Nag Hammadi.

Pour en revenir à notre livre judaïque d'Adam, il faut noter que le texte donné par l'Apocalypse de Moïse est apparu à plusieurs savants plus originel que celui de la Vita Adae latine, et, à plus forte raison, que le correspondant en paléo-slave ⁴⁾ utilisé par Charles dans le même contexte. Mais il faut ajouter que même des parties de la Vita Adae qui n'ont pas de correspondance dans le texte grec ont toute chance d'appartenir à un fonds juif authentique, et donc doivent être considérées pour notre recherche comme ayant une importance bien différente de celle de la littérature postérieure encratite ou gnostique sur Adam. En d'autres termes, nous allons jeter un coup d'œil sur un complexe de traditions juives sur Adam qui ont pu être connues par Paul. Je prends cette limite pour deux raisons: 1) parce que l'étude des conceptions juives sur Adam peut intéresser certains aspects de la doctrine paulinienne sur la rédemption et sur le Christ, 2) parce que peu d'années ou de décades après les lettres aux Romains et aux Corinthiens ont suffi à compliquer tout le tableau, à cause de l'introduction des spéculations encratites ou gnostiques sur les mêmes thèmes.

L'étude de cette espèce d'adamologie qui ressort du livre d'Adam et d'Eve est d'autant plus importante pour l'histoire religieuse, qu'elle contient un aspect qui est tout à fait absent dans les spéculations philo-

^{2bis}) [Pour la question des livres d'Adam, vr. maintenant le volume de Denis sur *les apocryphes grecs d'A.T.*, Leiden 1970].

3) Kmosko, *Patrologia Syriaca* I, t. 2, c. 1340 ss.

4) Celui-ci contient des éléments bien plus tardifs, bogomiles; cfr. XXXIII-XXXIV (Charles, op. cit., p. 135) sur le thème de la dispute sur la possession de la terre et du piège verbal tendu à Satan.

niennes ⁵⁾ ou dans les conceptions iraniennes sur l'Homme primordial. Cet aspect propre à l'adamologie de notre texte est celui de la vicissitude de l'histoire du salut. En effet, l'Homme céleste philonien ne joue aucun rôle dans la vicissitude du salut et dans l'eschatologie. Au contraire, l'Adam de notre apocryphe et de toute la littérature sur Adam est profondément inséré dans une vicissitude, dans une histoire du salut qui implique, on va le voir, toute une tension et toute une dialectique au sein de la triade Dieu, puissances, homme, et au dedans des puissances et de l'homme considérés en eux-mêmes. Dès lors, l'importance de l'étude de ces textes pour ceux qui s'intéressent à la sotériologie et à la christologie du christianisme naissant et du gnosticisme, sans vouloir pour autant transformer le livre juif d'Adam dans un texte chrétien ou dans un texte gnostique avant la lettre, et sans vouloir bien entendu réduire la christologie chrétienne ou l'anthropologie gnostique à une simple variation d'un thème déjà juif comme celui de l'Adam de notre apocryphe. Il est vrai d'ailleurs que cet Adam du livre juif a des aspects, apparemment contradictoires (il est pécheur, mais l'image de Dieu qui est en lui lui confère une majesté inéliminable), qui ne manquent pas dans certaines spéculations chrétiennes post-néotestamentaires ⁶⁾: une ambivalence d'ailleurs qui se continue aussi — *mutatis mutandis* — dans la littérature gnostique sur Adam, privé par le démiurge de sa gloire mais conservant des traces essentielles de sa nature pneumatique.

Pour en revenir encore une fois à notre apocryphe, nous voulons y souligner: 1) la tendance à envisager une histoire de l'humanité qui est en même temps une histoire du salut: il arrive p.ex. que le péché d'Adam et d'Eve n'y soit pas raconté ex professo dès le début, mais qu'il ne revienne que dans la suite, raconté par les protagonistes et surtout dans l'optique d'événements futurs, qui sont événements d'expiation et de salut; 2) le fait que dans cette histoire du salut Adam joue un rôle tout à fait central, non seulement par ses actions et ses révéla-

5) Surtout dans le *de opificio mundi*.

6) Ps.-Clem., *Hom.* III, 17,1 (l'homme sorti des mains du créateur a possédé l'esprit de la présience divine; cet homme est décrit en contraste à l'homme engendré par la sémence impure); cfr. aussi III, 20, 2: celui-là possède l'Esprit, qui, depuis le commencement du monde, changeant son nom et sa figure, traverse le temps du monde, jusqu'au temps où, avec l'onction de la miséricorde de Dieu, il arrivera à son temps et à sa paix. Cfr. aussi XI, 19, 1, pour le concept d'une histoire mondiale du salut, en relation au 'Vrai Prophète'.

tions postérieures à son péché, mais aussi par sa mort, sa sépulture, sa résurrection future.

Nous n'avons ici qu'à rappeler brièvement le contenu du livre. Celui-ci débute par la sortie d'Adam et d'Eve du Paradis. Les deux prototypes sont immédiatement atteints par le problème de la nourriture. Privés de la nourriture des anges, ils ont difficulté devant la nourriture des animaux: une opposition de termes qui envisage un aspect assez céleste de l'Adam du Paradis (celui-ci étant opposé à la 'terre'): un aspect qui rappelle la future thématique encratite, et qui d'ailleurs ne se recoupe pas avec la thématique philonienne de l'homme à l'état céleste. Suit la scène de la pénitence d'Adam et d'Eve, qui se purifient respectivement dans les eaux du Jourdain et du Tigris (que l'on remarque la distinction et la situation différente des deux fleuves par rapport à la Terre sainte) et pour une durée qui est plus longue pour Adam, en relation non pas à la gravité majeure de sa faute, mais à sa plus grande capacité de souffrance; et la faiblesse d'Eve est ultérieurement soulignée par le fait qu'elle, trompée par Satan, interrompt sa pénitence avant le terme, en encourageant le reproche d'Adam. Nous ne sommes évidemment pas à l'anti-féminisme (autrement dit: à la dévaluation ontologique de la femme et du féminin) propre — sur la base de raisons différentes — aux encratites ⁷⁾, ou aux pseudo-clémentines ⁸⁾, ou aux gnostiques de l'Évangile de Thomas ⁹⁾, ou aux

7) Jules Cassien, ap. Clem. Al., *Strom.* III, 93, 3, Stählin p. 239: l'âme descend dans ce monde de naissance et de mort ἐπιθυμία θηλυθεΐσα. (C'est la radicalisation d'une position platonicienne du *Timée*, 42 A, où la première incarnation de l'âme est masculine, la deuxième, moins noble, féminine); cfr. aussi Philon, de gig. I, 4: 'un homme injuste n'engendre pas, dans l'âme, des mâles'.

8) Le mal surgit avec l'inversion de l'ordre de priorité entre les deux éléments des syzygies, entre le masculin et le féminin. Hom. II, 15, 2 s.: ὃ καὶ τὰς τῶν συζυγιῶν ἐνήλλαξεν εἰκόνας, μικρὰ τὰ πρῶτα παραθέμενος αὐτῷ, μεγάλα δὲ τὰ δευτέρα, οἷον κόσμον, αἰῶνα. ἀλλ'ὁ μὲν παρὼν κόσμος πρόσκαιρος, ὁ δὲ ἐσόμενος αἰδῖος. πρώτη ἄγνοια, δευτέρα γνῶσις... ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ παρὼν κόσμος θηλὺς ἐστίν, ὡς μήτηρ τέκνων τίκτων ψυχάς, ὁ <δ> ἐσόμενος αἰὼν ἄρρην ἐστίν, ὡς πατὴρ ἀποδεχόμενος τὰ αὐτοῦ τέκνα.

9) Log. 114. 'Simon Pierre leur dit: Que Marie sorte du milieu de nous, car les femmes ne sont pas dignes de la Vie. Jésus dit: Voici que je la guiderai afin de la faire mâle, pour qu'elle devienne, elle aussi, un esprit vivant semblable à vous, les mâles. Car toute femme qui se fera mâle entrera dans le Royaume des cieux'. (*L'Évangile de Thomas*, A. Guillaumont, H.-Ch. Puech, G. Quispel et al., Paris 1959). Cfr. aussi l'Ev. des Egyptiens cité par Clément d'Al.: „Je suis venu pour détruire les œuvres de la femme... Quand les deux seront un, le mâle et la femelle, il n'y aura plus ni homme ni femme”.

Ophites¹⁰); ni notre apocryphe n'implique l'exaltation mystique correspondante du masculin. Mais son insistance sur la thématique sus-indiquée est symptomatique. En effet, la deuxième faute dans laquelle Eve, et elle seule, est tombée, déclenche chez celle-ci une série de dépressions mélancholiques : elle s'accuse de toute la faute de la première chute, souligne son incapacité foncière et s'éloigne d'Adam pour aller attendre la mort loin, à l'Occident¹¹). Mais une vie nouvelle, celle de son premier enfant Caïn, se fait entendre dans son sein. Loin d'Adam elle est dans les peines les plus effrayantes et s'adresse à Dieu. Mais ses prières n'ont pas d'effet : il est révélé que son salut — son accouchement — ne se vérifiera que par l'intercession d'Adam (*propter Adam*), ce qui en réalité arrive¹²). De nouvelles révélations anticipent sur l'histoire du salut, et de nouveaux événements (meurtre d'Abel,

10) Cfr. la doctrine des Naassènes (Hippol., *El.* V, 7,15, p. 82 Wendland) : Attis est recourré ἀπὸ τῶν χοικῶν τῆς κτίσεως κάτωθεν μερῶν et revient ἐπὶ τὴν αἰωνίαν ἄνω . . . οὐσίαν ὅπου . . . οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε θῆλυ οὔτε ἄρσεν ἀλλὰ καινὴ κτίσις, καινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὃ ἔστιν ἀρσενόθηλος (utilisation et altération de *Eph.* 2, 15). Plus haut le même texte (*El.* V, 7, 13) avait dit que ἡ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων . . . καὶ αἰωνίων ἄνω μακαρία φύσις (la Mère des dieux) τὴν ἀρρενικὴν δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνακαλεῖται πρὸς αὐτήν. Cfr. aussi le Baruch de Justin le gnostique (*ibid.* X, 15, p. 276s. Wendland).

11) *Vita Adae et Evae* XVIII, 1 (W. Meyer, *Vita Adae et Evae*, München 1879, dans les *Abhandl. bayer. Akad.* I.CI.XIV Bd. III Abt.): „Et dixit Eva ad Adam: vive tu ... Tibi concessa est vita, quoniam tu nec primam nec secundam praevaricationem fecisti, sed ego praevaricata et seducta sum, quia non custodivi mandatum Dei”. Cfr. XXXV, 2 s.: „Et cum vidisset eum Eva flentem coepit et ipsa flere dicens: domine Deus meus, in me transfer dolorem eius, quoniam ego peccavi. Et dixit Eva ad Adam: domine mi, da mihi *partem* dolorum tuorum, quoniam a me culpa haec tibi accessit”. Cfr. *Apoc. Mos.* XXXII, 1-2; XIV, 2: reproche d'Adam à Eve (et cfr. VII, 1). Mais *Apoc. Mos.* XXVII, 2 Adam s'accuse comme le seul coupable: ὅτι ἐγὼ μόνος ἥμαρτον. Mais il a été précédé par le reproche de Dieu: „tu as désobéi à mon commandement et tu as écouté ta femme” (XXIV, 1). *Apoc. Mos.* XXXIX, 1 Dieu reproche le péché à Adam, avec la formule ‘Qu’as tu fait?’ qui est celle du reproche d'Adam à Eve dans XIV, 2 cité. En résumant, il faut dire que le fait de souligner la faiblesse d'Eve, et le fait qu'Eve fut directement trompée par le Serpent, n'implique nullement qu'Adam soit innocent; mais la faiblesse de la femme en reste également établie. Pour le N.T., cfr. II *Cor.* 11, 3: φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή πως, ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐξέπότησεν Εὐαν ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτοῦ . . . et I *Tim.* 2, 14: καὶ Ἀδὰμ οὐκ ἠπατήθη, ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐξέπαθησα ἐν παραβάσει γέγονεν.

12) *Vita Adae* XXI, 2: “Beata es, Eva, propter Adam. Quoniam preces eius magnae sunt et orationes...”. Que l'on compare I *Tim.* 11-15, partic. 13-15: Ἀδὰμ γὰρ πρῶτος ἐπλάσθη, εἴτα Εὐα. καὶ Ἀδὰμ οὐκ ἠπατήθη (cfr. la n. 11), ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἐξαπατηθεῖσα ἐν παραβάσει γέγονεν· σωθήσεται δὲ διὰ τεκνογονίας, ἐὰν μείνωσιν ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀγάπῃ καὶ ἀγιασμῷ μετὰ σωφροσύνης (cfr. I *Cor.* 14, 33-35; I *Cor.* 11, 3,8-9).

naissance de Seth) compliquent le cadre. Mais le thème central n'en reste pas moins le suivant: Adam devra mourir, sa rédemption s'obtiendra par de là sa mort, voire par de là toute l'histoire humaine ¹³): on dirait même, *par* sa mort et *à travers* toute l'histoire ¹⁴).

Une insistance toute spéciale est posée en effet sur la mort d'Adam. Adam n'est pas le premier mort, étant donné qu'Abel est bientôt tué par son frère: mais Adam sera le premier enseveli ¹⁵), au cours de funérailles qui ont tout l'aspect d'une consécration à une vie future ou d'un 'sacrement' de la résurrection ¹⁶), au bénéfice de toute l'humanité, qui est sa sémence ¹⁷). Ces funérailles sont célébrées par les anges, sur l'instruction de Dieu, et ils font usage pour elles de toiles de lin (trois, de byssus, selon la *Vita*) et d'une „huile de fragrance”, qu'ils auront procurées, avec d'autres aromates, dans le Paradis du troisième ciel ¹⁸); et les corps d'Adam et d'Abel, et puis d'Eve, à ce qu'il semble, sont ensevelis dans le Paradis sur terre ¹⁹). Tout cela, on dirait, fait d'Adam une espèce d'ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων (pour prendre l'expression que I *Cor.* 15, 21 applique au Christ) et de πρωτότοκος τῶν νεκρῶν (*Col.* 1, 18, également le Christ): avec sa résurrection (cfr. *supra*, n. 17) arriveront la résurrection des hommes ²⁰) et l'âge à venir ²¹).

13) *Vita Adae*, XXIX, c: Et post haec habitabit Deus cum hominibus in terris videndus (texte ajouté).

14) *Apoc. Mos.* XXVIII, 4: ἀλλ' ἐξερχομένου σου ἐκ τοῦ παραδείσου, ἐὰν φυλάξῃ ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ ὡς βουλόμενος ἀποθανεῖν, ἀναστήσεως πάλιν γενομένης ἀναστήσω σε καὶ τότε δοθήσεται σοι ἐκ τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς καὶ ἀθάνατος ἔσῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. (Dans les fragments, plus tardifs, du *Testamentum Adae* chrétien et gnostisant [op. cit. ci-dessus, n.3, c.1341 et 1349] Adam est assez rapproché, dans sa glorification finale, de la glorification du Christ.) Voir aussi, en parallèle au texte de l'*Apoc. Mos.* cité. *Vita Adae* XLVII, 1-3: tunc vidit Seth manum domini extensam tenentem Adam; et tradidit Michahel dicens: Sit in custodia tua usque in diem dispensationis in suppliciis ad annos novissimos, quando convertam luctum eius in gaudium. Tunc sedebit in throno eius, qui eum supplantavit (ou: seduxit). Cfr. aussi *Apoc. Mos.* XLI, 1-3.

15) *Vita Adae* XLVIII, 4-7, partic. 5: et processerunt omnes virtutes angelorum ante Adam, et sanctificata est dormitatio mortuorum... Cfr. *Apoc. Mos.* XL, 1-7.

16) *Vita Adae* XLVIII, 5, cité à la n. 15.

17) *Apoc. Mos.* XLI, 3.

18) *Apoc. Mos.* XL, 1 ss., cfr. *Vita Adae* XLVIII, 4 ss.

19) *Vita Adae* XLVIII, 6: et sepelierunt Adam et Abel Michahel et Urihel angeli in partibus Paradisi; *Apoc. Mos.* XXXVII, 5; mais XL, 7 et XLI, 1 Adam est enseveli dans la terre.

20) *Apoc. Mos.* XLI, 3; *Vita Adae* LI, 2; *Apoc. Mos.* XLIII, 2.

21) Cfr. la deuxième cit. de la n. 20.

Voilà donc des particularités qui peuvent être importantes pour la théologie paulinienne de la mort et de la résurrection du Christ, en perspective *heilsgeschichtlich*, et pour la fonction d'Adam dans cette même perspective. On ne saurait évidemment ignorer les différences, voire les oppositions. Paul renverse la situation, en introduisant le 'dernier Adam' (I Cor. 15, 45), le 'deuxième homme provenant du ciel' (I Cor. 15, 47), qui existe avant le premier, mais qui se manifeste au centre de l'histoire et qui est en même temps le *πρωτότοκος τῶν νεκρῶν* et le *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως* (Col. 1, 15). Il ne sera plus question pour Paul des privilèges conservés par Adam même après le péché; bien au contraire (Rom. 18 s.). De plus, le premier Adam sera *ψυχικός* et *χοϊκός*, le Christ sera *πνευματικός* et *ἐπουράνιος* (I Cor. 15, 45-49). Seul le Christ enseveli et ressuscité sera le sacrement du salut déjà manifesté et de l'accomplissement des temps, qui n'abolira pourtant pas l'histoire, où se manifesterà l'aspiration de toute créature souffrant les peines de l'enfantement (Rom. 8, 22-23). Pour ce qui est d'Adam, Paul en aura fait éclater l'ambivalence et la dialectique de pécheur et d'image de Dieu. Adam sera le pécheur; la véritable image sera le Fils (I Cor. 15, 49, cfr. 24.28; Col. 1, 15), la tension et la dialectique qui étaient en Adam seront réglées par l'opposition des deux Adam: *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δι' ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, καὶ δι' ἀνθρώπου ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν. ὥστε γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιηθήσονται* (I Cor. 14, 21 s., cfr. 45: *ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν· ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*). Peut-être, la proclamation mystérieuse du 'Fils de l'homme' lui en aura frayé le chemin²²).

Mais l'argument paulinien de I Cor. 15, 12 ss. n'en supposera pas moins le fondement général de l'idée de résurrection: *εἰ δὲ ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται* (v. 13, cfr. 16). Il est vrai que ceci ne diminue en rien la spécificité et la primauté (dans l'ordre causal et exemplaire) de la résurrection du Christ, d'autant plus que l'argument des vv. 13 et 16 est polémique, *per absurdum*, comme il sera *ad hominem* plus bas, quand il s'agira de ceux qui se font baptiser pour les morts (v. 29), la résurrection du Christ étant un *primum* inconditionné, dans la conception et l'expérience religieuse de Paul.

De plus, l'idée de la résurrection est liée au concept de la vicissitude

22) Cfr. C. Colpe, in Kittel, *Th.W.z.N.T.*, s.v. ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου p. 408.

et de la fin de l'histoire: la résurrection du Christ, comme prémices, et celle des croyants en lui marquera la fin de l'histoire (v. 24); la dernière qui sera détruite sera la mort (v. 26). Cela implique que le Christ régnera quand tous ses ennemis seront à ses pieds et toute principauté, puissance et vertu sera évacuée (v. 24). Or, dans le livre d'Adam, celui-ci siégera sur le trône de Satan, qui l'a trompé²³; et Paul, de sa part, cite dans le contexte que nous venons d'évoquer (vv. 25 et 27) les ps. 109,1 (ἄχρι οὗ θῆ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ) et 8,7 (πάντα γὰρ ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ). Ce verset du ps. 8 appartient à une exaltation de l'homme, exaltation que I *Cor.* 15,27, *Eph.* 1,22 et *Hebr.* 2,8 utilisent en fonction du Christ; et dans ces textes l'utilisation est en fonction eschatologique et *heilsgeschichtlich*: ὅταν δὲ ὑποταγῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, τότε . . . (I *Cor.* 15, 28). — νῦν δὲ οὐπω ὁρῶμεν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ὑποτεταγμένα (*Hebr.* 2,8; dans *Eph.* 1,22 la vision contemple 'ce siècle et le futur': v. 21).

Quant aux puissances évacuées de I *Cor.* 15,24 et (encore moins) aux anges dont il est question dans ce texte de *Hebr.*, ils ne seront pas à identifier au Satan de la *Vita Adae*²⁴), mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que le διάβολος est mentionné *Hebr.* 2,14 dans un texte où le sauveur envoyé par celui „par lequel et à travers lequel tout a été créé et qui a porté plusieurs fils à la gloire” (v. 10) appelle les hommes ses frères (vv. 12 s. [citations du V.T.]), se fait semblable aux frères (v. 17) et détruit par la mort le maître de la mort, le diable (v. 14): οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται, ἀλλὰ σπέρματος Ἀβραὰμ ἐπιλαμβάνεται (v. 16).

23) *Vita Adae* XLVII, 3, cfr. XVII; *Apoc. Mos.* XXXIX, 2-3.

24) XII-XVII.

COMPARING THE RELIGIO-HISTORICAL AND THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD¹⁾

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This theme gives rise to a series of questions. For the first it is dubious whether theoretical considerations on methodology are very fruitful and attractive. Not improperly it has been said that discussing methodology is like an endlessly sharpening of a knife whilst one never gets something to eat. Such a theoretical exposition mostly is a bloodless argument which some people perhaps read with pleasure, but which is not to the taste of historians of religions. They are fascinated by the religious phenomena to such a degree, that they do not allow themselves time to reflect on the method of their study. Secondly the question arises whether one can deal with the method of history of religions and of theology without taking the object of the two disciplines into account. The method of a discipline generally results from its object. It is wellknown that each science approaches its material in its own way. Therefore one cannot compare the method of the two disciplines without taking their principles into considerations. Thirdly it is evident that there exists difference of opinion on the character and the object both of history of religions and of theology. How can the methods of the two disciplines be compared when there is no *communis opinio* on their principles? Fourthly it can be questioned whether it is useful to deal with the question in the abstract. It is clear that everyone who writes about the subject, starts from certain tacit presuppositions. Some decades ago objectivity was proclaimed as the sole principle of science. Nowadays scholars have come to the insight that how impartial

1) This article has originally been written for a volume on "History of Religions and Theology: Essays in Methodology" which for technical reasons could not be published. Assuming that the subscribers to *Numen* are interested in the subject, I decided to publish the treatise in the journal of the IAHR, C.J.B.

they may try to be, everyone looks at the subject of his study from his own angle, even the students of natural science who were formerly supposed to be absolutely unbiased. This holds certainly also true for the student of history of religions. Though he is obliged to present an unprejudiced picture of the religion which he is studying, he must be conscious of the fact that he involuntarily is influenced by the attitude which he takes to the subject of his inquiry. The implications of this situation are twofold: a) the historian of religions should acknowledge that his method is coloured by his personal outlook on the material which he handles. b) he should realize that he is moulded by a certain religio-historical tradition, which means that he is the follower of a certain national school. In regard to the second point it is mostly forgotten that the study of history of religions is strongly influenced by the cultural, spiritual and scholarly atmosphere in which the study takes place. One can make a further step. The character of history of religions is generally determined by the function which the discipline fulfils in the system of academical instruction of the country in question. Too little attention is paid to this background. Yet the scholarly milieu can be decisive for the manner in which the study of history of religions is conceived of. These spiritual surroundings often explain why a certain method is chosen. The present author therefore doubts whether it is of any use to treat the question of the relation of the religio-historical method to the theological method in the abstract. At any rate it will surely clarify his own standpoint when he starts by sketching the Dutch background of his study. After having described the respective problematics in Holland he can take a further step by voicing some views that have a more general and international significance.

In the Netherlands history of religions is pursued by scholars of different faculties and of different confessions. Historians of religions are to be found not only among the theologians, but also amidst the philologists, the historians, the sociologists, the psychologists, the ethnologists etc. They may be Protestants of different denominations, or Roman Catholics, or persons who belong to no church and do not profess any creed. This fact deserves special notice. The majority of these scholars study history of religions as an interesting subject alongside their actual professional study. They hardly come in touch with theology. They are not forced to confront their method with that of theology. They study religio-historical problems in a matter of fact

way, without caring about the presuppositions of their work. There is no reason why they should puzzle their head about the problematics which is tackled in this article. Now and then their scholarly accomplishments are impressive and surprising. From this fact the conclusion can be drawn that history of religions in principle is an empirical science. It does not pronounce any value judgments, but tries to describe the course of events in an unbiased way, as the students of every segment of historical studies are bound to do. A tendentious description of history is no good. The historian of religions would disqualify himself by showing his predilection or by pronouncing his assent or dissent. Deterrent examples are those treatises on the non-Christian religions which qualify these types of belief as the work of the devil or as the results of human sin.

There are in the Netherlands historians of religions who find themselves in another position. That are those persons who are charged to teach history of religions at the university. Remarkable enough these professorships are solely located in the faculties of theology, both Protestant and Roman Catholic. In principle it would be possible to create a professorship for the history of religions in the faculty of arts. For, history of religions is an autonomous science and is not obliged to reckon with theology or church. This step has never been taken.

There is a historical reason why history of religions is only taught in the faculty of theology. In former times the Dutch Reformed Church was the privileged national church. In the faculty of theology the dogmatics of that church was officially taught. In the nineteenth century the separation of Church and State came about. The faculty of theology became independent and accepted the principle of scholarly objectivity. The result was that by the academic statute of 1876 dogmatics were eliminated from the educational programme of the faculty of theology as a body of professors, nominated by the minister of education. This discipline was handed over to professors, appointed by the churches, who had to train the future ministers. They possessed an advisory capacity at the faculty of theology. To approach the situation from another side, one could say that the majority of the Dutch churches require that the future clergyman shall take his candidate's degree at the university. The churches themselves take care of the training for the ministry. Thus a so called "duplex ordo" was created which can be considered both as an advantage and as a drawback. In this context it

is important to mention the results of this regulation. In the first place it is interesting to know that in 1876 some law makers were inclined to take the utmost consequence of the idea that the study of religion should be impartially scientific. They proposed to change the name of the faculty of theology into that of the faculty of science of religion. Fortunately this step was prevented by a certain connectedness with theology and church which still prevailed among those persons who had to take the decision in this matter. Secondly it is essential to note that instead of dogmatics philosophy of religion and later on history of religions were inserted into the system of academical instruction. In this manner history of religions got its seat in the faculty of theology. Being an independent discipline with a method of its own, history of religions was from the beginning involved in discussions with theologians, especially with those professors who teach dogmatics, about questions of the principles of its study. Some orthodox theologians refused to consider history of religions as a theological discipline. Dr. A. Kuyper, the founder of the Calvinistic "Vrije Universiteit" (Free University) treated history of religions very stepmotherly by relegating it to the appendix of his extensive, threepartite "Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid" (Encyclopaedia of the Holy Theology) (1894). In his opinion history of religions being the history of pseudo-religion, did belong to the non-theological disciplines. Since that time the tide has turned, also at the "Free University". Nevertheless those theologians who are influenced by Karl Barth are still suspicious of history of religions, because they fear that the absolute truth of the Gospel will be endangered by acknowledging the significance and the religious value of the non-Christians religions. Thus an ever recurring discussion between theologians and historians of religions is the result of the fact that they members of the same faculty.

Unfortunately clarification in this respect is hampered by the fact that there is no *communis opinio* about the meaning of the notion: theology. Different denominations cherish diverging opinions. Each theologian may have his pet conception. Nevertheless two interpretations can easily be distinguished: a broader one and a narrower one. In the first place theology can be conceived of as the organic complex of disciplines in which the future minister should be trained so that he can successfully exercise his office. To these disciplines also history of

religions belongs and that for obvious reasons. The theologian should both have knowledge of the "Umwelt" of the Bible so that he better understands the unique significance of the Gospel, and he should be somewhat familiar with the non-Christian worldreligions, because in a world that is rapidly becoming smaller, Christians and non-Christians daily meet and have intercourse with each other. Thus history of religions has its legitimate place in the encyclopaedia of theology. One can take a further step. There is reason to argue that the method of history of religions actually is applied to other theological disciplines. Which is this method? It is the principle of scholarly impartiality, of purely historical research. In the study of the Old Testament, of the New Testament, of church history, of the history of dogma—merely to mention these historical disciplines—the students apply the same critical unbiased method as the historians of religions. It is exactly this scholarly procedure which guarantees the standard of theology as an academical discipline and marks its difference from theology, taught at ecclesiastical seminaries.

There is a second more strict conception of theology. This discipline can be understood in the original meaning of the word as the doctrine on God and on the salvation which He offers, as the scholarly exposition of the Gospel. The Gospel must be deduced from the Bible and is formulated by dogmatics. This last discipline cannot be studied in a disengaged way. It forces the student to take a decision in regard to the Christian truth. Thus it cannot be avoided that the question arises whether the religions, studied by history of religions, are founded on knowledge of God. If the decision might turn out in the negative, the position of history of religions in the faculty of theology is endangered. For, theology conceived in the second sense, feels itself related to the church and takes it as its duty to defend the true Christian doctrine. Actually there is a continuous tension between these two conceptions of theology, i.e. the academical-scholarly and the ecclesiastical-professing. Both have their right to exist. They balance one another. Thus, this is the place where the problem of the relation of the method of history of religions to that of theology is born. Here it is no artificial question, but an issue of current and existential interest.

However, in itself history of religions is a harmless and inoffensive business, as has already been pointed out. It studies religious facts in an empirical way, like all historians do, without bothering itself about

its method. The situation becomes complicated by the fact that phenomenology of religion has a voice in the matter. In order to clarify this point it should be realized that the notion: phenomenology of religion can be used in an double sense. It means both a scholarly method and an independent science, creating monographs and more or less extensive handbooks. It is this very method which gives rise to interesting discussions. This can only be fully understood when one is familiar with the origin and the principles of the science. In sketching this state of affairs I permit myself to make partly use of ideas about the issue which I have formerly formulated.²⁾

The Dutch historian of religions P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye was the first who published a treatise on the phenomenology of religion. It is to be found in his "Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte" (Handbook of the History of Religions) of 1887. The term: phenomenology is older than this handbook. It is used by Kant, Fries and Hegel in the sense of a philosophical theory about the process of knowledge. Though it is not certain whether Chantepie de la Saussaye borrowed the term from these philosophers it is quite clear what he meant by creating the new science. He must have felt that the study of religions with logical necessity leads to phenomenological investigations. The historian of religions not only studies separate facts, but he also compares elements of different religions and thereby detects parallels and analogies. This is the field of study on which the "Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte" (General History of Religions) and comparative religion focussed their attention. They have become popular, especially among the scholars who adhered the "religionsgeschichtliche Schule" (religio-historical School). Phenomenology of religion took a further step. It started from the conviction that it is more important to try to understand the unique quality of religious phenomena than giving too much attention to outward traits of resemblance. It was struck by the fact that e.g. magic, sacrifice, and prayer occur in a number of religions, yea all over the world. Therefore the question arose which the religious significance of such constitutive elements of religion could be. In this process of research the facts are severed from their historical context and combined in an ideological connection. The result is that one gets a deeper insight into the meaning and the structure of the religious phenomena.

2) "The Phenomenological Method" (C. J. Bleeker, *The Sacred Bridge*, 1963).

Since 1887 phenomenology of religion has rapidly developed. Gradually it evolved into an independent branch of the science of religion. This latter term requires further explanation. For, the issue at stake in this article is so complicated, because history of religion can not be treated as an isolated entity. It forms part of a system of disciplines all of which are in their own way occupied with the study of religion. They are the following disciplines: history of religions, sociology of religion, psychology of religion, phenomenology of religion and in a wider sense also philosophy of religion. There is a constant interaction between these sciences. They borrow facts and viewpoints from one another. They influence each others methods.³⁾ Nobody can study history of religions successfully without securing the help of sociology of religion and of psychology of religion. Particularly phenomenology of religion possesses paramount importance, on account of the fact that this discipline not only offers the heuristic principles and the scientific perspective by which the specialist suddenly gets insight into the sense of the meticulous work with which he is occupied, but it also provides the method, indispensable for the fruitful study of the history of religions. It is this method about which the controversy with the theologians is apt to arise.

In order to understand this working principle one should keep in mind that several students of phenomenology of religion have been influenced by the philosophical phenomenology of which E. Husserl is the chief exponent, or that they at least have borrowed their ideological apparatus from that branch of philosophy. The Husserlian phenomenology is a theory of knowledge, i.e. an investigation, intending to search for pure consciousness. We can skip any further exposition of the contents of this type of philosophy as being unessential for the course of our argument. I should only like to stress that in my opinion it is important to avoid the philosophical implications of the specific Husserlian method. My famous compatriot Dr G. van der Leeuw obviously has gone too far in this respect, as appears from the "Epilegomena" of his wellknown "Phenomenology of Religion". In this chapter he exposes a conception of the meaning of the notion: phenomenology, which may be philosophically right, but which in the

3) C. J. Bleeker, "The Relation of the History of Religions to kindred religious Sciences" (*Numen*, Vol. I Fasc. 2).

eyes of many historians of religions has no direct bearing on their study, yea even might create confusion. Moreover there are scholars, surely not the least able ones, who never theorize about their method, though they actually adopt a scholarly attitude which can be called phenomenological. This means that the reflection on this attitude will lead to the conclusion that it involves certain principles. These principles are generally denoted by two terms of the Husserlian philosophy. They are the epochè and the eidetic vision. The first principle means suspension of judgment. In using the epochè one puts oneself into the position of the listener who does not judge according to preconceived notions. Applied to phenomenology of religion this means that the discipline does not concern itself with the question of the truth of religion. Phenomenology of religion must begin by accepting as proper objects of study all phenomena that are professed to be religious. Subsequently the attempt may come to distinguish between genuine religion and false religion. The second principle, that of eidetic vision, can easily be understood. It has as its aim the search for the eidos, i.e. the essence and the structure of the religious phenomena. It is evident that this phenomenological method is the only valid principle for the study of history of religions. On the other hand it is at this point that lively and interesting discussions have their origin.

Phenomenology of religion is a young science. It finds its path fumbling and it stumbles now and then. Nobody can deny that there is an element of truth in the critical remarks which are sometimes leveled at the science. For many years I have acknowledged this by writing: "Actually there is a lack of clarity in the working procedure of phenomenology of religion . . ." In my opinion phenomenology of religion should work out a more precise method and it should sharply delimit the field of its activity. It should keep at a clear distance from the philosophical phenomenology so that its character stands out indisputably".⁴⁾

The attacks which are mentioned, come from the quarters of both philosophers and theologians and are directed against its right to exist, its aim and its method. It is worthwhile to pay attention to this criticism because a review thereof can cast new light on the problem at

4) C. J. Bleeker, *Grondlijnen eener Phaenomenologie van den Godsdienst*, 1943, p. 21.

stake. In the first place the right to exist of phenomenology of religion is questioned. After my "Inleiding tot een phaenomenologie van de godsdienst" (Introduction to a phenomenology of religion) had appeared in 1934 a Dutch reviewer, Dr G. H. van Senden, wrote: "Finally we feel forced to pronounce as our opinion that also this book did not manage to convince us that phenomenology of religion bears the character of a separate part of the science of religion, having its own nature, and to be distinguished from history of religions, psychology of religion and philosophy of religion. It is possible to collect all kinds of most interesting facts under the heading: phenomenology of religion, as this book shows, but thereby its character as an indispensable and essential part of the science of religion is not sufficiently proved". He adds: "A in my opinion hybridic science as the phenomenology of religion brings about more evil than good by continuously pronouncing judgments, not justified as to their philosophical meaning and causing anything but clarification by their edifying nature and their emotional association".⁵⁾ As a consequence of his opinion the reviewer proposed that this science be divided in such a way that one part of its pretended task be allotted to history of religion and the other part to philosophy of religion. The reviewer obviously is the victim of a misconception. The origin of phenomenology of religion clearly proves that it logically developed from the history of religions and that it therefore is an autonomous discipline having its solid right to exist.

Furthermore attention should be paid to the critical remarks which Dr van Senden makes on the phenomenological method. He accuses the science for pronouncing judgments which are not philosophically justified and which by their edifying and emotional quality hamper the clarification of religion. He thereby testifies to his lack of insight into the nature of phenomenology of religion. It never pretended to pronounce any judgment. It even strictly refrains from this act. Neither does it intend to edify people.

In this connection the judgment of Dr Th. L. Haitjema, now emeritus professor of dogmatics in the University of Groningen, on the work of his colleague Dr G. van der Leeuw merits the attention. It runs like this: "The phenomenology of religion shows on three points a lack of clarity: namely 1) lack of clarity in regard to the notion

5) *Barchembladen* 1943, p. 20/1.

"reality", 2) lack of clarity as to the concept of truth, 3) lack of clarity in its relation to theology".⁶⁾ This is the typical judgement of a theologian who makes demands on phenomenology of religion with which it by its very nature cannot comply. We refrain at the moment from a detailed refutation of the points of criticism. So much can be said that phenomenology of religion on principle abstains from a judgement on the reality and the truth of the religious phenomena and that an alleged lack of clarity in its relation to theology is not only its fault but equally of theology.

We are brief on the remarks of Dr Haitjema, because they recur in the pointed objections which Dr J. A. Oosterbaan, professor of philosophy and ethics in the university of Amsterdam, has raised, mainly in regard to the phenomenological method.⁷⁾ It can be summed up like this: 1) phenomenology of religion uses the principle of the epochè and of the eidetic vision in an illicit and unjust way, 2) it takes a certain position in regard to the question of the truth of religion, 3) it wrongly pretends to be a science of the essence of religion. This means that Dr Oosterbaan accuses phenomenology of religion of having transgressed the borders of its domain and of having infringed on the field of philosophy of religion. He should like to push back phenomenology of religion into what he considers to be its proper and original sphere of action i.e. the systematic description of the religious phenomena as part of historical studies without claiming to make statements about the essence of religion.

The critical remarks of Dr van Senden, Dr Haitjema and Dr Oosterbaan are exemplary and even up to date, because they embody the misunderstandings which are still prevailing about the relation between the method of phenomenology or history of religions and that of theology c.q. of philosophy of religion. Answering these objections I should like to emphasize the following points:

1) since 1897, when Chantepie de la Saussaye published his first treatise on the matter, the development of both history of religions and phenomenology of religions has been such that nowadays nobody can nor will confine himself to a mere description of religious facts, like the stock-taking in an antiquated museum. The general trend is for an

6) *Vox Theologica*, Dec. 1941.

7) *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Dec. 1958.

inquiry into the meaning and the structure of the religious phenomena. Nobody can put the clock of the historical development of a science back.

2) when phenomenology of religion makes use of the principles of the epochè and the eidetic vision it should clearly be understood that they are handled in a figurative sense. They are void of philosophical or theological implications. They simply express the attitude of impartiality, of attentive listening which is the absolute condition for a right understanding of the import of the religious phenomena. There can be no objection against this procedure, provided that it is clearly stated in which manner this scientific technique is made use of.

3) phenomenology of religion never pretended to be a science of religion. Its only pretension is that it may manage to detect the structure of a greater or smaller complex of religious phenomena. This is quite another business. To put it into other words: there is a striking difference between the way in which philosophy of religion and phenomenology of religion deal with this issue. The first science tries to formulate the essence of religion in a succinct definition. The second discipline aims at understanding the structure and the sense of constitutive factors of religion.

Nevertheless the question of the essence of religion plays a certain part in history of religions and phenomenology of religion. The student of both disciplines start their investigations, aided by a mostly subconscious notion of what religion is. Otherwise they would be unable to sift the chaff from the grain, i.e. the religious from the non-religious facts. Under their researches they may become conscious of this circumstance. This discovery can be a stimulus to articulate the implicate notion. At any rate the formula, born in this way, differs from the mostly lapidary definitions of the essence of religion which philosophy of religion produces. For, it either is a key word, indicating the very heart of religion, ⁸⁾ or it is a description of the structure of religion, according to its elements and its composition, ⁹⁾

4) it is a misunderstanding to assert that phenomenology of religion passes in any sense a judgment on the question of the truth of religion. For, it maintains the attitude of the epochè. It is equally wrong to

8) C. J. Bleeker, "The Key Word of Religion" (*The Sacred Bridge*).

9) C. J. Bleeker, "La structure de la religion" (*The Sacred Bridge*).

blame this science for not pronouncing a sentence on the reality and the truth of the religious phenomena. It balances so to say on the edge of a knife. On the one hand it is loyal to the principle of *epochè*. On the other side it must by force of its impartiality demand that religion should be understood as what it stands for, namely as a serious testimony of religious people that they possess knowledge of God. Even an atheistic student of history of religions must accept this view-point. Otherwise he will do violence to the facts.

5) in regard to the present argument it should above all be realized that the phenomenological principle is a method which can be and actually is applied to different branches of science. It would be easy to quote instances which show that in Holland—as surely elsewhere—this method has found application both in f.i. psychiatry and in natural science. The method possesses an universally scientific significance.

The Netherlands are one of the first countries where history of religions was studied and taught at the university. The development of the Dutch type of the discipline and its problematics may be said to possess an archetypical value. It shows that there has always been a tension between the religio-historical method and the theological method which brought about many profound discussions.

This tension is increased and at the same time put on an international level by the considerations which Dr H. Kraemer at several occasions dedicated to the study of history of religions in its relation to theology. Dr Kraemer who became famous as missionary and as advocate of the oecumenical movement, occupied during a series of years the chair of history of religions in Leiden. In this capacity he received sufficient incitement to reflect on the matter. Kraemer keeps history of religions on high esteem. He does not hesitate to allot to this science its legitimate place in the faculty of theology. Nevertheless he harbours one grievance against its students, i.e. that they pretend to study the religious phenomena fully unbiased and that they deem themselves exclusively able to offer scholarly reliable knowledge of religion, whereas the theologians are suspected of giving a subjective judgment, because they take a certain belief as starting-point of their studies. Kraemer rightly argues that to “understand” or to “comprehend” religion or a religion means to interpret it. Interpretation is not solely or even mainly, an intellectual but an existential activity. In regard to art this is readily acknowledged. In regard to religion this

is easily forgotten, but nevertheless religion is rather the field in which man in all his activities, including his supposedly "purely" intellectual activity, can not escape his existential situation. This idea of "purely" intellectual is one of the fictions of our time.¹⁰⁾ In the opinion of Kraemer those historians of religion who fancy that they work purely intellectual and without any bias, do not realize that they actually build on neo-positivistic presuppositions. This attitude only gives entrance to unengaging knowledge and does not lead to a decision as, according to Kraemer, might be expected from a historian of religions, who is a member of the faculty of theology or who is in touch with theology. He concludes that "the theologian who occupies himself with the study and interpretation of Religion and Religions can and should do so with a good *philosophical* conscience, provided he is ready to follow the well-founded rules of the game." The theologian who studies history of religions in his own manner does, according to Kraemer, not lag behind the official student of the discipline. Yea, he takes a further step. He thinks that "the rightly required impartial love of truth gets the best chance when one tries to look at the phenomena in the light of Christ, the most profound "kritikos" of all things".¹¹⁾ He therefore makes a plea for the creation of a "theologia religionis". This discipline could have different starting-points.

No wonder that also other scholars have proved to be supporters of this new science. Dr Oosterbaan who has already been quoted, is in favour of a theological phenomenology which he considers to be an outcome of a pneumatic theology, of a theology of the Holy Ghost. The latter discipline is explained like this: "one of its elements would be a theological phenomenology of the religious phenomena and of religion, whilst another factor would be a phenomenology of the sciences and of the philosophy in their different modes of appearance. Finally it must describe the transition of religion and philosophy in their culmination-point, where they come together (i.e. in the religious-ontological mysticism) in so far as this can be described as an immanent event."¹²⁾ The programme of the new science sounds somewhat vague and gives no clear idea of the nature of the projected theological

10) H. Kraemer, *Religion and Christian Faith*, 1956, p. 51.

11) H. Kraemer, *De plaats van godsdienstwetenschap en godsdienstfenomenologie in de Theologische faculteit*.

12) J. A. Oosterbaan, „De fenomenologie der godsdienstfenomenologie" (*Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 1958/9, p. 97 sq.

phenomenology. One gets the impression that it will stop at *pia vota*. At any rate the programme which Dr Oosterbaan has drawn up by far exceeds the domain of history of religions and of phenomenology of religion in their traditional forms. It is dubious whether there would be many points of contact between the new science and the older ones. In the opinion of the present author this contact is a *conditio sine qua non* of the significance and of the right to exist of the new science. Without the possibility of a close cooperation a "theologia religionis" or a theological phenomenology is a still-born child.

In this connection it is interesting to know that Dr P. Tillich has devoted some words to what he calls a "theological history of religion".¹³⁾ He remarks that "the material presented by the history of religion and culture" is an important source of systematic theology. He formulates this idea as follows: "This continuous and never ending use of culture and religious contents as a source of systematic theology raises the question: How are these contents made available for us in a way parallel to the method by which the biblical theology makes biblical material available?... There is no established answer to this question, since neither a theological history of religion nor a theological history of culture has been theoretically conceived and practically established. A theological history of religion should interpret theologically the material produced by the investigation and analysis of the prereligious and religious life of mankind. It should elaborate the motives and types of religious expression, showing how they follow from the nature of the religious concern and therefore necessarily appear in all religions, including Christianity in so far as it is a religion. A theological history of religion also should point out demonic distortions and new tendencies in the religions of the world, pointing to the Christian solution and preparing the way for the acceptance of the Christian message to the adherents of non-Christian religions. One could say that a theological history of religion should be carried through in the light of the missionary principle that the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is the answer to the question asked implicitly and explicitly by the religions of mankind." It was necessary to make this lengthy quotation in order to do justice to Tillich's intention. The reaction of the present author is that Tillich failed to prove that the

13) P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 44.

theological history of religion can be an independent discipline. Part of its task, i.e. in so far as the inquiry into types and motives of religious beliefs is concerned, can be accomplished by phenomenology of religion, whereas the evaluation of non-Christian religions is the concern of theology, c.q. dogmatics. This item should be treated either in the prolegomena, or in the chapter on general revelation, or in the paragraph on mission of the theological or dogmatic handbook in question. Moreover a theological history of religion is strictly taken a contradiction in terminis. History of religions is a historical study. Any attempt to give a theological appraisal of historic facts means a transgression from historic study to theology. Naturally theologians have the liberty to evaluate the historic course of events. However, this is a matter of their own concern and responsibility and is not any longer the business of historians or historians of religions.

Obviously Kraemer has a discipline in mind which works side by side with the traditional phenomenology of religion. He formulates its nature and task like this: "My own line is that "theologia religionis" is an attempt to clarify religion as a human phenomenon, in the light of Jesus Christ, the true man, the normal man, the *only* normal man in his relation to God, man and world." This means that theology and also the faculty of theology must have the courage "to clarify the religion on the basis of solid knowledge in the light of its own standard and to make in this way *its specific contribution to the science of religion*." He adds: "It is utterly astonishing that one has still to fight with the representatives of the science of religion *in* the faculty of theology about this right and this duty as if it was evident and solely scientific to acknowledge without discussion the competence of philosophy of religion to behave as the authority which has the right and is able to produce a normative and regulative idea of religion." What Kraemer says here about philosophy of religion applies in a sense also to history of religions and phenomenology of religion.

The last quotation raises the presumption that Kraemer's proposal encountered resistance. So is actually the case. This goes forth from a discussion between Dr Th. P. van Baaren, professor of the history of religions in Groningen en Dr Kraemer in the "Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift" (Dutch Theological Journal) ¹⁴⁾ Van Baaren first of all

14) June and October 1960.

defends the so called "duplex ordo" which in the opinion of Kraemer, apart from its historical value, essentially is an unsound construction. Thereafter he states: "Naturally dogmatic theology has the full right to judge the other religions from its standpoint." *Theologia religionis*" in the sense of Professor Kraemer is a beautiful and valuable discipline, but it is totally different from the science of religion in the accepted sense of the word and one should not blame the students of the latter science for not practising it, for, it simply is not their concern. However, I acclaim the existence of such a discipline without any reservation provided that it is build on solid knowledge of science of religion in the traditional sense. My only objection is that the results of this discipline should be in any sense normative for the science of the "ordinary" science of religion. The opposite naturally also holds true." The present author wholeheartedly subscribes this statement. Nobody can object to the creation of a "*theologia religionis*", provided that it does not claim authority over the ordinary history of religions and provided that it does not pretend to be the true history of religions which offers the deeper insight into the religious phenomena. It is quite conceivable that the new science would supplement and enrich the present religio-historical knowledge and insight. Provisionally the "*theologia religionis*" is a hypothetical entity. So long there is no book of some extent available, proving its right to exist, this new science is no serious partner in the discussion. Moreover it is dubious whether the principal part of its task could not be performed by dogmatics.

In another sense the question of the religio-historical method appears in one of the writings of W. Cantwell Smith,¹⁵⁾ This scholar critically discusses the concept of "religio" and the terms which are used for the worldreligions. The scrutiny leads to the conclusion that both the notion: religion and words as Christianity, Buddhism, Islam should be dropped, because they thwart the real religio-historical insight. Instead thereof two notions should be introduced, i.e. "an historical-cumulative tradition" and "the personal faith of men and women". Elsewhere it becomes clear what has moved Smith to make this statement.¹⁶⁾ He opposes to the impersonal character of a great deal on the religio-historical studies. He puts forward the thesis: "The study of a religion

15) W. Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*.

16) W. Cantwell Smith, "Comparative Religion: Whither-Why?" (*The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology*, 1959).

is the study of persons." This means that his concern is the living faith of men. In his opinion one can only get to know this by conversations with the adherents of the religion in question. This is at the same time the only manner to find a definition of religion which is really valuable. Therefore his conclusion runs: "No statement about religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers . . . It is the business of comparative religion to construct statements about religion that are intelligible within at least two traditions simultaneously". This approach is by no means ineligible. But it is not always appropriate. It can not be applied to the study of the religions of antiquity, for the simple reason that the adherents thereof can no longer be interviewed. These religions form an important segment of the field of study of history of religions. In regard to the religions of the present it is dubious whether even intelligent professors thereof have a thorough knowledge of their own religion. The expert often knows essential peculiarities which escape the attention of the believers. The conception of the believers must be supplemented and verified by the expert insight of the historian of religions. Therefore the method, advocated by Smith, has only a limited validity. His proposal to eliminate the notion: religion and the terms generally used for the worldreligions can not be accepted. Nobody is blind to the problematics, involved for instance in the term: Islam. But history of religions would be doomed to inactivity, if it were bereft of its present apparatus of notions, how imperfect these terms may be.

Still a third attack is made on the phenomenological method. It is undertaken by people who believe that this discipline should serve social, ethical or religious causes, such as the fraternization of the nations, worldpeace or a better understanding between the followers of the religions of the earth. Congresses for the history of religions generally are attended by some persons who cherish these ideals and expectations. Even lecturers may voice the opinion. A noble and learned spokesman of this standpoint was the late Dr Fr. Heiler. Repeatedly he has with great warmth broken a lance for the idea. His conception can best be gathered from an article, bearing the significant title: "History of Religions as a Preparation for the Co-operation of Religions".¹⁷⁾ He argues therein that history of religions leads to the insight that "there

17) *The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology*, 1959, p. 132 sq.

are seven principal areas of unity which the high religions of the earth manifest" (the reality of the transcendent, this transcendent reality immanent in human hearts, this reality the highest good, this reality of the Divine ultimate love, the way of man to God the way of sacrifice, the way to the neighbor, Love the most superior way to God) and that "a new era will dawn upon mankind when the religions will rise to true tolerance and co-operation in behalf of mankind." It is evident that peace among the nations and tolerance between the adherents of the different religions are ideals which deserve the devotion of all right thinking men. Thus organisations as "The World Congress of Faiths" and „The World Council of Churches" which respectively try to mobilize all believers and all Christians in a fight against intolerance and injustice, and insist on mutual understanding and unity, can make an appeal in wide circles. ¹⁸⁾ Whether an historian of religious supports these movements is up to his personal decision. As a scholar he would go too far by contending that this work is part of the task of history of religions. The discipline should keep aloof from such activities. ¹⁹⁾ In conformity with the study of history in general, history of religions is charged with the task and presenting a scholarly reliable picture of the religions of the past and of the present. It appears to me that Heiler is mistaken in double respect. Firstly it is questionable whether critical study of history of religions really can prove that there is unity between the higher religions in the seven areas which he mentions. It is to be feared that this is wishful thinking. Secondly the problem of religious tolerance which Heiler thinks will be brought about by mutual understanding of the followers of the high religions, actually is more complicated than he suggests. This has been pointed out by Dr R. J. Z. Werblowsky in a penetrating and matter of fact argument dealing with "Commitment and Indifference". ²⁰⁾ He rightly states that tolerance is not only a purely religious affair, but also a socio-psychological phenomenon. He further remarks that the idea of tolerance mostly results from a "philosophical mystical religiosity". Adherents of this religiosity often make the demand on certain religions, i.e. the prophetic ones, that they "should abandon

18) See: Moses Jung, Swami Nikhilananda, Herbert W. Schneider, *Relations among Religions, A Handbook of Politics and Principles*, 1963.

19) C. J. Bleeker, „Wat beoogt de studie van de godsdienst?" (*Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift*), Oct. 1961, p. 1 sq.

20) *Robert Waley Cohen Memorial Lecture*, 1967.

some of their basic principles". It is evident that one can hardly expect that this demand is always granted. This means that it is **wrong** to expect that all religions are able and even are willing to further tolerance unconditionally. Nevertheless there is, as Werblowsky says, "a "holy indifference" that stems from "an ultimate commitment". The future task must be "to break through, beyond tolerance, exclusiveness and co-existence to the full communion of the pluralist saints".

The preceding argument leads to the following conclusions in regard to the relation of the religio-historical and the theological method:

1) when history of religions and theology claim to be sciences, they are only permitted to use one, common method, i.e. the critical one. This means that they must treat their object according to the criteria of truth and reliability which respective are valid in both disciplines. Unfortunately offences are often committed against this general rule. In both sciences it happens that people work uncritically. They present untenable theses and they manipulate facts of doubtful value, to the detriment of the authority of their science.

2) it has been stated that the specific method of a discipline results from its aim. Therefore a comparison between the religio-historical and the theological method is rather difficult and to a certain extent unprofitable. At any rate in transferring the method of the one science to the other one should act with great caution. However, it has been stated that the religio-historical method, the principle of the science of religion, plays a great part in some fields of the encyclopaedia of theology. This may conversely be the case with the theological method as will presently be shown.

3) the character and also the method of theology in the strict sense of the word are determined by a) its object, i.e. the belief in God and b) its aim, namely the renewal of this belief. On account of its object theology is engaged on divine truth. Being embodied in human pronouncements this truth must be evoked by critical research. In the last resort it can not be treated in an unengaged way. It forces the theologian to assume an attitude, to make a choice, to take a decision. This act includes the task of adapting the divine truth to the present situation and of renewing the Christian faith. When a theologian does not create new theological thoughts, he merely repeats the statements of previous generations and he sticks fast in history of dogmas.

4) history of religions studies cultural phenomena, having a religious

significance, i.e. human actions and words, institutions and products of human activity which testify to the presence of religious faiths. History of religions cannot make pronouncements about God, His existence or His nature. The word: revelation does not fit in with its terminology. At best the historian of religions can make use of the notion: hierophany, following in the steps of M. Eliade,²¹⁾ or say that some phenomena testify to an encounter of man with the Holy. It is not the duty of the historian of religions to create something new. He should respect the facts as they are. He should listen to what religious people tell. He must try to understand the faith of the believers.²²⁾

5) thus there is a marked difference between history of religions and theology in the way in which they deal with religious values. The theologian ultimately assumes a personal attitude towards religious values. The historian of religions acknowledges the existence of religious values and tries to understand their significance. But his method should be completely free from any value judgment.

6) in the context of the argument the general description of the task of history of religions presented in 4) and 5) needs further qualification. The decisive question is in which sense the discipline is taken. Is it an attempt to trace the development of great religious ideas or does it consist in a painstaking research of details, partly of a cultural, social, economic or historic nature, the results of which are published in numerous articles and monographs? In the last case this type of religio-historical work falls outside the scope of the problematics at stake. In the first instance when personal insight and phantasy of the researcher play a part, the comparison of the religio-historical and of the theological method makes good sense and is a burning and highly interesting issue.

7) though history of religions and theology are independent disciplines, they influence one another and they can learn much from each other's method. This interaction could have the following effect: a) history of religions should never forget that religion is always centered round an absolute truth. Moreover it must search for true and pure religion which is mostly hidden among heaps of non-religious or quasi-religious facts. These are two view-points which theology would emphasize. b) theology should realize that in a great deal of its work,

21) M. Eliade, *Traité d'Histoire des Religions*, 1949.

22) W. B. Kristensen, *Inleiding tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis*, 1955, p. 22 sq.

especially in historical studies, the only valid method is that of science of religion. For this method guarantees its scholarly character and its academic standard.

8) more important than the mutual influence is perhaps the fact that the two disciplines charge one another with a certain task and that in the following way: history of religions urges theology to take the problem of the value of the non-Christian religions extremely serious. In an article on "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian".²³⁾ Tillich rightly says that "revelatory experiences are universally human". He enumerates five points, taken from the study of history of religions, which are in his opinion systematic presuppositions. These remarks show the way. Theologians who are expected to be forerunners in spiritual matters, should have the courage of definitely solve the age-long problem of the relation between Christianity and the non-Christian religions, and that by inserting in one way or another the knowledge of God, present in these religions, into its doctrine on revelation. This is what the modern world expects and hopes for.²⁴⁾ On the other hand the historian of religions can not fully keep aloof from the religious crisis of our age. Many people are spiritually uprooted. The relationship between the followers of different religions is often poisoned by hate, distrust and misunderstanding. Dr Werblowsky rightly remarks: "The students of religion cannot preach mutual understanding, but they are expected to foster strictly by their work a spirit of sympathy and tolerant understanding".²⁵⁾ I myself have once written on this issue: "It is our duty to spread our light to people who do not know properly what religion is. But our task is not conversion to faith whatsoever, but simply enlightening".²⁶⁾

23) *The History of Religions, Essays on the Problem of Understanding*, 1967, p. 242 sq.

24) C. J. Bleeker, *Christ in Modern Athens, the Confrontation of Christianity with Modern Culture and the non-Christian Religions*, 1965.

25) *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 58, 1959.

26) *Numen*, Vol. VIII, Fasc. 2-3, p. 239.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE JATAKAS

BY

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Distinguished as realised — finality as it is realised in the present — and real or ultimate — finality under its essential aspect of absolute goal — eschatology has arisen, in Christian theology, as a framework whereby the relation of the present to the future, temporal existence to eternal existence, present action to future reward and punishment, and the redeemed to the redeemer is clarified and justified. The application of such a framework to the Buddhist problem of finality can elucidate the problems and their solutions. Yet such a comparative study demands caution, since the structure is generally related to the structured in such a way that it must be modified if it is to be applied to a different set of problems. Such a modification suggests that a different result and different emphases will occur.

The Jātakas, forming part of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, the last section of the *Sutta Piṭaka*, are a collection of 547 poems and stories purporting to the Buddha's recollections of his previous existences as a *bodhisattva*. As the tradition has it the *Sutta Piṭaka* was recited at the Council of Rājagṛha in 477, and there is no real reason to deny this, or to exclude *The Jātakas* as part of the Rājagṛha canon. It is clear, however, that they were originally included in a form different from that of the Pāli Canon as it now is, and it is hardly likely that there were 547 Jātakas at the time of Rājagṛha. The *gāthās* are clearly survivors of an oral tradition, and one supposes that the Buddhist preachers were left to narrate the context and provide the ethical or religious dimension.

The language of the *gāthās* is much more archaic than that of the stories; and it certainly seems more probable to suppose that they are the older kernel of the work, and that thus in its original form the Jātaka... consisted only of these verses. It is quite true that they are unintelligible without the story.¹⁾

1) E. B. Cowell (ed.), in *The Jātaka* (reprint London: Luzac and Co., 1957), preface, p. x.

Originally a collection of folk-tales, quite probably pre-Buddhist, some of the *gāthās* are found in other Buddhist writings, the *Dhammapada* for example, and the tales are portrayed in sculptures as early as the first century B.C. They do not appear in their present canonical form until Buddhaghosa allegedly collected, expanded and commented on them in Ceylon around 400 A.D.

The aim of these tales of the Buddha's previous existence is to provide a theology for the Buddhist layman. Particularly concerned with the Doctrine of Transmigration, the Ten Perfections, the greatness, power and authority of the Buddha, *The Jātakas* provide the faithful with a practical guide to successful Buddhist living and a satisfactory solution to the problem of destiny. A. Foucher puts the catechetical implications of *The Jātakas* well:

In view of the proliferation and long success of the Jātakas we must admit that the religious and the zealous layman equally benefit from them. Through them, they more or less satisfy the curiosity which was, for them as for us, the great Unknown — the secret of our destiny.²⁾

To implement their aim and guarantee moral authority *The Jātakas* are presented as the *dicta* of the Buddha himself. In the introductory *baccuppannavatthu*, or 'story of the present' the various circumstances in the Buddha's life which prompted the birth-stories are related. At the end of each story is given a short summary where the Buddha identifies in the present each of the *dramatis personae*, demonstrating his extensive power of recollection of the past — a necessary verification of the Doctrine of Transmigration. The point or moral of each story is presented in one or more *gāthās*, uttered by the Buddha either as the *bodhisattva* or *in persona propria*. The first-person utterances of the Buddha afford the stories an aura of authenticity which invests the didactic method with a hagiographical quality.³⁾

Both the internal and external evidence⁴⁾ indicate that the use of the first person is a literary artifice, a fact further emphasized by the inconsistencies in doctrine which occur. This is noticed particularly in the attitude taken to women. Distinctly antifeminist in both moral and implication, many of the stories take a quite derogatory stance,

2) A. Foucher, *Les Vies Antérieures du Bouddha* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), pp. 71-2.

3) *loc. cit.*

4) Cf. previous remarks on the canonicity of *The Jātakas*;

describing women as “lustful, profligate, vile and degraded”⁵⁾ — “no limits check their sin”.⁶⁾ On the other hand, women like Sujātā are “faithful, virtuous and dutiful”,⁷⁾ and another the Bodhisattva extols thus:

Known to fame as peerless wife,
Sharing weal and woe of life
Equal she to either fate,
Fit with even kings to mate.⁸⁾

Some stories admit a qualified goodness to women: “Save the Realm of Brahma, there is no place from which women are excluded”⁹⁾, whilst others imply male-female equality, as when Sīvalī adopted the ascetic mode of life, and “attained absorption and became destined to birth in the Brahma world”.¹⁰⁾ Again, several of the stories encourage men to leave their wives and families, in what seems to be an extraordinary lapse of justice, and embrace the monastic life,¹¹⁾ whilst others encourage marriage and mutual love, fidelity and harmony.¹²⁾ Kingship is another area in which *The Jātakas* evidence conflicting theories; some imply a Divine Right of Kings doctrine¹³⁾ whilst others seem to involve something like a Social Contract theory.¹⁴⁾ These inconsistencies, due partly to the popular and non-theoretical orientation of the stories and partly to the timelag between the *Gāthās* and the commentary narratives, indicate that any findings on a Buddhist eschatology must be approached cautiously. Though there is a little cross-reference in this article, no claim is made concerning the orthodoxy of the eschatology deduced.

THE REALIZED ESCHATOLOGY

The eschatological leit-motif of *The Jātakas* is found aphoristically expressed:

Each one shall fare according to his deed,
And reap the harvest as he sows the seed,
Whether of goodly herb, or maybe noxious weed.¹⁵⁾

5) *Asātamanta Jātaka*, no. 61.

6) *Kuṇḍala Jātaka*, no. 536.

7) *Manicora Jātaka*, no. 194.

8) *Succaja Jātaka*, no. 320.

9) *Kulāvaka Jātaka*, no. 31.

10) *Mahājanaka Jātaka*, no. 539.

11) *Kalyāṇadhamma* sp *Jātaka*, no. 171.

12) Cf. *Godha Jātaka*, no. 333.

13) Cf. *Nigrodha Jātaka* no. 445, and *Abbhantara Jātaka*, no. 281 (?).

14) Cf. *Gaṇḍatindu Jātaka*, no. 520.

15) *Dhonasākhā Jātaka*, no. 353. Also cf. Gal. 6 : 8.

Such a doctrine of merit provides an ethical as well as a doctrinal basis for the key doctrine of Transmigration. One's life of virtue may lead to rebirth in heaven; one's life of vice may lead to rebirth in hell; ¹⁶⁾ one may return to the terrestrial order in a higher or lower state. Used respectively as an encouragement or a threat, heaven and hell figure in numerous tales. On one occasion, for example, Sakka used hell as the threatened consequence of a merchant's misdeeds, and the repentant merchant *Bilārikosiya*, after a life of almsgiving, ¹⁷⁾ was reborn in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three.

"You have heard tell of a great merchant of Benares, who lived in this city once upon a time, and built halls of almonry, and in charity gave much?" "Yes", said they, "we have heard of him". "I am that merchant", he said, "and by those gifts I am now become Sakka, king of the gods; and my son, who did not break my tradition, has become a God, Canda; and his son is Suriya, and his son is Mātali, and his son is Pañcasikha; of these, yonder is Canda, and that is Suriya, and this is Mātali the charioteer, and this again is Pañcasikha, now a heavenly musician, once father of yonder lewd fellow! Thus potent is giving of gifts; therefore wise men ought to do virtuously". Thus speaking, with a view to dispelling the doubts of the people there assembled, they rose up in the air, and remained poised, by their mighty power surrounding themselves with a great host, their bodies all ablaze, so that the whole city seemed to be on fire. Then Sakka addressed the crowd: "We left our heavenly glory in coming hither, and we came on account of this sinner *Bilārikosiya*, this last of his race, the devourer of all his race. In pity for him are we come, because we knew that this sinner had broken the tradition of his family, and burnt the almonry, and haled forth the beggars by the throat, and had violated our custom, and that by ceasing to give alms he would be born again in hell." Thus did he discourse to the crowd, telling the potency of alms-giving. *Bilārikosiya* puts his hands together in supplication, and made a vow; "My lord, from this time forth I will no more break the family custom, but I will never eat, without sharing with another my own supplies, even the water I drink and the tooth-cleaner which I use."

Sakka having thus humbled him, and made him self-denying, and established him in the Five Virtues, went away to his own place, taking the four gods with him. And the merchant gave alms as long as he lived, and was born in the heaven of the Thirty-Three. ¹⁸⁾

16) 'Heaven' and 'hell' are here used generically.

17) Almsgiving, one of the Ten Perfections, is often the moral stressed in a heaven-hell context. Cf. for example the *Duddada Jātaka*, no. 180:

"'Tis hard to do as good men do, to give as they can give, Bad men can hardly imitate the life which good men live. And so, when good and evil go to pass away from earth, The bad are born in hell below, in heaven the good have birth."

18) *Bilārikosiya Jātaka*, no. 450. It is to be remarked here that Sakka and the other gods help men along the path of virtue.

The implications here are unambiguous — the quality of the afterlife is dependent on the quality of action in the earthly existence.

1. *Heaven*

'Heaven' is commonly distinguished in Buddhist teaching into various heavens. Very many of the tales end with the hero being "reborn in the realm of Brahma". This *Brahmaloka* is nowhere described in any detail, nor are any of its twenty heavens mentioned. It appears as an indefinite but important heaven, a reward for virtue. There are, however, other heavens mentioned: the heaven of the Four Great Kings; ¹⁹⁾ the first of the six Kāma-heavens, or Devalokā; the heaven of the Thirty-Three; and the heaven of the Thirty-Six Sakkas. These appear to be arranged hierarchically in the *Mandhātu Jātaka*, no. 258. Two other ill-defined spirit-worlds are mentioned favourably; the *Yama-world*, the third world of sense, ²⁰⁾ and the *Peta-world*, or world of the spirits, ²¹⁾ which appears as a kind of purgatory. ²²⁾ In addition, the six celestial worlds are mentioned, but without any explicitation. ²³⁾

Heaven is visualized in spatial terms, and the heavens of *The Jātakas* imply corporeal existence. The *Nimi Jātaka*, no. 541, devotes many *gāthās* to a fabulous description of heaven:

Behold you mansion with five pinnacles :
There, deckt with garlands, lies upon a couch
A most puissant woman, who assumes
All kinds of majesty and wondrous power . . .
There are seven mansions, shining clear and bright,
Where dwells a mighty being, richly dight,
Who with his wives inhabits them . . .
Yon mansion built of jewels, shining bright,
Symmetrical, proportioned, a fair sight,
Where in divinest melody around,
Songs, dances, drums and tabours do resound . . .

19) *Sirikālakāṇṇi Jātaka*, no. 382; *Campeyya Jātaka*, no. 506.

20) *Haṭṭhipāla Jātaka*, no. 509.

21) *Nimi Jātaka*, no. 541.

22) On this point, cf. B. C. Law, *The Buddhist Conception of Spirits* (London: Luzac and Co., 1936) who says: "In many cases... when the offence was very serious, the sinner suffered for thousands of years in hells and then they came up to wear out the remnants of their sin as *petas* . . .

From the hells they come up to the upper regions and go through a purgatory, as it were, in their *peta-life* . . . Many of the *petas* are described as having been transformed into the *peta* beings directly they died, without going into hell. (pp. 108-9).

23) *Haṭṭhipāla Jātaka*, no. 509.

and indicates mansions “with many a pinnacle, all manner of flowers about, and fine trees, echoing with songs of birds of all kinds”, with luxurious provisions, dancing girls and nymphs, and so on. The heaven of the Thirty-Three, which this vision described, is mentioned in twenty five of *The Jātakas*.²⁴⁾ From the various contexts in which it is cited the heaven of the Thirty-Three is open to both men and women;²⁵⁾ Buddhas go there after working a miracle;²⁶⁾ when one’s merit is exhausted, one must descend to the terrestrial order.²⁷⁾ Four of the tales narrate the rebirth of the *bodhisattva* from the heaven of the Thirty-Three,²⁸⁾ and in several of the stories the bodhisattva leaves the world to be reborn as Sakka.²⁹⁾ It is clear, too, that rebirth is possible not only from the various heavens to earth, but from one heaven to another. Upon his death Naḷakāra and his father “were born in the heaven of the Thirty-Three, and dwelt in the six heavens of sense one after the other in direct and in reverse succession”.³⁰⁾

2. Hell

Perhaps significantly in a lay-oriented catechesis, hell is treated in *The Jātakas* at greater length than is heaven. As was earlier pointed out, hell is the punishment due for misdeeds: “Wrong to hell leads men astray”.³¹⁾ The *bodhisattva* exclaims to the hunter who hurled his javelin, “You may have missed *me*, my good man; but depend upon it, you have not missed the reward of your conduct, namely, the eight large

24) *Kulāvaka Jātaka*, no. 31; *Mora Jātaka*, no. 159; *Asadisa Jātaka*, no. 181; *Samgāmāvacara Jātaka*, no. 182; *Mandhātu Jātaka*, no. 258; *Kakkāru Jātaka*, no. 326; *Asaṅka Jātaka*, no. 380; *Bilārikosiya Jātaka*, no. 450; *Udaya Jātaka*, no. 458; *Kāma Jātaka*, no. 467; *Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka*, no. 479; *Sādhina Jātaka*, no. 494; *Somanassa Jātaka*, no. 505; *Hatthipāla Jātaka*, no. 509; *Kumbha Jātaka*, no. 512; *Alambusa Jātaka*, no. 523; *Kusa Jātaka*, no. 531; *Sudhābhajana Jātaka*, no. 535; *Nimi Jātaka*, no. 541; *Khaṇḍakala Jātaka*, no. 542; *Mahānārada-kassapa Jātaka*, no. 544; *Vidhura-paṇḍita Jātaka*, no. 545; *Mahāummaga Jātaka*, no. 546; *Vessantara Jātaka*, no. 547.

25) *Udaya Jātaka*, no. 458.

26) *Sarabhamiga Jātaka*, no. 483.

27) *Sādhina Jātaka*, no. 494.

28) *Kakkāru Jātaka*, no. 326; *Somanassa Jātaka*, no. 505; *Mahāummaga Jātaka*, no. 546; *Vessantara Jātaka*, no. 547.

29) e.g. *Keḷisīla Jātaka*, no. 202; *Bilārikosiya Jātaka*, no. 450.

30) *Surici Jātaka*, no. 489; repeated in *Hatthipāla Jātaka*, no. 509.

31) *Samkicca Jātaka*, no. 530.

and the sixteen lesser hells and all the five forms of bonds and torture".³²⁾

Sañjiva, Kālasutta and Roruva, great and small,
Saṅghāta, Great Avīci, are names that may well appal,
With Tapana and Patāpana, eight major hells in all.³³⁾

The greatest of the eight hells, Avīci, is vigorously depicted: "A pit of red-hot embers, eighty cubits deep, filled with Acacia-charcoal, all ablaze and aflame".³⁴⁾ It is the place of Adhamma,³⁵⁾ of ultimate torment,³⁶⁾ the opposite of Bhavagga — the highest Brahmaloṇa.³⁷⁾ Just as the lying king Apacara was swallowed into Avīci,³⁸⁾ so was the arch-liar and heretic Devadatta *and the five hundred families of his attendants*.³⁹⁾ Various other hells, such as the Ussada and the Khura-dhūra, with Veteraṇī the river of hell,⁴⁰⁾ the hell of the Four Iron Cauldrons,⁴¹⁾ the Raven hell,⁴²⁾ the Lotus hell where Kokālika the heretic burns⁴³⁾ and the hell of Māra⁴⁴⁾ are mentioned, and described collectively as "hot, covered all with burning flames of fire".⁴⁵⁾ "Blind darkness is there, and no moon or sun, a hell ever more tumultuous and dreadful; it is not known as either day or night".⁴⁶⁾

Hell, like heaven is visualized spatially, and like heaven is only temporary. When sin has been purged, re-birth is possible. This is implied in the following story:

Now at that time one of the damned who had put on the circlet and was suffering the tortures of hell, asked the Bodhisatta — "Lord, what sin have I committed?" The Bodhisatta detailed the man's evil deeds to him and uttered this stanza:

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- 32) *Kuruṅga Jātaka*, no. 21.
 33) *Samkicca Jātaka*, no. 530.
 34) *Khadiraṅgāra Jātaka*, no. 40.
 35) *Dhamma Jātaka*, no. 457.
 36) *Mūgaṇḍakka Jātaka*, no. 538.
 37) *Mahāummaga Jātaka*, no. 546.
 38) *Cetiya Jātaka*, no. 422.
 39) *Samuddavāṇija Jātaka*, no. 466.
 40) *Samkicca Jātaka*, no. 530.
 41) *Lohakumbhī Jātaka*, no. 314.
 42) *Mahānāradaḥassapa Jātaka*, no. 544.
 43) *Takkāriya Jātaka*, no. 481.
 44) *Khadiraṅgāra Jātaka*, no. 40.
 45) *Nimi Jātaka*, no. 541.
 46) *Mahānāradaḥassapa Jātaka*, no. 544.

From four to eight, to sixteen thence, and so
To thirty-two insatiate greed doth go,
— Still pressing on till insatiety
Doth win the circlet's grinding misery.

So saying he went back to the realm of the Devas, but the other abode in hell till his sin had been purged from him. Then he passed thence to fare according to his deserts.⁴⁷⁾

Corporeal existence is implied, as when the razor sharp wheel falls on Mittavinda and crushes him.⁴⁸⁾ In fact, the hell of *The Jātakas* bears a close resemblance to the purgatory⁴⁹⁾ of medieval Christian theology, the main characteristics of which were punishment and temporality. This purgatorial aspect of hell is best exemplified in the *Mittavinda Jātaka*, no. 82:

No more to dwell in island palaces
Of crystal, silver, or of sparkling gems, —
With flinty headgear thou'rt invested now;
Nor shall its grinding torture ever cease
Till all thy sin be purged and life shall end.

3. The Present Life

The various accounts of heaven and hell involve a cyclic theory of time consonant with the cyclic theory of personal or psychological time upon which the theory of transmigration is evidently founded. These two places, for such indeed they are, are temporary and perhaps temporal. Unlike the heaven and hell of Christian theology, they are realized eschata, not ultimate, since they involve change — impermanence that does not transcend the material order. This is important, since it effectively means that there is a future realized eschatology for each individual that does not coincide with the real eschatology. It is evident from many of the identificatory passages in *The Jātakas* that the present also is an element of the realized eschatology, at least insofar as it is qualitatively determined by past action. Yet it seems probable that the present shares in the realized eschatology in a more significant way.

Where is kindness, truth, and justice, temperance and self-control,
There no death can find an entrance; thither lies each saintly soul.⁵⁰⁾

47) *Mittavinda Jātaka*, no. 104.

48) *Mittavinda Jātaka*, no. 369.

49) Cf. previous remarks on the *peta*-world, n. 22. Enlightenment on the rôle of spirits may be found in N. Chakravarti's "Spirit Belief in the *Jātaka* Stories", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, n.s. Vol. x (1914), pp. 257-63.

50) *Upasāḥa Jātaka*, no. 166.

Very many of the *Jātaka* tales encourage a virtuous life, and in particular single out the Ten Perfections. ⁵¹⁾ These, in so many *Jātakas*, are encouraged as goals in life. Again and again, especially in the stories where he appears as a *sannyāsin*, *ṛṣi*, preacher, etc., the *bodhi-sattva's* virtues are so marvellous that it is through them that miracles are wrought, instanced by the cure of Dhataratṭa's foot. ⁵²⁾ There is, then, a realized eschatology in the practice of virtue, since through the practice of virtue one approaches the highest state — Arahatsip. As the *Apaṇṇaka Jātaka*, no. 1, stresses, one who has found his refuge in the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order "shall not pass hence to states of suffering".

THE REAL OR ULTIMATE ESCHATOLOGY: NIRVĀṆA

Though many of *The Jātakas* tell of various people who have attained to Arahatsip — Nirvāṇa — there is no extensive treatment of the subject, which remains difficult to the western commentator. ⁵³⁾ As *The Jātakas* have it, Nirvāṇa is attained through the threefold method of contemplation, asceticism and zealous effort.

One thing there is, Brethren, which, if practised and developed, conduces to utter loathing of the world's vanities, to the cessation of passion, to the end of being, to peace, to insight, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa. What is this one thing? — The meditation on the thought of the Buddha. ⁵⁴⁾

The same *Jātaka* equates meditation on the thought of the Buddha to walking by truth: "What is called walking by truth . . . finally is the giver of Arahatsip". Beyond contemplation, one must renounce worldly vanities, ⁵⁵⁾ usually by assuming the hermit's life. Sakka says of Akitti: "He is dissatisfied with all kinds of being, and for Nirvāṇa's sake dwells in the forest. ⁵⁶⁾ Thirdly, a zealous campaign must be waged against concupiscence — only those who makes strenuous effort accomplish sainthood. ⁵⁷⁾ "Zeal is the way to Nirvāṇa". ⁵⁸⁾

⁵¹⁾ On this point cf. A. Foucher's excellent discussion "Le Bodhisattva et les Perfections" in his *Les Vies Antérieures du Bouddha*, pp. 301-34.

⁵²⁾ *Haṃsa Jātaka*, no. 502.

⁵³⁾ Cf. G. R. Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and its Western Interpreters*, (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1968). esp. the Preface.

⁵⁴⁾ *Apaṇṇaka Jātaka*, no. 1.

⁵⁵⁾ *Cullakaseṭṭhi Jātaka*, no. 4.

⁵⁶⁾ *Akitti Jātaka*, no. 480.

⁵⁷⁾ *Samvara Jātaka*, no. 462.

⁵⁸⁾ *Gaṇḍatindu Jātaka*, no. 520.

The bliss that doth all sense of pain transcend,
Unwavering, unconditioned, without end,
Is by pure souls, now in Nirvāṇa, won
Who with concupiscence long since have done.⁵⁹⁾

All of these methods of attaining Nirvāṇa the *Sattubhastā Jātaka*, no. 402, sums up as knowledge: "Knowledge is the best among the qualities that bring the great and endless Nirvāṇa, the rest are the attendants of knowledge".

Nirvāṇa is described as the cessation of suffering. Suppavāsā, daughter of King Koliya, exclaims while in labour: "Blessed is Nirvāṇa wherein such suffering doth cease".⁶⁰⁾ But it is not described as a state of Joy in the Mahāyānist sense. Rather, there is no consciousness of any distinction between joy and sorrow.

When joy turns to sorrow, and weal becomes woe,
Patient souls even pleasure may wring from their pain,
But no such distinction of feeling they know,
When the calm of Nirvāṇa poor mortals attain.⁶¹⁾

This *gāthā* emphasizes the calm of Nirvāṇa, and implies a type of knowledge quite different from the ordinary experimental type. It is not the preserve of the monk alone, or of those of high caste. The equalitarian spirit of Buddhism is reflected in the following *gāthā*:

Khattiya, Brahmin, Vessa, Sudra, and Caṇḍala, Pukkusa,
All these can be compassionate, can win Nirvāṇa's bliss:
Who among all the saints is there who worse or better is?⁶²⁾

The single Nirvāṇa is open to all, without any prescribed method for its attainment: "There is only one Nirvāṇa for all these modes of meditation".⁶³⁾ "The uttermost verge of existence"⁶⁴⁾ it follows upon the last existence upon earth: ⁶⁵⁾ the daughter of a wealthy merchant "had reached her final existence, and within her breast . . . glowed her sure hope of winning Arahatsip".⁶⁶⁾ Beyond the Brahma-world,⁶⁷⁾

59) *Kuṇāla Jātaka*, no. 536.

60) *Asātarūpa Jātaka*, no. 100.

61) *Ekarāja Jātaka*, no. 303.

62) *Uddālaka Jātaka*, no. 487.

63) *Kimsukopama Jātaka*, no. 248.

64) *Mahāmora Jātaka*, no. 491.

65) *Aṭṭhasadda Jātaka*, no. 418.

66) *Nigrodhamiga Jātaka*, no. 12.

67) This is deduced from the *Nimi Jātaka*, no. 541, when King Makhādeva, standing in the Brahma's heaven, pondered "Will there be Nirvāṇa now, or not?"

Nirvāṇa is imperishable, ⁶⁸⁾ and *unlike the temporal order*, it is everlasting: ⁶⁹⁾ "Except Nirvāṇa, which is everlasting, all things else, being composite in their nature, are insubstantial, transient, subject to living and death". ⁷⁰⁾

The Nirvāṇa described in *The Jātakas* seems to correspond to Lamotte's "un séjour inébranlable", ⁷¹⁾ and at least as far as *The Jātakas* are concerned La Vallée Poussin is correct in affirming that "at bottom Nirvāṇa for the religious Buddhist is really synonymous with heaven". ⁷²⁾ It is evident that Nirvāṇa is transcendent, eternal, final and one, all attributes of a real or ultimate *eschaton*.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

1. *Relation of the Realized to the Real Eschatology*

In a doctrine which is both religious and ethical, where central tenets are held and action leads to a reward, a relation between the realized and real eschatology is to be expected. In an embryonic fashion *The Jātakas* in fact provide a dual relationship.

A. *The 'existential relation'*

The first may be described as an existential relation, where Nirvāṇa is realized in the terrestrial order. This serves to reinforce the transcendent aspect of Nirvāṇa, since such a realization of Nirvāṇa is not dependent on or determined or defined by the time or the place in which it occurs. It is a spatio-temporal event only from the subjective viewpoint. Such an existential relation is analogous to the workings of Grace in the Christian solution to the problem of relating the present to the future Aion.

68) *Valāhassa Jātaka*, no. 196.

69) Cf. *Hiri Jātaka*, no. 363; *Sattubhassa Jātaka*, no. 402; *Aditta Jātaka*, no. 424; *Kuṇāla Jātaka*, no. 536; *Mahāsutasoma Jātaka*, no. 537.

70) *Mora Jātaka*, no. 159.

71) E. Lamotte, *L'Histoire du Bouddhisme indien des origines à l'ère Saka* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1958), p. 676.

72) Cited in G. R. Welbon, *op. cit.*, p. 261. Note, however, Th. Stcherbatsky's criticism in *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1965), pp. 23-7, and *passim*. Cf. also S. Radhakrishnan's introduction to *The Dhammapadam* (London, OUP, 1958), pp. 46-52, for an excellent treatment of Nirvāṇa. Amongst other things he says: "Nirvana is not extinction, but is the unconditioned life of the spirit" (p. 49).

B. The Buddha

An aspect of the *Jātaka* doctrine of Nirvāṇa which has not been mentioned (since it is not necessary to the definition of Nirvāṇa as the real eschaton) is the fact that it is conferred by the Buddha.⁷³⁾ This, combined with what may be described as the apotheosis of the Buddha in *The Jātakas*, would suggest the second relation between the realized and the real eschata — the Buddha.

There are in *The Jātakas* definite and unmistakeable signs of the divinisation of the Buddha, though he never becomes God as in the extreme Mahāyānist schools. In bestowing Nirvāṇa, for example, the Buddha is described as something more than the human being of primitive Buddhism:

But the All-Knowing Buddha by his supremacy in the Truth bestowed... Arahatship with all its supernatural knowledge, even while a single meal was in progress. And by that knowledge he grasped the whole of the sacred texts. Oh! how great is a Buddha's power!

Now the Blessed One, knowing full well the talk that was going on in the Hall of Truth, thought it meet to go there. So, rising from his Buddha-couch, he donned his two orange under-cloths, girded himself as with lightning, arrayed himself in his orange-coloured robe, the ample robe of a Buddha, moving with the royal gait of an elephant in the plenitude of his vigour. Ascending the glorious Buddha-throne set in the midst of the resplendent hall, he seated himself upon the middle of the throne emitting those six-coloured rays which mark a Buddha, — like the newly-arisen sun, when from the peaks of the Yugandhara Mountains he illumines the depths of the ocean. Immediately the All-Knowing One came into the hall, the Brotherhood broke off their talk and were silent. Gazing around on the company with gentle loving-kindness, the Master thought within himself, "This company is perfect! Not a man is guilty of moving hand or foot improperly; not a sound, not a cough or sneeze is to be heard! In their reverence and awe of the majesty and glory of the Buddha, not a man would dare to speak before I did, even if I sat here is silence all my life long. But it is my part to begin; and I will open the conversation."⁷⁴⁾

The Buddha himself claims superhuman powers.⁷⁵⁾ He is omniscient,⁷⁶⁾ generous and powerful,⁷⁷⁾ pure and sinless⁷⁸⁾ and so forth.

73) Cf. *Cullakaseṭṭhi Jātaka*, no. 4, and *Tiṭṭha Jātaka*, no. 25.

74) *Cullakaseṭṭhi Jātaka*, no. 4.

75) *Lomahamsa Jātaka*, no. 94.

76) *Apaṇṇaka Jātaka*, no. 1; *Vaṇṇuṇṇa Jātaka*, no. 2; *Mahāsūpina Jātaka*, no. 77; *Sigāla Jātaka*, no. 148; *Tiṇḍuka Jātaka*, no. 177; *Paṭadūsaka Jātaka*, no. 280; *Jāgara Jātaka*, no. 414; *Sumaṅgala Jātaka*, no. 420; *Suppāraka Jātaka*,

He has “inaugurated the universal reign of religion”.⁷⁹⁾ But one of his most significant features, and here he approaches the *bodhisattva* of the Mahāyāna, is his soteriological function. In the *Nigrodhamiga Jātaka*, no. 12, the *bodhisattva*, reborn as a deer, is prepared to lay down his life for the sake of another deer. But the most outstanding instance of the *bodhisattva* as *soter* occurs when a hunter is about to slay a she-monkey, blind and weak with age.

This the Bodhisatta saw, and said to his brother, “Jollikin, my dear, this man wants to shoot our mother! I will save her life. When I am dead, do you take care of her.” So saying, down he came out of the tree, and called out, “O man, don’t shoot my mother. she is blind and weak for age. I will save her life; don’t kill her, but kill me instead!” and when the other had promised, he sat down in a place within bowshot. The hunter pitilessly shot the Bodhisatta.⁸⁰⁾

Such a “shepherd who lays down his life for his sheep” quality is a major step in *The Jātakas* apotheosis of the Buddha. A “refuge”, then, in a special way,⁸¹⁾ as the prime exemplar of virtue and dhamma, the Buddha is in effect the pivot between the realized and the ultimate end.

2. The relation between individual and collective eschatology

The presentation of the realized eschatology — heaven and hell — and the real eschatology — Nirvāṇa — in *The Jātakas* is most generally in a context of individualism. Where the Buddha admits a group of people to Nirvāṇa, as in the *Sīlavīmamsana Jātaka*, no. 305, the collectivity is accidental; he admits to Nirvāṇa 500 individuals. Though there is no consistently explicated doctrine of collective salvation, several *Jātaka* tales describe the *bodhisattva* leading a herd or group to safety.⁸²⁾ A more consistent doctrine of community is implied in *The Jātakas*, doctrine of the social consequences of good and evil action. The many tales which extol friendship indicate a social awareness, but in

no. 463; *Dūta Jātaka*, no. 478; *Mahāsutasoma Jātaka*, no. 537; *Mahāummagga Jātaka*, no. 546.

77) *Cullakasetṭhi Jātaka*, no. 4; *Kaṇha Jātaka*, no. 29; *Mūlapariyāya Jātaka*, no. 245; *Matarodana Jātaka*, no. 317; *Jāgara Jātaka*, no. 414.

78) *Maṇisūkara Jātaka*, no. 285; *Cullabodhi Jātaka*, no. 443.

79) *Abhantara Jātaka*, no. 281.

80) *Cūlanandiya Jātaka*, no. 222.

81) *Ananusociya Jātaka*, no. 328.

82) Cf. for example *Naḷapāna Jātaka*, no. 20; *Vānarinda Jātaka*, no. 57.

these catechetical parables it is admonition which indicates the social dimension. There is no such thing as secret sin:

In sooth there is no act of sin, that in this world may hidden lie,
That which the fool a secret deems, the spirits of the wood espy.
Concealment nowhere may be found, nor can a void exist for me,
E'en where no being is in sight, while I am there no void can be.⁸³⁾

The concept of an all-pervasive *bodhisattva*, like the Yahweh of psalm 138, is significant. Sin is in itself social: "A sinner is Devadatta and sinners are all his people; the sinner keeps company with the sinful.⁸⁴⁾ Yet the worst result of sin is its debilitation of the *Saṅgha*: "Sin among the brethren if it grows will destroy the cause of Saint-hood."⁸⁵⁾

Such an embryonic theory of community at least implies that to some extent one's personal salvation and attainment of Nirvāṇa is related to those of other people. The constant instruction in the Ten Virtues emphasizes duty to and membership of the *Saṅgha*. The performance of right action, then, provides the relation between the individual and collective eschatology.

CONCLUSION

The Jātakas represent an important corpus of doctrines which are not necessarily mutually consistent. Yet, because of its lay orientation, *The Jātakas* cater more or less successfully for the popular desires and expectations. There is implied, as has been demonstrated, a significant eschatology which affords direction to religious doctrine and ethical precept. Whether the theory outlined here is consonant with theories to be found in other Buddhist writings, or a general Buddhist eschatology, is beyond the scope of this article.

Two things, however, do appear. Firstly, the eschatology of *The Jātakas* is a process-eschatology, that is, one which is based on active attainment (self merit) rather than the passive reception of Promise (the merit accumulated by the *bodhisattvas*). To this extent is the *Jātaka* eschatology distinguishable from that of the Mahāyāna. Secondly, the ultimate eschatology — eternal, transcendent and real — presented by *The Jātakas* seems to be a development of the (reconstructed)

83) *Silavīmamsana Jātaka*, no. 305.

84) *Sattigumba Jātaka*, no. 503.

85) *Kumbhakāra Jātaka*, no. 408.

original Buddhist doctrine of 'extinction'.⁸⁶) This eschatology has been deduced from the 547 birth tales. Its implications, however, are best summed up in the final *gāthās* of the *Iti-vuttaka*, a work co-canonical with *The Jātakas*, and of approximately the same age.

Having Insight into all the world,
Into all the worlds exactly,
Detached from all the world,
In all the world without compare —

All-surpassing in everything, steadfast,
Freed from all ties,
The highest Repose belongeth to him
Having attained Nirvāṇa, with no fear from any side.

This same Blessed and Enlightened One,
Scatheless (*anīgha-*), having severed (the bonds of) doubt,
Hath attained destruction of all actions (*kamma-*)
(And) is released from the destruction of the Substrata.

This same Blessed and Enlightened One,
This lion beyond compare,
Hath set the Wheel of Brahma in motion
For the world with its gods —".

Thinking this, the gods and men
Who have gone to Buddha for refuge,
Will worship him, after going,
As "The Great One that hath transcended Time,

The Victorious One, best of those victorious,
Reposeful, Sage of those reposeful.
Emancipated, highest of those emancipated,
The One that hath crossed, best of those that have crossed —".

Thinking this they will worship him
As "The Great One that hath transcended Time";
Nor is there in the world with its gods
Any One thy equal.'⁸⁷)

86) Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 24-9.

87) *The Iti-Vuttaka*, ed. J. H. Moore (New York: AMS Press, 1965), § 112.
Cf. also J. Przyluski, *op. cit.*, pp. 345, 350.

RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT IN POLEN *)

VON

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Wenn man versucht, einen Abriß der polnischen Religionswissenschaft ¹⁾ zu zeichnen, so entsteht eine Reihe von Problemen, die nicht nur methodologischer Natur sind. Religionswissenschaft war in Polen nie in der Weise eine selbständige wissenschaftliche Disziplin ²⁾, wie es in westeuropäischen Ländern schon seit jeher selbstverständlich ist, vor allem in Holland, Schweden, Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland, wo es Lehrstühle für religionswissenschaftliche Gebiete gibt. Sie ist in Polen nur auf den Schreibtischen von Orientalisten, Ethnologen, Archäologen, Soziologen, Psychologen etc. als Nebendisziplin ihrer eigentlichen Forschung zu finden. Andererseits kann man auch nicht von einem im wesentlichen einheitlichen religionswissenschaftlichen Denken sprechen, da eine Anzahl von Forschern unter starkem westeuropäischen Einfluß

*) Dieser Aufsatz soll keineswegs eine Gesamtbibliographie der polnischen Religionswissenschaft anstreben, sondern nur die wichtigsten Richtungen und Tendenzen innerhalb der polnischen religionswissenschaftlichen Forschung angeben.

Für Rat und Hilfe beim Verfassen des vorliegenden Aufsatzes, danke ich Herrn Prof. Dr. Günter Lanczkowski (Heidelberg) und Doz. Dr. Zygmunt Poniatowski (Warschau).

1) Ausführliche Materialien zur Geschichte der Religionswissenschaft in Polen sind in Euhemer erschienen (vgl. besonders 10 (1966) 6). Siehe auch: M. Nowaczyk, *Zarys dziejów religioznawstwa w Polsce*. (Abriß der Religionswissenschaftsgeschichte in Polen), Warszawa (= W.) 1962; Z. Poniatowski, *Wstęp do religioznawstwa* (Einführung in die Religionswissenschaft), W.³ 1962, S. 66-72; H. Swienko, *Matériaux à la bibliographie de la science des religions* [polnisch (= pol.)], *Euhemer* (= *Euh.*) 4 (1960) 2, S. 62-70; 5 (1961) 4, S. 80-85; 5 (1961) 6, S. 61-65; 11 (1967) 1/2, S. 177-201; zu Biographien und zur Bibliographie siehe: J. Krzyżanowski (Hrsg.), *Słownik folkloru polskiego* (Lexikon für polnische Folklore) W. 1965.

2) Obwohl heute schon ein Zentrum für Religionswissenschaft an der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaft existiert, gibt es an polnischen Universitäten noch keinen Lehrstuhl für religionswissenschaftliche Disziplinen; daneben findet man jedoch Lehrstühle für Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie an theologischen Hochschulen, die allerdings nicht dem internationalen Niveau ihres Fachbereich entsprechen.

stand und die Religionswissenschaft auch durch die in Polen existierenden verschiedenen weltanschaulichen Richtungen geprägt wird. Es läßt sich heute eine Unterteilung in marxistisch-laizistische³⁾, katholische und protestantische Forscher vornehmen. Aus den entsprechenden Elementen formt sich das allgemeine Bild der polnischen Religionswissenschaft, welche sich in ihrer Spezifik von westeuropäischer Religionswissenschaft unterscheidet, die im Grunde einheitliche Züge trägt.

Die Anfänge der Religionswissenschaft in Polen erwuchsen einem vorwissenschaftlichen Interesse für Religion, das im 18. Jahrhundert unter dem Einfluss der Aufklärung zu Untersuchungen über die Funktionen und die Bedeutung von Religion⁴⁾ führte und daneben Anreiz zu Forschungen über polnische Folklore⁵⁾ gab.

Das soll nicht heißen, daß Material vorhergehenden Jahrhunderten zu finden wäre⁶⁾, durch das sich Interesse für Religion nachweisen läßt. Vor allem in der Zeit der Reformation, ermöglicht durch das tolerante Verhalten des polnischen Staates⁷⁾, den Hosius als „Asyl der Häretiker“ bezeichnete⁸⁾, entstand fruchtbare antitrinitarische (sozinianische, *pol. arianische*) Literatur⁹⁾, die von großer Bedeu-

3) Aufgrund der starken Position der katholischen Lehre hat sich in Polen sehr früh eine antiklerikale Bewegung entwickelt, die man nicht unbedingt mit Atheismus gleichsetzen kann. Diese Bewegung hat die Meinungen zahlreicher polnischer Religionsforscher beeinflusst; dem zur Folge wendet sich ihre, an das Christentum (darunter versteht sie den Katholizismus) gerichtete Kritik, eher an eine Institution als an die eigentliche Religion.

4) Vgl. H. Hinz, „Rozważania Kollątaja o religii“ (Kollątaj's Gedanken über die Religion), *Studia Filozoficzne* (1958) 1, S. 86-112.

5) Vgl. W. Bieńkowski, *Poprzednicy Oskara Kolberga na polu badań ludoznawczych w Polsce* (Vorläufer Oskar Kolberg's auf dem Gebiet der Volkskunde in Polen), Wrocław (= Wr.) 1956; siehe auch: Zb. Kuchowicz, *Z dziejów obyczajów polskich w wieku XVII i XVIII* (Aus der polnischen Sittengeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts), W. 1957.

6) Vgl. dazu die Exkursion zum Hofe des großen Khan Kujuk in den Jahren 1245-46, die auf die Initiative von Papst Innozenz IV. zustande kam. Sie stand unter der Leitung von Johannes del Plano Carpini. Mitglied dieser Exkursion war auch ein polnischer Mönch, Mitverfasser des Berichts über diese Exkursion, der zweifellos bedeutungsvoll für die Geschichte der Religionsforschung ist. Siehe: B. Szczęśniak, „The Mission of Giovanni del Plano Carpini and Benedict the Pole of Vratislavia to Halicz“, *JEH* 7 (1956) S. 12-20 und die dort zitierte Literatur.

7) Vgl. J. Leclercq, *Histoire de la Tolérance au siècle de la Réforme*, Paris 1955 (deutsch: Stuttgart, 1965, S. 521-567).

8) Vgl. St. Hosius, *Opera omnia*, Köln 1584, Bd. II, S. 225.

9) Vgl. A. Wiszowaty (Hrsg.), *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, 8 Bde, Irrenopolis/Amsterdam 1656; siehe dazu: Bibliographie von: Reformacja w Polsce

Bedeutung für die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Philosophie der Aufklärung war¹⁰).

In besagten antitrinitarischen Schriften findet man nicht nur Betrachtungen über theologische Probleme, sondern auch Schriften über Toleranz, das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Religionen und Glaubensbekenntnissen zueinander und sogar über den Atheismus, dessen Repräsentant auf polnischer Seite Casimirus Lisinsky (poln. Kazimierz Łyszczyński, 1634-1689)¹¹) war, der auf dem Scheiterhaufen verbrannt wurde.

So läßt sich als Konsequenz der geschichtlichen Entwicklung und der geographischen Lage festhalten, daß von Anfang an Kontakte mit dem Heidentum (Pruzen und Litauen)¹²) mit anderen Formen des Christentums (russischer Orthodoxie)¹³), mit anderen Religionen,

(Reformation in Polen) Jg. 1 (1921)-13 (1963/55) in: *Reformacja i Odrodzenie w Polsce* (Reformation und Renaissance in P ... 3 (1958) S. 219-287.

10) Vgl. St. Kot, *Le mouvement antitrinitaire au XVI^e et XVII^e siècle, Humanisme et Renaissance* 4 (1937) S. 16-58, 109-156; Ders., *Socinianismus in Poland*, Boston 1957; ausführliche Bibliographie bei L. Szczucki, *Arianie polscy*, *Euh.* 3 (1959) 5, S. 588-598; 3 (1959) 6 S. 710-718; Z. Ogonowski, *Socynianizm polski*, W. 1960; L. Chmaj, *Bracia polscy. Ludzie, idee, wpływy* (Polnische Brüder. Leute, Ideen, Einflüsse) W. 1956; St. Cynarski (Hrsg.), *Raków, ognisko „arianizmu”* (Raków, Zentrum des Antitrinitarismus), Kraków (= K.) 1968.

11) Vgl. A. Nowicki, „Matériaux à la bibliographie de K. Łyszczyński” (pol), *Euh.* Zeszyty Filozoficzne (Philosophische Hefte) 7 (1963) 4 S. 45-83; *Euh.* 9 (1965) 5, S. 131-144; 10 (1966) 1, S. 71-80; 10 (1966) 2, S. 71-88; Die reiche Tradition des Atheismus in Polen sieht ihren Ursprung schon in der Renaissance (Simonis Simonii Lucensis, *primum Romani, tum Calviniani, deinde Lutherani, denuo Romani, semper autem Athei summa religio*, Cracoviae 1588). Daraufhin begann man, sich mit Atheismus zu beschäftigen (z.B. W. Tylkowski, J. Morawski), siehe dazu: A. Nowicki, „Esquisse de l'histoire de l'atheographie en Pologne (pol.)”, *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 83 f.

12) Die diesbezügliche Quellenliteratur ist umfangreich (vgl. Z. Ivinskis, *Bibliographie der alten litauischen Religionen* (litauisch) 1938). Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient Johannes Lasicius (Jan Łasicki), vgl. dazu in: *Michalonis Lituanie de moribus Tartarorum, Lituanorum et Moschorum*. Basel 1615 und darüber siehe: A. Mierzyński, *Jan Łasicki, źródło do mitologii litewskiej* (J. L..., Quelle zur litauischen Mythologie) K. 1870. Von großer Bedeutung bleibt auch das historische Werk von Joannis Dlugossi seu Longinis *canonici Cracoviensis historiae Polonicae libri XII* (Cracoviae 1863-87, Hrsg. von I. Żegota und A. Przeździecki).

Siehe auch: S. Matusiak, *Olimp polski podług Długosza* (Der polnische Olymp nach Długosz) L. 1908; T. Sinko, „De Dlugosii praefatione Historiae Polonorum” in *Studia z dziejów kultury polskiej*. W. 1949, S. 105-143; „Bibliography of the Old-Prussian Language” (up. 1965) *Acta Baltico-slavica* 5 (1967) S. 257-311.

13) Vgl. B. Szczęśniak, a.a.O.; J. Woliński, *Polska i kościół prawosławny* (Polen und die orthodoxe Kirche) Lwów (= L.) 1936.

besonders mit dem Judentum¹⁴⁾, und dem Islam (Tartaren und Türken)¹⁵⁾, vorhanden waren, was zweifellos das Interesse für Religionswissenschaft in Polen geformt hat, für das auch Berichte von Reisen¹⁶⁾, vor allem als religiös-historische Quellen, nicht ohne Bedeutung waren.

Doch sind die Anfänge wissenschaftlicher Beschäftigung mit Religion eng verbunden mit der Periode der Aufklärung¹⁷⁾, während der sich die Forschung über slawische Antike intensivierte, die sich vor allem mit Relikten in der slawischen Volkskultur beschäftigte. Dadurch wurden auch Forschungen über Religionsethnologie in Gange gesetzt, mit der man sich in dieser Zeit im Rahmen der Volkskunde auseinandersetzte. Für deren Vater hält man einen der führenden Repräsentanten der polnischen Aufklärungsperiode, Hugo Kołłątaj (1750-1812); und zwar deshalb, weil er ein wissenschaftliches Programm¹⁸⁾ formulierte,

14) Von 1150 an gab in Polen größere jüdische Gemeinden, die in Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum standen, vor allem zur Zeit der Reformation. Vgl. dazu: M. Bataban, *Kiedy in skąd przybyli Żydzi do Polski* (Wann und von wo die Juden nach Polen kamen) W. 1930 und die dort zitierte Literatur; Ders., „Umysłowość i moralność żydostwa polskiego w XVI w.” (Geist und Moral des polnischen Judentums im 16. Jhdt.) in *Kultura staropolska*, W. 1932, S. 606-639.

15) Vgl. S. Kuczyński, *Tatarzy polscy* (Polnische Tartaren) W. 1938; Diplomatische Besuche in orientalischen Ländern, vor allem in der Türkei, waren in dieser Hinsicht von Bedeutung, vgl. dazu: *Dyplomaci w dawnych czasach. Relacje staropolskie z XVI-XVIII stulecia* (Diplomaten in der alten Zeit. Altpolnische Berichte aus dem 16.-18. Jhdt.) K. 1959, S. 69-76; J. St. Bystroń, *Polacy w Ziemi św., Syrii i Egipcie 1147-1914* (Polen im Heiligen Land, Syrien und Ägypten in den Jahren 1147 bis 1914) K. 1930; K. Hartleb, *Polskie dzienniki podróży w XVI w. jako źródło do współczesnej kultury. Uwagi i przyczynki*. (Polnische Reisetagebücher im 16. Jhd als Quelle für die gegenwärtige Kultur. Bemerkungen und Beiträge) L. 1920.

16) Vgl. K. Hartleb, *Mikołaja Krzysztofa Radziwiłła pielgrzymka do Ziemi św.* (M... K... R...s Pilgerschaft zum Heiligen Land) L. 1934; K. Pawłowski, *Perygrynacja do Indyi Krzysztofa P...w roku 1596* (Peregrinum nach Indien des Christoph Pawłowski im Jahre 1596) W. 1914 (Hrsg. der Handschrift: T. Baranowski); S. Stasiak, „Les Indes Portugaises à la fin du XVI^e siècle d'après la relation du voyage fait à Goa en 1596 par Christophe Pawłowski”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* (= RO) 3/4 (1925-27); J. Krzyszkowski, „Polacy XVIII w. na wybrzeżach Wsch. Afryki” (Polen im 17. Jhd. an den Küsten des östlichen Afrikas) *Misje katolickie* 52 (1933); M. Beniowski, *Historia podróży i osobliwych zdarzeń* (Geschichte von Reisen und ihren sonderbaren Ereignissen) Bde 1-4 (1797); L. Orłowski, Maurycy A. Beniowski, W. 1961.

17) Siehe: J. Fabre, *Stanislaus-Auguste Poniatowski et l'Europe de lumières*, Paris 1952.

18) Vgl. T. Sierociński, *Ks. Hugona Kołłątaja korespondencja listowna z Tadeuszem Czackim* (Briefliche Korespondenz H. K... mit T. Cz...), Biblioteka

das von grundlegender Bedeutung auch für die erste Etappe religionswissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen war ¹⁹⁾).

Daneben läßt sich als Erfolg dieser Forschungen auch die Entstehung einer slawischen Archäologie verzeichnen, deren Pionier Jan Potocki (1761-1815) ²⁰⁾, der in Westeuropa als Verfasser des „Manuscripts trouvés à Saragosse“ (1804/5) bekannt wurde, ganz neues Material für die Erforschung des vorchristlichen Polens und Rußlands ²¹⁾ zusammenstellte und auf seinen Reisen ²²⁾ durch die Türkei, Ägypten, Spanien, Marokko, den Kaukasus und die Mongolei viele, für die allgemeine Religionswissenschaft wertvolle Quellen ausfindig machte. Seine Arbeiten über den Orient sind nicht die einzigen ²³⁾, die in jener Zeit über dieses Gebiet geschrieben worden sind und in ihrer Bedeutung

Warszawska, Bd. 3 (1846); I. Stasiewicz, *Z. problemów nauki okresu Oświecenia* (Wissenschaftliche Probleme der Aufklärungsperiode) Wr. 1960, S. 93; Aufmerksamkeit verlangt St. Staszic (1755-1826) Gründer der „Gesellschaft der Freunde der Wissenschaft“ (Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauki) im Jahre 1808 und Verfasser des Werkes: *Ród ludzki* (Das menschliche Geschlecht), W. 1819-20; Bibliographie zu seinen Schriften siehe: W. Hahn (Hrsg.), St. Staszic, Lublin (= Lub.) 1926.

19) Vgl. J. Kamocki, *Przegląd kwestionariuszy etnograficznych wydanych w języku polskim* (Übersicht über die in polnischer Sprache herausgegebenen ethnologischen Fragebogen), Poznań (= P.) 1953 in *Archiwum Etnograficzne*, Nr. 5 (S. 5. über Fragebogen von J. 1805); W. Surowiecki, *O sposobach dopełniania historii i znajomości Słowian* (Über die Methoden der Ergänzung der Geschichte und der Kenntnisse von den alten Slawen) in *Roczniki Warszawskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk* (= *Rocz. W.T.P.N.*) 8 (1810) S. 82-119; K. Wiesiołowski, „O starożytnościach religijnych Słowian, mieszkańców Polski“ (Über die religiöse Antike der Slawen, der Bewohner Polens) in *Rocz. WTPN* 9 (1816); Zorian Dołęga Chodakowski (A. Czarnowski), *O słowiańszczyźnie przedchrześcijańskiej* (Über das vorchristliche Slawentum) K. 1835 (Neue Aufl., W. 1967).

20) Vgl. L. Kukulski, Einführung in J. Potocki, *Podróże* (Reisen), W. 1959; A. Brückner, *Jan Potocki*, W. 1911.

21) Vgl. J. Potocki, *Essai sur l'histoire universelle, Recherches sur la Sarmatie* (1788); Ders., *Fragments historiques et géographiques sur la Scythie, la Sarmatie et les Slaves*, Braunschweig, 4 Bde (1796); Ders., *Histoire primitive des peuples de la Russie*, Petersburg (1802). Von jeder seiner Werke sind nur 100 Exempl. gedruckt!

22) Vgl. J. Potocki, *Podróże...* a.a.O.; W. Kotwicz, *Jan Potocki i jego podróż do Chin* (J. P... und seine Reise nach China) Wilno (= Wil.) 1935.

23) Vgl. B. Baranowski, *Znajomość Wschodu w dawnej Polsce do XVIIIw* (Über die Kenntniss des Orients im alten Polen bis zum 18. Jhd) Łódź (= Ło.) 1950; J. Reychman, *Orient w kulturze polskiego Oświecenia* (Der Orient in der Kultur der polnischen Aufklärungsperiode, mit Résumé) W. 1964 und die dort zitierte Literatur.

für die Geschichte der Religionswissenschaft wie auch des Romantismus in Polen verdienen sie uneingeschränkte Würdigung.

Die Forschungen auf dem Gebiet der Volkskunde, deren Krönung das Werk Oskar Kolbergs (1814-1890)²⁴⁾ darstellt, trugen eine Fülle von Dokumentationsmaterial über den Volksglauben in der Magie und der Volksdämonologie, über Ritual, Kult, religiöses Brauchtum und über Folklore ein, das in das Religions- und Volkslied trat. Sein Werk wurde in späteren Arbeiten sehr häufig benutzt²⁵⁾.

In dieser Zeit ist besonders schöpferisch die Universität in Wilno, wo die Arbeiten des Professor Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861)²⁶⁾ eine historische und kritische Grundlage für andere religionsgeschichtliche Materialien schufen, die sich in den Schriften des Ignacy Domeyko (1802-1889)²⁷⁾, A. B. Chodźko (1804-1891)²⁸⁾ und anderen polnischen Reisenden wieder finden, die das Schicksal aus Polen vertrieben hatte²⁹⁾.

24) Vgl. O. Kolberg, *Lud. Jego zwyczaje, sposób życia, mowa, podania, przysłowia, obyczaje, gusła, zabobony, muzyka i tańce*. (Das Volk. Seine Sitten, Lebensformen, Sprache, Legenden, Sprichwörter, Riten, Hexerei, Aberglaube, Musik und Tanz) seit 1857 sind 60 Bde erschienen; über O. Kolberg siehe: K. Judenko, in *Euh.* 9 (1965) 1, S. 53-64.

25) Vgl. z.B. K. Szulc, *Mytyczna historia polska i mythologia słowiańska* (Die mythische Geschichte Polens und die slawische Mythologie) P. 1880; R. Świerzbński, *Wiara Słowian ich był domowy i społeczny* (Der Glaube der Slawen, seine Existenz in der häuslichen Gemeinschaft und in der Gesellschaft) W. 1884; W. Bogusławski, *Dzieje słowiańszczyzny półn.-zach. do połowy XIII w.* (Die Geschichte des Nord-westlichen Slawentum bis zur Mitte des 13. Jhd.) 3. Bde, P. 1887-1892.

26) Vgl. J. Lelewel, *Edda, to jest księga religii dawnych Skandynawii mieszkańców* (Die Edda, das ist das Buch der Religion der alten skandinavischen Bevölkerung) Wil. 1807.

27) Vgl. I. Domeyko, *Pamiętniki 1831-1838* (Tagebuch 1831-1838) Hrsg. von Prof. auf dem Universität Santiago de Chile. Verfasser der *Aulazania i sus habitantes*, Santiago de Chile 1845 (übers. deutsch, franz., engl., poln.) und J. Tretiak, Bd. 1, K. 1908.

28) A. B. Chodźko Professor für slawische Literatur im Collège de France (Paris), verfaßte die *Legendes slaves du moyen-age* (Paris, 1858) und *Les Khoraçan et son héros populaire* (Paris, 1852); über ihn siehe: J. Reychnan, A. Chodźko *wielki orientalista polski*, *Problemy* (1956) 5.

29) Vgl. z.B., W. Węzyk, *Wyjutki z podróży po Egipcie odbytej w roku 1839 przez...* (Auszüge aus der Reise nach Ägypten im Jahre 1839 von...), Biblioteka Warszawska, Bde 1-2 (1841); W. Małachowski, *Wspomnienia z podróży do Indii Wsch. w latach 1829-30 i 1831 odbytej* (Erinnerungen an die Reise nach Ost-Indien in den Jahren 1829-30 und 1831), Handschr. der Universitäts-Bibliothek Warschau Sign. Nr. 9708; I. Żagiel, *Podróż historyczna po Abisynii, Aden,*

Diese Vorstufe wissenschaftlicher Religionsforschung trägt den Charakter einer Forschung, die sich eher mit dem äußeren Erscheinungsbild des religiösen Lebens bestimmter religiöser Gruppen beschäftigt ³⁰).

In der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, als in Europa der Evolutionismus in seiner Blüte stand, bildete sich in Polen die Religionswissenschaft in der gegenwärtigen Form heraus. Zunächst begann sie mit einer Vertiefung der bisherigen Forschung. Die neue Betrachtungsweise der Religion nahm ihren Anfang mit den Schriften des bekannten Historikers, Musik- und Sprachwissenschaftlers Jan Karłowicz (1836-1903) ³¹) und den Arbeiten eines der polnischen Pioniere auf dem Gebiet der Soziologie, Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941) ³²), die das Interesse für Religion von soziologischen Aspekten her förderten.

Jan A. Karłowicz war einer der ersten polnischen Gelehrten, die in Polen die evolutionistische Kulturtheorie vorantrieben. In seinen religionswissenschaftlichen Forschungen legte er den Schwerpunkt auf die Mythologie, die er als „Philosophie der Urmenschen“ bezeichnet hat.

Szoa, Nubii u źródeł Nilu, z opisaniem jego wodospadu oraz po krajach podrównikowych do Mekii i Medyny, do Syrii i Palestyny, Konstantynopola i po Archipelagu (Historische Reise nach Abessinien, Aden, Schoa, Nubien und in das Quellgebiet des Nil mit einer Beschreibung seiner Wasserfälle, in die äquatorialen Länder, nach Mekka und Medina, nach Syrien und Palästina, Konstantinopel und durch den Archipel) Wil. 1884; S. Korzeliński, *Opis podróży do Australii i pobytu tamże od 1852-1856* (Beschreibung einer Reise nach Australien und des Aufenthaltes in diesem Lande von 1852-1856) W. 1853; W. Skibniewski, *Wycieczka do Nubii (Exkursion nach Nubien)* Petersburg, 1890.

30) Vgl. R. Zawiliński, „O sposobie gromadzenia materiałów etnograficznych” (Über die Sammelmethode ethnographischen Materials) in, *Wiśła* 1 (1887) S. 3-8, 43-48, 83-86, 123-127.

31) Vgl. z.B. J. Karłowicz, Najnowsze badania podań i ich zbiory (Moderne Forschung über Sagen und ihre Sammlungen) in *Ateneum* (1883) Bibliographisches und biographisches Material vgl.: O. Gajek, *Jan Karłowicz i Ludwik Krzywicki jako reprezentanci dwóch nurtów w etnologii polskiej* (J. K. und L. K. als Repräsentanten zweier Tendenzen in der polnischen Ethnologie) Wr. 1959.

32) Vgl. L. Krzywicki, *Ludy. Zarys antropologii etnicznej* (Die Völker. Abriß der ethnischen Anthropologie) W. 1893; Ders., *Primitive Society. Its Vital Statistics*, W.-P.-London, 1934; Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: (Sammelband) *Ludwik Krzywicki, praca zbiorowa poświęcona jego życiu i twórczości*, W. 1938, Bibliographie S. 253-306; I. Krzywicka, *Żywot uczonego, Ludwik Krzywicki*, W. 1951. Im Jahre 1955 initiierte das „Philosophische Komitee der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften” die Herausgabe der gesammelten Werke von L. Krzywicki.

Sein Denken ist verbunden mit Taylor und Comte, deren Arbeiten die Methodologie seiner Forschungen beinhalten ³³⁾).

Der zweite, L. Krzywicki, gehört zu diesen vielseitigen Wissenschaftlern, die sich mit Religionsgeschichte, Soziologie, Ökonomie, Psychologie und Ethnologie beschäftigten. Seine Ansichten über Religion sind vor allem praeformiert durch die Einflüsse von Taylor, Lubbock, Spencer, Frazer, Lang, Marett, Morgan und Lipert; die er in marxistischem Sinne interpretiert hat ³⁴⁾). Die religionswissenschaftliche Problematik in seinen Arbeiten betrifft die Fragen der Entstehung der Religion, die wir im Totemismus, Animismus und der Magie erblicken; ferner die gegenwärtige Religion, soziale Quellen und die soziale Funktion der Religion sowie ihre Entwicklungs- und Zerfallsprozesse. Äußerst interessant und originell sind seine Untersuchungen über soziologische Typen in der sozialen Umwelt der Stadt und des Dorfes (Studien über polnischen Katholizismus).

Diese besondere Entwicklung verschiedener Arten von Religionswissenschaft läßt ein ausgedehntes Interesse an diesen Forschungen entstehen, das sich in der Neugründung von einigen Zeitschriften ausdrückt: „Wisła“ (Weichsel) 1887, „Lud“ (Volk) 1895, „Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej“ (Gesammelte Nachrichten zur Landanthropologie) 1877, und „Materiały antropologiczno-archeologiczne i etnograficzne“ (Anthropologisch-archäologische und ethnografische Materialien) 1896, die eine große Anzahl von religionswissenschaftlichen Artikeln publizierten.

Die geschichtlichen Ereignisse zogen die Verbannung politisch tätiger Polen nach Sibirien ³⁵⁾ nach sich, wo sie unter anderem bedeutende Forschungen über den Schamanismus ³⁶⁾ verschiedener sibirischer Völker anstellten. An dieser Stelle ist es wichtig, zu bemerken, daß diese Forschungen von polnischer Seite aus in eine größere Öffentlichkeit getragen wurden, und zwar durch ein Referat ihres bedeutendsten Re-

33) Vgl. O. Gajek, und S. Urbańczyk, in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (= *PSB*) Bd 12/1 Fasc. 52 (Kariowicz) mit Bibliographie.

34) Vgl. St. Ossowski, *Sociologie des religions en Pologne*, in *Archives de Sociologie des Religions*, 2 (1957); T. Kowalik, L. Krzywicki, W. 1965.

35) Vgl. M. Janik, *Dzieje Polaków na Syberii* (Geschichte der Polen in Sibirien) K. 1928.

36) Die bedeutendste Arbeit in diesem Bereich stammt von M. Eliade, *Le Chamanisme*, Paris 1951 (deutsch: *Schamanismus und archaische Ekstasentechnik*, Stuttgart 1954) die in vielen Hinsichten von polnischen Quellen über dieses Forschungsgebiet ausgeht, z.B. S. 208 ff.

präsentanten, Waclaw Sieroszewski (1858-1945)³⁷⁾ unter dem Titel „Du chamanisme d'après les croyances des Jakoutes“, das auf dem ersten internationalen Kongreß für Religionsgeschichte in Paris (1900) vom Sekretär dieses Kongresses, L. Marillier, vorgetragen wurde³⁸⁾. Gleichzeitig mit W. Sieroszewski muß man M. Witaszewski (1857-1918)³⁹⁾ und B. Piłsudski (1866-1918)⁴⁰⁾ nennen, doch waren diese beiden nicht die einzigen, die als Verbannte in Sibirien⁴¹⁾ geforscht haben. Auch noch in späteren Jahren stellte Sibirien eine Art Zentrum polnischer Wissenschaft dar. Von den bedeutenden Wissenschaftlern dieser Zeit sind vor allem zu erwähnen A. B. Dobrowolski (1872-1954)⁴²⁾, der mehr als Polarforscher bekannt wurde, M. A. Czaplicka

37) Seine Frühwerke wurden in russischer Sprache in vielen Fachzeitschriften publiziert. Die wichtigsten sind: *Dwadzieścia lat w kraju Jakutów* (Zwanzig Jahre im Jakutenland) Bde 1-2, W. 1935 (1961, 3. Aufl.); *The Yakuts, Abridged from the Russian of Sieroshevski by W. G. Summer* (revised and completed by W. Sieroshevski), *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute* (= *JAI*) 31 (1901). Eine Gesamtausgabe seiner Werke in 25. Bden ist in Warschau (1935) erschienen. Über ihn siehe: St. Kатуżyński, „Edward Piekarski et Waclaw Sieroszewski comme chercheurs des croyances des Yakoutes (pol.)“, *Euh.* 8 (1964) 3, S. 34-37.

38) *RHR* 46 (1902) S. 204-235, 299-338.

39) Seine Schriften (siehe W. Dmitriewa, „Rukopisnye materialy N. A. Witaschewskowo“, in *Kratkije soobscschenija Instit. Wostokowiedienija* 16 (1955) S. 72-79) wurden in russischen Zeitschriften veröffentlicht und konzentrierten sich auf den Schamanismus bei den Jakuten. Am Rande ist noch zu bemerken, daß Eliade (*Schamanismus*, S. 221, 225) seinen Namen in der englischen Transkription für die russische Schreibweise anführt, also nicht „Vitashevskij“, sondern Witaszewski. Zu Witaszewski siehe: W. Armon, in: *Etnografia Polska* (= *E.P.*) 4 (1961) S. 141-152.

40) Er forschte in Sibirien so wie auch bei den Ajnen auf Hokkaido (*Materials for the Study of the Ainu Language and Folklore*, 1912) und auf Sachalin (Das Bärenfest der Ajnen auf Sachalin, in *Globus* 96 (1909) 3; Der Schamanismus bei den Ainu-Stämmen von Sachalin, in *Globus* 96 (1909) 5). Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: W. Kotwicz, in *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* (= *RO*) 12 (1936) S. 159-167.

41) Von anderen nach Sibirien Verbannten verdienen Aufmerksamkeit: Edward Piekarski (1858-1934) (dazu siehe: N. Poppe, Eduard Piekarski. in *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, 7 (1927); W. Kotwicz, *E.P.*..., *RO* 10 (1934); St. Kałużyński, a.a.O., S. 28-34) und Benedykt Dybowski (1833-1930) (dazu siehe: J. Domaniński, *B.D.*..., W. 1954) bekannt durch seine Forschung auf Kamtschatka.

42) A. B. Dobrowolski hat sich mit Religion in enger Verbindung mit philosophischer Anthropologie beschäftigt, vgl. dazu z.B.: Charakterystyka i ocena magionistyki jako drogi poznania (Charakteristik und Bewertung der Magionistik als Weg der Erkenntnis), *Euh.* 1 (1957) 1, S. 11-17. Über ihn siehe:

(1886-1921)⁴³), die später als Ethnologin an englischen Universitäten (Oxford, London, Bristol) tätig war und sich durch ihre Mitarbeit bei der *Encycl. of Religion and Ethic*⁴⁴) einen Ruf erwarb, und St. Poniatowski (1884-1944)⁴⁵), der als Professor der Anthropologie und Ethnologie an der staatlichen Universität Warschau und der Freien Universität (Wolna Wszechnica), ebenfalls in Warschau, lehrte. Im Jahre 1914 war er Mitglied einer wissenschaftlichen Expedition im Amurgebiet⁴⁶). In seinen ethnologisch-religionswissenschaftlichen Arbeiten repräsentiert er die Richtung der kulturhistorischen Schule.

Die Entwicklung der religionsethnischen Forschungen zog eine Verlagerung auf Untersuchungen über die soziale Funktion der Religion in Gesellschaften der Fremdvölkerkulturen nach sich, was am ehesten seinen Ausdruck in den Werken des Gründers des Funktionalismus, Bronisław Malinowski (1884-1942)⁴⁷), fand, dessen Hauptarbeiten in englischer Sprache erschienen⁴⁸) und deshalb ziemlich bekannt geworden sind. In Deutschland arbeitete Jan Czekanowski (1882-

J. Ostrowski, *Euh.* 1 (1957) 1, S. 9 f; E. Sajdak-Michnikowska, *Euh.* 4 (1960) 1, S. 97-108.

43) Zu Leben und Werk siehe in: K. Dobrowolski, *PSB* Bd. 4 (1938) S. 173; W. Koppers, *Anthropos* 27 (1932) S. 518. Ihre Hauptwerke: *Aboriginal Siberia*, Oxford 1914; *My Syberian Year*, London 1916; *The Turks of Central Asia*, Oxford 1918.

44) Vgl. *Samoyed*, Bd. 11, S. 172-177; *Siberia*, Bd. 11, S. 488-496; *Slavs*, Bd. 11, S. 587-595; *Tungus*, Bd. 12, S. 473-483; *Yakut*, Bd. 12 S. 826-829.

45) Seine Forschungen konzentrierten sich auf Untersuchungen über die Funktion des Ritus (z.B. vgl., *Przyczynek do badania izolacji obrzędowej* (Abhandlung zur Forschung über die Ritusisolation) W. 1921) und seine Rolle in der Volkskultur (vgl. z.B., *Przyczynek do genezy pierścienia* (Abhandlung zur Genese des Rings), *Lud* 23 (1924) S. 32-37). Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: E. Bulanda, *Rocz. W.T.N.* 31-38 (1938-1945) S. 235-237; J. Krajewska, *Euh.* 3 (1959) 6, S. 642-54.

46) Vgl. St. Poniatowski, *Materials to the Vocabulary of the Amur God*, *Bibliotheca Universitatis Polonae*, 1923, Fasc. 10.

47) Die Bedeutung B. Malinowski's und sein Beitrag zur weltlichen Religionswissenschaft dürfte allgemein bekannt sein und bedarf an dieser Stelle keiner besonderen Erörterung. Es ist hier zu bemerken, daß er schon in seinen polnischen Publikationen Fundamente zum Funktionalismus gelegt hat; *Totemizm i egzogamia*, *Lud* 17 (1911) S. 31-56; 18 (1912) S. 14-57; 19 (1913) S. 153-171; *Wierzenia pierwotne i formy ustroju pierwotnego* (Urtümliche Glaubensformen und Formen des urtümlichen Systems) K. 1914; *Przedmowa* (Vorwort) in Fross, *Koczownictwo* (Nomadentum) 1936.

48) Siehe z.B. Ph. M. Kaberry, Einleitung in B. Malinowski, *Dynamik des Kulturwandels*, Zürich 1951, S. 5-19 und da zitierte Literatur.

1965)⁴⁹⁾, bekannt als Anthropologe und Ethnologe, der im Nil-Kongo-Zwischengebiet forschte.

Neben den schon erwähnten fanden sich in Polen noch weitere Forscher, sowohl laizistische wie auch katholische, die sich mit Religionssoziologie⁵⁰⁾ beschäftigten. Als der führende unter ihnen ist Stefan Czarnowski (1879-1937)⁵¹⁾ zu erwähnen; er ging von der E. Durkheim- und H. Hubert- Schule aus; in diesem Bereich ist auch seine bekannte Arbeit über den hl. Patrick⁵²⁾ entstanden. Er war an der Universität Warschau Professor für Soziologie, und als erster Professor in Polen hatte er an der Freien Universität (Wolna Wszechnica) in Warschau einen Lehrstuhl für Religionswissenschaft⁵³⁾ inne. In seinen Arbeiten präzisiert er den Begriff der „Religionskultur“ auf der Grundlage seiner Untersuchungen über die christliche Kultur des mittelalterlichen Irlands und den polnischen Katholizismus, und formulierte die These, daß „Religionskultur nicht identisch sei mit dem religiösen Bekenntnis einer Glaubensgemeinschaft, sondern vielmehr das System von Riten und Kulturformen meine, dessen sich die jeweilige Glaubensgemeinschaft bedient, und die sie den materiellen und geistigen Lebensumständen gemäß den verschiedenen sozialen Schichten anpaßt.“

Außer S. Czarnowski beschäftigten sich eine Reihe andere Soziolo-

49) Vgl. J. Czekanowski, *Forschungen im Nil-Kongo-Zwischengebiet*, Leipzig 1911-1927; Ders., *Wstęp do historii Słowian* (Einführung in die Geschichte der Slawen) W. 1957.

Von polnischen Forschern hat auch R. Stopa (*Z badań nad ludnością i kulturą Afryki południowo-zachodniej* (Über die Bevölkerung und Kultur Süd-West-Afrikas, W. 1938, siehe auch Ders. *Structure of Bushman*, Wr. 1970) über afrikanische Religionen gearbeitet.

50) St. Ossowski, *Sociologie...* a.a.O.; T. Abel, *Sociology in Postwar Poland*, *American Sociological Review* (= *ASR*) 15 (1950) S. 104ff.; F. Znaniecki, *Polish Sociology*, in G. Gurwitsch und W. E. Moore (Hrsg.) *Twentieth Century Sociology*, New York 1945, S. 703 ff.; St. Bystron, *Socjologia. Wstęp informacyjny i bibliograficzny*. W. 1947; siehe auch Z. A. Jordan, *Marxistischer Revisionismus in Polen*, in *Marxismusstudien* 8 (1968) S. 86-95.

51) Im Jahre 1956 sind seine Gesammelten Werke publiziert worden (*Dziela*, 5.Bde (Hrsg. N. Assorodobraj) W. 1956).

52) Vgl. *Le culte des héros et ses conditions sociales: saint Patrick, héros national de l'Irlande*, Paris 1919, S.XCIV, 369.

53) In der polnischen Sprache verwendet man für den Begriff „Religionswissenschaft“ zwei Begriffe: „Religionistyka“ und „Religioznawstwo“. Der erster wurde vor allem in der Zeit vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg benutzt, während der zweite in der heutigen Literatur vorherrscht.

gen mit Religion, so vor allem Florian Znaniecki (1882-1958)⁵⁴), Professor an polnischen und amerikanischen Universitäten, J. St. Bystroń (1892-1964)⁵⁵), Soziologe und Ethnologe, der in Jahre 1923 auf dem Kongreß für Religionsgeschichte in Paris teilnahm, wo er einen Vortrag über die Agrarsitten und den Ursprung des Agrarkults bei den Slawen hielt⁵⁶); außerdem K. Dobrowolski (geb. 1894)⁵⁷) und katholische Geistliche⁵⁸), die sich intensiv mit soziologischen Analysen auseinandersetzten was sich für die praktische Theologie als einen äußerst nützlichen Forschungsbereich erwies.

Neben der Religionssoziologie bildeten sich sehr früh religionspsychologische Forschungen⁵⁹) heraus, die von E. Abramowski (1868-1918)⁶⁰), der in seinen Arbeiten von psychologischen Experimenten ausgeht und die Theorie der Kryptomnäsie als Genese religiösen und ästhetischen Empfindens vertrat, und J. Wł. Dawid (1859-1914⁶¹),

54) F. Znaniecki Professor für Soziologie an der Universität Poznań (1920-1939) und Columbia (1931-1933) und an anderen amerikanischen Universitäten, ist der Begründer des Polnischen Instituts für Soziologie (Polski Instytut Socjologiczny) und seines Organs *Polski Przegląd Socjologiczny*. Auf dem Gebiet der Religionssoziologie ist er durch seine gründlichen Forschungen und Klassifikationen über die Religiosität der Bauern bekannt geworden [*The Polish Peasant in Europa and Amerika* (1918-1920); *Cultural Reality* (1919)].

55) Professor für Ethnologie [Poznań (1919), Kraków (1923)] und Soziologie [Warszawa (1924)] geht in seinen Arbeiten von der Generalthese aus, daß es „keine Geschichte der Kultur ohne eine Geschichte der Religion gibt“. Seine Forschung betrifft hauptsächlich die Religiosität in der Volkskultur. Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: K. Judenko, *Euh.* 6 (1962) 2, S. 23-35 (S. 36: Bibliographie).

56) Außerdem haben noch S. Czarnowski und T. Zieliński daran teilgenommen. Vgl. J. St. Bystroń, V. Międzynarodowy Zjazd Historyków Religii, *Lud* 22 (1917).

57) Vgl. *Dzieje kultu św. Floriana do połowy XVI w.* (Geschichte des Hl.-Florian-Kults bis zur Mitte des 16. Jhds) W. 1923.

58) Vgl. z.B., F. Mirek, *Elementy społeczne parafii rzymsko-katolickiej. Wstęp do socjologii parafii* (Soziale Elemente in der röm.-kath. Gemeinde. Einführung in die Soziologie der Gemeinde) P. 1928.

59) Einer der ersten, die die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Religionspsychologie richtete, war J. Ochorowicz (1830-1913), der Verfasser des Buches: *Bezwiedne tradycje ludzkości* (Unbewußte Traditionen der Menschheit) W. 1898.

60) Vgl. *Czucia rodzajowe jako pierwiastek estetyki i mistycyzmu* (Geschlechtsgefühle als Elemente der Ästhetik und Mistik) 1911; *Modlitwa jako zjawisko kryptomnezji* (Das Gebet als Erscheinungsweise der Kryptomnäsie) Pzeg. Fil. 1912 S. 348 ff; *Psychologia modlitwy* (Die Gebetspsychologie) Myśl Wolna 2 (1923) 4, 5. Über ihn siehe: J. Szmyd, *Rocznik Wolnej Myśli* (1961).

61) Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: J. Szmyd, *Euh.* 10 (1966) 3/4, S. 121-132; Ders., *Euh.* 12 (1968) 1, S. 57-72; T. Pasierbiński, *Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny* 5 (1960) 17 (3).

der im Grunde genommen als erster diese religionswissenschaftliche Disziplin in seiner „Psychologie der Religion“⁶²⁾ systematisch ausformulierte, initiiert wurden. Die Aufgabe der Religionspsychologie sieht er in einer gründlichen Beschreibung dessen, was im religiös lebenden Menschen vor sich geht, und in einer Erklärung der wechselseitigen Bezüge von religiösen, physiologischen und umweltbedingten Umständen⁶³⁾. In seinen Arbeiten bemerkt man die Einflüsse von W. James (Problem des Mystizismus), Wundt, Binet und Galton und sogar von Schleiermacher, dies besonders deshalb, weil er bei seiner Polemik gegen die Leub'sche⁶⁴⁾ These betont, daß nicht alle religiösen Umstände für psychologische Forschungsmethoden faßbar sind und daß „für das Verständnis religiöser Fakten eine geistige Gemeinschaft und ein unmittelbares Verständnis für die Sache selbst unabdingbar sind.“⁶⁵⁾

Die psychologische Forschung hat vor allem Władysław Witwicki (1878-1948)⁶⁶⁾, einer der hervorragenden Platokenner und Übersetzer ins Polnische, im übrigen ein vielseitig begabter Gelehrter⁶⁷⁾, der unter anderem das Werk von W. James in polnischer Sprache herausgegeben hat. Auf dem Gebiet der Religionspsychologie sind seine Forschungen über die Struktur religiösen Gefühls der Intelligenz⁶⁸⁾ am meisten bekannt geworden; in ihnen unterscheidet er den Überzeugungsglauben vom Suppositionsglauben (seine Forschungen beruhen auf einer Analyse des katholischen Glaubens als des in Polen dominierenden). Daneben ist S. Błachowski (1899-1962)⁶⁹⁾ zu erwähnen,

62) *Psychologia religii*, W. 1933 (Posthume Auflage der Vorlesungen von 1913, veröffentlicht in: *Krytyka* 40 (1913).

63) *Krytyka*, a.a.O., S. 22 f.

64) Vgl. J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religions, its Origin, Funktion and Future?*, New York 1912, S. 275.

65) J. W. Dawid, *Psychologia*... a.a.O., S. 40.

66) Über ihn siehe: J. Szmyd, *Euh.* (1963) 1, S. 40-54; 7 (1963) 2, S. 24-36.

67) In seinem umfangreichen Nachlaß finden sich nicht nur zahlreiche Arbeiten über Psychologie, sondern auch über Pädagogik, Kunstgeschichte (er selbst war auch Graphiker und Maler) wie auch eine Übersetzung des Matthäus-Evangeliums (*Dobra Nowina*, W. 1958).

68) *La foi des éclairés*, Paris 1939.

69) Vgl. *The Magical Behaviour of Children in Relation to School*, *The Americ. Jour. of Psych.* 50 (1937) S. 347-361; Ders., *Good Luck Letters. A Contribution to the Psychology of Magical Thinking* in *Kwart. Psych.* 11 (1939). Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: B. Hornowski, *Przegląd Psychologiczny*, 6 (1963); J. Szmyd, *Euh.* 5 (1961) 4, S. 28-37.

der durch seine Forschungen über die Mechanismen religiöser Psychosen bekannt ist; gemeinsame Arbeiten entstanden auch mit S. Boro-wiecki über die Erzeugung von ekstatischen Zuständen und Sinnes-täuschungen.

Als Hilfswissenschaft haben auch katholische Gelehrte Religions-psychologie getrieben, teils im thomistischen Sinne ⁷⁰⁾, teils unter Benützung experimenteller oder psychoanalytischer Methoden ⁷¹⁾. Zu den Vertretern der experimentellen Methode sind unter anderem Geist-liche wie E. Jełowicki ⁷²⁾, L. Skibniewski ⁷³⁾, H. Kazimierowicz ⁷⁴⁾ zu zählen sowie J. Pastuszka ⁷⁵⁾ der bis heute der berühmteste Reprä-sentant dieser religionswissenschaftlichen Richtung in Polen ist. Na-türlich muß an dieser Stelle bemerkt werden, daß die Religionspsy-chologie, mit der man sich in katholischen Kreisen beschäftigte, mehr zur Theologie der Seelsorge als zur Religionswissenschaft gehört.

An der Grenze zwischen Religionssoziologie und Religionspsycho-logie ist die sogenannte soziale Psychologie der Religion ⁷⁶⁾ entstanden, die sich sowohl mit dem religiösen Individuum als auch mit der religiösen Gruppe beschäftigt.

Sämtliche aufgezeigten religionswissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, be-sonders die Religionsethnologie, fanden ihren Ausdruck in der ver-gleichenden Religionswissenschaft ⁷⁷⁾ (genauer: in der allgemeinen

70) Vgl. z.B., K. Wais, in *Przegląd Teologiczny* (= *Prz. Teol.*) 10 (1929) S. 7-9; P. Siwek, *Metody badań zjawisk nadprzyrodzonych* (Methoden der For-schung über übernatürliche Erscheinungen) K. 1933.

71) Vgl. K. Kucharski, *Zmysły i ich rola w religii katolickiej* (Die Sinne und ihre Funktion in der katholischen Religion) Wil. 1937; S. Wuet, *Psychoanaliza a sakrament pokuty* (Psychoanalyse und das Sakrament der Buße) Włocławek 1937; J. Piskorz, *Wiara parafian* (Der Glaube der Gemeinde) Tarnów 1936.

72) Vgl. z.B., *U progu współczesnej psychologii religii* (An der Schwelle der modernen Religionspsychologie) K. 1930.

73) Vgl. z.B., *Psychologiczna diagnoza powołania kapłańskiego* (Psychologische Diagnostik der Kaplansberufung) L. 1934.

74) Vgl. z.B., „Psychoanaliza w konfesjonale” (Psychoanalyse im Beichtstuhl), *Przegląd Katolicki* (Warszawa) 1932, Nr. 30/34.

75) Vgl. z.B., *Filozofia religii Bergsona*, W. 1936; Ders., *Psychologia indy-widualna*, Lub. 1938.

76) Vgl. S. Nałkowski, *O współczesnej formacji religijnej w Polsce* (Über die gegenwärtige Religionsformation in Polen) W. 1918; P. Hulka-Laskowski, *Polska wierząca* (Das gläubige Polen) W. 1929.

77) Als erster hat in Polen J. Archutowski [Porównawcza historia religii” (Vergleichende Religionsgeschichte), *Ateneum Kapłańskie* (= *At. Kap.*) 9 (1913) S. 109-122] den Begriff der „vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft” geprägt.

Religionsgeschichte), mit der sich eine Reihe von Gelehrten aus den verschiedensten Fachbereichen, von der Theologie über Geschichte, Philologie, Ethnologie bis zu der tatsächlichen Religionswissenschaft, beschäftigt hat. Ignacy Radliński (1834-1920)⁷⁸⁾, der Philologie und Orientalistik studierte wird heute als der Vater der polnischen Religionswissenschaft angesehen. Auch Andrzej Niemojewski (1864-1921)⁷⁹⁾, ein Vertreter der mythologischen Schule in Polen⁸⁰⁾, wird zu den bekanntesten Religionswissenschaftler gezählt.

I. Radliński, der 1882 mit einem Aufsatz unter dem Titel „Erstes Blatt der Religionsgeschichte“⁸¹⁾ debütierte, stand unter dem starken Einfluß des Evolutionismus und repräsentierte eine äußerst antiklerikale Meinung⁸²⁾. Er beschäftigte sich mit Studien über das Christentum⁸³⁾, besonders im Rahmen einer philologischen Analyse, die leider im Hinblick auf andere zu seiner Zeit erscheinende philologische Arbeiten schon veraltet war. In Polen wurde er berühmt durch die Popularisierung des Werkes von E. Renan, von welchem seine Schriften beeinflusst sind.

A. Niemojewski, ein vielseitig begabter Denker, anfangs Poet und Schriftsteller, später Aktivist auf politischer und sozialer Ebene, Gründer der Zeitschrift „Myśl Niepodległa“ (Der unabhängige Gedanke) und Übersetzer von Josephus Flavius und E. Renan, konzen-

78) Über sein Leben und seine Bedeutung für die polnische Religionswissenschaft siehe: Cz. Lechicki, *Euh.* 2 (1958) S. 39-48.

79) Zu seiner Biographie und Bibliographie siehe: Z. Poniatowski, in: A. Niemojewski, *Biblia a gwiazdy* (Bibel und Sterne) W. 1959 (2. Aufl.) S. 7-13; H. Chyliński, Einführung in A. Niemojewski, *Bóg czy człowiek* (Gott oder Mensch) W. 1960, S. 5-26.

80) A. Niemojewski, *Gott Jesus im Lichte fremder und eigener Forschungen*, München 1910.

81) Vgl. in *Ognisko* (Festschrift für T. T. Jeż) 1882; er hat jedoch schon 1880 *hebräische Literatur* in: *Dzieje literatury powszechnej* (Allgemeine Literaturgeschichte) (Hrsg. Chmielowski), bearbeitet.

82) Vgl. *Katolicyzm, modernizm i myśl wolna* (Katholizismus, Modernismus und freies Denken) W. 1912; An dieser Stelle ist zu bemerken, daß der Katholizismus in dieser Zeit gegen den Evolutionismus Stellung bezog (siehe dazu: Z. Radziwolski, *L'église catholique de Pologne et l'évolutionisme* (pol.), *Euh.* 13 (1969) 1/2, S. 155-168.

83) Vgl. *Apokryfy judaistyczno-chrześcijańskie*, W. 1905; Ders., *Dzieje Jedyne-go Boga* (Geschichte des einen Gottes) W. 1905; Ders., *Dzieje jednego z synów Bożych* (Die Geschichte eines der Söhne Gottes) W. 1907; Ders., *Dzieje trzech osób w jednym Bogu* (Die Geschichte der drei Personen in einem Gott) W 1915 (1. Teil); Ders., *Jezus, Paweł, Spinoza, rzecz historyczno-społeczna* (Jezus, Paulus, Spinoza — historisch-soziale Betrachtungen) W. 1912.

triierte sich in seiner religionswissenschaftlichen Forschung auf Probleme der Entstehung des Christentums im Sinne der Astralmythologie (Einflüsse von Friedrich Delitzsch)⁸⁴), der in Polen nach dem II. Weltkrieg von seinem Schüler A. Czubryński (1885-1960)⁸⁵ vertreten wurde.

Von sehr großer Bedeutung für die Forschung über Religionen waren auch Altertumsforscher⁸⁶), Historiker, Archäologen und Philologen, von welchen Tadeusz Zieliński (1859-1944)⁸⁷ und Ryszard Gansiniec (Ganszyniec) (1888-1958)⁸⁸ größere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen.

T. Zieliński, Professor an der Universität Petersburg (1887-1920) und Warschau (1920-1934), einer der berühmtesten Kenner der Antike in seiner Zeit⁸⁹), forschte über das Christentum im Geiste des Panhellenismus; er hielt die christliche Religion für die Fortsetzung der griechisch-römischen Glaubensformen. Sein Werk umfaßt 900⁹⁰) wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen, und zwar in deutscher,

84) Vgl. A. Niemojewski, *Objaśnienie katechizmu* (Kommentar zum Katechismus) W. 1911; Ders., *Tajemnica astrologii chrześcijańskiej* (Die Geheimnisse der christlichen Astrologie) W. 1913; Ders., *Horoskopy święte przypowieści ewangelicznych* (Heilige Horoskope der evangelischen Gleichnisse) W. 1917; Ders. *Biblia...* a.a.O., W. 1924.

85) Vgl. z.B., A. Czubryński, Astralistyczna krytyka tekstów Nowego Testamentu, *Euh.* 2 (1958) 2, S. 35-38. Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: Z. Poniatowski, *Euh.* 5 (1961) 2, S. 110 f.

86) Vgl. z.B., R. Gostkowski, *Kapłani i kapłanki w sztuce kretańskomykeńskiej i greckiej* (Priester und Priesterinnen in der kretisch-mykenischen und griechischen Kunst) Wil. 1936; St. Przeworski, Notes d'archeol. syrienne et hittite, in *Syria* 17 (1936) S. 32-44; Ders., Prähistorische Felsenzeichnungen aus Vorderasien, in *Archiv Orientalni* 7 (1935) S. 9-15; H. Markowski, Rozporządzenie Cezara o ochronie grobów i czci pochowanych (Ein kaiserlicher Erlass über den Schutz der Gräber und die Ehre der Bestatteten), *Eos* 17 (1936) S. 43-49; A. Chodźko-Domaniewska, Czy Minerwa nie była samoistnym bóstwem (Ob Minerva eine selbständige Gottheit war?) *Eos* 17 (1936) S. 295-307.

87) Über ihn siehe: A. Rehm, *Jb. der Bayer. Akademie der Wiss.* 1944-1948 (1948); H. Däumling, *Gnomon* 21 (1949) S. 373; St. Srebrny, *Eos* 27 (1947) Fasc. 2. Zielinska-Kenokopi; Mein Vater, Tadeusz Z., *Paläologia* I (1952) 220-233.

88) Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: J. Łanowski, *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki* (= *KHNT*) 3 (1958) 4, S. 629-637; Cz. Lechicki, *Euh.* 2 (1958) 1, S. 3-7; K. Majewski, *Archeologia* 9 (1957) S. 206-210.

89) Einer. Eindruck seiner Bedeutung vermitteln die 5 polnischen und 8 weitere Ehrendokortitel, die ihm vom Ausland verliehen wurden, wie auch die an ihn verliehene Goethemedaille für Kunst und Wissenschaft.

90) Zu seiner Bibliographie siehe in: E. Dąbrowski (Hrsg.), *Religie świata* (Die Weltreligionen) W. 1957, S. 359 ff. G. Pianko, *Meander* 14 (1959) 8-9,

französischer, englischer, spanischer, italienischer, russischer und polnischer Sprache, in denen sehr häufig religionswissenschaftliche Problematik zu finden ist.

P. Gansiniec, Professor an der Universität Poznań (Posen), Lwów (Lemberg), Wrocław (Breslau) und Kraków (Krakau), konzentrierte sich in seinen religionswissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen auf den Ritus⁹¹⁾, den er für das Wesen der Religion hielt, und stellte aus diesem Grunde für Religionshistoriker das Postulat auf, daß man sich aus der Notwendigkeit der Sache mit Heterologie (Geschichte des Kults) als integrelem Teil der Religionswissenschaft zu beschäftigen habe. Seine Ansichten sind deshalb auch ziemlich verwandt mit denen Georg Thomsons (z.B. die magische Funktion des Mythos). Gansiniec's Meinung tritt uns in seinen zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen entgegen, besonders in den Begriffen, die er für „Paulys Realencyclopädie der Stichworte der classischen Altertumswissenschaft“ bearbeitet hat (über 50)⁹²⁾. Versucht man, seine Forschung zu charakterisieren, so stößt man auf Relationen zu Salomon Reinach und manchmal auch zur E. Durkheim-Schule. Entgegen anderslautender Meinungen hat er immer betont, daß „die Mythologie kein zutreffendes Bild von der griechischen Religion wiedergibt“⁹³⁾. Sein reichhaltiger Nachlaß an Schrifttum⁹⁴⁾ umfaßt nicht nur vergleichende Studien über antike Religionen, sondern auch Studien über mittelalterliche religiöse Formen und ihre Verbindung mit dem Altertum⁹⁵⁾.

S. 437-461. Eine besondere Bedeutung für die Religionswissenschaft besitzen: *Rzym i jego religia* (Rom und seine Religion) (1920); *Hermes Trismegistos* (1921); *Chrześcijaństwo starożytne a filozofia rzymska* (Das antike Christentum und die römische Philosophie) (1921); *Religia starożytnej Grecji* (englisch: *The Religion of ancient Greece*, Oxford-London 1926); *Religia hellenizmu; Hellenizm a judaizm; Religia Rzeczypospolitej rzymskiej* (1933-1937).

91) Vgl. z.B., Das Rationale im Glauben und Ritus, in *Historisch-politische Blätter*, 1915, Ders., *De magicis ritibus*, Breslau 1913.

92) z.B. *Adventus*, *Aleuromanteia*, *Israel*, *Katabasis*, *Kranz*, *Ringe*, *Ritus*, *Sacer* u.a.

93) Vgl. *Kwartalnik Klasyczny* 7 (1933) S. 189.

94) Vgl. seine Bibliographie in: *Euh.* 2 (1958) I, S. 4 f.; für Religionswissenschaft von Bedeutung: *Apollo als Heilgott*, in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Medizin* 15 (1923) S. 33-42; *Der Ursprung der Zehngebote Tafeln*, Berlin 1920; *Studia do dziejów magii* (Studien zur Geschichte der Magie). 1922; „De argumentis immortalitatem vulgo adstruetibus particulo primo“, P. 1920.

95) Vgl. z.B., *Pierścień w wierzeniach ludowych starożytnych i średniowiecznych* (Der Ring im Volksglauben des Altertums und des Mittelalters), *Lud* 22 (1923) S. 33-62.

Im Kreis seiner Schüler sind Arbeiten entstanden, die die Thesen über den Ursprung des „Mutter-Erde-Kults“ kritisierten⁹⁶⁾.

Die antiken Religionen wurden auch unter ethnologischen Aspekten erforscht, womit sich in erster Linie W. Klinger (1875-1962) beschäftigt hat. Seine Untersuchungen befassen sich vor allem mit vergleichendem Material zur Volkskultur in der Antike und im Slawentum⁹⁷⁾ und mit den Einflüssen antiker Glaubensformen auf das Christentum⁹⁸⁾.

Eine zentrale Stellung in der polnischen Religionsforschung nahm neben den Untersuchungen über antike Religionen diejenige über den Orient im Altertum⁹⁹⁾ und in der Gegenwart ein. Mit letzteren Problemstellungen befassen sich Orientalisten¹⁰⁰⁾, deren Ergebnisse in dem Werk „Religionen des Orients“¹⁰¹⁾ vorliegen. Mitarbeiter an diesem Werk waren die in Polen führenden Orientalisten, deren wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit noch teilweise im heutigen Polen weitergeführt wird. Einer der bedeutendsten war Jean Przyluski (poln. Jan

96) H. Matakiewicz, (1906-1932), *Fabulae de deorum heroumque natalibus*, K. 1932; Ders., *De Terra Mater a Graecis culte*, in *Eos* 31 (1928) S. 337-364; Über sie siehe: R. Gansiniec, *Kwartalnik Klasyczny*, 6 (1932) S. 235-240.

97) W. Klinger Professor an den Universität Kiew (bis 1920) und Poznań, hat z.B., *Doroczne święta ludowe Europy a tradycja greckorzymska* (Jährliche Volksfeste in Europe und die griechisch-römische Tradition) 1930 verfaßt. Über ihn siehe: J. Krzyżanowski, *Literatura Ludowa*, (1960) 4/5, S. 83-86.

98) Vgl. z.B., *Obrzędowość ludowa Bożego Narodzenia* (Volksritus des Weihnachtsfestes) 1926.

99) Interesse für den Alten Orient war in Polen vorhanden, vor allem wenn man an die Erinnerungen und Berichte von Reisen und an die Anfänge der polnischen Ägyptologie denkt (vgl. J. Pilecki, *Droga polskiego historiografa do egiptologii*. T.S. Smoleński (1184-1909) (Der Weg des polnischen Historiographen zur Ägyptologie...) in *Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Nauki Polskiej*, Ser. A, Fasc. 11 (1967) S. 63-69; siehe auch dazu: G. Maspero, *Annal. des Serv. de Antiq.* 10 (1909) S. 91-99). Zur Geschichte der polnischen Orientalistik siehe: *Szkice z dziejów polskiej orientalistyki* (Hrsg. S. Strelcyn) W. 1957.

100) Am Rande ist zu bemerken, daß in den Jahren 1937-1939 C. Regamey (heute Professor in Fribourg) als Privat-Dozent an der Universität Warszawa tätig war, der sich mit Problemen der indischen Religionen beschäftigte; vgl. *Three Chapters from the Samādhirājasūtra*, W. 1938; *The Bhādrāmāyākāvya-karana, Introduction, Tibetan Text, Translation and Notes*, W. 1938.

101) St. Schayer (Hrsg.), *Religie Wschodu*, W. 1938 unter Mitwirkung: J. Przyluski, *Religie azjatyckie*; T. Zieliński, *Elementy wschodnie w religiach świata antycznego* (Orientalische Elemente in den Religionen der antiken Welt); A. Śmieszek, *Religia egipska*; R. Ransozek, *Religia asyro-babilońskie i hetyckie*; St. Schayer, *Religia irańskie*; Ders., *Braminizm*; Ders., *Buddyzm*; W. Jabłoński, *Religia Chin*; Ders. *Religia Japonii*.

Przyłuski, 1885-1944)¹⁰²⁾ Professor am Collège de France und an der Sorbonne, ein bekannter und allgemein geschätzter Religionswissenschaftler, der seine Aufmerksamkeit auf Probleme der indischen Religionen¹⁰³⁾ und auf die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte¹⁰⁴⁾ richtete. Neben ihm sind folgende Professoren polnischer Universitäten zu erwähnen: St. Schayer (1899-1941)¹⁰⁵⁾, ein hervorragender Indologe, der Ägyptologe A. Śmieszek¹⁰⁶⁾, der Assyrologe R. Ranaszek (geb. 1894)¹⁰⁷⁾ und der Sinologe W. Jabłoński (1901-1957)¹⁰⁸⁾, deren Forschungen vor allem von einer philologischen Textanalyse ausgingen, und die manchmal zur Vertiefung Kenntnisse aus kulturellem Material zu Hilfe nahmen.

Die orientalische Forschung besitzt in Polen eine weit zurückreichende Tradition; hier zu bemerken ist, daß der Koran schon im 19. Jahrhundert übersetzt wurde¹⁰⁹⁾, was auf ein besonderes Interesse, das bis in die Zwischenkriegsperiode andauerte, für die Beschäftigung mit dem Islam¹¹⁰⁾ hinweist. Man beschränkte sich damals jedoch

102) Vgl. über ihn: *RHR*.

103) Vgl. z.B., *Le Bouddhisme*, Paris 1933, *La Cocile de Rājagṛha. Introduction des canons des bouddhiques* Paris 1928; *Totémisme et végétalisme dans l'Inde*, Paris 1927.

104) Vgl. z.B., „Die Mutter-Göttin als Verbindung zwischen den Lokal-Göttern und dem Universal-Gott“, *Eranos* 6 (1938) S. 35-57.

105) St. Schayer ist der Gründer des *Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies* (1937-1939) und der modernen polnischen Orientalistik (über ihn siehe: A. Zajączkowski, in *Szkice ...* a.a.O., S. 43-50), wie auch der Verfasser vieler indologischer Arbeiten: Precanonical Buddhism, in *Archiv Orientalni* 7 (1935) S. 121-132; Das mahāyānistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Mādhyānikas, *Orient. Literaturzeit.* 38 (1935) S. 401-415; *Przyczynki do zagadnienia czasu w filozofii Indii* (Abhandlungen zum Problem der Zeit in der indischen Philosophie), K. 1938; Siehe dazu: C. Regamey, in *Christus und die Religionen der Erde*, Bd. 3 (1961) S. 235-303.

106) Vgl. z.B., *Notes on Egyptian Accent as Evidenced in coptic Nouns*, P. 1935; Ders., *Geneza podania greckiego o Memnonie królu Etiopów* (Die Genese der griechischen Sage über Memnon, den König der Äthiopier) K. 1926.

107) Vgl. z.B., *Kronika króla hetycznego Thuthaljas IV* (Kronik des Hettiterkönigs Thuthaljas IV) W. 1934.

108) Mitglied des 'Société Asiatique' und 'American Oriental Society', Verfasser sinologischer Schriften: *Chuang (Chou) Nau-hua-czê-king* (Übersetzung und Bearbeitung) W. 1953; *Z dziejów literatury chińskiej* (Aus der Geschichte der chinesischen Literatur) W. 1956; *Antologia literatury chińskiej* (Hrsg.) W. 1956.

109) von J. Murza-Buczacki, 2 Bde, W. 1858.

110) Vgl. z.B., M. Aleksandrowicz, *Krótki zarys religii islamu* (Kurzer Abriß der islamischen Religion) Wil. 1937; W. Natanson, *Prądy umysłowe w islamie* (Intellektuelle Strömungen im Islam) L. 1931; D. Künstinger, *Przekład i objaś-*

nicht nur auf den Islam, sondern man übersetzte auch von anderen orientalischen Religionen heilige Schriften¹¹¹⁾ und analysierte deren Strukturen und Formen¹¹²⁾.

Unter philologischen Aspekten trieben auch Slawisten religionswissenschaftliche Studien, welche die im 19. Jahrhundert ausgesetzten Untersuchungen über die ursprünglichen Religionen des Slawentums wieder aufnahmen. An der Spitze dieser Untersuchungen steht ohne Zweifel Alexander Brückner (1855-1939)¹¹³⁾, Professor an der Universität Berlin, der Religion als eine wesentliche Form der Kultur betrachtete. Die von ihm behandelte Problematik des Slawentums wurde von anderen Forschern¹¹⁴⁾ übernommen, die in ihren Abhandlungen die zahlreichen Dokumente der materiellen Kultur berücksichtigten.

Der führende unter diesen war der Sprachwissenschaftler und

nienia 43 sury Koranu (Übersetzung und Interpretation der 43 sury des Koran), K. 1926.

111) Vgl. z.B., O. Pietraszewski, *Zend-Avesta, ou plutôt Zendaschta*, 3. Bde, Berlin 1838 (poln. Übersetzung der Zend-Avésta); S. Michalski-Iwieński, *Upaniszady* (Übersetzung und Kommentar) W. 1924 (2. Apfl.); J. Bromski, *Enuna Eliš, czyli opowieść babilońska o powstaniu świata* (Enuna Eliš, die babylonische Sage über die Entstehung der Welt) W. 1925; J. S. Dzierżbicki, *Legends budyjskie*, W. 1927.

112) Vgl. z.B., W. M. Gielecki, *Pomysły filozoficzne w hymnach Rigwedy* (Philosophische Konzeptionen in den Rig-veda-Hymnen) K. 1911; J. Rozwadowski, *Don Tanons et les Cimmériens*, RO 2 (1919-24) S. 142-144; P. Smolik, *Wśród wyznawców Burchan-Buddy* (Bei den Anhängern des Burchan-Budda) K. 1925; E. Słuszkiewicz, *O duszach, duchach, diablach i demonach indyjskich* (Über die indischen Seelen, Geister, Satanen und Dämonen) L. 1936; A. Gawroński, *Nauka Upaniszadów* (Die Lehre der Upanischaden) W. 1937; H. Willman-Grabowska, *Pojęcia i wyobrażenia czasu w Wedach i Bramana* (L'idée de l'âtman depuis le Rigveda jusqu'aux Brâhmana), *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 13 (1938) S. 1-22. Zur polnischen Indologie siehe: H. Willman-Grabowska, in *Szkice...* a.a.O., S. 237-250 und die dort zitierte Literatur.

113) Er war in der Zwischenkriegsperiode einer der berühmtesten polnischen Slawisten. In seinem umfangreichen Nachlaß befinden sich ca. 1500 bibliographische Positionen (siehe: W. Wisłocki, *Studia staropolskie*, K. 1928) von denen sich viele mit Religionsproblematik auseinandersetzen; vgl. z.B., *Mitologia słowiańska (slawische Mythologie)* K. 1918; *Mitologia polska*, W. 1924; Zur Geschichte des Aberglaubens in Polen, in *Archiv f. Slaw. Phil.* 5 (1892) S. 687 ff; 6 (1893) S. 316 f; *Starożytna Litwa. Ludy i bogi* (Das alte Litauen Völker- und Götter) W. 1904.

114) Vgl. z.B., A. L. Lubicz, *Mitologia słowiańska polług Naruszewicza, Lelewela, Bogusławskiego, Brücknera i Gruszeckiego*, W. 1911; J. Klawe *Totemizm a pierwotne zjawisko religijne w Polsce. Studium porównawcze* (Totemismus und das ursprüngliche Erscheinen von Religion in Polen. Vergleichende Studien.) W. 1920.

Ethnologe Kazimierz Moszyński (1887-1959)¹¹⁵⁾, der Vertreter des sogenannten kritischen Evolutionismus¹¹⁶⁾. In seinen religionswissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen widmet er die Hauptkonzentration der Magie¹¹⁷⁾, der Theorie des Glaubens, Riten und abergläubischen Elementen im Volk¹¹⁸⁾.

Auch in theologischen Kreisen erschien schon 1898 eine religions-ethnische Betrachtung ältester religiöser Formen¹¹⁹⁾. Sie bildete den Anfang einer katholischen Religionswissenschaft¹²⁰⁾. Dies beweist eine große Anzahl von Publikationen, die die Konzeption des Urmonotheismus¹²¹⁾ popularisieren. Daneben gab es jedoch auch originelle Autoren, die von dieser Schule nicht so stark abhängig waren, wie z.B. der noch heute tätige Priester F. Manthey, der eines der ersten Hand-

115) Zu seinem Leben und Werk siehe: B. Moszyńska, *EP* 3 (1960) S. 31-40.

116) Vgl. z.B., K. Moszyński, *Ewolucjonizm krytyczny na tle innych kierunków w etnologii* (Der kritische Evolutionismus im Lichte anderer Richtungen in der Ethnologie) *Lud* 38 (1948) S. 3-27.

117) Vgl. z.B., *Origine de la magie et de la religion*, 1926.

118) Vgl. z.B., *Kultura ludowa Słowian* (Die Volkskultur der Slawen) W. 1934.

119) Vgl. z.B., W. Zaborowski (1830-1900), *Najstarze ludy na świecie. Studium etniczno-religijne* (Die ältesten Völker der Welt, ethnisch-religiöse Studien) K. 1898; Ders., *Pojęcia religijne Persów za Achemenidów* (Religiöse Begriffe bei den Persern in der Achemeniden-Zeit), *Przegląd Powszechny* (Kraków) 27 (1890) S. 49-63; 174-193.

120) Vgl. z.B., I. Radziszewski (1871-1922), *Geneza religii w świetle nauki i filozofii* (Die Genese der Religion im Lichte der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie), *At. Kap.* 7 (1911); A. Pechnik, Artikel über untergegangene Religionen, in *Gazeta kościelna* (Kirchliche Blätter) (1916-1917); S. Szydelski, *Studia nad początkami religii* (Studien über die Entstehung der Religion) L. 1916; Ders., *Początki chrześcijaństwa* (Der Ursprung des Christentums) W. 1911; Ders., *Eschatologia irańska a biblijna*, L. 938; J. Stawarczyk, *Protomandaizm a powstanie gnozy* (Protomandaismus und die Entstehung der Gnosis) L. 1935; Ders., *Zagadnienie mandajskie i próba jego rozwiązania* (Das mandäische Problem und ein Versuch seiner Lösung) W. 1935.

121) Vgl. z.B., J. Kruszyński, *Studia nad porównawczą historią religii* (Studien über die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte) P. 1926 E. Kosibowicz, *Problem ludów pigmejskich* (Probleme der Pygmäenvölker) K. 1927; F. Konieczny, *Modlitwa u ludów pierwotnych. Studium historyczno-religijne*. (Das Gebet bei fremden Völkern) L. 1934; W. Kwiatkowski, *Pierwotny monoteizm wg świadectw etnologii* (Der Urmonotheismus auf der Grundlage ethnologischer Zeugnisse) in *Idee Boga*, W. 1930; Ders. *U kolebki chrześcijaństwa* (An der Wiege des Christentums) W. 1936; E. Dąbrowski, *Historia religii*, W. 1918; S. Szydelski, *Czasy przedhistoryczne w świetle badań Morgana i W. Schmidta* (Prähistorische Zeiten im Lichte der Forschungen von Morgan und Schmidt) *At. Kap.* 19 (1927) S. 126-148.

bücher der Religionsgeschichte¹²²) verfaßte, und weitere Priester, deren Arbeitsgebiet die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte bildete, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religion Indiens und des Islams¹²³). Auch die Exegeten haben wesentliche Bedeutung für die Religionsforschung, von ihnen ist der Professor an der Katholischen Universität in Lublin (KUL) und der Jagiellonischen Universität in Krakau (UJ) Józef Archutowski (1879-1944)¹²⁴) zu erwähnen. Er hat nicht nur in die katholische Theologie Polens als erster moderne Methoden der Bibelexegese eingeführt, die von einem breiten historischen Kontext ausgehen, sondern auch den Begriff der vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft geprägt. Außer ihm waren noch St. Szczepański¹²⁵) u.a. katholische Wissenschaftler¹²⁶) tätig.

Neben diesem Kreis setzten sich jedoch ebenfalls protestantische Theologen der Fakultät für evangelische Theologie an der Universität Warschau mit Religionswissenschaft auseinander. Dort befand sich ein Lehrstuhl für Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie unter der Leitung des damaligen Dozenten W. Niemczyk (geb. 1898)¹²⁷),

122) Vgl. F. Manthey, *Historia religii w zarysie*, Pelpin 1935; Ders., *Magia a religia* Pelpin 1936; Ders., *Powstanie duszy ludzkiej wg. wyobrażeń ludów* (Die Entstehung der menschlichen Seele nach der Vorstellung der Völker), *Roczniki Teologiczno-kanoniczne* (= RTK) 3 (1957) 2.

123) Vgl. z.B., A. Taczak, *Buddyzm a chrześcijaństwo* (Buddhismus und Christentum) P. 1918; W. M. Dębicki, *Buddyzm i chrystianizm* W. 1901; T. Radkowski, *Derwisy. Sufizm w religii Mahometa*, W. 1916.

124) Vgl. z.B., J. Archutowski, *Patriarchat czy matriarchat*, 1910; *Monoteizm izraelski i jego geneza* (Der israelitische Monotheismus und seine Genese) 1924; *Kosmogonia biblijna w świetle starowschodnich opowiadań i nauki* (Die biblische Kosmogonie im Lichte altorientalischer Erzählungen und Wissenschaft) 1934; Über sein Leben und Werk siehe: St. Grzybek, *Ruch Biblijny i Liturgiczny* (= RBL) 3 (1950) S. 164-173.

125) Vgl. z.B., St. Szczepański, *Najstarsze cywilizacje Wschodu klasycznego, Babilon* (Die älteste Zivilisation des klassischen Orients, Babylon) W.-L., 1923; Ders., *Mieszkańcy Palestyny pierwotnej* (Die Bewohner Alt-Palästinas) K. 1920.

126) Vgl. z.B., F. Rózański, *Israelici, ich religia, obyczaje i zwyczaje* (Israel, seine Religion, Sitten und Moral) 2 Bde, L. 1879 (2. Aufl.); J. Poplich, *Niektóre źródła babilońskiego opowiadania o potopie* (Verschiedene Quellen zur babylonischen Sintflut-Erzählung) *Prz. Teol.* 3 (1922) S. 137-141; J. Jelito, *Ślady kultury hetejskiej w Palestynie* (Spuren hettischer Kultur in Palästina) *Prz. Teol.* 8 (1927) S. 58-63, 189-192; J. Kruszyński, *Religia izraelska w okresie przedmojżeszowym* (Die israelitische Religion vor Moses) *At. Kap.* 34 (1934) S. 1-19; J. Teodorowicz, *Od Jahwe do Mesjasza* (Von Jahwe zum Messias) P. 1936.

127) Vgl. z.B., W. Niemczyk, *Idea zbawienia i odkupienia w religii Starego Testamentu* (Die Heils- und Erlösungsidee in der Religion des AT) K. 1932.

heute Professor an der Christlich-Theologischen Akademie (ChAT)¹²⁸) in Warschau. Seine Interessen richteten sich auf indische Religionen, die er auch in Vergleich zum Christentum stellte¹²⁹). Auch Professor J. Szeruda (1889-1962)¹³⁰), einer der bedeutendsten Exegeten und Hebraisten, widmet sich in den fünfziger Jahren als einer der ersten den Fragen der Qumranforschung¹³¹).

Außerhalb des Universitätssektors repräsentiert in protestantischen Kreisen P. Hulka-Laskowski (1881-1946)¹³²) die Religionswissenschaft, die zur überkonfessionellen Betrachtungsweise der Religion und ihres Wesens oszilliert. Seine Tendenz zum Antikatholizismus ist jedoch nicht zu leugnen.

Entscheidende Bedeutung für die gegenwärtige polnische Religionswissenschaft hat der Rückgriff auf die marxistischen Religionswissenschaftler der Zwischenkriegsperiode, was sich am Beispiel von Jan Hempel (1877-1937)¹³³) illustrieren läßt. Er beschäftigte sich mit dem Christentum und seiner Kritik. Darin ist der Einfluß von K.

Heute gehört er zu den Übersetzern der neuen polnischen *Bibel* im Rahmen der British and Foreign Bible Society.

128) Dazu siehe: E. Kneifel, *Geschichte der Ev.-Augsb. Kirche in Polen*, Niedermarschacht 1962, S. 213-218, 240-245; *Kirche im Osten* (= Kir. Ost.) 2 (1959) S. 132, 3 (1960) S. 145, 5 (1962) S. 153, 6 (1963) S. 141, 7 (1964) S. 164, 8 (1965) S. 162, 9 (1966) S. 142, 11 (1968) S. 140, 12 (1969) S. 138.

129) Vgl. z.B., W. Niemczyk, *Problematyka cierpienia w Religii i Filozofii* (Das Problem des Leidens in Religion und Philosophie) K. 1937.

130) *Das Wort Jahwes* (Diss. Basel) 1920; *Narodowy i uniwersalny charakter religii żydowskiej* (Der nationale und universale Charakter der israelitischen Religion) W. 1922; siehe auch: *RGG* (3) Register, 242.

131) Vgl. J. Szeruda, *Odkrycie rękopisu biblijnego (IQIs)*, *Strażnica Ewangelicka*, 6 (1951) S. 14; Ders., *Uwagi gramatyczne i tekstowo-krytyczne do nowo odkrytego rękopisu hebrajskiego Izajasza z Ain Fesha* (Grammatische und textkritische Bemerkungen zum neuentdeckten hebräischen Manuskript Jesajas) *RO* 19 (1954) S. 144-162.

132) Zu Leben und Werk siehe: H. Wroński, Einführung in P. Hulka-Laskowski, *Pięć wieków herezji*, W. 1960; Cz. Lechicki, in *Jednota* 21 (1963) 9; Bibliographie in *Słownik Współczesnych Pisarzy Polskich* W. 1963, S. 690-694; A. Badura, in *Jednota* 25 (1967) 2, S. 19-21. In deutscher Sprache sind veröffentlicht: P. Hulka-Laskowski, *Der Klosterprozess von Czenstochowa*, Frankfurt/M 1912; Ders., *Religiöse Sekten in Polen*, Frankfurt/M 1919.

133) Zu Leben und Werk siehe: W. Papiewska, *Jan Hempel*, W. 1958; für die Religionswissenschaft sind wichtig: J. Hempel, *Ewangelie, ich powstanie i znaczenie* (Evangelien, ihre Entstehung und Bedeutung) W. 1923; Ders., *Dziesięcioro przykazań* (10 Gebote) W. 1924; Ders., *Bohaterska etyka Ramajany* (Heldische Ethik der Ramayana) Lub. 1914.

Kautsky¹³⁴⁾ und H. Cunow¹³⁵⁾ zu erkennen, deren Schriften er auch in die polnische Sprache übersetzte.

Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg haben sich in Polen in Folge der Umwälzungen auf sozial-politischer Ebene auch die Strukturen der Wissenschaft verändert. Im großen und ganzen traten jedoch in den ersten zehn Jahren der Nachkriegszeit dieselben Forscher an die Öffentlichkeit, die sich auch schon vor dem Kriege einen Namen gemacht hatten, so z.B. Orientalisten¹³⁶⁾, Historiker¹³⁷⁾, Philologen¹³⁸⁾ Ethnologen¹³⁹⁾, und Archäologen¹⁴⁰⁾, die alle die vorher initiierte religionswissenschaftliche Forschung weiterführten¹⁴¹⁾. Mit dem Augenblick des Erscheinens der „Religionswissenschaftlichen Rundschau. Euhe-

134) *Der Ursprung des Christentums* (pol. W. 1923).

135) *Der Ursprung der Religion und des Gottesglaubens* (pol. W. 1927).

136) Vgl. z.B., W. Jabłoński, „Etyka a etykieta konfucjańska” (Ethik und Etikette des Konfuzianismus) *Sprawozdania PAU* (= *Spr. PAU*) 51 (1950) S. 13-15; H. Willman-Grabowska, *Demonologia Athervavedy*, *Spr. PAU* 49 (1948) S. 3-7; St. F. Michalski, *Ścieżka prawdy (palii)* (Wege der Wahrheit) Ło. 1948; E. Śluszkiewicz, *Państwo i społeczeństwo w dawnych Indiach* (Staat und Gesellschaft im alten Indien) W. 1949; dazu siehe auch: H. Willman-Grabowska, *Szkice...* a.a.O., S. 248-250.

137) Vgl. z.B., A. Szelański, *Kulty drzewne i mit ozyrysowy* (Baumkulte und der osirianische Mythos), *Myśl współczesna*, (1948) 6/7 S. 374-383; M. Markowska, *Mity greckie* (Griechische Mythologie) W. 1953 (2. Aufl.); A. Chodźko-Domaniewska, O pierwiastkach egejskich w religii greckiej (Ägäische Elemente in der griechischen Religion) *Meander* 4 (1949) 9, S. 441-450; R. Gansiniec, eine große Anzahl von Artikeln über antike Religionen in *Filomata* (Kraków).

138) Vgl. z.B., T. Milewski, *Religia Azteków*, in *Aztek Anonim. Zdobywanie Meksyku*, Wr.-K. 1959, S. XXVI-XXXVI; G. Labuda, *Słowiańszczyzna pierwotna* (Die Ursprünge des Slawentums) W. 1954.

139) Vgl. z.B., J. Czekanowski, *Wstęp do historii Słowian* (Einführung in die Geschichte der Slawen) W. 1957; J. St. Bystróż, *Etnografia Polski*, P. 1947.

140) Vgl. z.B., J. Krajewska (1901-1960); zu Ihrem Leben und Werk siehe: J. Rosen-Przeworska, in *Lud* 47 (1961) S. 609-614; K. Judenko, *Euha* 5 (1961) 2, S. 110. W. Antoniewicz, O religii dawnych Słowian (Über die Religion der alten Slawen), *Światowid* 20 (1948/49) S. 327-343; K. Majewski, Les champs de sépulture d'Ukraine et le problème de la genèse des Slaves orientaux (pol. mit Résumé), *Archeologia* 2 (1948) S. 167-176 (493) und weitere zahlreiche Artikel über slawische und frühgriechische Religionen in *Archeologia*.

141) In der Periode des marxistischen Dogmatismus (Stalinismus), der die damalige Wissenschaftsstruktur implizierte, hielt man die Religionswissenschaft für eine der „Arbeiterklasse gegenüber feindlich eingestellte, bourgeoise Lehre”.

Nach den politischen Umwälzungen im Oktober 1956 änderte sich auch die Politik auf kultureller Ebene, so daß sich Religionswissenschaft als selbständige Disziplin etablieren konnte.

mer" ¹⁴²⁾ im Jahre 1957 und der Gründung der „Polnischen Gesellschaft für Religionswissenschaft“ (Polskie Towarzystwo Religioznawcze) ¹⁴³⁾, deren Organ die Zeitschrift ist, wurde auch die Religionswissenschaft eine selbständige wissenschaftliche Disziplin. Schon kurze Zeit später gründete man innerhalb der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Polska Akademia Nauk) ¹⁴⁴⁾ eine religionswissenschaftliche Abteilung, die heute unter der Leitung des ehemaligen Professors für Ethik an der KUL, J. Keller steht, und deren Organ „*Studia religioznawcze*“ (Religionswissenschaftlichen Studien, von 1 (1969) 1/2) ist.

Die Religionswissenschaftler, die sich in großer Anzahl in den Forschungszentren zusammenfinden, legen ihre religionswissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen sehr breit an; sie teilen diese Wissenschaft in folgende Gruppe auf ¹⁴⁵⁾: (1) Allgemeine Religionstheorie, Methodologie und Geschichte der Religionswissenschaft ¹⁴⁶⁾; (2) verglei-

¹⁴²⁾ Die erste Nummer für November-Dezember erschien im Jahre 1957. Die Redaktion hatte der führende polnische Repräsentant des atheistischen Denkes, A. Nowicki inne. (Das *Inhaltsverzeichnis* der Jahrgänge 1960-1962 wurde auch in französischer Sprache abgedruckt, ebenfalls von 1963 in englischer Sprache, so daß diese Artikel nach dem französischen Verzeichnis zitiert sind.)

¹⁴³⁾ Sie wurde am 24.06. 1958, anfangs unter der Leitung des Professors für Philosophie an der Universität Warschau, J. Legowicz (vorher Professor an der KUL), später unter der Leitung von Prof. W. Łukaszewicz, gegründet. Weitere Gründungsmitglieder waren: A. Czubryński, E. Kriegewicz, Cz. Lechicki, T. Margul, M. Nowaczyk, Z. Poniatowski, H. Rosen, A. Szelański, H. Świątkowski. Dazu siehe: *Euh.* 1 (1957) 1, S. 125; 2 (1958) 4, S. 97; 5 (1961) 3, S. 108-113.

¹⁴⁴⁾ Am Anfang im Jahre 1961, ist „Zakład Religioznawstwa“ (Religionswissenschaftliche Abteilung) im Rahmen des Instituts für Soziologie und Philosophie der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Direktor: Prof. Dr. J. Legowicz) entstanden, welche in einzelne Sektionen unterteilt war: a) für Geschichte und Theorie des Christentums unter der Leitung von J. Keller, b) für Geschichte und Theorie des Atheismus unter der Leitung von A. Nowicki, c) für Geschichte und Methodologie der Religionswissenschaft unter der Leitung von Z. Poniatowski; vgl. *Euh.* 8 (1964) 1, S. 91 ff.

¹⁴⁵⁾ Vgl. *Sommaire Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 95.

¹⁴⁶⁾ Diese Disziplin entstand durch die Initiative von Z. Poniatowski, als Metareligionswissenschaft. Ihre Aufgabe sieht er in einer Abgrenzung des Bereichs der Religionswissenschaft und in der Bezeichnung seiner Spezifik, Methodologie und Geschichte. Vgl. Z. Poniatowski, *O istocie i strukturze religii* (Über Wesen und Struktur der Religion) *Katowice* (= *Kat.*) 1958; Ders., *Wstęp... a.a.O.*; Ders., Einführung in *Zarys dziejów religii* (Abriß der Religionsgeschichte) W. 1964; Ders., *Treść wierzeń religijnych* (Inhalt des religiösen Glaubens) W. 1965; Ders., und M. Nowaczyk, *Théorie générale de la religion*,

chende Religionsgeschichte¹⁴⁷); (3) Religionssoziologie¹⁴⁸); (4) Religionspsychologie¹⁴⁹); (5) Religionsethnologie¹⁵⁰); (6) Theorie und Geschichte des Christentums¹⁵¹); (a) Problematik der Genese

methodologie et l'histoire de la science des religions (pol.) *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 5-19; T. Margul, *Sto lat nauki o religiach* (Hundert Jahre Religionswissenschaft) W. 1964.

147) Zu diesem Gebiet ist zahlreiche Literatur entstanden, siehe: H. Swienko, *Matériaux à la bibliographie de la science des religions*. Publications (1945-1966), (poln.), *Euh.* 11 (1967) 1/2, S. 177-201 und weitere bibliographische Materialien in *Euhemer*. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen: Z. Poniatowski (Hrsg.), *Zarys...* a.a.O.; Ders., (Hrsg.) *Mały słownik religioznawczy* (Kleines religionswissenschaftliches Wörterbuch) W. 1969; T. Margul der sich in erster Linie auf die Religion Indiens (vgl. „Present-Day Worship of the Cow in India“, *Numen* 15 (1968) S. 63-80) wie auch auf die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte, spezialisierte (vgl. z.B., *Mity z pięciu części świata* (Mythen aus 5 Erdteilen) W. 1966; Ders., *L'histoire comparée de la religion* (pol.) *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 21-30.

148) Zu den führenden Repräsentanten dieser Richtung gehört E. Ciupak, der die Traditionen der polnischen soziologischen Schule fortführt (vgl. z.B., *Kultura religijna wsi* (Die religiöse Kultur des Dorfes) W. 1961. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind seine Forschungen am polnischen Katholizismus, vgl. dazu: Ders., *Kult religijny i jego społeczne podłoże. Studia nad polskim katolicyzmem*. W. 1965; siehe auch zu dieser Problematik: M. Kościuszkiewicz, *Bibliografia badań socjologicznych nad postawami religijno-moralnymi* (Bibliographie der soziologischen Forschung über religiöse Moralpositionen), *Studia Socjologiczne*, (1964) 4; K. Judenکو und Z. Poniatowski, *Sociologie de la religion*, *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 31-43 (pol.).

149) Leider kann man noch nicht von eigenständigen Forschungsergebnissen sprechen, da man sich seither nur mit der Geschichte der Religionspsychologie beschäftigte. Vgl. J. Szmyd, *Psychologie de la religion* (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 43-47.

150) Hier konzentriert sich die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Religionsgenese (vgl. z.B., St. Kowalski, *Spór o religię pierwotną* (Die Auseinandersetzung um die ursprüngliche Religion) W. 1966 (2. Aufl.)) und auf die Fremdvölkerreligionen (vgl. z.B., A. Kuczyński, *Le pluralisme des âmes dans les croyances des peuples paléoasiatiques* (pol.) *Euh.* 12 (1968) 1, S. 37-46), man muß jedoch feststellen, daß Ethnologen mit wenigen Ausnahmen, außerhalb von *Euhemer* und der 'Polnischen Religionswissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft' forschen. Vgl. H. Swienko, *Ethnographie religieuse* (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 49-60.

151) Diese Disziplin übernimmt in erster Linie eine kritische Analyse einer katholischen theologischen Literatur, die man nicht als Randerscheinung dieser Forschung betrachten kann, da eines der wesentlichen Elemente der polnischen marxistischen Religionswissenschaft die Polemik der katholischen Interpretation der Religionswissenschaft ist. Andererseits werden ausführliche Forschungen über die Genese des Christentums angestellt, wozu man auch die Qumranforschung zählt, die im Sinne der ersten Auslegungen von A. Dupont-Sommer oder J. Allegro betrieben wird (vgl. dazu W. Tyloch, *Rękopisy z Qumran nad Morzem Martwym* (Manuskripte aus Qumran am Toten Meer) W. 1963; Ders., *Aspekty społeczne gminy z Qumran* (Soziale Aspekte der Gemeinde von Qumran) W. 1968; weiter siehe: Z. J. Kapera, *La bibliographie polonaise des manuscrits de la Mer Morte*

des Christentums (Urchristentum), (b) Kirchengeschichte, (c) Die Anfänge und die Organisation der Kirche in Polen, (d) ethische Problemstellung, (e) katholische Sozialdoktrinen, (f) kanonisches Recht, (g) außerkatholische Bekenntnisse¹⁵²); (7) christliche Philosophie¹⁵³); (8) Atheographie (Atheismus, seine Geschichte und Theorie)¹⁵⁴).

Die Religionswissenschaft, die sich als marxistisch bezeichnet¹⁵⁵) geht von der These der Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie¹⁵⁶) aus und beschäftigt sich dennoch mit Disziplinen, die untrennbar mit Theologie verbunden sind,¹⁵⁷) was die oben erwähnte Gliederung beweist.

(pol.), *Euh.* 12 (1968) 2, S. 129-140 wie auch Bibliographie in *Revue du Qumran*).

Des weiteren findet man dort auch historische Problematiken, die sich auf die Funktion der Kirche in der Geschichte Polens beschränken, wie auch allgemeine Probleme der Kirchengeschichte und katholischen Philosophie (Kritik des Neothomismus und Personalismus) mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Dialoge und der Ökumenismusthematik. Vgl. J. Keller, *La théorie et l'histoire du christianisme* (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 61-69.

152) Diese Teilung der „Theorie und der Geschichte des Christentums“ scheint durch die wissenschaftliche Herkunft des Professors J. Keller impliziert zu sein, der in seiner Zeit als Professor für katholische Ethik zu den führenden Persönlichkeiten der katholischen Universität in Lublin gehörte und der immer die Notwendigkeit der Fortführung dieser charakteristischen Disziplin der katholischen Theologie, die heutzutage als kritischer Apparat gegen die gegenwärtigen Tendenzen des Katholizismus in Polen gebraucht wird.

153) Diese Disziplin ist mehr ein Hilfsmittel der Religionswissenschaft, in der man von einem marxistisch-philosophischen Standpunkt aus die christliche Philosophie in Geschichte und Gegenwart zu analysieren und zu kritisieren versucht. Vgl. z.B. J. Legowicz, *Filozofia okresu cesarstwa rzymskiego* (Philosophie der römischen Kaiserzeit) W. 1962; W. Heinrich, *Historia filozofii średniowiecznej* (Geschichte der Philosophie des MA) W. 1965; L. Kołakowski, *Notatki o współczesnej kontrreformacji* (Notizen zur Gegenreformation der Gegenwart) W. 1962; T. Płużański, *Theilhard de Chardin*, W. 1964; siehe dazu: J. Borgosz, *La philosophie chrétienne* (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 71-81.

154) Vgl. A. Nowicki, *Esquisse de l'histoire de l'athéographie en Pologne*, (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 6, S. 83-89 und da zitierte Literatur.

155) Vgl. A. Nowicki, *Rola kategorii 'formy' i 'treści' w definiowaniu religii i ateizmu* (Die Funktion der Kategorien 'Form' und 'Inhalt' bei der Religion und des Atheismus), *Euh.* 2 (1958) 3, S. 17-30; Ders., *Les catégories centrales de la science marxiste des religions*, (pol.) *Euh.* 13 (1969) 1/2, S. 3-17 (pol.). *Mata Encyklopedia Religioznawstwa Marksistowskiego* (Kleine Enzyklopädie der marxistischen Religionswissenschaft) *Euh.* 14 (1970) 3/4.

156) Vgl. z.B., T. Kotarbiński, *Wykłady z dziejów logiki* (Vorlesungen aus der Logik Geschichte) Ło. 1957; Ders., *O pojęciu metody* (Über den Begriff Methode) W. 1957, S. 3 f; Z. Poniatowski, *Nauka a religia* (Wissenschaft und Religion) W. 1963.

Die Charakteristika, die Ziele und die Doktrinen dieser religionswissenschaftlichen Kreise weisen, trotz allgemein vorgegebenem, theoretischem Programm, keine einheitlichen Ansichten auf. Dieser Mangel wird sogar in zentralen methodologischen Punkten offenkundig. Die Auseinandersetzung wird durch folgende Aussage von A. Nowicki in scharfen Konturen umrissen: „... für uns Marxisten ist der höchste Wert nicht diese oder jene Religionsstruktur, sondern die soziale Funktion, die die jeweilige Religion erfüllt“¹⁵⁸). Von Seiten des führenden Methodologen der polnischen Religionswissenschaft, Z. Poniatowski¹⁵⁹), und einigen bedeutenden Orientalisten¹⁶⁰), die zu

157) Vgl. M. Nowaczyk, *La théorie marxiste de la religion* (pol.), 5 (1961) 1, S. 106-124; viele der hier erwähnten Disziplinen werden im Westen zur Theologie gezählt, jedoch kann man auch dort schon Tendenzen zur Integration der Religionswissenschaft in die Theologie sehen, so vor allem in Skandinavien (vgl. dazu: C.-M. Edsman, Theologie oder Religionswissenschaft?, *Theol. Rund. NF* (1970) S. 1-32). Sie sind jedoch nicht so scharf abgegrenzt wie in der polnischen Religionswissenschaft, wo man von einer negativen Kritik der Religion ausgeht.

158) Vgl. A. Nowicki, *Euh.* 4 (1960) 5/6, S. 197.

159) Vgl. Z. Poniatowski, *Treść...* a.a.O., S. 15 f.

160) Vgl. S. Strelcyn, in: La discussion avec les orientalistes (pol.) *Euh.* 5 (1961) 5, 68: „...obwohl — ich zitiere nach Dr. Nowicki — ‚die soziale Funktion der Religion objektiv das wichtigste (für die religionswissenschaftliche Forschung) ist‘, läßt sich dennoch nicht postulieren, daß sich ein Orientalist oder Philologe ausschließlich mit dieser Disziplin zu beschäftigen hat. Was trägt es denn aus, daß ich als Äthiopist bei Forschungen über die christliche Religion der Bevölkerung Abessiniens in Richtung der Vorschläge von Dr. Nowicki gehe und mit den Problemen der sozialen Funktion, mit der Analyse des religiösen Schrifttums Abessiniens beginne? Was bringt das? Im Grunde genommen finde ich dann nichts anderes als das, was man im Katholizismus findet, der auch für Nichtorientalisten ein einfaches Forschungsobjekt ist.“ wie auch W. Kortański, a.a.O., S. 72: „...Besonders beunruhigend sind Nowicki's weitere Ausführungen, die besagen, daß die soziale Funktion (der Religion) als Funktion der Klassen zu verstehen sei. Man kann zwar nicht bestreiten, daß viele Aspekte des religiösen Lebens in der Gesellschaft etwas mit der Problematik des Klassenkampfes gemeinsam haben; es ist wichtig, solche Momente in die Forschung einzubeziehen, jedoch, wäre es nicht falsch, andere mögliche Erscheinungsformen von sozialem Belang in der Religion unberücksichtigt zu lassen? (...) Es ist klar, daß jede Erscheinung (religiöse) auf einem ganz bestimmten Forschungsgebiet seine ganz bestimmte Ursachen und Konsequenzen in den sozialen Beziehungen wie auch in den Existenzsituationen einer bestimmten ethnischen Gruppe hat, so daß die Aufgabe des Religionswissenschaftlers, meiner Meinung nach, in einer adäquaten Nachweisung ganz bestimmter Implikationen besteht, z.B. in vielen, vor allem primitiven Religionen, der Nachweis der bedeutenden Funktion der Magie (...) wo anders wieder ist es wichtig, seine Aufmerksamkeit auf Reformatoren der Religion zu richten (...).“

den Herausgebern von *Euhemer* gehören, wurde er heftig kritisiert.

A. Nowicki, Hauptideologe der marxistischen Religionswissenschaft, bekannt durch seine Arbeiten über den Atheismus und seine Geschichte¹⁶¹), benutzt trotz seiner Abneigung gegen den Strukturalismus und Phänomenologie Begriffe, die charakteristisch sind für religiöse Strukturen, was u.a. der Begriff „Unsterblichkeit“¹⁶²) in seiner Theorie des Atheismus beweist.

Um die Entwicklung der heutigen polnischen Religionswissenschaft macht sich vor allem Zygmunt Poniatowski verdient. Er — der als erster in Polen in Fach Religionswissenschaft habilitierte — unternahm den Versuch diese Wissenschaft dem breiteren Publikum zugänglich zu machen. In seinen mehr als 160 Publikationen liegt das Hauptgewicht auf dem Problem der Entstehung des Christentums.

Dieser religionswissenschaftliche Kreis versuchte die erheblichen Lücken in der polnischen religionswissenschaftlichen Literatur nicht nur durch eigene Veröffentlichungen¹⁶³), sondern auch mit Übersetzungen der klassischen Werke weltlicher religionswissenschaftlicher Literatur, wie z.B. von O. James, R. Pettazzoni, M. Eliade, R. Otto, J. Wach¹⁶⁴) (in Vorbereitung sind M. Weber, G. van de Leeuw und C. G. Jung), zu schließen.

Dem marxistischen Forschungsprogramm präzise untergeordnet sind die Abhandlungen über die soziale Funktion der Religion¹⁶⁵),

161) Vgl. z.B., A. Nowicki, *Wykłady o krytyce religii* (Vorlesungen zur Kritik der Religion) W. 1963; mehrere Abhandlungen über G. Bruno und Vanini, besonders in *Euh.* (z.B. Les exemplaires des premières éditions des oeuvres de Vanini dans les bibliothèques du monde, (pol.) *Euh.* 9 (1965) 5, S. 3-31; 10 (1966) 3/4, S. 103-120; 11 (1967) 1/2, S. 171-176).

162) Vgl. A. Nowicki, La perspective athéiste de l'immortalité, (pol.), *Euh.* 11 (1967) 1/2, S. 45-51.

163) Vgl. z.B. Z. Poniatowski, *Zarys...* a.a.O. (2. Aufl. hrsg. von J. Keller); T. Margul, *Present-Day...* a.a.O.; J. Wierusz-Kowalski, *Les principaux éléments de la structure du langage sacré* (pol. mit Résumé in russ., engl. und franz.) *Studia Rel.* 1 (1966) 1/2 S. 33-54, siehe auch: „Register zu Euhemer (1957-1966)“ in *Euh.* 11 (1967) 1/2, und hier bereits zitierte Literatur.

164) Das Programm dieser Reihe (Seria „R“) ist von A. Nowicki kritisiert worden (vgl. *Les catégories...* a.a.O., S. 12 f), besonders in Hinsicht auf R. Otto und M. Eliade als äußerst gefährlich für die richtige Entwicklung der marxistischen Religionswissenschaft.

165) Vgl. z.B., E. Stuszkiewicz, La fonction sociale der Mānavadharmasāstra, (pol.), *Euh.* 6 (1962) 3, S. 15-19; J. Tabaczyńska, Le culte de l'empereur au Japon (pol.), *Euh.* 5 (1961) 1, S. 3-12; W. Tyloch, La fonction sociale de L'Ancien Testament. Le problème de l'esclavage à la lumière de certains textes

über den Zerfall von Religionen ¹⁶⁶) und über den Atheismus ¹⁶⁷). Außerdem beschäftigen sich marxistische Religionswissenschaftler mit allgemeiner Religionsgeschichte. Veröffentlichungen darüber stammen hauptsächlich von Orientalisten ¹⁶⁸). In der Zeitschrift *Euhemer* erscheinen Artikel, deren Themen im Westen nur von Exegeten bearbeitet werden. ¹⁶⁹)

Des weiteren lenkten Philosophen ihre Aufmerksamkeit den Religionen zu, so vor allem L. Kotakowski ¹⁷⁰), B. Suchodolski ¹⁷¹) u.a., deren Thesen nicht immer den Interpretationen des ideologischen Überbaus entsprechen, deren Vertreter Nowicki ¹⁷²) ist. Er postuliert eine

du Pentateuque (pol.), *Euh.* 6 (1962) 5, S. 3-17; 6 (1962) 6, S. 11-19; Ders., La fonction sociale du Nouveau Testament, (pol.), *Euh.* 8 (1964) 4, S. 3-16; T. Żbikowski, Confucius et la fonction sociale du confucianisme (pol.), *Euh.* 9 (1965) 3, S. 9-21; St. Piekarczyk, Les fonctions sociales des religions et la morale des dieux scandinaves (pol.), *Euh.* 7 (1963) 1, S. 3-16.

¹⁶⁶) Vgl. z.B., Margul, L'extinction du culte de Mardouk babylonien (pol.), *Euh.* 9 (1965) 4, S. 3-12; Ders., Le procès de l'extinction de la religion de l'ancienne Égypte (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 1, S. 5-15.

¹⁶⁷) Vgl. z.B., J. Gałęcki, L'athéisme de Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) (pol.), *Euh.* 9 (1965) 5, S. 87-102; M. Skrzypek, L'athéisme de Meslier (1664-1729) (pol.), *Euh.* 10 (1966) 5, S. 45-54.

¹⁶⁸) Vgl. z.B. S. Strelcyn, Un magicien grec en Éthiopie, *JA* 239 (1951) S. 175-191; Ders., *Prières magiques éthiopiennes pour délier les charmes*, W. 1955 (weitere siehe in *Euh.* 12 (1968) 2, S. 142-Bibliog.) St. Kałużynski, Les religions du Tibet (pol.), *Euh.* 5 (1961) 4, S. 3-16; Ders., Le chamanisme (pol.), *Euh.* 7 (1963) 2, S. 63-81; E. Słuszkiewicz, *Budda i jego nauka* (Buddha und seine Lehre) W. 1965; W. Kotański, *Zarys dziejów religii Japonii* (Abriß der Geschichte der Religion in Japan) W. 1965; W. Tyloch, 30 ans de découvertes à Ras Shamra-Ugarit (pol.), *Euh.* 4 (1960) 1, S. 92-112; Ders., Culture et Religion des Hittites (pol.), *Euh.* 4 (1960) 3, S. 94-109.

¹⁶⁹) Vgl. z.B., Z. Poniatowski, État de recherches sur le problème de Logos (pol.), *Euh.* 6 (1962) 6, S. 3-10; Ders., Les recherches statistiques sur le Nouveau Testament (pol.), *Euh.* 9 (1965) 4, S. 13-27; Ders., Le prologue de l'Évangile selon Jean — un hymne préchrétien? (pol.), *Euh.* 11 (1967) 4/5, S. 59-70; Ders., *Au commencement était le Logos* (In 1, 1a), *Studia Rel.* 1 (1969) 1/2 S. 55-80 (pol. mit Résumé).

¹⁷⁰) Über die polnische Philosophie und ihre Tendenzen siehe: Z. A. Jordan, Marxistischer Revisionismus in Polen, in *Marxismusstudien*, 5 Folge (1968) S. 85-129 und die dort zitierte Literatur; L. Kotakowski, *Kultura i fetysze*, W. 1967; Ders., *Świadomość religijna i więź kościelna*, W. 1965 (franz. *Chrétiens sans Eglise. La connaissance religieuse et le lien confessionnel au XVII^e siècle*. Leiden 1969); Ders., Einführung zu: M. Eliade, *Traité...* (pol. Übersetzung) W. 1966, S. XI-XV.

¹⁷¹) Vgl. z.B., Filozofia mitu, in *Nauka i sztuka* (1946) 5/6, S. 191-211; *Idea mitu*, a.a.O., (1946) 1, S. 27-47.

¹⁷²) Vgl. A. Nowicki, *Les catégories...* a.a.O., S. 13 f.

für die UDSSR charakteristische religionswissenschaftliche Gestaltung.

In Universitäts-Kreisen nehmen die Archäologen in der Religionsforschung¹⁷³⁾ einen bedeutungsvollen Platz ein, da sie für einige Bereiche ergiebiges Material bereitstellen können, das für die Religionswissenschaft auf internationaler Ebene von Wichtigkeit ist. Die Interessen Professor K. Michatowski's¹⁷⁴⁾ und seiner „Schule“ richten sich auf eine „komplexere“ archäologische Forschung, die auch Religionen altentümlicher Kulturen, so die Ägyptens,¹⁷⁵⁾ des Su-

173) Siehe dazu: *Materiały do Bibliografii archeologii śródziemnomorskiej z Polsae za lata 1800-1967* (Polnische Materialien zur Bibliographie der Mittelmeerraum-Archäologie, 1800-1967) W. 1952-69, 3Bde (weitere Bde folgen), *bibliografii archeologii śródziemnomorskiej w Polsce za lata* W. 19 Bde 3; vgl. z.B. K. Majewski, Monuments et images représentant l'élite au pouvoir comme moyens d'exercer une influence idéologique sur la société à l'époque de l'Antiquité et les siècles suivants, in *Congress. Intér. Antiq. Graeco-Romana ac tempora nostra, Argumenta lectionum*, Brno 12-16.04.1966, S. 61-66; B. Rutkowski, The decline of the minoan peak sanctuaries, in *Atti e Memoire del 1° Congresso Inter. di Micenologia, Roma, 27. settembre-3. ottobre 1967*, seconda parte, Roma 1967, S. 157-162; J. Kostrzewski, *Kultura prapolska* (Urpolsche Kultur), besonders S. 325-412, W. 1962 und da zitierte Literatur; *Slavia antiqua* (Hrsg. W. Hensel) in poln., tschechisch, franz., engl. u.a. (bis 1968, 15 Bde) bringt Material zu slawischen Religionen; W. Antoniewicz, O religiach dawnych Słowian (Über die Religionen der alten Slawen) in *Religie świata*, W. 1957, S. 327-344.

174) Professor K. Michatowski gehört zu den berühmtesten Archäologen unserer Zeit. In seinen Forschungen geht er über den Rahmen der reinen Archäologie hinaus und beschäftigt sich mit allgemeinen Problemen der antiken Kulturen im Mittelmeerraum. Zu erwähnen sind hier seine Arbeiten über den architektonischen Kanon ägyptischer Tempel (*Kanon w architekturze egipskiej*, W. 1956) wie auch Abhandlungen zur ägyptischen (z.B. *Atum, bóg Heliopolis*, W. 1945) und griechischen (z.B. *Bogowie i ludzie w sztuce greckiej*, W. 1929-1930) Religion. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind seine jüngsten Veröffentlichungen zu Problemen des christlichen Nubiens (*Faras. Die Kathedrale aus dem Wüstensand*, Zürich/Köln 1967 und die dort zitierte Literatur) und Ägyptens (*Ägypten, Kunst und Kultur* (Herder) 1969). Es ist hier zu erwähnen, daß im Jahre 1967, dem Jubiläumsjahr seiner 40-jährigen wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit, die Festschrift *Mélanges offerts à Kazimierz Michalowski*, W. 1967 entstanden ist, der man eine große Bedeutung für Altertumsforschung nicht absprechen kann; siehe dazu: M. Marciniak, *Euh.* 12 (1968) 1, S. 152; P. Szolc, Archeologia w służbie człowieka (Die Archäologie im Dienste des Menschen. Interview mit Prof. K. Michalowski), *Jednota* 25 (1967) 2, S. 10 f., 18 f.

175) Vgl. z.B., T. Andrzejewski, *Le papyrus mythologique de Te-hem-en-Mout*, W. Paris 1959; Ders., *Egipskie Księgi snów* (Ägyptische Traumbücher) *Przegląd Orientalistyczny* 2 (1959) 4, S. 369-381; Ders., *Księga Umarłych piastunki Kai, papyrus ze zbiorów Muzeum Narodowego w Warszawie* (Totenbuch..., Papyrus aus der Sammlung des Nationalmuseums Warschau) W. 1952; M. Marciniak,

dans ¹⁷⁶) (Nubien), Palmyras ¹⁷⁷), und der klassischen antiken Welt ¹⁷⁸) berücksichtigt. Als Ergebnis seiner Entdeckungen, besonders in Nubien, kann man heute unter Verwendung des Materials anderer Nubienforscher sehr viel Neues über das Frühchristentum ¹⁷⁹) an den Peripherien der antiken Welt und über die Funktion der christlichen Kunst aussagen, die, gestützt auf ihren ikonographischen Kanon, die Rolle einer religiösen Sprache gespielt hat. ¹⁸⁰)

Für die Religionsforschung liefert ebenfalls das polnische Zentrum für afrikanische Studien wichtiges Material. Es war von Professor S. Strelcyn geleitet, der als der Herausgeber der international anerkannten Zeitschrift „Africana Bulletin“ ¹⁸¹) bekannt wurde. Die

Quelques remarques sur la formule *ir nfr*, *ir nfr*, in *Travaux du Centre d'Archéologie Méditerranéenne de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences, Etudes et Travaux*, II (1968) S. 25-32; J. Lipińska, Names and history of the sanctuaries built by Tuthmosis III at Deir el-Bahari, *JEA* 53 (1967) S. 25-33; W. Zdrojewska, Alexandrian Statuette of Eros from Polish Excavations at Tell Atrib, *Études...* a.a.O., II, S. 243-256; K. Myśliwiec, Une esquisse du décorateur du temple d'Horus à Edfou, *Études...* a.a.O., III (1969) S. 63-80; E. Dąbrowska-Smektała, La confession d'un Égyptien (pol.), *Euh.* 9 (1965) I, S. 77-89.

¹⁷⁶) K. Michałowski, a.a.O.; S. Jakobielski, Two Coptic Foundation Stones from Faras, *Mélanges* (K. Michałowski) W. 1966, S. 103-109. Siehe dazu Bibliographie in: Das Wunder aus Faras = *Katalog, Villa Hügel-Essen*, 1969 Recklinghausen 1969, S. 147-150.

¹⁷⁷) Vgl. z.B., M. Gawlikowski, Les dieux du Palmyre dans la lumière de l'archéologie (pol.), *Euh.* 9 (1965) 6, S. 3-12; Ders., Les prêtres de Palmyre. Problèmes d'iconographie, (pol. mit Résumé) in *Studia palmyreńskie* (Hrsg. K. Michałowski), I (1966) S. 74-95; T. Borkowska, Les bas-reliefs votifs de Palmyre, a.a.O., S. 96-124.

¹⁷⁸) Vgl. z.B., Z. Kiss, Dionysos Enfant sur une panthère, *Études...* a.a.O., II, S. 267-276; J. Kubińska, Les monuments funéraires dans les inscriptions grecques de l'Asie Mineure, W. 1968.

¹⁷⁹) Vgl. K. Michałowski, La Nubie chrétienne, in *Africana Bulletin* 3 (1965) S. 9-26; P. Szolc, Remarks on hebrew inscription and symbolics of Faras *Études...* o.a.O., II, S. 285-294; Ders., Chrześcijaństwo nubijskiej pustyni (Christentum in nubischen Wüstensand) in *Pielgrzym Polski* (= *PP*) 42 (1968) 12; Ders., „Apostelgeschichte 8, 26-40 im Lichte der Archäologie“, in *Pro Unitate*, Heidelberg 1969, S. 27-32.

¹⁸⁰) Vgl. z.B., K. Michałowski, a.a.O.; T. Gołowski, On the iconography of the Holy Virgin represented on Faras murals. Standing Virgin holding the Child on her Arm, *Études...* a.a.O., II, S. 295-312; Ders., Scènes de la Passion et la Résurrection sur une peinture de Faras, *Études...* a.a.O., III (1969) S. 207-230; P. Szolc, *Remarks...* a.a.O.; Ders., Some Problems of the Genesis of Paiting in Faras, *Études...* a.a.O., III, S. 199-206.

¹⁸¹) *Africana Bulletin* das seit 1961 erscheint, enthält englische und französische Artikel über Probleme Afrikas.

Thematik dieser Zeitschrift greift neue Materialien und Bearbeitungen der Religionsproblematik Afrikas auf.

Moderne ethnologische Arbeiten befassen sich vor allem mit Problemen des Ritus¹⁸²⁾ und der Volksdämonologie¹⁸³⁾, den Religionen der Gesellschaften Südamerikas¹⁸⁴⁾, Nordamerikas und Asiens¹⁸⁵⁾. In enger Beziehung dazu stehen philologisch-folkloristische Forschungen¹⁸⁶⁾.

Auch in den katholischen Kreisen haben die vergleichenden Religionswissenschaften die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gelenkt; ihren Ausdruck fanden sie in den unter der Leitung von E. Dąbrowski (1901-1970)¹⁸⁷⁾ herausgegebenen Werken unter dem Titel „Religie świata” (Weltreligionen)¹⁸⁸⁾ und „Religie Wschodu” (Religionen des

182) Vgl. z.B., B. Błazińska, *La magie et son rapport avec la religion à Podhale* (pol.), *Euh.* 4 (1961) 5, S. 36-43; J. P. Dekowski, *Stan i problematyka badań nad obrzędowością ludową środkowego dorzecza Pilicy* (Der Stand und die Problematik der Forschung im Gebiet des Pilica-Flusses) *Studia Etnograficzne* 5 (1963) S. 75-99; weitere Angabe siehe: E. Karwot, *Zagadnienia wierzeń i magii w pracach Polskiego Towarzystwa Ludoznawczego na tle osiągnięć etnografii polskiej w ostatnim dziesięcioleciu* (Probleme des Glaubens und der Magie in den Arbeitender Polnischen Gesellschaft für Völkerkunde, die auf Grund der Ergebnisse der polnischen Ethnographie in den letzten zehn Jahren entstanden sind), *Lud* 43 (1956) S. 71-92.

183) Vgl. z.B., B. Baranowski, *Procesy czarownic w Polsce w XVII i XVIII w.* (Polnische Hexenprozesse im 17. und 18. Jhd) Ł. 1952; W. Drozdowska, *Istoty demoniczne* (Dämonische Wesen) Ło., *Studia Etnograficzne* 6 (1966) S. 177-184.

184) Vgl. z.B., R. H. Nocoń, *Dzieje i kultura Inków* (Geschichte und Kultur der Inkas) W.-Wr.-K., 1958; Ders., *Kobieta w życiu Indian Ameryki Południowej* (Die Bedeutung der Frau im Leben der südamerikanischen Indianer) Kat. 1964 (besonders S. 90-132; 207-293); M. Frankowska, *Zwierzęta w gospodarce, wierzeniach i zwyczajach Indian Peru XVI i XVII w. w świetle kroniki Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala* (Die Funktion des Tieres in der Wirtschaft, in den Sitten und im Glauben der peruanischen Indianer 16. und 17. Jhd. im Lichte der Chronik...), *E. P.* 4 (1961) S. 173-205.

185) Vgl. z.B., B. Kohutnicki, *Podobieństwo elementów kultu niedźwiedzia u ludów północnych obszarów Ameryki i Azji* (Vergleichbare Elemente der Bärenkulte der Völker in den nördlichen Regionen Amerikas und Asiens, *E. P.* 9 (1965) S. 322-346.

186) Vgl. J. Krzyżanowski, „Dwudziestolecie folklorystyki polskiej” (20 Jahre polnische Folkloristik), *Literatura Ludowa* 8 (1964) 4/6, S. 4 ff.

187) Der führende Repräsentant der katholischen exegetischen Schule in Polen, (Prof. am KUL 1945-1955) war der Herausgeber polnischer Kommentare zum Alten und Neuen Testament (im Verlag Pallottinum, Poznań). An Rande seiner Hauptforschung beschäftigt er sich mit religionswissenschaftlicher Problematik, besonders mit antiken Religionen.

188) E. Dąbrowski, *Religie świata*, W. 1957 enthält in seiner Bibliographie zahlreiche polnische religionswissenschaftliche Publikationen (S. 359 ff.).

Orient)¹⁸⁹⁾. Einen besonderen Rang in der Religionswissenschaft dieses Kreises nimmt die Religionsethnologie — die immer noch im Geiste Wilhelm Schmidt's betrieben wird — (E. Bulanda, T. Chodzidło)¹⁹⁰⁾ und die Religionspsychologie¹⁹¹⁾ ein, die in Polen nur von katholischen Wissenschaftlern repräsentiert wird. Man vertritt hierin natürlich eine der marxistisch-religionswissenschaftlichen Meinung vollkommen entgegengesetzte Position¹⁹²⁾, woraus sich polemisierende Diskussionen ergaben.

Das Bild der polnischen Religionswissenschaft wäre nicht vollständig, ohne Hinzuziehung des katholischen Laientums, das sich bei PAX¹⁹³⁾, WIĘŹ¹⁹⁴⁾ und ZNAK¹⁹⁵⁾ konzentriert. In diesen Zeitschriften wird

189) E. Dąbrowski (Hrsg.), *Religie Wschodu*, P.-W.-Lub, 1962; vgl. dazu: Discussion sur le livre de..., *Euh.* 8 (1964) 1, S. 77-86.

190) Vgl. z.B., T. Chodzidło, 85-lecie ks. Wilhelmina Schmidta (85 Jahre...) in *RBL* 7 (1953) 6, S. 198-200; Ders., Znaczenie historii religii w apologetyce (Die Bedeutung der Religionsgeschichte für die Apologetik), *RTK* 8 (1961) 3, S. 23 ff.; Ders., Powszechność zjawiska religijnego (Die Allgemeinheit religiöser Erscheinungen), *At. Kap.* 52 (1960) Bd. 60, H. 1, S. 19-30; E. Bulanda, Czy kryzys etnologicznej szkoły wiedeńskiej? (Liegt eine Krisis der Wiener ethnologischen Schule vor?), *Lud* 45 (1958) S. 91-124; Ders., Geneza i znaczenie mitu w historii kultury (Genese und Bedeutung des Mythos in der Kulturgeschichte), *RBL* 12 (1959) 4, S. 373-396; Ders., Początki i powstanie religii w świetle nowszych badań prehistorii i etnologii (Die Entstehung und die Anfänge der Religion im Lichte der neuen prähistorischen und ethnologischen Forschungen), *Collectanea Theologica* (= *CT*) (1961) fasc. 1/4 S. 85-104; weitere Angaben siehe in der Bibliographie, *Euh.* 11 (1967) 1/2, S. 179, 182, 191, 200.

191) Vgl. z.B., J. Pastuszka, Człowiek religijny jako problem psychologiczny (Der religiöse Mensch als psychologisches Problem), *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* (= *ZN KUL*) (1963) 1, S. 3-14; Ders., *Psychologiczne źródła niewiary* (Psychologische Quellen des Unglaubens) Lub 1946; J. Majkowski, Psychologia ascezy, *At. Kap.* 55 (1963) Bd. 66, H. 3/4, S. 234-239; weitere siehe in Bibliographie... a.a.O., S. 183 f.

192) Vgl. z.B., J. Majka, Książka o religijności wsi (Buch über die Religiosität des Dorfes. Randbemerkungen zu E. Ciupak, Kultura... a.a.O.) *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Tyg. Pow.) (1961) Nr. 25, S. 57; A. Prusko, Religia a problem dezintegracji człowieka współczesnego (Die Religion und die Probleme der Desintegration des modernen Menschen), *At. Kap.* 52 (1960) Bd. 60, H. 1, S. 115-120.

193) „PAX” unterhält als sozialistische Organisation mit christlicher Weltanschauung in seiner umfangreichen Publikationstätigkeit 5 Zeitschriften (*Słowo Powszechne*, *Kierunki*, *WTK*, *Zorza świąteczna*, *Życie i Myśl*) und 1 Verlag (Instytut Wydawniczy PAX). Es werden hier sowohl Abhandlungen polnischer als auch ausländischer Autoren veröffentlicht. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist die Monatszeitschrift *Życie i Myśl* (Leben und Denken).

194) Vgl. dazu Monatszeitschrift *Więź* und Anm. 195.

195) Diese Zeitschrift wie auch die schon erwähnte *Więź* repräsentieren den

neben dem Dialog mit atheistisch-marxistischen Kreisen¹⁹⁶) besonders das gegenwärtige religionswissenschaftliche und theologische (auch protestantische) Denken¹⁹⁷) betrachtet; aber im Grunde wollen katholische, besonders theologische Kreise der Religionswissenschaft eine apologetische Funktion unterschieben¹⁹⁸), die eine hinreichend objektive Religionsforschung jedoch nicht immer zuläßt.

Man kann heute bereits von einer Religionswissenschaft in protestantischen Kreisen sprechen, die ihr Denken mit der bekannten protestantischen Tradition der Religionswissenschaft in der Welt zu verbinden sucht. Obwohl an der protestantischen Hochschule¹⁹⁹) Lehrstühle für Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie existieren, kann man leider keine besonderen wissenschaftlichen Leistungen²⁰⁰) von Seiten dieses Zentrums anführen. Die eigentliche Religionswissenschaft ist bei der protestantischen und ökumenischen Presse zu Hause (besonders: *Jednota*, *Posłannictwo*, *Pielgrzym Polski*) wo man atheistische Interpretationen kritisiert, die beispielsweise Biblistik und die Probleme indischer Religionen betreffen²⁰¹). Des weiteren versucht man, gegenwärtiges protestantisches Gedankengut²⁰²) und Probleme der Religionsphänomenologie, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sprache der Religion²⁰³), der Qumranforschung²⁰⁴), des Frühchristentums²⁰⁵) und des Islam zu popularisieren.

Kreis der katholischen Laienintelligenz, die in ihren religionswissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen eine Gegenposition zur marxistisch-atheistischen Religionswissenschaft aufzubauen versucht. Vgl. z.B., J. Majkowski, *Psychologia religii*, *Znak* 10 (1958) 8/9, S. 920-938; K. Klószak, *Próba rozwiązania problemu pochodzenia duszy ludzkiej* (Ein Versuch zur Lösung des Entstehungsproblems der menschlichen Seele), *Znak* 13 (1961) 9, S. 1181-1234; J. Turowicz, *Wielkie religie wobec współczesności* (Die Stellung der Großen Religionen zur Gegenwart), *Znak* 12 (1960) S. 1105-1235; A. Morawska, *Socjologia a odnowa* (Soziologie und Renovation), *Znak* 16 (1964) S. 722-733.

196) Vgl. z.B., *La discussion d'un livre recent Sociologie de la religion* (pol.) (das in der Buchreihe „*Wież*“ erschienen ist (1962)). *Euh.* 7 (1963) 5, S. 57-73 an welcher auch Mitglieder der *ZNAK* und *WIEŻ* teilgenommen haben.

197) Vgl. z.B., A. Morawska, Paul Tillich, *Znak* 17 (1965) 7/8, S. 986-1010.

198) Vgl. z.B., W. Kwiatkowski, *Apologetyka totalna*, W. 1961, Bd 1 S. 24-45.

199) W. Niemczyk, *Historia religii*, W. 1965; Ders., *Filozofia religii*, W. 1965 und Veröffentlichungen in: *Rocznik Teologiczny CHAT*.

200) Vgl. z.B., K. Karski, *Islam i chrześcijaństwo* (Islam und das Christentum) (Diss. Warszawa ChAT, 1967).

201) Vgl. z.B., P. Szolc, *Czy Biblia mówi prawdę?* (Eine kritische Rezension des Buches von E. Garden, *Ob die Bibel recht hat?* (1959)), *Jednota* 24 (1966) 10,

S. 14-18; Ders., Gandhi a chrześcijaństwo (Gandhi und das Christentum), *PP* 42 (1968) 7/8, S. 80-86.

202) Vgl. z.B., P. Szolc, über D. Bonhoeffer in *Jednota* 25 (1967) 4, S. 8; Ders., über A. Schweizer in *PP* 42 (1968) 1 S. 6-9; 43 (1969) 2, S. 16f.

203) Vgl. z.B., P. Szolc, Sztuka a chrześcijaństwo (Kunst und das Christentum), *PP* 43 (1969) 4 S. 41-43; Ders., Boże Narodzenie w sztuce (Weihnachtsdarstellung in der Kunst) *PP* 43 (1969) 12, S. f., Ders., *Das Kunstwerk als Ausdruck des Gottesglaubens*, XIII Congress of the IAHR (Stockholm 1970).

204) Vgl. z.B. P. Szolc, Dwadzieścia lat badań qumrańskich (20 Jahre Qumranforschung) *Jednota* 25 (1967) 3, S. 5-7, 17; Ders., Chrześcijaństwo wobec odkryć nad Morzem Martwym (Die Stellungnahme des Christentums zu den Entdeckungen am Toten Meer) *PP* 43 (1969) 3, S. 30ff; 4, S. 39ff; 6, S. 68f.

205) Vgl. z.B., P. Szolc, Na tropach pierwszych chrześcijan (Auf dem Weg der ersten Christen), *PP* 44 (1970) 4, S. 44-46; 7/8, S. 74-76 (weiter folgt).

GUSTAV MENSCHING SEPTUAGENARIUS

BY

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Bonn

On May 6, 1971, Gustav Mensching, Professor Emeritus of History of Religions at Bonn University and author of a long and still growing list of various studies in Comparative Religion,¹⁾ celebrates his 70th birthday. The life and work of the scholar has kept an academic tradition alive that came into prominence through men like Rudolf Otto who forcefully challenged the merely historical and rational approach to religious history. Mensching studied under Otto at Marburg in the early twenties and earned his doctorate here in 1924. It was, incidentally, again Marburg that payed tribute to him as a scholar by bestowing upon him the honorary degree of a Doctor of Religious Sciences (Dr. sc. rel.) in 1951.

Mensching started his career as a lecturer in the History of Religions at the Brunswick Institute of Technology near his native Hanover. A study on *Das heilige Schweigen* (1926) established his repute, and in 1927 he was called to the State University of Lettland to take the chair of Religious History there. After teaching at Riga for 8 years he came to Bonn where, in 1942, he was appointed to the chair of Comparative Religion previously held by Carl Clemen.

Mensching's life has been most productive in terms of scholarly and academic activity. His work in phenomenology is summed up most comprehensively in the volume *Die Religion* (1959), and his interest in sociology of religion is best reflected in the two major volumes *Soziologie der Religion* (2nd ed. 1968) and *Soziologie der großen Religionen* (1966). Other books like *Toleranz und Wahrheit in der Religion* (1955) and *Der Irrtum in der Religion* (1969) takes up issues

1) Bibliographies of G. Mensching's works are to be found in: R. Thomas (ed.), *Religion und Religionen: Festschrift für Gustav Mensching zu seinem 65. Geburtstag*. Bonn: L. Röhrscheid 1967. (Bibl.: O. Wenig).

G. Mensching, *Topos und Typos: Motive und Strukturen religiösen Lebens*. (Essays in Comparative Religion, ed. H.-J. Klimkeit, for the occasion of the author's 70th birthday). Bonn: L. Röhrscheid 1971. (Bibl.: U. Vollmer).

touched upon in earlier works, applying the insights gained there to the problems addressed here. They represent, so to speak, works of applied Comparative Religion.

Though Mensching concerns himself, basically, with patterns and structures, showing up the alternative forms which religion may assume in its various manifestations, his is not only a phenomenology of religion, but also a sociology and typology, and, indeed, first and foremost a search for religious life in and behind the facts as they present themselves to us historically. In fact the basic elements of his study are live religious *topoi* rather than dead *bruta facta*. The intention is to fathom the pulsing life here in these symbols of meaning, and then to go beyond them to the discernment of general types and structures. It is this fascinating search for the general pattern behind the data viewed as parts of a living organism that has attracted many a generation of students to Mensching's lecture halls. Hence an appreciation of Gustav Mensching's work in Comparative Religion will not be able to confine itself to an assessment of his printed books and essays alone but will also have to take into account the stimulation to further independent scholarly quest issuing from his academic work as a whole.

SYNCRETISM AND AMBIGUITY

BY

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Dr. J. H. Kamstra has recently published a lecture about the significance of syncretism for the phenomenology of religion, and its connection with theology¹). His interest in this topic arose out of his experience of the mutual resistance set up between the syncretistic Japanese and Christianity, and out of his detailed study of the oldest case of syncretism in Japan, namely that brought about through the arrival of Buddhism in that country²). He complains that since the work of H. Kraemer³), little has been done in the analysis of syncretism, and that it has been neglected in the general study of religion. No reference to it is made at all, for example, in the 634 pages of Geo. Widengren's recent *Religionsphänomenologie*⁴). Moreover most practitioners of the study of religion are strongly influenced by Christianity and tend to see syncretism as an illicit contamination, as a threat or a danger, as taboo, or as a sign of religious decadence.

Kamstra notes that the word *synkretizein* was first used by Plutarch to mean "to come to concord, just as the Cretans do when threatened by a common enemy" and that Erasmus used it in the sense of reconciliation. Theologians in the seventeenth century began to use it also pejoratively. Kamstra himself proposes to use the word to mean: "the coexistence of elements foreign to each other within a specific religion, whether or not these elements originate in other religions or for example in social structures"⁵). He elaborates the various ways in

1) Kamstra, J. H., *Synkretisme op de Grens tussen Theologie en Godsdienst-fenomenologie*, Leiden 1970, E. J. Brill. C.f. a short notice of this same work by the present writer in *Religion: A Journal of Religion and Religions*, Vol. I Part 1, Spring 1971.

2) Kamstra, J. H., *Encounter or Syncretism; the Initial Growth of Japanese Buddhism*, Leiden 1967, E. J. Brill.

3) Kraemer, H., *De Wortelen van het Syncretisme*, 's-Gravenhage 1937.

4) Widengren, Geo., *Religionsphänomenologie*, Berlin 1969.

5) Kamstra, *Synkretisme*, p. 10.

which these elements can be related, and then divides his attention between (1) "the theological approach to syncretism: the real roots of syncretism" and (2) "the phenomenological approach to syncretism: the dynamics of syncretism".

In the context of theological approaches to syncretism Kamstra pays special attention to the analysis of Hendrik Kraemer. Kamstra considers it important to move away from analyses which are theologically loaded and to move instead to a phenomenological base. His criticism of Kraemer, with this in view, is particularly illuminating because, sensing that Kraemer's analysis was theologically conditioned, he turned his attention precisely to that religion which Kraemer had claimed was not in principle syncretistic, namely Kraemer's own religion, and found the roots of syncretism there. Or rather, as he further explains, the roots of syncretism lie neither in the "naturalism", whether primitive or monistic, of which Kraemer had spoken in distinction to the "prophetic" religions, but rather in the very structure of human existence. "To be human is to be a syncretist", he writes ⁶⁾. And by this he means: "Even a prophet—however filled he may be with the divine—simply needs the speech and the situation of his audience in order to be comprehensible at all ⁷⁾".

In the text of his lecture Kamstra appeals to the authority of Paul to illustrate this point, while in a note thereto he suggests that Buddhism can provide a helpful nuance in its distinction between *samvṛti* and *paramārtha satya*, i.e. between conventional and absolute truth. It seems that it would be possible to elaborate Kamstra's thesis at this point on a stronger comparative base. Perhaps this should strictly speaking be done, if what he says is to be allowed to stand as a generalisation in the study of religion. On the other hand there is little point in tediously going over what will almost certainly not be seriously challenged. However I would emphasise briefly that there may be a slight problem here in that Kamstra's position could be taken as representing an alternative *theological* standpoint to that of Kraemer with regard to the interpretation of the nature of prophetic religion in general and the Christian religion in particular. After all, one remembers that the very title of his fascinating book *Encounter or Syncretism* involved the use of a word fashionable in twentieth century Christian

6) Ibid. p. 23.

7) Ibid. pp. 23 f.

theology, even though the book itself dealt with a completely different area of the history of religion. I do not myself consider that Kamstra's analysis of the roots of syncretism does suffer from this defect but it might have been better to free his analysis from the strains set up by the fact that it was conceived in reaction to Kraemer's theologically conditioned view.

In support of Kamstra at this point, one might add a complementary voice from a different quarter, namely that of Professor G. Maeda, who has argued that Christianity is a Mahāyānistic (*daijōteki*) religion⁸). By this he meant that it takes in elements foreign to itself and in this way extends its influence. That Maeda should make this point and should illustrate it also in the context of Israelite religion in Canaan, (in spite of the prophetic reaction to which I referred above, which is really part of the total process), independently strengthens Kamstra's contention that syncretisms may be generally discerned also in those "prophetic" religions thought by Kraemer to be in principle not syncretistic.

Having freed himself from theology Kamstra goes on to approach the question of syncretism from a phenomenological point of view. As a matter of fact, by doing this he opens up a field for a better understanding of theology and eventually returns to it. While agreeing that this can be done, my own argument will find it necessary to return to theology *and its equivalents* rather sooner, and in this way, I believe, will reduce the no-man's-land which Kamstra has left between theology and phenomenology. As will be seen, the frontier between the two is perhaps as tight as anywhere when one is considering the nature of syncretism.

Kamstra finds, as I have found⁹), that only one author, namely G. Van Der Leeuw, has dealt to any extent with the question of what he calls the "dynamics" of religion. He singles out especially Van Der Leeuw's conception of "transposition" (*Verschiebung*) as a clue on which to build further. This simply means that religions are changing all the time, and that therefore the meanings of different elements within different religions, many of which they borrow from each

8) Maeda, Gorō, 'Nihon no Kirisutokyō', *Shisō*, April 1962, pp. 93 ff.

9) Pye, E. M., 'The Transplantation of Religions', *Numen* XVI.3, Dec. 1969, pp. 234 ff. G. Van Der Leeuw, *Religions in Essence and Manifestation*, London 1938, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Chapters 93 and 94.

other, are also likely to change according to the context. Kamstra is particularly impressed by the fact that very frequently elements continue to exist within a religion even though they have really lost their original meanings, and intriguingly calls this "syncretism from within". This syncretism from within is a kind of alienation (*vervreemding*) within a religion with regard to items in its structure which continue to exist there simply because of their familiarity. I believe Kamstra has touched here on a kind of religious or spiritual experience which many have known in modern times, especially in the West with regard to Christianity but perhaps also in the East with regard to various traditions, notably Buddhism in Japan. As Kamstra himself says (with an unfortunate unguarded theological allusion), "Examples of this syncretism from within are in our time legion".¹⁰⁾

However, it seems to me that it is also at this point that there is a major error in Kamstra's argument. He writes, "After all that we have said, syncretism is therefore also the result of alienation in an existing religion. This alienation can arise as a result of all kinds of structural changes. The *criterion* for syncretism is therefore alienation: something which either comes in as alien from without or which is alienated from within — whichever it is"¹¹⁾. I would challenge the view that alienation is "the criterion" for syncretism of all kinds. Kamstra found he needed to use the word "alienation" to characterise syncretism from within, but he has by no means shown that it is an appropriate word to characterise syncretism from without, which he has now simply slipped in along with the former. Indeed, fascinating though I find the idea of syncretism from within, it seems to distort our general vision of syncretism for two other reasons. Firstly the word "alienation" is itself unsatisfactory because it is too reminiscent of prophetic religions. It tends to suggest that we are estranged from that to which we should turn, we have wandered from our true home, we are cast out from the Garden of Eden, etc. Secondly, Kamstra is at this point too fascinated by the idea of "the within" of a religion, too introvert, feeling too much that religions are declining things being dissolved from within and attacked from without, no longer sensing the urge which many religions have to move out and to move on. Hence he sees syncretism "from without" as indeed a threat to an existing constellation. Why

10) Kamstra, *op. cit.* p. 27.

11) *Ibid.* p. 27.

speak, one may ask, of syncretism “from without”? Why not “*towards without*”? If we speak of syncretism as something which can be “*towards without*” it cannot be said that alienation is the chief category for understanding it. It is perhaps not too much to say that Kamstra’s analysis here, if not theologically conditioned as he had shown Kraemer’s analysis to be, is at least spiritually conditioned, and that while this leads to some valuable insights, it also leads to a distortion of the true nature of syncretism.

Before attempting to grasp the nature of syncretism by another route, one of the byproducts of Kamstra’s approach is worth noting. This is that as a result of his emphasis on syncretism “from within” he is able to recognise a parallel hermeneutical activity in quite diverse traditions. In any religion considered dynamically syncretisms may be seen to be in the process of being unmasked and broken off while at the same time new ones are being built up again. Kamstra says that in this sense every theologian and every theological faculty moves in a frontier territory. More significant methodologically however is perhaps the frontier to which the comparative basis for these remarks leads, not the frontier of theology with the world, but the frontier between phenomenology and theology. It would seem that if theology, buddhology and other equivalents, considered as ongoing activities contributing to the dynamics of their respective religions, can in fact be studied in parallel or comparative terms, then this opens the way for a much more precise attempt to indicate the ways in which they operate. This in turn would lead to the possibility of experts asquiring a grasp of the principles and variables involved, so that theologians (and their equivalents) would no longer work on the basis of an intuitive sensitivity to the strains and stresses and possibilities of their own tradition, sometimes throwing up an effective new syncretism and more often not. Rather they would proceed on the basis of a scientific grasp of the nature of the dynamics of religion, so that while their activity would still be an imaginative one compared with some activities it could also be considered as a technological one. Building sacred bridges, or helping people to recognise them when they appear on the initiative of divinities (for in phenomenology we dare not beg the question about the divine initiative), would become analogous to building ordinary bridges (except with regard to leaving open the matter of divine initiatives). A comparative and phenomenological study of the dynamics of religion, with

special reference to the hermeneutical activities of individuals acting with varying degrees of self-consciousness, would therefore become part of the fundamental equipment of any would-be theologian or buddhologist. Indeed insofar as technological know-how indicates the viability of various options open to the engineer, the phenomenology of religion would begin to put pressure on its frontiers with theology, by no means necessarily with a deleterious effect. However this is not the place to begin to develop such a comparative science of hermeneutics.¹²⁾ It is necessary for the time being to return to the specific problem of syncretism.

As I said above, it is necessary to return to theology and its equivalents rather sooner than Kamstra does, in order even to understand the nature of syncretism. Note however that we do not turn to theology in a concealed way. Nor should we be swayed by sensitivity to one religious situation. It is necessary to turn to theology *and its equivalents* comparatively and hence phenomenologically (since one cannot be a committed exponent of all the equivalents at once), in order to approach the *meanings* of syncretism. The meaning, if there is a meaning, can only be found through the meanings. Here therefore theology and its equivalents put pressure on phenomenology. Indeed if some few of the equivalents are thought to be particularly helpful in elucidating the meaning of syncretism, the pressure of those equivalents will be particularly strong, and care should be taken to see that the presuppositions of no one religious tradition distorts our view even when it is not our own religious tradition. Although Kamstra is very interested in the meanings of syncretistic situations, his definition of syncretism quoted above contains no reference, direct or indirect, to meanings. This can be rectified, but it should be done in such a way that no one religion is called upon to supply the meaning. I hope to indicate that meanings can be referred to in an indirect and neutral way, such that the general theory of syncretism points back again for its specific meaning to specific cases.

12) Such a comparative approach to hermeneutics really needs a much wider basis than that offered by an examination of syncretism alone. It would also have to consider at least the manner in which religious traditions reassert themselves in intolerably ambiguous situations (c.f. my article referred to above), and further the nature of the criteria applied in various religions in the definition or redefinition of the "essence" (*hridaya*) of their respective traditions. This of course raises hosts of theological problems, and their equivalents!

A further curiosity of Kamstra's definition of syncretism is that it also contains no reference at all to one of his other main concerns. Again and again he emphasises the importance of the dynamics of religion, but this does not appear to have influenced his formulation in any noticeable way. This is a second point to which attention will be paid below.

It is on the notion of the coexistence of elements foreign to each other that we must build. As a clear case of syncretism I should like to refer to the relations between Buddhism and Shinto, especially as developed under the influence of the theory of *honji-suijaku*. These relationships have been referred to in various publications and have been examined in detail recently by Alicia Matsunaga¹³). It is interesting that this writer traces the Buddhist ideas underlying this theory back to the Chinese Buddhist distinction between *pen* and *chi* and thence to the Indian Buddhist distinction between *samvṛti* and *paramārtha satya*, referred to earlier. I think it would be generally agreed that the relations in question are a clear case of syncretism in that they obviously involve the coexistence of elements foreign to each other in a single religious context.

We must now approach the matter of the meanings. For the Buddhist the meaning was that in the form of a local divinity (*kami*) there was latently present the being of a Bodhisattva or a Buddha. Thus the *kami* Ōmiya was considered to be a manifestation of Shakyamuni, the *kami* Hachiman was sometimes considered a manifestation of Amida, etc. In this way existing focal points of religious devotion were drawn into a syncretistic field and interpreted in terms of Buddhist meaning. It appears from the Shinto side that the movement into syncretism may at first have been one of self-defence, in that the alternative to accommodation would have been the extinction of Shinto meanings altogether¹⁴). However that may be, there is no doubt that in this way Shinto meanings were able to persist, and in due course there came the Shinto reaction known as *han-honji-suijaku*, i.e., *honji-suijaku* in reverse, in terms of which the Buddhist

13) Matsunaga, Alicia, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation. The Historical Development of the Honji-Suijaku Theory*, Tokyo and Rutland Vermont 1969, Sophia University and Charles E. Tuttle Co.

14) Eliot, Sir George, *Japanese Buddhism*, London 1959, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 243.

meanings were treated as but superficial manifestations of the profounder Shinto *kami*. The point about all this is that the elements under consideration became *ambiguous*. They were able to bear two distinct meanings depending on the different points of view of the people involved with them. These meanings were tussled over again and again, and it is a mark of the resilience of the Shinto religion that its *kami* were not after all completely assimilated. Syncretistic tension continued to be felt until there was a remarkable attempt at recoupment from the Shintō side. It is important not to allow either one of the two possible meanings of a symbol being used in *honji-suijaku* terms to overwhelm the phenomenological approach to syncretism. Of course it is the meanings which matter, but we can neutrally seize the importance of the various meanings here by recognizing the *ambiguity* of the situation.

It should not be thought that this type of relationship between Buddhism and Shinto can be observed only in cases where the theory of *honji-suijaku* can be applied. Consider for example the story of the visit of the monk Gedatsu to the Grand Shrine of Ise, as told in the *Taiheiki*:

“Once this holy man went to the Grand Shrine of Ise to worship at the Outer and Inner Shrines and speak secretly of the delights of complete response to the teachings of Buddhism. These shrines are not as other shrines, for their bargeboards are not curved, nor do their pointed boards bend backward. Wherefore it seemed to Gedatsu that they were as ‘the straight way that rejects what is roundabout’. And beholding the ancient pines lowering their branches and the old trees spreading out their leaves, he likened them to bodhisattvas descending from heaven to save living things here below. Although the names of the Three Treasures of Buddhism may not be spoken here, he thought weeping, yet in this way too men may reach salvation.”¹⁵⁾

Or consider the following spell used by *yamabushi* to exorcise the malevolent influence of the god Konjin over certain quarters of the compass.

“Because of ignorance the three worlds are a prison,
Because of enlightenment the ten directions are free.
In truth there is neither East nor West,
Where then are South and North?”¹⁶⁾

15) McCullough, Helen, *The Taiheiki, A Chronicle of Medieval Japan*, New York 1959, Columbia University Press, p. 368.

16) Renondeau, G., *Le Shugendō: Histoire, Doctrine et Rites des Anachorètes dits Yamabushi* (Cahiers de la Société Asiatique, 8), Paris 1964, Imprimerie Nationale, p. 140.

This spell clearly operates on two quite distinct levels or in two quite distinct spheres of meaning. Moreover the two spheres of meaning are mutually exclusive. If one really believes that the exorcism is desirable or necessary one clearly has not yet reached the point of insight into the nature of phenomena to which Buddhist philosophy tends. Yet the spell makes use of Buddhism to allay fear. Conversely if one takes the Buddhist analysis to heart the spell becomes redundant. Yet the two are coexisting in a single religious pattern even while the ambiguity shows signs of being intolerable.

Nor is the relevance of this analysis restricted to the Buddhist-Shinto situation. The transpositions referred to by Van Der Leeuw and by Kamstra all display this character of ambiguity. They all refer to elements within a coherent religious pattern around which pivot two or more sets of meanings. Again, the notion of ambiguity does not restrict us either to what Kamstra would call "syncretism from without", which is what the cases we have examined are. It is equally crucial, and is equally neutral with regard to particular meanings (unlike the loaded word "alienation"), in the context of "syncretism from within", where the circles of meaning turning around particular elements in a tradition sometimes seem to move and slide like shifting sand, so that the specific elements themselves are ambiguous.

To take ambiguity as the main characteristic of syncretism is consistent also with Kamstra's view that it stems from man's very nature in the sense that each man is a limited being unable to grasp the revelation of the divine or the ultimate truth except in so far as this or these are refracted in terms of his own situation. Every constitutive element in a given religious pattern is ambiguous, one might say, in that it has a meaning at one and the same time both in the general situation of the man to whom it is meaningful and in the symbolic context which bears the revelation of the religion in question. However, while the nature of syncretism is clearly to be found in the nature of religion in general and the nature of religion in the nature of man, I would prefer to continue to speak more specifically about ambiguity as the keynote of syncretism, that is, in connection with the relationship between elements originally foreign to each other and (to accept Kamstra's theory of syncretism from within) elements becoming foreign to each other, in religious situations.

If ambiguity may be taken as the keynote of syncretism of all kinds,

it is necessary now to emphasise that this is to be understood dynamically. Syncretism, as the coexistence of elements of diverse origin interacting ambiguously, is a natural *moving* aspect of major religious traditions such as Buddhism, Shintō, Christianity, and indeed, I would venture to suggest, of all religious traditions. It is part of the dynamics of religion which works its way along in the ongoing transplantation of these religious traditions from one cultural context to another whether geographically or in time, while their more or less sophisticated adherents are more or less aware of what is going on. But since the traditions are moving all the time, and since the meanings are continually being refashioned, any particular case of syncretism is necessarily *temporary*. The ambiguous clash of meanings demands some resolution and even if this is not forthcoming immediately the demand is still there inherent in the relationship. Three resolutions seem to be possible in practice as in logic, apart from a postponement of any resolution. The first is the extension of one meaning to the point of the effective elimination of the other, in which case we may speak of *assimilation*. The second is the fusion of the diverse elements such that while a single coherent pattern of meaning has been attained that pattern is so different from any of the patterns hitherto available that *a new religion* may be deemed to have emerged. The third is the drifting apart of the two meanings, in which case we may speak of *dissolution*. These three forms of resolution are all possible whether we consider syncretism from (or towards) without or syncretism from within; although usually syncretism from without will probably make us think more often of the assimilation of an existing religious pattern while syncretism from within will make us think more often of the dissolution of an existing religious pattern. It would be interesting to analyse the emergence of a new religion in terms of its dependence on syncretism from without and from within preceding religious traditions respectively. (Kamstra refers briefly to some new religions in the context of the latter.) It should be noted further that there is a certain amount of tension between individuals and groups over all this. An ambiguous syncretistic situation may be resolved in terms of one meaning or other for an individual or even a series of individuals, even though the syncretism persists long after as a wider cultural phenomenon offering its various possibilities to further individuals. This is why syncretistic situations may persist for a long time and even indefinitely, even though they

are as explained above, intrinsically temporary. It would be quite wrong to call them permanent. To describe them as temporary is to indicate that they are situations of tension (whatever the various protagonists may say about harmony, toleration, etc!) and that they are to be understood entirely in terms of the dynamics of religion.

To emphasise tension as I have done should not be taken as an invitation to conclude that syncretism is altogether incoherent. A syncretistic situation is coherent even while demanding resolution in that there are variously coherent meanings for the various people involved, and also, for the phenomenologist of religion, in the sense that it is a collection of events in the history of religion which have a recognisably coherent structure. Finally I would agree with Kamstra that the elements involved in a syncretistic religious situation need not necessarily be themselves all of religious origin but may include political, philosophical and other secular elements of all kinds.

For the above reasons I would define syncretism as *the temporary ambiguous coexistence of elements from diverse religious and other contexts within a coherent religious pattern.*

DER HOCHGOTT UND DER MIKROKOSMISCHE MENSCH

VON

K. A. H. HIDDING

Leiden

Ehe wir die Beziehung zwischen Hochgott und mikrokosmischen Menschen untersuchen können, müssen wir zunächst unsere Auffassung vom Hochgott genau präzisieren. Drei Gelehrte haben in dieser Hinsicht in der ersten Hälfte dieses Jahrhunderts wichtige Forschung geleistet, und zwar Pater W. Schmidt, K. Th. Preuss und R. Pettazzoni¹⁾. Die Auffassung von Schmidt, der im Hochgott den einen und einzigen Gott der monotheistischen Religion sah, gilt nun wohl als überwunden. Schmidt entmythologisierte diese höchsten Wesen und gab ihnen einen derart transzendenten und geistigen Charakter, sodass seine Theorie nicht der Wirklichkeit entsprach und nun von fast niemandem mehr geteilt wird.

Dies kann man nicht von den Auffassungen von Preuss und Pettazzoni sagen, die sich zwar stark voneinander unterscheiden, aber vor allem einander ergänzen und beide den kosmischen Character dieses Hochgottes betonen. Preuss bezeichnet ihn sogar als kosmische Totalität, als das Wesen, das der Ursprung der Wirklichkeit ist und diese in ihrer Existenz erhält. Er gibt dem Menschen den Lebensunterhalt und den Kultus, wodurch zugleich die kosmische Ordnung als eine Verkörperung des Hochgottes selbst erhalten wird. Preuss sieht einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen den Begriffen Totalität, Ordnung und Kultus und dem Hochgott, der auch engstens mit dem Himmel zusammenhängt.

Pettazzoni hat vor allem stark die Beziehung des Hochgottes mit dem Himmel betont, der alles und also auch die niederen göttlichen und dämonischen Mächte begrenzt, umfasst und zusammenhält. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, können wir den Himmel am besten als Symbol des

1) P. W. Schmidt, *Ursprung und Werden der Religion*, Münster, 1930. K. Th. Preuss, *Die geistige Kultur der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1932, idem, *Glauben und Mystik im Schatten des höchsten Wesens*, Leipzig, 1926. R. Pettazzoni, *The All-knowing God*, London, 1956.

Hochgottes bezeichnen, sei es auch, dass man in den betreffenden Kulturen unseren Begriff Symbol nicht kennt, auf den wir aber als Hilfsvorstellung nicht verzichten können. Im Himmel offenbart sich der Hochgott, sodass dieser ihn repräsentiert und der Gläubige ihn darin erblickt. Er kann damit identisch sein, darin wohnen oder auf andere Weise damit verbunden sein, aber in der ganzen Welt erfährt der Mensch das Bild des Himmels, der ihm Licht und Luft, Wärme und Regen und noch so vieles Andere schenkt, das für alles Dasein unentbehrlich ist, als eine göttliche Offenbarung. Es sind jedoch nicht allein diese natürlichen Gaben, sondern es ist vor allem auch der geistige Aspekt des Himmels, der den Menschen beeindruckt hat. Hierauf konzentriert Pettazzoni sein ganzes Interesse.

Der Himmel selbst wird, auch wieder in unserer Terminologie, als ein persönliches Wesen betrachtet, der alles sieht und auf Grund hiervon strafend eingreift, wenn der Mensch bestimmte Übertretungen begeht. Das schliesst nicht ein, dass man von diesem Hochgott eine antropomorphe Vorstellung haben muss, aber man erfährt den Himmel selbst als etwas Persönliches, und also als allwissend und wollend. Für uns, die wir dem Menschen als körperlich-geistige Einheit solch eine besondere Stelle im Kosmos zuschreiben, ist dies nicht einfach zu verstehen, aber wir müssen auf grund vieler Einzelheiten annehmen, dass der Himmel als Symbol des Hochgottes alles weiss, sieht und hört. Es geht hier vor allem um den Menschen, der durch sein Verhalten die kosmische Ordnung stört, die die Totalität von Himmel und Erde nicht allein konstituiert, sondern mit dem Hochgott sogar identisch ist. Er offenbart sich vor allem hierin und macht dadurch alles Dasein möglich. Gott ist immer und überall das Mysterium der Welt, an das der Mensch glaubt und das er indirekt durch seine Offenbarung als ein Wunder erfährt. Und diese Offenbarung empfängt er in den hier gemeinten Religionen durch „die Anschauung des Universums“, um mit einem Terminus von Schleiermacher zu sprechen.

Dies bedeutet in erster Linie, dass der Mensch die Welt, in der er wohnt, als eine durch ihren immer weiter zurückweichenden Horizont begrenzt wahrnimmt, die auch ihn umfasst und in sich birgt. Er weiss sich hiervon völlig abhängig und er sieht sie als eine persönliche Grösse, einen Makroanthropos, der sein Leben nicht allein schützt, sondern auch alles von ihm weiss und ihn, wenn es nötig ist, für seine Übertretungen bestraft, die die Gesamtordnung bedrohen. Denn diese ist

selbst die letzte Wahrheit von allem Dasein, die das Fortbestehen davon gewährleistet und das höchste Gut ist, dass dem Menschen bekannt ist.

Der Mensch weiss, sehr oft durch eine Offenbarung des Hochgottes selbst, der einstmal in der Vorzeit einen Abgesandten zur Erde schickte, um ihn die Kultur zu lehren, wie er sich in jeder Hinsicht, individuell und sozial, zu verhalten hat, und dies ist in der Adat der Gemeinschaft festgelegt. Sündigt er dagegen, dann stört er nicht nur den guten Verlauf innerhalb seiner Gemeinschaft, sondern auch den des Kosmos selbst, sodass hieraus allerlei Katastrophen entstehen: Überschwemmungen, Brände, Krankheiten, Stürme usw., die die gesamte Gemeinschaft bedrohen. Wenn der Hochgott verstimmt wird durch schlechtes Betragen des Menschen, dann bedeutet dies zugleich die Störung der kosmischen Ordnung, sodass allerlei chaotisch-kosmische Mächte die Möglichkeit erhalten, in die Welt einzugreifen. Denn zur Totalität gehören auch Chaos und Unheil, durch deren Überwindung einstmals die Ordnung erkämpft wurde, wie der Schöpfungsmythus berichtet. Das Chaos ist ebenso unvergänglich wie die Ordnung und es muss immer aufs neue in seine Schranken zurückverwiesen werden, nicht zuletzt durch ein gutes Verhalten des Menschen, was aus seinem Gehorsam gegenüber seinen Pflichten besteht, die auch kultischer Art sind. Auch hierdurch wirkt er von seiner Seite und für seinen Teil mit, das kosmische Gleichgewicht zu erhalten.

Die Tatsache, dass man den Hochgott als einen Makroanthropos auffasst, bedeutet keineswegs, dass eine solche Auffassung als eine menschliche Projektion unreal wäre. Für seine Existenz ist der Mensch tatsächlich völlig abhängig vom Kosmos und es ist nicht weniger wahr, dass er ständig durch Katastrophen und Krankheiten überfallen wird, die er mit von ihm begangenen Übertretungen in Zusammenhang bringt. Bei einer solchen persönlichen Beziehung zum Kosmos als Hochgott muss man den Menschen als Mikrokosmos betrachten, primär aber ist die Auffassung von dem Kosmos als Makroanthropos. Es ist bekannt, auf welche Weise in vielen Kulturen die Auffassung von dem Menschen als Mikrokosmos bis in Einzelheiten in vielerlei Analogien ausgebildet worden ist, leider fehlt bisher eine umfassende monographische Untersuchung über dieses Thema ²⁾. Die Idee, dass die

2) Für das indo-europäische Gebiet: Geo Widengren, *Iranische Geisteswelt*, Baden-Baden, 1961, idem, *Religionsphänomenologie*, Berlin, 1969. A. Olerud,

Welt und der Mensch die gleiche totalitäre und im Wesen unvergängliche Struktur zeigen und die gleiche natürlich-geistige Einheit darstellen, ist jedoch, wie überall auf der Erde sich zeigt, universell verbreitet. Der Hochgott ist die natürlich-geistige Totalität, die der Mensch erkennen kann, weil er dies auf seine Weise auch selbst ist, wie letztlich jede Erscheinung als Teil des Ganzen hierdurch wesentlich bestimmt wird. Alles hat darum auch seine geistigen Aspekte, wodurch es sich dem Menschen zu erkennen gibt, der es benennen und eine bestimmte Beziehung damit herstellen kann. Dieser Aspekt offenbart sich in der äusserlichen Erscheinung, in dem Bild von jeder Erscheinung, wodurch man es kennen lernen und von anderen unterscheiden kann. Das Unterscheidungsvermögen beruht auf der wesentlichen Verwandtschaft aller Erscheinungen, die die Totalität ausmachen. Die diese instandhaltende wirksame Ordnung bestimmt die Art, das Bild und das Schicksal von allem, was existiert, und hierauf beruht die Einsicht des Menschen in die Welt und sein Einfluss auf sie, der etwa in der Zeichendeutung und der Magie zum Ausdruck kommt, wie auch in der hier geltende Auffassung der Medizin. Weil der Mensch am Kosmos partizipiert, kann er alle Erscheinungen perzipieren; er steht ihnen aufgeschlossen gegenüber und kann sie in sich aufnehmen, reflektieren und dadurch kennenlernen, als mit ihnen wesentlich verwandt. Wo er sich selbst als eine mikrokosmische Erscheinung auffasst, findet diese Auffassung ihren Grund in seiner Wahrnehmung von der Welt als einem mit ihm selbst verwandten Makroanthropos, weil sie an der gleichen natürlich-geistigen Ordnung teilhaben und als zeit-räumliche Erscheinungen eine gleiche Struktur zeigen. Er ist dann auch selbst unvergänglich bei allen Veränderungen, wie die universell verbreitete Auffassung von der sogenannten doppelten Seele zeigt.

Man kann dies auch in moderne wissenschaftliche Sprache ausdrücken, wenn man etwa mit Piaget die Struktur definiert als eine Totalität, ein in sich selbst geschlossenes, sich selbst regulierendes Transformationssystem, das sich selbst erhält³⁾. Wird in unserem Fall die Ordnung in der Totalität, die der Hochgott ist, gestört, dann

L'idée de macrocosmos et de microcosmos dans le Timée de Platon, Uppsala, 1951.
Für Afrika: Germaine Dieterlen, *Essai sur la Religion Bambara*, Paris, 1951.
Für Indonesien: Ph. L. Tobing, *The structure of the Toba-Batak belief in the High God*, Amsterdam, 1956.

3) J. Piaget, *Le Structuralisme*, Paris, 1968.

weiss er das und reagiert mit kosmischen Strafen als ein Zeichen, dass das Chaos gleichsam ausgebrochen ist. Dann muss auch der Mensch reagieren, nicht allein dadurch, dass der Übeltäter bestraft wird, sondern vor allem durch kultische Massnahmen, die die Wiederherstellung der Ordnung und die Zurückkehr des Friedens und der Harmonie bewerkstelligen müssen. Die chaotischen Mächte, die sich in Krankheiten und auf vielerlei andere Weisen offenbaren, werden hierdurch wieder auf ihre Stelle im kosmischen Ganzen zurückgedrängt.

Der Hochgott ist identisch mit der Welt als ein transformatorisches und sichselbst regulierendes System, das sich als eine lebendige Totalität immer in einem labilen Gleichgewicht befindet. Als kosmische Ordnung ist der Hochgott nicht allein statisch und otios, *deus otiosus*, sondern zugleich dynamisch und beweglich, weil jede Totalität eine Einheit von Gegensätzen ist. Zur Totalität gehört sowohl das Natürliche wie das Geistige, eine Auffassung, die wir auch im heutigen Denken finden, etwa bei dem Ontologen N. Hartmann mit seiner Schichten-theorie, bei der das Reich des Geistes die höchste Schicht ist, oder bei Teilhard de Chardin, bei dem die verschiedenen Sphären in der Noosphäre ihre Krönung finden. Solch ein Zusammenhang des Natürlichen und des Geistigen innerhalb der alles umfassenden Totalität des Seins beweist, dass hier das Bewusstsein als eine bestimmte, hoch differenzierte Weise von Sein aufgefasst wird, sodass zwischen dem Materiellen und dem Geistigen nur ein gradueller Unterschied besteht⁴⁾.

Die so weit verbreitete Auffassung vom Gottesurteil beweist auch, dass man in diesen Kulturen den Kosmos persönlich auffasst. Entstehen Katastrophen und vermutet man, dass diese die Folge von bestimmten Übertretungen sind, dann kann man den Beschuldigten einem Gottesurteil unterwerfen, sodass z.B. das Wasser, die Erde oder das Feuer als die Repräsentanten des Hochgottes das entscheidende Urteil fällen, ob er sterben muss oder nicht. Der Unschuldige wird durch die Wahrheit bewahrt und geschützt, wie z.B. der Chandogya Upanisjad (VI, 16) sagt, sodass diese nicht allein geistig, sondern auch materiell anerkannt wird.

Auf ihre Weise zeugen Erscheinungen wie Astrologie und Wahrsagekunst vom kosmischen Gemeinschaftsgefühl und religiösen Naturgefühl dieser Gläubigen an eine allesumfassende und verbindende hei-

4) N. Hartmann, *Neue Wege der Ontologie*, Stuttgart, 1949. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le Phénomène humain*, Paris.

lige Ordnung. Dadurch, dass auf bestimmte Erscheinungen geachtet wird, gelangt man zu einem Wissen über die günstige beziehungsweise ungünstige Art der Situation, in der sich ein Mensch befindet, der ein wichtiges Unternehmen beginnen will. Es ist dabei gleichgültig, ob man dies aus der Konstellation am Himmel oder von der Zeichnung der Leber eines Opfertieres abliest, oder ob man zu solch einer Erkenntnis durch komplizierte Berechnungen kommt. In allen Fällen geht es um die der kosmischen Ordnung inhärente Wahrheit, die allein den Menschen und seine Gemeinschaft vor Katastrophen bewahren kann.

Hieran wirkt er auch durch seinen Kultus mit. Er stellt etwa im Umgang und im Opfer das Mysterium von allem Dasein dar, in dem immer wieder das Licht und das Leben ihren Durchgang durch die Finsternis und den Tod vollbringen, um aufs neue auferstehen zu können. Auch das Bewusstsein von der Unentbehrlichkeit der Reziprozität bringt er zum Ausdruck, weil nur hierdurch die Integrität der Totalität erhalten bleiben kann. Hierin darf kein Teil für sich selbst bleiben, sondern er muss immer als funktioneller Teil vom Ganzen wirken. Die intuitive Erkenntnis dieser Notwendigkeit bringt den Menschen beim Opfer dazu, Gott dasjenige zurückzugeben, was er von ihm selbst empfangen hat, und nur durch solch eine Gegenseitigkeit kann die kosmische Ordnung erhalten bleiben als die letzte Wahrheit aller Existenz, wie viele Mythen beweisen. Wo der Hochgott mit der kosmischen Ordnung identisch ist als das Wesen der Wirklichkeit, ist in letzter Instanz jede Erscheinung auf ihre Weise eine mikrokosmische Totalität als *imago mundi*, in der sich das Universum spiegelt. Spezial dasjenige, was als heilig gilt, zeigt diesen totalitären Charakter: ein Baum, oft zugleich Lebensbaum und Baum der Erkenntnis, Tempel, Palast, Stadt, Land, Dorf, Fürst, Berg und Volk, sie können alle als Abbildungen, Zentren oder Repräsentanten des Heiligen funktionieren und hierdurch eine heilsame Wirkung ausüben. Und der Mensch selbst bringt dadurch in seine Welt Ordnung, dass er sich in seinem klassifikatorischen Denken kosmischer Einteilungskategorien bedient wie Himmel und Erde, Land und See, Windrichtungen, Geschlechter, bestimmte Farben oder Tiere und so viel anderes, worunter man alle anderen Arten von Erscheinungen rubriziert. Alles Denken ist ordnen und übersichtlich machen, und zu dieser Absicht verwendet der Mensch in diesen Kulturen die eben genannten oder andere Teile seiner Welt, die man in der Totalität des Kosmos unterscheiden kann. Hierauf beruht die

Wissenschaft sowohl von der Wahrsagekunst, wie der Magie und der Medizin, aber auch die oft so differenzierte soziale Organisation und Heiratsregelung, und schliesslich die gesamte Kultur als Schöpfung des menschlichen Geistes, der durch diese Sicht seine Struktur empfängt.

Diese Sicht auf die Dinge ist die der Wahrnehmung oder Anschauung, wozu der Mensch dank der Sinneswerkzeuge seines Körpers fähig ist. Durch diesen Körper ist er eine Erscheinung neben allen anderen Erscheinungen in der Welt, an der er partizipiert, und gerade auf die grosse Bedeutung hiervon ist in letzter Zeit vor allem durch Phänomenologen wie Merleau-Ponty und Erwin Strauss, mit sehr viel Nachdruck hingewiesen worden ⁵⁾. Dass der Mensch Teil ist von und Teil hat und nimmt an der Welt und diese erkennen kann, beruht also auf der Tatsache, dass er ihr immanent und verwandt ist. Was dies bedeutet, kann man allein verstehen, wenn man die unlösbare Beziehung zwischen der Immanenz und ihrem Gegenteil, der Transzendenz, im Auge behält, die sich gegenseitig voraussetzen. Man kann allein etwas transzendieren, wenn man am Zusammenhang mit der Wirklichkeit festhält, wie ja auch der Astronaut tut, der an die Erde gebunden bleibt durch das irdische Material seiner Rakete und den Sauerstoff, den er mitnimmt. Umgekehrt weiss man nur dann etwas von seiner Immanenz, wenn man nicht in ihr befangen bleibt, sondern sie transzendiert. Es handelt sich hierbei um relative Begriffe, sodass der Mensch auf eine dominierende Weise als bewusstes Wesen die Wirklichkeit mehr oder weniger transzendiert oder im starken Masse an sie gebunden bleibt. Hat das Bewusstsein der Immanenz das Übergewicht im Denken, dann vollzieht sich dies in der Anschauung oder Wahrnehmung, die ihn in eine direkte Beziehung mit der Welt bringt, die er erkennt, weil sie sich in ihrer Erscheinungsform ihm zu erkennen gibt. Aber dominiert das Bewusstsein, dass er sich über die Welt erheben kann, dann bedeutet dies, dass er in einer grösseren Freiheit gegenüber und über der gleichen Wirklichkeit steht, über die er in Worten und Begriffen sprechen und urteilen kann. Dieses Urteil liest er nicht von den Bildern der Erscheinungen ab, sondern er bildet es selbst durch die Möglichkeit, abstrakt denken zu können, d.h. mit Begriffen, die er sich durch das Abstrahieren von dem wahrgenommenen Bilde schafft. Auf Grund dieser und gebunden an diese direkte Wahrnehmung, die er in seiner Freiheit

5) M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Paris, 1954. E. Strauss, *Vom Sinn der Sinne*, Berlin, 1956.

trotzdem transzendiert, erwirbt er sich auf indirektem Weg eine Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit, die viel weiter geht als die Wahrnehmung, und ihm viel mehr Macht über sie gibt. Auch hier gilt, dass das abstrakte und transzendierende Denken gebunden bleibt an das Immanente und Konkrete, das Wahrnehmung heisst, und das dem Menschen ebenfalls Erkenntnis seiner Welt ermöglicht. Sei es auch, dass dieses vielmehr koordinierend vorgeht und das abstrakte Denken überwiegend subordinierend — mit allen Folgen davon.

Dieser Exkurs war nötig, um den mikrokosmischen Menschen und sein wahrnehmendes Denken an seinem in der Geschichte entstandenen Gegensatz zu verdeutlichen: der Mensch als Subjekt, der die Welt als sein sekularisiertes Objekt erlebt, und der sich also selbst im ganzen nicht mehr als wesentlich verwandt mit dem Kosmos als Makroanthropos sieht. Diese Menschen finden wir in den monotheistischen Religionen, bei denen die Vorstellung vorherrscht, dass Gott die Welt als ihm wesensfremd aus dem Nichts erschafft, und dem Menschen in ihr eine besondere Stelle zuerkennt, weil allein er auf seine Weise ein geistiges Wesen ist. Gott transzendiert hier auf absolute Weise die Welt, so wie der Mensch dies auf eine relative tut, aber beide sind der Welt entfremdet. Wo der Mensch Gott als die heilige Totalität und die Ordnung des Ganzen sieht, weiss er sich selbst als Mikrokosmos, aber wenn er ihn als den transzenten Schöpfer erfährt, für den alles Objekt ist, dann erkennt er sich selbst als ein Subjekt gegenüber der Welt und ein Objekt vor Gott. Auch hier gilt ein solcher Gegensatz nie im absoluten Sinne, weil auch Mikrokosmos und Subjekt aufeinander angewiesen sind, wie auch die hiermit unmittelbar zusammenhängende überwiegend monistische Auffassung vom Hochgott als dem Prinzip des Kosmos und die dualistischere vom *Creator ex nihilo*. Beide Auffassungen zeigen, dass Gott selbst für den Menschen ein Mysterium ist und bleibt, und dass alle Unterschiede in der Auffassung zu den so verschiedenen Erscheinungen zurückzuführen sind, die der Mensch in seiner Religion und Kultur als Offenbarungsmittel von Gott erfährt und anerkennt. In der direkten Wahrnehmung ist dies das Bild von der autonomen, heiligen Welt und im Denken über diese Welt ist es Gottes Wort, das einstmals diese vergängliche und endliche Welt ins Dasein rief.

Auch Bild und Wort schliessen sich keineswegs gegenseitig aus, sondern sie ergänzen sich wie das beim Sehen eines Bildes und beim

Hören und Begreifen eines Wortes geschieht beim Konstituieren des menschlichen Bewusstseins. Beide, Sehen und Hören, können den Menschen vom Bewusstsein erfüllen, dass er gegenüber einer Aporia, einem Wunder steht, das er nicht zu erklären, sondern lediglich hinzunehmen hat als den unerforschlichen und unerschöpflichen Grund aller Wirklichkeit. Diese lässt sich innerhalb ihrer Einheit von Raum und Zeit wahrnehmen und untersuchen, aber fragen wir, was Raum und Zeit als die Konstituanten der Wirklichkeit an sich sind, dann fehlt jede Möglichkeit einer Antwort, die selbst völlig abhängig ist von dieser Einheit, die auch der Mensch selbst ist ⁶⁾. Ob man die Welt als eine aus sich selbst bestehende und sich selbst erhaltende unendliche Struktur sieht, wie der an den Hochgott glaubende dies auf seine Manier und die moderne Wissenschaft auf die ihre tut, oder dass man sie als eine endliche und abhängige Welt betrachtet, wie es die Dogmen der monotheistischen Religion lehren, in beiden Fällen ist das Bewusstsein, vor einem Wunder zu stehen, die letzte Einsicht. Und ein Wunder ist, um wieder mit Schleiermacher zu sprechen, nichts als der religiöse Name für das Geschehen, das schliesslich Mysterium ist und bleibt.

6) K. A. H. Hidding, „Sehen und Hören“, in: *Liber Amicorum, Studies in honour of Prof. dr. C. J. Bleeker*, Leiden, 1969.

RELIGIO, PRIESTHOODS AND MAGISTRACIES IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

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In Roman history, the functions of the state cult were inseparably connected with affairs of the state. A glance at available data indicates that administration of the cults was always in the hands of the governing circles. The magistrates, who celebrated the great games for the gods, also performed the sacrifices and took the *auspicia*, while at the same time a great number of them served as members of priestly colleges. Although magisterial and priestly functions were separated from each other and did not overstep the boundaries of established spheres of action, the two seemed to interact in the careers of priests whose membership can be proved. The priests belonged to the same classes to which those individuals belonged who were contending year after year for the magistracies and often held them. They continued to be members of the great consular families. *Novi homines* seldom achieved priest-hoods or consulships.

There are a number of works in which priests were treated. L. Mercklin¹⁾ presented a list of *pontifices* and *augures*, utilized by Mommsen,²⁾ who included also Mercklin's list of *Xviri*.³⁾ In 1871, C. Bardt compiled the membership of the major colleges during the Republic, to the death of Caesar.⁴⁾ He presented evidence for the individual priests and attempted to establish by conjecture priestly successions after the *lex Ogulnia* (he did not list the *flamines*, nor the minor priesthoods).

1) *Die Cooptation der Römer*, Mitau-Leipzig, 1848, pp. 215/216.

2) RF — *Römische Forschungen*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1864, 1879 (repr. G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1962), 1, pp. 83 ff.

3) Mercklin, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

4) *Die Priester der vier grossen Collegien aus römisch-republikanischer Zeit*, K. Wilhelms, Gymnasium in Berlin, XI. Jahresbericht, Berlin 1871. Bardt presented the *IIIviri*, the later *VIIviri epulones*, as the fourth major college, but it is under Augustus that we first hear of the four major colleges (Suet., *Aug.* 100; Dio, 53.1.5, Marquardt — J. Marquardt and Th. Mommsen, *Handbuch der römischen Alterthümer*, 7 vols., 2nd ed., 1876-1886, 3, p. 221; RKR — G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, 2nd ed., München, 1912, (*Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, V, 4), pp. 483 ff.; as against Cicero's three (*har. resp.*, 9, 18; *nat. deor.*, 3, 2, 5).

His work was incorporated without critical evaluation by T. Robert S. Broughton and M. Patterson,⁵⁾ who presented names of magistrates and priests from available literary tradition as well as non-literary evidence. M. Hoffman Lewis treated the priests of the Julio-Claudian period,⁶⁾ of whom twenty fall within the limit of 44 B.C. Besides the above, diverse, partial and/or topical studies offered additional views of Roman priesthoods.⁷⁾

Because priests belonged to the same classes and consequently espoused the same interests as the magistrates, an investigation of these class-bound aspects of priesthood and magistracy seems to be warranted, especially in view of the fact that such aspects have not received comprehensive attention in recent years. In the following study an attempt will be made to present a summary of those priestly functions which interacted with magistracies, in the frame of the Roman concepts of aristocracy and *religio*, as reflected in the functions of the priesthoods of the Roman Republic. (All dates will refer to B.C. Frequently used abbreviations will be indicated before the first citation of each work, e.g.: OCD = *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. by M. Cary and others, Oxford, 1949.)

Priesthoods in General

According to Roman tradition, major sacrifices were performed by the yearly magistrates, preferably by the consuls. As part of this duty they were responsible for the direction of community affairs pertaining

5) MRR — T. Robert S. Broughton and M. Patterson, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, 3 vols., New York, 1951/52, Suppl., 1960.

6) M. Hoffman Lewis, *the Official Priests of Rome under the Julio-Claudians*, Am. Ac. in Rome, Papers and Monographs, 1955, basing her material on P. Hable, *De Pontificum Romanorum inde ab Augusto usque ad Aurelium conditione publica*, D. Breslau, 1888; and G. Howe, *Fasti sacerdotum P. R. publicorum aetatis imperatoriae*, Leipzig, 1903, Diss. Halle.

7) Some monographs and articles considered priests from politico-social points of view; e.g., V. Spinazzola, "Augur," in E. de Ruggiero, *Dizionario epigrafico di antichità romana*, Rome, 1895-1950; A. Klose *Römische Priesterfasten*, 1, Diss. Breslau, 1910; J. Gagé, *Apollon Romain*, Paris, 1955, pp. 698 ff., the *Xviri* with inaccuracies; G. Radke, "Quindecimviri," in RE, 24, pp. 1114,53 ff., for lists, cf. pp. 1142,64 ff. *Pontifices maximi*: RAAF-F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, Stuttgart, 1920, p. 414, as well as priests as political entities, *passim*; the *pontifices* in the first century B.C., L. R. Taylor, "Caesar's Colleagues in the Pontifical College," *AJPh*, 63 (1942), pp. 385 ff., list pp. 411/412; D. E. Hahn, "Roman Nobility and the three Major Priesthoods, 218-167 B.C.," *TAPhA*, 94 (1963), pp. 73 ff., basing his material entirely on MRR, without source analysis, and without list; also J.-Cl. Richard, "Sur quelques grands pontifes plébéiens," *Latomus*, 27 (1968), pp. 786 ff.

to men and gods. The magistrates took the *auspicia*,⁸⁾ while general supervision of religious functions was in the hands of the *quattuor amplissima collegia*:⁹⁾ the three major ones: the *pontifices*, the *augures*, and the *quindecimviri sacris faciundis*, as well as the fourth, in a more or less subordinate position, the *tresviri*, later *septemviri epulones*.¹⁰⁾ Membership in all these colleges was valued for the prestige it gave to the holders and their families, but especially in the college of *pontifices* and *augures*, since they were consulted by the senate in most controversial issues regarding religion.¹¹⁾ They could always insist that sacred matters be taken by the senate before profane ones,¹²⁾ and in such cases, the senate regularly discussed the problem in a probu-

8) It is not our purpose to analyze the thorny problem of *auspicia*, and *spectio*, cf. the very detailed description in RSR — Th. Mommsen, *Römische Staatsrecht*, 3 vols., 1887, unchanged reprint of the 3rd ed., Ak. Druck- u. Verlags., Graz, 1952, 1. pp. 87 ff. To *auspicium*: Wissowa in RE, (Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, edited in succession by Kroll, Mittelhaus and Ziegler), 2, pp. 2580,26 ff.; to *spectio*: Marbach, RE, 3A, pp. 1570.20 ff., who defines the similarity between the two, and specifies that in the case of *spectio* the meaning includes "action and the right to action" as well. He makes a distinction between the rights of *magistratus maiores* and *magistratus minores* and suggests that in special cases even the *augures* could have had the right. As far as *spectio* is concerned, three categories are to be distinguished: (1) the *augures*, in possession of *nuntiatio* concerning *ausp. oblativa* (cf. below), (2) the magistrate in possession of *spectio* for *ausp. impetrativa* and *oblativa*, and (3) private persons. To this, cf. A. Magdelain, *Recherches sur l'imperium, la loi curiate et les auspices d'investiture*, Paris, 1968, in which the author considers the legal problems in the interrelation between *imperium* and *auspicia*. (Also, E. Meyer, *Römische Staat und Staatsgedanke*, Darmstadt, 1961, 85,123 ff.) When and how the distinction evolved cannot be said; yet, at the end of the Republic, it was quite precisely delimited, as seen in Cic., *Phil.*, 2.32,81: "Quid enim? Istuc, quod te sacerdotii iure facere posse dixisti, si augur non esses et consul esses, minus facere potuisses? Vide me etiam facilius. Nos enim nuntiationem solum habemus: consules et reliqui magistratus etiam spectionem." Also, Varro, *l.l.*, 6,82: "in auspiciis distributum est, qui habeat spectionem qui non habet." The passages are analyzed in RSR, 1, p. 89, n. 3.

9) Suet., *Aug.* 100; *Mon. Anc.*, 2,16; cf. Kornemann's article on *Collegium*, RE, 4, pp. 380,14 ff., esp. 382,21-383,47.

10) For bibliography regarding history, organization and activity of priesthoods, cf. RKR, pp. 479-549; Marquardt, 3.234-415; RSR, 1, pp. 104-116; 2, pp. 18-73; 3, pp. 110-111 and 1049-1062; Bouché-Leclercq — A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Manuel des Institutions Romains*, Paris, 1886, pp. 510-562; RRG — K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte*, (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, V. 4), Beck, München, 1960, pp. 195-212 and 394-411; Hoffman-Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

11) Marquardt, pp. 235 ff.; RKR, pp. 479 ff.; RSR 3, p. 1000.

12) *ibid.*, p. 999.

leutic manner, with one of the four colleges under whose competence the case might have fallen. The decision remained always with the senate; yet, since the priestly colleges consisted mostly of *senatoriales*, their advice should be considered as that given by a permanent committee of the senate.

Among the priestly colleges the most important was that of the *pontifices*.¹³⁾ To them fell the duty of advising with the senate concerning the gods,¹⁴⁾ the supervision of ceremonies according to the prescribed ritual, and the appeasement of the gods when prodigies appeared.¹⁵⁾ They held the *indigitamenta*, the proper and precise words with which the gods could be approached,¹⁶⁾ the very words which were pre-announced by the *pontifex maximus*, their chief, in any religious affair, to the magistrate.¹⁷⁾ Most importantly, the *pontifices* were the custodians of the *libri pontificii* (*pontificales*, *pontificum*), a treasure trove of *acta*, *indigitamenta*, *ritualia*, *commentarii*, *fasti*, and *annales*, which were to be consulted by the college of *pontifices* only. Also, they guarded the *commentarii*, i.e., the *responsa* and *decreta*, which pertained to the sacred rites.¹⁸⁾

13) Besides the *pontifices*, the *rex sacrorum*, the *flamines* (3 *maiores* and 3 *minores*), the Vestal virgins constituted the membership of the pontifical college. They were ranked according to a strictly established hierarchial order. Among the occasional dual priesthoods held by one person, the above-mentioned priesthoods were never combined. This fact would tend to prove the essential unity of the college's membership (RKR, p. 504).

14) RRG, pp. 195-212; 400-402; J. Bleicken, "Oberpontifex und Pontifikal-kollegium," *Hermes*, 85 (1957), pp. 345-366.

15) *ibid.*, p. 259.

16) H. Usener, *Götternamen, Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung*, Bonn, 1896, *passim*; M. Kretzer, *De Romanorum vocabulis pontificabilis*, Diss. Halis. Sax., 1903, pp. 44-81; Richter, RE, 9, pp. 1334,57 ff.

17) Bleicken, "Oberpontifex . . .," *loc. cit.*, describes the *pontifex maximus* as a spokesman for the college, p. 364.

18) HRR — H. Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum reliquiae*, 2nd. ed., 2 vols., repr. of the edition Teubner, Leipzig, 1914, Stuttgart, 1967, 1, pp. III-XXIX; W. S. Teuffel (new ed. W. Kroll and F. Skutsch), *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, 3 vols., Teubner, Leipzig (1, 6th ed., 1916; 2, 7th ed., 1920; 3, 6th ed., 1913); 1, par. 76, pp. 135 ff.; for more recent bibliography, cf. HRR, pp. 385-387; also, (publ. O. Reverdin) *Fondation Hardt, Les Origines de la République Romaine*, Entretiens, Tome XIII, 1967, pp. 135-169. Gabba follows P. Fraccaro's excellent evaluation of the problem: "The History of Rome in the Regal Period," (transl. U. Erwins), *JRSt*, 47 (1957), pp. 59-65. Cf. also L. Pareti, *Storia di Roma*, Torino, 1952, I, pp. 56-57; A. Alföldi, *Early Rome and the Latins*, Jerome Lectures, Seventh Series, Ann Arbor, 1964, pp. 165 ff.; L. Cantarelli, "Origine degli Annales

In the last stages of the Republic, Cicero described these *annales* as the "ius religionum, vetustas exemplorum, auctoritas litterarum monumentarumque,"¹⁹⁾ and the *pontifices* as their interpreters.²⁰⁾ In historically ascertainable times, the head of this college was the *pontifex maximus*, who eventually emerged as the most important priest in Rome.²¹⁾ He was not a *primus inter pares*, according to Wissowa;²²⁾ rather, the whole college of *pontifices* formed a unit at the head of which, for the sake of bureaucratic expediency, stood the *pontifex maximus*. This was perhaps the reason why the *pontifices* were not nominated by the *pontifex maximus*; rather, they were coopted in the whole college.²³⁾ Thus, we should see the *pontifex maximus* as the spokesman for the decision of the entire college concerning *piacula*, *vota publica*, *consecrationes*, adoptions, wills, marriages, funeral rites as well as deletions from and additions to the official calendar.²⁴⁾

Among their responsibilities, perhaps the most significant was the regulation of the calendar. The *lex Acilia* gave them undisputed right to determine the days when meetings could be held, sacrifices be offered, votes cast, and valid decisions of the senate be brought forth.²⁵⁾

Maximi," *RFIC*, 26, 1898, pp. 209 ff., identifies the *acta* (cf. *HRR*, I, pp. VII ff.), or the *annales pont.* with the *commentarii*.

19) Cicero, *de domo sua*, 2,4.

20) *ibid.*, I,1, ff.

21) *RKR*, pp. 504 ff.; *RRG*, pp. 117 ff. and 195 ff. The *pontifex maximus* did not become the head of the Roman state cult immediately after the *regifugium*; rather, the position was held by a specially created priesthood, the *rex sacrorum*. He eventually lost his pre-eminence because of the limitations on his functions, while the *pontifices maximi* could embrace new trends, could satisfy demands for religious activism when adverse conditions of the Hannibalic War developed religious fervor among the population, aided by the outstanding leadership of some strong personalities among them.

22) *RKR*, p. 509; Bleicken, "Oberpontifex . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 364.

23) Cf. Wissowa, *RE*, 4, pp. 1208,25 ff.

24) To the sphere of competence, cf. *RKR*, pp. 511 ff.; *RRG*, pp. 197/198; *piacula*, W. Ehlers, *RE*, 20, pp. 1179,56 ff.; *consecrationes*, Wissowa, *RE*, 4, pp. 896,29 ff. Concerning magisterial functions of the *pontifex maximus*, cf. Bleicken, "Oberpontifex . . .," *loc. cit.*, where he has shown that separation between priests and magistracies always existed and remained.

25) Marquardt, 3, p. 286,6; *RKR*, p. 513; *Macr.*, p. 1,13,21; 14,1; *Amm. Marc.*, 26,1,12; G. Rotondi, *Leges publicae populi Romani*, Milano, 1912, repr. Alms, 1962, p. 273. In a recent note, *Hermes*, 95 (1967), pp. 383/384, T. J. Luce, jr., suggested that the interpretation of Livy's 9,9,2: "... intercalatae poenae usuram . . .," could signify that the *pontifices maximi* were in a position to manipulate monthly interest rates. His theory will remain an assumption because evidence cannot be offered that the *pontifices maximi* ever deliberately used intercalation for this purpose.

Decisions were conveyed to the magistrates through *decretum* or *responsum*,²⁶⁾ to which three members of the college were sufficient. Those three could even overrule the *pontifex maximus*.²⁷⁾

Several spheres of the *pontifex maximus'* legal competence became important in the political and legal framework of the Roman state. Firstly, it was his duty to give advice for an *adrogatio* in the *comitiis calatis*.²⁸⁾ Secondly, he had the right of *multa*²⁹⁾ and the discipline of the Vestal virgins,³⁰⁾ as well as priests. Lastly, even against the will of the person whom he selected, he had the right of *captio*.³¹⁾ For this very reason the law of formal inauguration and the undatable *lex Papia* were passed in order to regulate this power of the *pontifex maximus*.³²⁾ In fact, one can see in the duties and privileges of the *pontifices* and *pontifices maximi* a bond between religious and public affairs, which was strengthened by the parallel duties and privileges of the *pontifices*, most of whom held the highest magistracies.³³⁾

The historical origin and development of the second college, the

26) RKR, p. 514; *decretum*, Hesky, RE, 4, pp. 2289,21 ff.; esp., pp. 2302,21 ff., pointing out that these are not binding but will become effective through the decree of the magistrate.

27) Livy, 31.9,7 ff.

28) RRG, *op. cit.*, p. 400; Leonhard, RE, 1, pp. 419,45 ff. The *pontifex maximus* never had the right to call together the assemblies, nor was he their presiding officer (cf. RRG and Bleicken, *loc. cit.*, against RKR, p. 511 and RSR, 2, p. 37.)

29) W. Hellebrand, RE, Suppl. 6, pp. 556,8 ff.; J. Bleicken, "Kollisionen zwischen Sacrum und Publicum," *Hermes* 85 (1957), pp. 446 ff.

30) Livy, 4.44,11 and R. M. Ogilvie, *Commentary on Livy*, Books 1-5, Oxford, 1965, p. 602; also, Livy, 8.15,7. Later interpolation and potential political misuse is shown by Münzer, "Die römische Vestalinnen bis zur Kaiserzeit," *Philol.*, 92 (1937), pp. 47 ff. and 199 ff. C. Koch (*Religio, Studien zu Kult und Glauben der Römer*, Nürnberg, 1960, pp. 2 ff.) points out that it is a criminal process because for breach of religious law such a process was not initiated by the community.

31) Livy, 27.8,4,5; Gell., *n.a.*, 1,12,1-5 and 11, concerning the Vestal virgins.

32) Gell., *loc. cit.*, 11. Evidently, it must have come later in the Republic in view of the fact that the *pontifices maximi*, as a directing force in politico-religious affairs, did not emerge until the third century. Two possibilities exist, either through a C. Papius, tr. pl. in 65, or the trib. Papius in 253, the year when Ti. Coruncanius was elected a *pontifex maximus*. Rotondi, *Leges publicae populi Romani*, Milano, 1912, (repr. Alms, 1962), pp. 376/377, holds to the later date, which seems to be feasible, although the earlier date is not impossible because "potrebbe anche trattarsi di una legge di un'epoca intermedia e di autore ignoto."

33) A superficial view of MRR, 2, pp. 524 ff. will show the validity of this statement. In a pending publication on Republican priests I have come to the conclusion that only one sixth of the known members of priestly colleges and sodalities did not hold higher magistracies.

augures, is mired in pseudo-history. Yet, the study of *auspicia*, through which they claimed to ascertain the will of Jupiter,³⁴⁾ was their main preoccupation and was so closely connected with Roman society that without them Rome would have been unimaginable. In most cases the magistrates took the *auspicia* and the *augures* gave interpretation according to strictly established *formulae*. Their ritualistic act of interpreting, named "augurium agere",³⁵⁾ was not connected with the performing of sacrifices in any way because such performances fell under the sphere of pontifical competence.³⁶⁾ The *augures* did not offer a glance into the future,³⁷⁾ nor did they determine the causes of contemporary misfortune; rather, from signs, according to well-established laws of augury,³⁸⁾ they merely indicated or interpreted the agreement or disagreement of the gods. Therefore, their priestly duties were in no way clashing with those of the members of other colleges. Yet, the importance of those duties seems to be evident.

The college was always in a parallel position to the pontifical college, as seen in the selection, number of members, and personalities in the membership. It is presumed that the *augures* had a president, most likely the oldest member.³⁹⁾ In their archives were collected the augural *fasti*, *acta*, *libri*, and/or *commentarii*,⁴⁰⁾ which were divided into the *decreta*⁴¹⁾ and *responsa*,⁴²⁾ which were records of augural decisions concerning the magisterial *auspicia*, as opposed to the *libri* which de-

34) RSR, I, pp. 76 ff.; Wissowa, RE, 2, pp. 2313,41 ff.

35) Varro, *de l.l.* 642; Cicero, *de div.*, I.17,32; cf. also, K. Latte, *Kleine Schriften*, (ed. O. Gigon, W. Buchwald and W. Kunkel), Beck'sche Verlag, München, 1968, p. 103.

36) RKR, p. 524.

37) Cicero, *de div.*, 2.33,70.

38) Bouché-Leclercq, pp. 524-539; Marquardt, pp. 401-409; good, brief review in *Der Kleine Pauly, Lexicon der Antike, auf Grundlage von Pauly's Realencyclopädie*, ed. K. Ziegler and W. Sontheimer, Stuttgart, (to the present only three vols., I, 1964; 2, 1967; 3, 1969), I, pp. 735-31 ff., by W. Eisenhut.

39) Cicero, *de sen.*, 18,64, the controversial passage concerning M. Porcius Cato's augurate: "Multa in nostro (or vestro) collegio praeclara, sed hoc, de quo agimus, in primis, quod, ut quisque aetate antecedit, ita sententiae principatum tenet, neque solum honore antecedentibus, sed iis etiam, qui cum imperio sunt, maiores natu augures anteponuntur." Some MSS read "nostro," others, "vestro," a reading which is accepted by P. Weullemier (Paris, 1940) and A. Rinaldi (Milano, 1946). Cf. Wissowa, RE, *loc. cit.*, pp. 2322,31 ff.

40) Marquardt, p. 400.

41) Cicero, *de div.*, 2.15,35 and 35,73, *leg.*, 2.12,31; Livy, 4.7,3.

42) Cicero, *de domo sua*, 15,40.

scribed the science of augury. Exactly in these interpretations is it possible to see the importance of the augural college. Roman law demanded that certain state occasions, *e.g.*, magisterial entry into office, decisions of assemblies, and departures for wars, could be performed only after *auspicato*,⁴³⁾ *i.e.*, after the good will of the gods had been ascertained. If the *auspicia* indicated displeasure or disapproval of the gods, the function was automatically suspended or cancelled.⁴⁴⁾ In fact, any influence of the augural college would emanate from these interpretations, since all doubts or difficulties which might have manifested themselves in taking the *auspicia impetriva* were put to the augural college for study and decision.

As Wissowa pointed out (RE, *loc. cit.*, pp. 2333,67 ff.), originally their capacity was advisory, which through the centuries acquired a great deal of politically expedient formalism. He specified that most likely in the last century of the Republic one can see that the magistrate was not obliged to accept the augural interpretation.⁴⁵⁾ Yet, after the assembly was over, the augural college could be consulted, especially if *auspicia oblativa*, like thunder or lightning⁴⁶⁾ were reported, or a procedural mistake occurred, on account of which *vitium* could be proclaimed.⁴⁷⁾ Thus, the validity, or the permissibility of the political action depended on their decision. Specifically, through this process, in Cicero's time,⁴⁸⁾ they could (1) grant or refuse permission to hold an assembly; (2) stop a proceeding in the middle; (3) adjourn assemblies, although called to order by the highest magistrate; and (4) force the *consul* to resign. That a magistrate could not ignore such power is evident, although it would be presumptuous to generalize that the same precise system existed from the earliest phases of the Republic.

The third college was the *quindecimviri* (originally *duumviri*, later *decemviri*) *sacris faciundis*.⁴⁹⁾ Originally consisting of two, by 367, the number of priests was raised to ten,⁵⁰⁾ equally divided amongst

43) To this, cf. Julicher, RE, 2, pp. 2580,26 ff. cf. also, *spectio*, Marbach, RE, *loc. cit.*, and *obnuntiatio*, Weinstock, RE, 17, pp. 1726,48 ff.

44) RSR, 1, p. 76, Among the *auspicia*, the *impetriva* were sought on demand from the gods by the magistrate. Yet, the *augures*, or for that matter any person, could declare the sighting of other, not demanded *auspicia*, which were called *oblativa* (Wissowa, RE, *loc. cit.*, pp. 2330,44 ff.).

45) Festus, p. 268. L.; Pliny, *n.h.*, 28,17, "neque...auspicia pertinere ad eos, quicumque...observare se ea negaverint."

46) Cicero, *de div.*, 2.18,42.

47) *e.g.*, Livy, 45.12,10; 23.31,13.

48) Cicero, *de leg.*, 2.12,31.

49) RRG, p. 160, n. 4; pp. 397/398. G. Radke, RE, 24, (1), pp. 1114,53 ff.; cf. lists of members pp. 1142,64 ff.

50) Livy, 6.37,12.

plebeians and patricians.⁵¹⁾ (Thus, in the third century, the college was construed similarly to the pontifical and augural colleges.) It is possible that a dual presidency was the executive organ of the college, as seen in the *magistri* of the saecular games in 249, a plebeian, M. Livius Salinator, and the other a patrician, M. Aemilius Lepidus Numida.⁵²⁾ The major duty of the college was the guarding⁵³⁾ and interpreting of the Sybilline oracles,⁵⁴⁾ which were consulted at times of great danger to the State. The consultation had to be done at the special request of the senate⁵⁵⁾ for the following reasons: (1) in case of party strife,⁵⁶⁾ (2) great misfortune,⁵⁷⁾ or (3) prodigies which were difficult to interpret.⁵⁸⁾ Afterwards, the *decemviri* brought to the senate's attention the words of the oracle, gave their interpretation, which then the senate complemented with the necessary resolutions.⁵⁹⁾ These interpretations did not presage a doomed future; rather, they clarified and gave positive specifications of *modus operandi* in securing the favour of the gods in the business at hand, "to put it bluntly, to get luck on their side."⁶⁰⁾ The oracles understandably were kept in

51) Livy, 6.42,2.

52) MRR, I, p. 223. The priesthoods are mentioned in connexion with the *ludi saeculares*. Bardt, *XVviri s.f.* 1, Klebs, RE, I, p. 572,33/35 for M' Aemilius, and Bardt, *XVviri s.f.* 2, Münzer, RE, 13, pp.891-23-66 for M. Livius Salinator. They point out that the names are correct (CIL, I², p. 29), but there is serious doubt concerning the historical event, the alleged third *ludi saeculares* in 236. Mommsen has shown (*Römische Chronologie bis auf Caesar*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1859, p. 186), that the date was established on the *fasti*, in order to coordinate it with the date of the Augustan revival of the same. Most authorities hold to the date of 249 (RKR, p. 451; L. R. Taylor, OCD, p. 821; Radke, RE 24, p. 1143,45 ff.; RRG, p. 246 ff.). A M' Aemilius' death is mentioned in Livy, 26.23,7, it is possible that he is our *Xvir s.f.*, since no other person can thus be identified.

53) Dion. Hal., 4,62.

54) Gell., *n.a.*, I,19,11; Cicero, *de div.*, I,2,4.

55) Cicero, *de div.*, 2,11,12; Dion. Hal., 4,62,5.

56) στάσις, or "στάσεως καταλαβούσης τὴν πόλιν" in Dion. Hal.; *tumultus* in Val. Max., I,1,1; esp. concerning the Gracchan revolt.

57) "δυστυχία," or -ς τινὸς μεγάλης συμπεσοῦσης κατὰ πόλεμον in Dion. Hal.; *clades* in Livy, 40.37,1.

58) "τεράτων τινῶν καὶ φαντασμάτων" in Dion. Hal., diverse terms in Latin authors.

59) RKR, p. 531.

60) H. Stuart-Jones in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. by S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock and M. P. Charlesworth, vols. 7, 8 and 9, Cambridge, 1928-1934, 7, p. 430; RKR, p. 539,2; especially, the above-cited passage of Dion. Hal., 4,62,5.

the greatest secrecy,⁶¹) since only the *decemviri* constituted the competent agency to study them.⁶²) That these oracular interpretations and ambiguous answers could be used for other than religious benefit seems to be evident.

There seems to be some confusion in the records between the *XVviri s.f.* and the *haruspices*, yet the *haruspices* were never *sacerdotes publici p.r.*⁶³) In case of necessity they were invited from outside of Rome.⁶⁴) They foretold the future, a fact which should indicate the essential difference between them and the augural and decemviral colleges.⁶⁵) They have not constituted a special college in Rome until the time of the emperor Tiberius.

The *Epulones*, the latest of the four colleges, was instituted in 196⁶⁶) because the *pontifices* were unable to cope with the increasing burden of religious rituals. The *epulones'* dependency upon the *pontifices* is evident, since the *pontifices* arbitrated in their differences⁶⁷) and substituted for them whenever they were not available to perform prescribed functions.⁶⁸) These included a number of cult-oriented ceremonial duties, "*tensae, curricula, praecentio, ludi, libationes epulaeque ludorum.*"⁶⁹)

61) Cicero, *de leg.*, 2.12,30; Lact. *Inst.*, 1,6,13.

62) On account of their interpretations "Mater Idaea" was brought to Rome by 204 (Livy, 29.10,4 ff.). Among the many attempts to explain historically the bringing of Magna Mater to Rome, Latte's seems to be acceptable (RRG, p. 260, esp. note 3). He says that in later historical periods one hardly ever hears about the cult, "weil er hauptsächlich von den ärmeren Schichten getragen wurde, die naturgemäss in den Inschriften weniger hervortreten. Dann hatte man gerade, als die eigentliche Gefahr des zweiten Punischen Krieges vorüber war, diesen Schichten eine Konzession gemacht." Latte admits the likelihood that the new cult could signify an attempt to introduce new methods of religious cult. Nevertheless, he reduces the possibilities to one common denominator, "Für die Religionspolitik der römischen Regierung in dieser Zeit ist die Rücksicht auf die Stimmungen in der Bevölkerung Roms massgebend, nicht die Aussenpolitik." R. Muth, "Römische Religio." *Serta Philologica Aenipontana*, 7/8, Innsbruck, 1962, pp. 253/254, considers the "Magna Mater" cult as the first notable manifestation of Roman flexibility within the frame of traditional cult practices.

63) RKR, p. 543; H. Stuart-Jones, CAH, 7, pp. 429/430; RRG, pp. 396/397.

64) Cicero, *de div.*, 1.43,97; Livy, 27.37.7.

65) RKR, p. 547.

66) Livy, 23.42,1; cf. RRG, p. 251.

67) Cicero, *de har. resp.*, 10,21.

68) Dio C., 43,41,9; 48,32,4.

69) Cicero, *loc. cit.*

Requirements and membership

Originally, all priesthoods were of the patrician order,⁷⁰⁾ but in the late Republic only the *rex sacrorum* and the *flamines maiores* were bound to patrician status.⁷¹⁾ The college of the *decemviri sacris faciundis* was most likely open to the plebeians by the Licinio-Sextian law.⁷²⁾ The plebeians next secured the right of pontificate and augurate through the *lex Ogulnia* in 300,⁷³⁾ in accordance with the gains made after 366.

The members of the colleges were chosen for life in contrast to annual magistracies.⁷⁴⁾ Technically, no priest could be dismissed, only the *salii* were obliged to abdicate whenever they reached another priesthood.⁷⁵⁾ Also, the Vestal virgins were permitted to leave after 30 years of service. We know that priestly competence remained even when a priest left the city for some reason or other. The *pontifex maximus* was obliged to remove a priest from his position only when the priest's duty came into opposition to his other activities, especially in the case of the *flamines*.⁷⁶⁾ Also, when a priest was condemned in

70) RKR, pp. 487 ff.

71) RKR, pp. 506, 5,6,7,8.

72) Livy, 6.37,12; 6.42,2; 10,8; CIL, 1², 15.

73) Livy, 10.6-9,2; MRR, 1, p. 172; the membership was increased by adding four or five places to the existing colleges of four patricians each. According to Bardt (p. 32) "...die Zahl so gut bezeugt ist, wie überhaupt nur eine aus dem Alterthum bezeugt sein kann." Nevertheless, he points out (cf. RRG, p. 197, n. 1) that the *pontifex maximus* was not noted in Livy's list. It is evident that the head of the pontifical college could be either a plebeian or patrician, as seen in the 7 plebeian and 6 patrician *pontifices maximi* between 225 and 44. There is evidence that in both colleges the patricians were restricted to about half the places. Yet, the plebeians were eligible for all the places (cf. L. R. Taylor, "Caesar's Colleagues in the Pontifical College," *AJP*, 63 (1942) p. 407).

74) RSR, 2, pp. 19 ff.

75) RKR, p. 494, note 1.

76) Val. Max., 1.1,4 ff.; Livy, 26.23,8; Concerning the *flamines*, as representatives of the divine *numina*, cf. Muth, *Römische Religio*, loc. cit., pp. 259 ff. Between the middle of the third and second centuries, we find that the *flamines'* position came under the control of the *pontifices maximi* who delimited some individual priests in their political functions. Latte (RRG, p. 195) speaks about "Machtkämpfe" in politico-religious matters, even of a revolution, by which the *pontifex maximus* became the head of the Roman sacral institutions. J. Bleicken ("Oberpontifex..." loc. cit., *Hermes*, 85, pp. 363 ff.), after having traced the *pontifex maximus'* position as far as *imperium*, *potestas* and *auspicium* are concerned, comes to the conclusion that the *flamines*, *Rex sac.*, as well as the Vestal virgins, were not under the *pontifex maximus* in the sense of a superior, rather

court, he automatically lost his priesthood,⁷⁷⁾ but in the case of the *augures* (and the *fratres aruales*), even then their priestly competence remained.⁷⁸⁾ The position of the *pontifex maximus* could never be lost. Since the number of members was specific,⁷⁹⁾ the priestly colleges constituted special groups of permanent functionaries whose lifelong terms potentially permitted them to exercise an impact upon society through their state and society-connected duties.

The selection of the priests was originally in the hands of the members of the colleges, who chose new members through cooptation; in the historically ascertainable later periods, exceptions were the *rex sacrorum*, *flamines* and Vestal virgins, who were appointed by the *pontifex maximus*.⁸⁰⁾ Two members of the college nominated the candidates, the number of which was limited to three.⁸¹⁾ In Cicero's time, most likely a vote of some *comitia* was taken between the nomination and the cooptation.⁸²⁾ It is certain, however, that during the third century

as the administrative head of the pontifical college: that the *pontifices*, especially the *pontifex maximus*, always remained what they originally were, i.e., priests, separate from magistrates. He sees in the eventual superiority of the *pontifex maximus* a lengthy development due to strong personalities in the position.

Muth, *Römische Religio*, loc. cit., (pp. 253 ff.), after tracing the cult concepts of Roman religion in the Republic and the Empire, states: "Die Geschichte der römischen Religion wird man primär sicher nicht als Geschichte ihrer zunehmenden Überlieferung sehen dürfen, sondern als Geschichte des Strebens nach Selbstbehauptung der alten Religionsidee," (p. 253).

In a recent article, J.-Cl. Richard, "Sur quelques grand pontifes plébéiens," *Latomus*, 27 (1968), pp. 786 ff., espouses the idea that the change was due to forceful plebeian *pontifices maximi* between 242-131, who embellished the position of the *pontifex maximus* by delimiting the function of the *flamines maiores* for political and religious reasons.

77) *Plut., quest. Rom.*, 99. Cicero, *Brut.*, 33,127, "hic (Sulp. Galba, cos. 110) qui in collegio sacerdotum esset, primus post Roman conditam iudicio publico est condemnatus."

78) *Plut., quest. Rom.*, 99.

79) Information conveniently collected in RKR: *pontifices* and *augures*, originally three, later increased to six, nine, fifteen, and through Caesar to sixteen (pp. 503,4 ff., 523,4); the *epulones* originally three and later increased to seven (p. 518); and *XVviri s.f.* (pp. 534/535).

80) Wissowa, "cooptatio," RE, loc. cit.; RKR pp. 487 ff.; RRG, pp. 394-396.

81) Livy, 40.42,11; Tac., *ann.*, 4,16. In case of the Vestal virgins, the list of nominees included 20 names, of which the new members were selected by lot (Gell., *n.a.*, 1,12,11). In case of the others, it is generally considered that three names were proposed.

82) *Pont.*: Cicero, *ep. ad Br.*, 1.5.3; Suet., *Nero*, 2; *Aug.*: Cicero, *Phil.*, 2.2.4; 13.5,12; *XVviri s.f.*: (RKR, pp. 534/535).

the *pontifex maximus* was elected from the members of the pontifical college⁸³⁾ by a special assembly of 17 tribes.⁸⁴⁾ After some unsuccessful attempts,⁸⁵⁾ in 104 a plebescite of the *tr. pl.*, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, determined that the members of the four major colleges be elected by the vote of the 17 tribes.⁸⁶⁾ The nomination became most likely the responsibility of the *augures*.⁸⁷⁾ The vote of the assembly, nevertheless, obliged the presiding officer of each college formally to coopt the new member. Sulla temporarily stopped the law,⁸⁸⁾ but a lieutenant of C. Julius Caesar in 63, T. Labienus, reinstated it again.⁸⁹⁾ The result was that in the time of Cicero regular elections were held for priests between the consular and praetorial elections.⁹⁰⁾ Some requirements for entrance into priestly colleges were specific.⁹¹⁾ An individual who wanted to become a member had to be a Roman citizen,⁹²⁾ of free birth,⁹³⁾ and without bodily defect.⁹⁴⁾ Yet, un-specific characteristics must have been more exacting and more difficult to fulfill in Rome's aristocratic society where the upper classes maintained an almost exclusive political control.

The priests were members of this segment of the population; most of them, especially the *pontifices* and *augures*, held higher magistracies. Thus, in their pre-selection and eventual inauguration, the same, *i.e.*, aristocratic, *criteria* appear to prevail.

83) L. R. Taylor, "The Election of the *Pontifex Maximus* in the Late Republic," *Cl. Phil.*, 37 (1942), pp. 421 ff., esp. p. 421, note 1, for bibliography. Cf. Münzer's evaluation of the same problem in RAAF, pp. 185/186.

84) RSR, 2, pp. 27 ff.; RKR, pp. 495, 508 ff.

85) C. Licinius Crassus, *tr. pl.* 145, proposed a bill for popular vote in electing priests; RRG, p. 277; MRR, 1, p. 470.

86) Cicero, *pro Deiot.*, 11,31; Livy, *per.*, 67; Val. Max., 6,5,5; RSR, 2, pp. 25 ff.; H. Last in CAH, 9, pp. 163/164; RAAF, pp. 359/360; MRR, 1, pp. 561/562, n.5.

87) Auct. *ad. Her.*, 1.12,20: "lex iubet augurem in demortui locum qui petat in contione nominare."

88) Livy, *per.* 89; Dio, 37.37,1; Auct., *vir. ill.*, 75,11; for further references, cf. MRR, 2, p. 75.

89) Dio, 37.37,1-2; Taylor, "The Election of the *Pontifex Maximus*," *loc. cit.*, pp. 421/422.

90) Cicero, *ep. ad. Brut.*, 1,5,4; Dio Cass., 41.36,3.

91) RSR, 2, 32; 3,566; RKR, p. 491.

92) Cicero, *pro Balbo*, 24,55.

93) Gell., *n.a.*, 1,12,4.

94) Cf. RKR, p. 491; Dion. Hal., 2.21,3; Seneca, *contr.* 4,2; Gell., *n.a.*, 1,12,3; Fronto, p. 149. Nab.; Plut., *quest. Rom.*, 73; RKR, p. 491.

Excursus 1

It is beyond the scope of this paper to elucidate the means by which Roman aristocracy maintained leadership. Nevertheless, a brief reflection upon the problem appears to be necessary.⁹⁵) Studies in Roman politics attempted to define some norms, e.g., *mos majorum*, *amicitia*, *virtus*, from literary evidence of the late Republic and the Empire (*ad mores*, cf. A. Steinwenter, *mores*, RE, 16, pp. 290,17 ff.; esp. "M. als Sitten," pp. 296,44 ff; also, P. L. Schmidt, "Der kleine Pauly," 3, pp. 1427,1 ff.). The following statement, *i.a.*, can illustrate acceptance of this tendency in Roman political life, as seen by R. Syme (*The Roman Revolution*, Oxford, 1939, p. 315):

"The Romans as a people were possessed by an especial veneration for authority, precedent and tradition, and by rooted distaste for change unless change could be shown to be in harmony with ancestral custom, '*mos majorum*' — which in practice meant the sentiments of the oldest living senators."

(*Ad amicitia*, Oehler, *amicus*, RE, 1, pp. 1831,5 ff. (esp. *2) brief restatement under *amicitia* in "Der kleine Pauly," by H. Hausmaninger, 1, pp. 299,52 ff); Syme (op. cit., p. 12) illustrates *amicitia* thusly:

"Three weapons the *nobiles* held and wielded, the family, money and the political alliance (*amicitia* or *factio* . . .);" and p. 157, "Roman political factions were welded together . . . on a favourable estimate the bond was called *amicitia*, otherwise *factio*."

Quoting also Sallust (*b.J.*, 31,15) and Cicero (*fam.*, 3.10,9):

"in quo (aug. college) non modo amicitiam violari apud maiores nostros fas non erat, sed ne cooptari quidem sacerdotem licebat, qui cuiquam ex collegio esset inimicus."

Cf. also, D. E. Hahm, "Roman Nobility and the Three Major Priesthoods," *TAPH*, 94 (1963), pp. 80, 82, 83, who saw in priesthoods nothing but a tool in embellishing "party positions" of the aristocracy (following Münzer's and Sculard's theories concerning family and other connections.) D. Earl, *The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome*, Ithaca, New York, 1967, p. 21, sees in the relentless pursuit of certain continuously changing ideas, specifically *virtus*, the basic goal of aristocratic rule. He says:

"*Virtus*, for the Republican noble, consisted in the winning of personal pre-eminence and glory by the commission of great deeds in the service of the Roman state."

95) *Laudationes* and *elogia* will be treated below as far as they pertain to the individual careers of priests. To questions on Republican nobility, *i.a.*, Gelzer, *Kl. Schr.*, op. cit., 1, pp. 17 ff., was utilized as well as for those concepts which are not essential in the consideration of requirements for priestly cooptation: *dignitas*, *gravitas*, *pietas* (C. Koch, RE, 20, pp. 1221,58 ff.), *fides*, (Otto, RE, 6, pp. 2281,41 ff.), *labor* and *patientia*. To these cf. also Burck, *Gymn.* 58, 1951, pp. 163 ff., and Koch, op. cit., pp. 103 ff., for analysis of *vir bonus*.

The emergence, and pervading interests, of Roman nobility to pursue these concepts is excellently analyzed by D. Kienast, *Cato der Zensor, seine Persönlichkeit und seine Zeit*. Heidelberg. 1954, esp. Chapter II, pp. 25 ff.

While the above statements contain vestiges of feasible interpretation, any generalized acceptance and unselective reliance upon one or more of such concepts will present only part of the historical picture. One has to consider that a great number of strong personalities appeared, especially among the *pontifices* and *augures*, as well as among the magistrates who did not hold priesthoods, who became the directing force in the creation of a milieu, in which such slogans as *mos majorum*, *amicitia*, and *virtus* were shaped according to given conditions and individual, rather than class-based, considerations. Furthermore, many Roman writers of the late Republic and the Empire were preoccupied with the deterioration of ancestral ideals. Thus, their opinion concerning moral and ethical problems has to be viewed according to the personal conditions of their own time (cf. F. Hampl, "Römische Politik in republikanischer Zeit und das Problem des Sittenverfalls," *Hist. Zeitschr.*, 188 (1955), pp. 497 ff.). Consequently, *mos majorum*, *amicitia*, *virtus*, which were steadily changing vehicles of Roman aristocratic standards, cannot be considered extraordinary elements of priestly selection.

However, besides these, available *ex post facto* evidence in the form of *elogia* and *laudationes* offer ideal standards by which individuals in leading positions were evaluated (Vollmer, *laudatio funebris*, RE, 12, pp. 992,23 ff.; also P. L. Schmidt, "Der kleine Pauly," 3, pp. 517,60 ff.) Vollmer presents a chronological order of available *laudationes*, but points out their historical unreliability. Cf. to this, A. Lippold, *Consules, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des römischen Konsulats von 264 bis 201 v. Chr.*, Bonn, 1963, esp. chapter 2, pp. 73 ff.). In the *laudationes* a tripartite ideal appears which specified the area of activity for a man in the eye of the public. Included in this area were government, army, and state cult, comprising the whole activity of public life in which the last was as important as the first, and separation between one and the other was not possible.

To illustrate the point, L. Caecilius Metellus, cos. 251 and 247, pont. max. 243, was praised in this manner by his son, according to the statement of Pliny (*n.h.*, 7,139 ff.): "...primarium bellatorem esse, optimum oratorem, fortissimum imperatorem, auspicio suo maximas res geri, maximo honore uti, summa sapientia esse, summum senatorem haberi, pecuniam magnam bono modo invenire, multos liberos relinquere et clarissimum in civitate esse." (Cf. to this, Kienast, *op. cit.*, pp. 29/30, and Lippold, *op. cit.*, pp. 75/76). Similarly, in the case of the not yet deceased P. Licinius Crassus Dives, *pont. max.* 212-183, Livy (30.1.5) writes the following: "Nobilis idem ac dives erat; forma viribusque corporis excelebat; facundissimus habebatur seu causa oranda, seu in senatu et apud populum suadendi ac dissuadendi locus esset; iuris pontificii peritissimus; super haec bellicae quoque laudis consulatus compotem facerat." The text is a typical text of a *laudatio*. (Apparently, it would have a better place in 39.42 than here.) Almost the same characteristics are given in Sempr. As. (HRR, fr. 8, from Gell., *n.a.* 1,13,10): "Is Crassus ... scriptoribus traditur habuisse quinque rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod pontifex maximus."

Precise generalization cannot be established as far as priestly requirements

are concerned, since these statements refer to past actions which are consequently different, according to individual achievements. But in the values which are suggested, one can establish an overall framework as far as Roman aristocracy is concerned. Generally, the individual is described as a brave and wise man, expert in war and in counsel, an eloquent speaker, masterful in matters connected with law, forceful in mind and character, and, besides the previously mentioned characteristics, is also well-versed in military matters. Wealth by honourable means was also a factor. Ultimately, he must have been well-equipped with "congestis omnibus humanis ab natura fortunaque bonis," (Livy, 30.1.4), not an esoteric idea even in our days.

*Advisory and Political Role of Priests
Some aspects of magistracy and priesthood*

The Republic was a government of the aristocracy in which after 366 plebeian and patrician families alike retained their position by not permitting unproven, unreliable elements to enter their ranks. Münzer pointed out this condition when he said that only few privileged individuals could find acceptance as members of the priestly colleges, since cooptation meant membership for life, while magistrates changed annually. He emphasized that often the same individuals competed for both magistracies and priestly appointments and priesthood at times preceeded, or in some cases followed a political career.¹⁾ As illustration of Münzer's statement the following fact can be offered: with few exceptions all priests held some form of magistracy. As such, their constitutional position as leaders of the community was not delimited to merely magisterial functions; rather, it was combined with priestly duties. Thus, the priests were not merely a permanent advisory body for the government, but they were expounders of certain policies in the community, where they represented expertise of traditional

1) RAAF, p. 2. "Denn nur wenige Auserlesene finden Aufnahme in die Priesterschaften. Zwar ist deren Stellenzahl grösser als die der staatlichen Behörden, doch Beamten Gewalt ist durch die Verfassung in enge zeitliche Grenzen eingeschlossen, geistliche Würde aber wird auf Lebenszeit verliehen. Um so mehr richtet sich der Ehrgeiz nicht nur auf Anteil an der Regierung, sondern auch auf Sitz und Stimme in einem Priesterkollegium, und um so mehr ist Mitgliedschaft derselben Kollegiums bald die Voraussetzung, bald die Folge von Zugehörigkeit zu derselben Partei, wie umgekehrt Wettbewerb um Staatsämter und um Priestertümer zwischen denselben Gegnern stattfindet." The statement is offered by way of introduction to RAAF. Münzer's use of the term "geistliche Würde" should be considered a euphemism, vaguely corresponding to contemporary concepts of "religious dignity."

ritualistic practices in their permanent, annually unchanging colleges. Toward the government, the priests' role was primarily consultative. In fact, the priests, the "sacerdotes publici" of Rome²⁾ were not representatives of a divinity in the sense that they acted in a divinity's name or brought forth legally binding decisions. Rather, as shown previously, they were advisory or interpretative organs in the maintenance of the best relations between the gods and the state.

It is impossible to establish a precise *modus operandi* in seeking and giving of sacerdotal advice: nevertheless, some basic aspects appear to be the same on each occasion: (1) Before consultation with priests was sought, portents appeared,³⁾ about which a magistrate officially consulted the senate; (2) the senate's deliberation and decision was usually connected with official advising with members of a priestly college;⁴⁾ (3) after a decision had been made, the senate permitted⁵⁾

2) RKR, pp. 479/480; RSR, 2, p. 26; Livy, 26.23.7: "Sacerdotes publici eo anno demortui sunt novique suffecti," in the year 211 B.C. (MRR, I, pp. 272 ff.); also, 42.28.10, "Eo anno (172 B.C.) sacerdotes publici mortui..." Wissowa mentions that the priesthoods originally were connected with family names. He is quoting Arnobius, 3.38, according to whom the oldest male member was responsible for the maintenance of the cult (cf. especially p. 404, notes 3, 4, and 5). There is neither time nor place to consider the speculative implications of this observation, yet it is significant that in its very conceptions, priesthoods were connected with individual families, e.g., the *Luperci* are from the *Quinctiales* or *Fabiani*.

3) To portents and prodigies, cf. Händel, RE, 23, pp. 2283,3 ff. In connection with the disastrous battle of Trasimene, portents from as far back as 223 were recalled (Livy, 21.62-63), as well as from outside of Rome (Livy, 22.1.8-13), portents before and during the battle (22.3.11-13; *ibid.*, 5.8). In the year 203 the same signs and omens appeared (Livy, 30.2.9-13), as well as in the year 199 (Livy, 32.1.13). In each case, the magistrates "consultuit patres de religione," Livy, 22.1.14. For further information cf.: F. Luterbacher, *Der Prodigien glaube und Prodigienstil der Römer*, Pr. Burgdorf, 1904, pp. 14 ff.; G. Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius, Sendung Roms bei Livius*, Frankfurt, 1951, pp. 99 ff.; B. Krauss, *An Interpretation of Omens, Portents, [etc.] in Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius*, Diss. U. of Pennsylvania, 1931; P. G. Walsh, *Livy, His Historical Aims and Methods*, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 61 ff.; Ogilvie, *Commentary, op. cit.*, pp. 403/404 for additional material; for Livy's 4th decade, P. Lebrecht Schmidt, "Zum Text Livianischer Prodigienberichte", *Hermes*, 6 (1968/69), pp. 725-732.

4) The senate's deliberations were initiated in 217 by the new dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus, *augur* since 265. The senators, after consultations with the *XVviri s.f.* (Livy, 22.9.8) and the *pontifices* (*ibid.*, 11) passed a *sen. cons.* In 203 the college of the *pontifices* were the advisory body (Livy, 30.2.13), again in the year 200 (Livy, 31.9.9-10). In 199 *haruspices* were the consultants of the senate, and the college of *pontifices* again in 187 (Livy, 39.5.9-10).

5) Livy, 39.5.10.

or commanded⁶⁾ the magistrate to carry out the decision. It is problematic when and how the priests gave their advice; yet this is precisely the *môte* question. That they were unofficially involved in the first step of the process seems to be evident from the duties of the priestly colleges.⁷⁾ The *augures*, e.g., were basically interested in portents, signs and prodigies, and it is inconceivable that they or the *pontifex maximus* would not be cognizant of such occurrences. Again, it seems to be logical that the *consul* or the *praetor* would have consulted informally with them, especially in view of the fact that consuls themselves, or members of their families, were members of the same colleges. Final decisions again depended on the same group. Their advice, as a *decretum*, was the decisive one, notwithstanding the fact that, technically, the *senatus consultum* followed the *decretum*.⁸⁾ Yet, in view of the preparatory steps, the *senatus consultum* appears to be a legal technicality.

Nevertheless, advice given was more than a mere suggestion. Its weight and importance rested in the Roman's view of gods and *religio*, a culmination of which was expressed in the late Republic in the often quoted passage of Cicero (*har. resp.*, 9, 19):

"Quam volumus licet, patres conscripti, ipsi nos amemus: tamen nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Poenos, nec artibus Graecos, nec denique hoc ipso huius gentis ac terrae domestico nativoque sensu Italos ipsos ac Latinos, sed pietate ac religione atque hac una sapientia, quod deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus." ⁹⁾

Accordingly, this late Republican view considered that the Romans, through their special contact with their gods, and supposedly because of their *pietas* and *religio*, did surpass all other nations. Historically,

6) "iubet," Livy, 22.9.11; "censuerat," 32.1.13; the consul also acts at the dictation of "praeunte maximo pontifice," Livy, 31.9.9. To this, cf. pertinent references in D. W. Packard, *A Concordance to Livy*, 4 vols., Cambridge, 1968.

7) RSR, 3, p. 999.

8) *ibid.*, 1, pp. 112 ff.; 3, pp. 364 ff.

9) To analysis of this passage, cf., i.a., Muth, *loc. cit.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247/248, where the warning is given: "Allerdings dürfen wir aus den beigebrachten und ähnlichen Aussagen für unser Anliegen nicht zuviel herauslesen: gemeint ist nur, dass die Römer die Götter eifriger und bewusster kultisch verehrten als die Angehörigen anderer Völker..." Lippold, *op. cit.*, pp. 297/298, points out that a too idealizing interpretation does not necessarily correspond to historical reality. For additional information concerning *religio* of the Romans, cf. below.

the Ciceronian account is suspect as an actual reference of earlier periods. One need only remember the difficulties connected with the subsequent Augustan revival of traditionalist Roman rites where adequate answers often could not be found to questions concerning earlier religious practices.¹⁰⁾ Thus, even in Cicero's time, one must assume interpretations based upon conjecture.

In view of the fact that there are many studies which analyzed what the Romans understood as *religio*,¹¹⁾ it is necessary to attempt (1) briefly to define the terms, and (2) to trace manifestations of *religio* in Roman society through rites and ritualistic practices.

Most authorities agree that the modern term religion does not correspond to the Latin *religio*, and any alliteration could become conceptually misleading. According to Kobbert¹²⁾ the term has both an objective and subjective meaning; thus, for the Romans it signified

10) *l.c.*, RRG, pp. 294 ff.

11) To this complex problem, besides the works cited below, the following were consulted:

1. W. Warde Fowler, "The Original Meaning of Sacer," (repr. from JRSt, 1, 1911), in *Roman Essays and Interpretations*, Oxford, 1920, pp. 15 ff.
2. L. Deubner, *Die Römer, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, begründet von Chantepie de la Saussay), new ed. by A. Bertholet & E. Lehmann, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1925.
3. W. R. Halliday, *The Pagan Background of Early Christianity*, Liverpool, 1925.
4. C. Bailey, *Phases in the Religion of Ancient Rome*, London, 1932 (Sather Lectures at the U. of Calif., 1931).
5. N. Turchi, *La religione di Roma antica*, Bologna, 1939.
6. H. Wagenvoort, *Imperium. Studien over het mana-begrip en zede en taal der Romeinen*, Amsterdam-Paris, 1941; transl. into English: *Roman Dynanism*, Oxford, 1947.
7. F. Altheim, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (revised 2nd ed.), 2 vols., Berlin, 1956 (1st ed. in 3 vols., Berlin and Leipzig, 1931-33, transl. into English by H. Mattingly, 1938).
8. J. Bayet, *Histoire Politique et Historique de la Religion Romaine*, Paris, 1957.

J. B. Kaetzler, *Religio, Versuch einer Wörterklärung* (20. Jahresbericht des bischöflichen Gymnasiums Paulinum in Schwaz 1952/53) Schwaz, 1953, pp. 2 ff., was not available to me. For further extensive bibliographies, analyses of primary and secondary sources, cf. Muth, *loc. cit.*, *op. cit.*, note on pp. 248 ff.; H. J. Rose, "Roman Religion," JRS, 50 (1960), pp. 161 ff., and RRG, pp. 1 ff. Still useful, general background, W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, Macmillan, London, 1933.

12) RE, 1A, pp. 565,39 ff.

an attitude, a feeling toward the suprarational, in conjunction with an objective, superior meaning of power, a prohibition, a place and action.

Other definitions pursue the same line of thought. Warde-Fowler (*The Rel. Exp., op. cit.*, p. 249) approaches the problem from the sociological point of view, sees its origin in the anthropological magical formulae, with which a primitive, unsophisticated people tried to put themselves in "right" with the powers of the universe, but adds (*ibid.*, p. 249) that later, under the impact of a developing society, this meaning was found wanting and thus developed into a "religious instinct... to mean the fulfillment of religious obligation quite as much as the anxious feeling which has originally suggested it." (*ibid.*, p. 249). In the following, he argues that in spite of the fact that later writers might not have known anything about earlier cult practices of the Romans, because of manifestations of ritualistic forms he considers the possibility of earlier, society-bound sincerity in religious matters.

Wissowa (RKR, p. 380), initiating his discussions from similar bases, describes it the following way:

"Grundlage und Voraussetzung für die gesamte Götterverehrung ist das Gefühl der Abhängigkeit von der göttlichen Macht und Fürsorge *religio* und der Wunsch, die höheren Gewalten sich gnädig zu stimmen und zu erhalten..."

This "Wunsch," according to him, will be shaped by special regulations through which the state or the individual oblige themselves to certain practices and in turn consider the gods equally bound to fulfill their part of the bargain.

For H. J. Rose (OCD, p. 758), *religio* is a bond and non-physical, inner restraint which the state or the individual oblige themselves to certain practices and in turn consider the gods equally bound to fulfill their part of the bargain.

Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 99, sees *religio* "in der leidenschaftslosen, gewissenhaften Beobachtung eines aussermenschlichen Gegenübers." He points out (*ibid.*, p. 100) that:

"Die römische *res publica* ist somit gleichsam das Ergebnis einer zwischenstaatlichen Zusammenarbeit. In ihrem Aufbau und ihrem geschichtlichen Werden herrschen zwar ausschliesslich die Gesetze der menschlichen Logik und eines wirklichkeitsbewahrten politischen Instinktes. Allein es geschieht kein einziger entscheidender Akt, der nicht auf dem Weg der Auspizien dem transzendenten Gegenüber zur Stellungnahme, zur Offenbarung seines Fiat oder Veto, unterbreitet wird. Damit wird die Handlung menschlicher Initiative und Verantwortung zu einem Bestandteil des göttlichen Wollens, das sich der Römer unter dem Begriff des *Fatums* als eine in die Zukunft übergreifende Planung vorstellt. Die Götter erscheinen auf diese Weise als die eigentlichen Baumeister des Staates."

Among more recent authors, perhaps the most significant is Muth's approach to the problem (*loc. cit.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 ff.). He expands Koch's statement:

“Die Geschichte der römischen Religion wird man primär sicher nicht als Geschichte ihrer zunehmenden Überfremdung sehen dürfen, sondern als Geschichte des Strebens nach Selbstbehauptung der alten Religionsidee.”

Furthermore, he points out that the Romans' concept of their gods rested upon the cognizance of *numina in actu* (*ibid.*, pp. 257 ff.), which he defines thusly:

“Göttliches numen bleibt für den Römer stets primär machtvolles göttliches Gebieten und Walten, göttliches Tätigsein in menschlichen Bereich und in der Zeit, also in menschlicher Geschichte, es äussert sich in konkreter geschichtlicher Erfüllung.”

He shows that (1) the concept *numen* existed in the earliest forms of Roman *religio*, and (2) “...die Römer die göttlichen *numina* zu bestimmten Zeiten in konkreter geschichtlicher Situation praesent empfanden, wie ihnen die Gottheit dabei manifest wurde” (p. 258). He sees acceptance of the *numen* is manifested in leaders before and during state actions connected with *auspicia* and *vota*, as well as in certain priests, especially the *flamen Dialis*, *flamines maiores* in general, and the Vestal virgins (p. 259):

“Diese Auffassung erhebt sogar zum Glauben, dass die betreffende Gottheit im Leben ihres Priesters schlechthin gegenwärtig sei, wodurch diese Priester aus einer bloss profanen Existenz herausgehoben sind.”

Muth's insight is of importance because according to this *numen* concept, these priests (as well as the Vestal virgins) held a unique position between men and the gods. Consequently, they were bound by the strictest cult regulations. Ultimately, one could say *religio* was a sense of obligation, aptly described by Muth as “eine Art *commercium*” (*loc. cit.*, p. 258, or, as described by Latte (RRG, p. 39), a rule-bound sense of adherence to the manifested demands of higher powers. This sense of obligation, or *commercium*, was applied to gods as well as to places, and the *caerimoniae* connected with it referred to the object as well as the subject of *religio*. Latte also emphasized that religiosity for the Romans was not

“...eine Gesinnung die die ganze Persönlichkeit prägt, sondern die ständige Bereitschaft, auf jedes Anzeichen einer Störung des gewohnten Verhältnisses zu den Göttern mit einer begütigenden Handlung zu antworten und einmal übernommenen Verpflichtungen nachzukommen.”

That the Romans were always ready to maintain the most satisfactory equilibrium in their obligations between themselves and the gods is evident from the elaborate and pedantic rites with which they wanted to regulate their relationship with the gods, individually as well as in community affairs. As seen above, in the rites the magistrates acted for the whole community, obliged themselves in the community's name, and fulfilled the vows. In turn, however, they expected the gods to fulfill their obligations towards them, in maintaining their good will and fending off hostile powers. The religious acts and ceremonials, therefore, were designed in theory not so much to please the gods as to bring about some manifestation of the divinity by proffering certain *formulae*, thus exercising coercive force upon the divinity to assist and cooperate with the individual or community in return for some already justified or promised compensation.¹³⁾

Nevertheless, ceremonialism as the essential quality of early Roman religion should be enlightened from another aspect. For anthropologists, the word collectively describes rituals by which the supernatural powers are enlisted in behalf of man. As such, ceremonialism is always a part of the total religious system as well as a functioning element of culture,¹⁴⁾ and with its simplicity and/or pageantry it constitutes the one tangible, internally satisfactory, least changeable evidence for man that he is in proper contact with the supernatural powers. Actions, words, the mystical language of the unknown and all other paraphernalia are the means by which this contact is fostered, and they did and do exist in all religions. In Rome, without these means, *religio* would have remained intangible for the majority, as well as unsatisfactory and meaningless. Moreover, the eventually achieved traditional formalism of ritualistic observance became a powerful unifying force between performers and spectators alike, through sentiments evoked during the rites.

It is not the purpose of this work to trace the history of Roman rites except insofar as it pertains to the subject matter at hand. Therefore, the following observation should be made; firstly, when Roman affairs first appear in the light of history, the performing and supervisory elements of the community's religious functions appear to have maintained religious ceremonialism as it existed with cohesive and

13) H. D. Jocelyn, "The Roman Nobility and the Religion of the Republican State," *JRH*, 2 (1966), pp. 89 ff., analyzes in great detail the problems of external ritualism, as part of the peculiar Roman concept of *religio*. He offers examples of cult-based activities in the second and first centuries, and argues that ritualistic observances, whether or not based upon fear, ignorance or political expediency, essentially maintained the concept of *religio*.

14) M. Herskovits, *Man and His Works*, New York, Knopf, 1950, pp. 361 ff.

unifying results for society, especially through the centralization of Italian cults in the city and the incardination of these other cults into the Roman state religion; ¹⁵) secondly, throughout the religious changes of the middle and late Republic, when Hellenistic philosophy, new religions, and the resultant *skepsis* diminished the nobility's interest in ancient Roman religion, ¹⁶) the government did not reject, nor did it fundamentally change the formalism of ancestral religion. Rather, (1) by permitting the community to turn to various foreign divinities, and (2) by adhering to the tradition, the essential unity of the community was astutely and consistently maintained. For our purpose, it is immaterial whether the avowed purpose of this adherence was a sincere faith, the serving of individual ambitions, or the peculiarly Roman interpretation of rule-bound obligation toward gods. The fact remains that religious ceremonialism was maintained during the Republic by the very nobility which provided magistrates and priests alike, in the perpetuation of an established *status quo*, in spite of subsequent, often personally unbelieving attitudes.

Excursus 2

Such attitudes can be observed in the later stages of the Republic. They are not essentially connected with priestly functions; rather, they reflect the opinions of diverse authors in diverse sources, and offer sophisticated views concerning *religio* in general. ¹⁷) They all agree, however, that rites, or *caerimoniae*, have a necessary role. Vestiges of such retrospection can be observed in Roman society since the third century. ¹⁸) T. M. Plautus and P. Terentius Afer's

15) RRG, esp. chapters VII, VIII, IX, pp. 148 ff., *i.a.*, although Latte's statement that "Zu der politischen Machtkonzentration gestellt sich eine religiöse" (p. 193), cannot be accepted without further qualification. Also, Muth, *loc. cit.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 253/254, and Lippold, *op. cit.*, pp. 309/310.

16) RRG, esp. chapter X, pp. 264 ff.

17) RKR, esp. chapters 7-14, pp. 38 ff., *passim*; RRG, esp. chapters VIII, IX, X, pp. 195 ff., *passim*.

18) Doubt has to be raised concerning the historical acceptability of some anecdotes in the third century; e.g., in 293, the humorous disdain expressed by the consul, L. Papirius Cursor, for the *auspicia*, when he vowed to Jupiter "pocillum mulsi" instead of "templa" to the "deis immortalibus" (Livy, 10.42.7). To this, cf. Münzer's justifiably critical attitude in RE, 18, pp. 1052,41 ff.; or, in 249, when the consul, P. Claudius Pulcher, showed impatient contempt in ordering the sacred chickens to be thrown into the sea because of unfavorable *auspicia* (Cicero, *de div.*, 2,33,70/71; *nat. deor.*, 2,3,7; Livy, *per.* 19). Münzer, RE, pp. 2857,63 ff., admits in this case the possibility of historical validity because the anecdote corresponds to the "Geist jener Zeit" and the general character of P. Claudius Pulcher. Nevertheless, his statement remains merely an assump-

plays are full of allusions of travesty,¹⁹⁾ which were produced at the *Ludi Romani*, *Plebei*, *Apollinares* and *Megalenses*,²⁰⁾ indicating how sophisticated Romans started to look upon *religio*.

Q. Ennius' questioning spirit in matters of religion was approved by the aristocracy,²¹⁾ especially after he had translated the ἀναγκαφή of Euhemerus of Messene and reduced the gods to the level of earthly beings who started to be adored only after their deaths.²²⁾ C. Lucilius rejected miracles as figments of the imagination and called Numa the inventor of religious terrorism.²³⁾ Characteristic are the comments of Polybius in the second century.²⁴⁾ He said that *religio* is nothing more than superstition; yet, he added in an admiring tone:

“ἐπὶ τοσούτον γὰρ ἐκτετραγώδηται καὶ παφεισῆκται τοῦτο τό μέρος παρ’ αὐτοῖς εἰς τε τοὺς κατ’ ἰδίαν βίους, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολήν. ὁ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι θαυμάσιον. ἐμοὶ γε μὴν δοκοῦσι τοῦ πλήθους χάριν τοῦτο πεποιημέναι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν πολίτευμα συναγαγεῖν, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἦν ἀναγκαῖος ὁ τοιοῦτος τρόπος· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐστὶν ἐλαφρόν καὶ πλήρες ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανόμων, ὀργῆς ἀλόγου, θυμοῦ, βιαίου, λείπεται τοῖς ἀδήλοις φόβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγωδίᾳ τὰ πλῆθη ἔχειν.”

Polybius made a sharp distinction between the “πολίτευμα σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν” and the “πλῆθος,” which is “ἐλαφρόν καὶ πλήρες ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανόμων, ὀργῆς ἀλόγου, θυμοῦ βιαίου.” and must be left in blessed ignorance, through “ἀλήλαις φόβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγωδίᾳ.” It is an understatement that Polybius considered religion an “opiate of the people”; nevertheless, his expressed admiration for the *modus operandi* duly represented an attitude of enlightenment which separated the nobles from the non-nobles, the advantaged from the disadvantaged, the governors from the governed.

According to Augustine, Q. Mucius Scaevola, consul 95, pontifex ca. 115-82,

tion. To Livy's use of religious awe and prodigies for the sake of *bona exempla*, cf. E. H. Haight, *The Roman Use of Anecdote, in Cicero, Livy & the Satirists*, New York, 1940, pp. 37 ff. She points out that doubt and rational approach to interpretation of *religio* was the direct result of overemphasis of *prodigia*.

19) Plautus: *Cistell.*, 513 ff.; also Alcesimar's blunderings about the gods' names, esp. prol.; cf. also, RRG, p. 265; Terentius: *Phormio*, pp. 704 ff.; *Eum.*, pp. 584 ff.

20) RKR, pp. 451 ff.

21) Enn., *Telam.*, 11.316-318 (ed. Vahlen, pp. 178/179; in ed. Jocelyn, CXXXIV, a and c, pp. 127/128), as quoted in Cicero, *de div.*, 2.50, 104; “ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitem, sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus,” adding to it in *nat. deor.*, 3.32, 79: “Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest.”

22) Jacoby, RE, 6 pp. 964, 42 ff.; cf. for instance, Cicero, *nat. deor.*, 1.16, 42.

23) Lucil., *fragm., sat.*, 1, 15 (ed. Marx).

24) Pol., 6.56, 6-12; F. W. Walbank (*A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1957-67, 1, pp. 11/12 and 741/742; 2, p. 515) points out that “P. approved the use of *religio* for disciplinary purposes” (p. 741), but maintains that any belief beyond the limits of possibility is a manifestation of simplistic, narrow intelligence (Pol., 16.12, 3-11).

felt that it is expedient "...falli in religione civitates."²⁵) His argument was derived most likely from Stoic ideas prevailing in the Scipionic circle, namely, the three sorts of teachings concerning the gods:²⁶) "...tria genera tradita deorum: unum a poetis, alterum a philosophis, tertium a principibus civitatis."²⁷) Since the third was aimed at the welfare of the state in which the masses were uneducated and terror and pageantry-bound, it was not to be disturbed. Similar views were expressed, as seen in Augustine, by M. Terentius Varro, who maintained this three-partite division: "...tria genera theologiae dicit esse, id est rationis quae de diis explicatur, eorumque unum mythicon appellari, alterum physicon, tertium civile?"²⁸) He explains the "tertium genus" as follows: "...quod in urbibus cives, maxime sacerdotes, posse atque administrare debent. In quo est, quod deos publice sacra et sacrificia colere et facere quemque par sit."²⁹) Varro further adds: "Prima inquit Varro theologia maxime adcommodata est ad theatrum, secunda ad mundum, tertia ad urbem."³⁰) Curious is the explanation of the "genus civile:" "Multa esse vera, quae non modo vulgo scire non sit utile, sed etiam, tametsi falsa sunt, aliter existimare populum expediat."³¹)

In all these interpretations one can observe a chasm between Roman statesmen, who were members of the educated nobility and the governed, who comprised the majority of the population. In Cicero, the distinction is not clear. He appears to have maintained a separation between politically expedient and philosophically relevant interpretations in matters connected with religion and cult.³²) As a member of the Roman governing class, he maintained that: "people's constant need for the advice and authority of the aristocracy helps to hold the state together."³³) He was specific about the means by which this constant need

25) Aug., *civ. Dei*, 4.27,16 (ed. Dombart and Kalb, Teubner).

26) In the second century, Panaetius, a member of the Scipionic circle, defined and divided religious beliefs into "μυθική, πολιτική, φιλοσοφική." Cf. M. Pohlenz, RE, 18, pp. 432,18 ff.; for further analysis of the problem, cf. RRG, p. 277.

27) Aug., *civ. Dei*, 4.27,2/3 (ed. Dombart, Kalb, Teubner); Varro, *Ant.*, fr. 24 (ed. Condeimi, Zan. Bologna); to this, Augustine adds: "Triplici enim genere deorum censum distinxit: unum esse physicum, quod philosophi retractant, aliud mythicum, quod inter poetas volutatur, tertium gentile, quod populi sibi quique adoptaverunt" (Varro, fr. 24).

28) Aug., *civ. Dei*, 6.5,1 ff. (ed. cit.); Varro, fr. 23 (ed. cit.); to questions concerning Varro's *res divinae*, RE Suppl., 6, pp. 1234,31 ff., esp. the three *genera theologiae*, cf. RKR, pp. 67 ff.

29) *ibid.*, loc. cit., *civ. Dei*, pp. 57 ff.

30) Varro, fr. 28 (ed. cit.).

31) Aug., *civ. Dei*, 4.31,15 ff. Similar opinion of Augustine is expressed in *civ. Dei*, 3.4,9 ff.: "...quam latum locum aperiatur falsitati, ut ubi intellegamus plura iam sacra et quae religiosa potuisse confingi, ubi putata sunt civibus etiam de ipsis diis prodesse mendacia."

32) RRG, pp. 285/286, concerning Cicero's three-partite attitude toward the use of religion. Also, T. A. Dorey, ed., *Cicero*, esp. chapters 6, by A. E. Douglas, and 7, by J. P. V. D. Balsdon, New York, 1965, pp. 135-214.

33) Cicero, *de leg.*, 2, 12, 30,31: "Quod sequitur vero, non solum ad religionem pertinet, sed etiam ad civitatis statum, ut sine eis, qui sacris publice praesint religioni privatae satis facere non possint continet enim rem publicam consilio et auctoritate optimatum semper populum indigere..."

of the people was to be fulfilled. Writing about the college of *pontifices*, e.g., he wrote that:

"Cum multa divinitus, pontifices, a maioribus nostris inventa atque instituta sunt, tum nihil praeclarius quam quod eosdem et religionibus deorum immortalium et summae rei publicae praesse voluerunt, ut amplissimi et clarissimi cives rem publicam bene gerendo religiones, religiones [MSS. reading: religionibus] sapienter interpretando rem publicam conservarent."³⁴)

Also, being a member of the augural college, a position which he appreciated above all else, he held the *augures* to be the most important among the leading priesthoods. He said:

"Maximum autem et praestantissimum in republica ius est augurum cum auctoritate coniunctum. Neque vero hoc, quia sum ipse augur, ita sentio, sed quia sic existimare nos est necesse. Quid enim maius est, si de iure quaerimus, quam posse a summis imperiis et summis potestatibus comitiatus et concilia, vel instituta dimittere, vel habita rescindere? Quid gravius, quam rem susceptam dirimi, si unus augur *alio die* dixerit? quid magnificentius, quam posse decernere, ut magistratu se abdicent consules? quid religiosius, quam cum populo, cum plebe agendi ius aut dare aut non dare? quid? legem si non iure rogata est, tollere? ut Titiam decreto collegii; ut Livias, consilio Philippi, consulis et auguris: nihil domi, nihil militiae, per magistratus gestum, sine eorum auctoritate posse cuiquam probari?"³⁵)

Significantly, Cicero emphasized the dual, interacting role of political magistracy (rem publicam bene gerere), and priestly position (religiones sapienter interpretari), alluding thereby to the inseparable ambivalence of politics and cult in service of the state.³⁶)

Examination of the above late Republican literature indicates, therefore, that *religio* in the last centuries of the Republic was nothing more than an implementation of the previously suggested *commercium*

34) Cicero, *de domo sua*, 1.1. That this quotation would prove that the college of *pontifices* is confined to senators is unacceptable. Rather, they were members of the senate because of the magistracies which they held. Separation between Church and State in ancient Rome was unknown. It is not the role of this paper to analyze Cicero's aims and dreams as a rationalizer concerning the sage interpretation of religion. That he reflected upon a possible reform seems to be evident from *de div.*, 2.72, 148: "Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus."

35) Cicero, *de leg.*, 2.12, 31. Evidently, the passage does not refer to primary position of the *augures* among the priestly colleges. Rather, it shows that they wielded potential influence at least in Cicero's time, and according to Cicero.

36) e.g., in *de or.*, 3.33, 134, Cicero praises former great *pontifices maximi*, to whom: "...de omnibus divinis atque humanis rebus referretur; iidemque et in senatu et apud populum et in causis amicorum et domi et militiae consilium suum fidemque praestabant." Cf. also the tendentious praise in *de dom.*, 1.2.

between gods and men. The philosophical inquiries reached only a small part of the population; superstitious practices held no meaning for the educated and only caused fear among the uneducated. But exactly in this fear rested the importance of ceremonial practices. The rites, precise performance of duties, as the major part of the Roman cult, held the masses in awe, similar to a papal audience of today or some formal, glittering state occasion such as a presidential inauguration. Thus, cult and rites were fostered emphatically by the governing nobility for the sake of political expediency, and for that only. In fact, in the maintenance of Roman religious practices, one can see the essential reason for interrelation between priesthoods and magistrates, cult and politics. The masses constituted the armies, as well as the assemblies. Upon their attitude rested the career of ambitious individuals who were not only performers of sacrifices as magistrates, but often "expert" interpreters of religion, as members of priestly colleges.

Excursus 3

A few examples should suffice to illustrate how well this interplay between magistracy and priesthood utilized rites-connected practices for non-religious reasons. The *pontifices*, e.g., supervised ceremonial exactitude, could insist upon repetitions, up to ten times, for the smallest breach of the rule;³⁷⁾ they were overseers of the official calendar; they could determine the specific days on which meetings were held, triumphs and moveable feasts celebrated,³⁸⁾ even though political issues would have demanded otherwise.³⁹⁾

Cicero outrightly states that the augural practices, discipline, religious rites and laws were tools of policy in the service of the state: "Retinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates republicae mos, religio, disciplina, ius augurum, collegii auctoritas."⁴⁰⁾ A few examples should suffice to illustrate this service.

37) RRG, p. 199, note 2.

38) RKR, pp. 432 ff., concerning feast days, and p. 513; Mommsen, *Röm. Chron.*, pp. 40 ff.

39) Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, cos. 56, deleted comitial days and proclaimed thanksgivings in order to manifest his resistance against P. Clodius Pulcher (cf. MRR, 2, p. 207; esp., Cicero, *ad Quint. frat.*, 2.1,1-2; 2.4,4 and 5). Thanksgivings were decreed for Caesar's victories in 57, possibly to delay legislation which was contrary to Caesar's interests (*bell. Gall.*, 2,35: "... dies quindecim supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulla"). In the year 50, C. Scribonius Curio used the refusal of his demand for intercalation as the reason for siding with Caesar, MRR, 2, p. 249. It is not surprising that Caesar had to initiate calendar reform; yet, significantly, he achieved that as *pontifex maximus*. Concerning triumphs, cf. U. Schlag, *Regnum in senatu*, Stuttgart, 1968, pp. 17-22; G. V. Sumner, "A New Reading of the Fasti Tr. Cap.," *Phoenix*, 19 (1965), pp. 24-26.

40) Cicero, *de div.*, 2.33,70.

At the end of the fourth century, augural power was used apparently for political expediency because the *augures* could not agree that a plebeian should become a dictator.⁴¹⁾ Sometimes the *auspicia* were falsified for purposes not necessarily religious. In 293, for instance, incorrect interpretations were given because of the "ardor omnium."⁴²⁾ In 193, all public business had to be suspended because of the continuous earthquakes (most likely due to augural interpretation): "ex auctoritate senatus consules edixerunt ne quis, quo die terrae motu nuntiato feriae indictae essent, eo die alium terrae motum nuntiaret."⁴³⁾ In 180, L. Cornelius Dolabella's election as *rex sacrorum* was successfully stopped by "vitium," which usually was an unfavorable omen.⁴⁴⁾ Scipio Nasica (Corculum) and C. Marcius Figulus were recalled and forced to abdicate under augural *auspicia*.⁴⁵⁾

From the first century, the following example should suffice. Obvious political in-fighting was the cause of withdrawal for M. Calpurnius Bibulus, cos. 59, opponent to Julius Caesar, in order to watch for omens and thus hinder Caesar's legislation.⁴⁶⁾ P. Vatinius' selection as praetor was the result of Pompey's claim that he had heard thunder and thus dissolved the assembly, although "force and violence" was used as well.⁴⁷⁾

The first *interrex* of plebeian status, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica, was put into this position by unfavorable *auspicia* which were augurally promulgated during the election scandals of 54.⁴⁸⁾ Cicero, as a private person, was bitter and adamant in describing popular cult as a superstition (*de div.*, 2.72, 148):

41) Livy, 8.23, 16; MRR, 1, p. 145; if one could give credit to the account in Livy, 10.40, 4. To this and other examples, cf. E. H. Haight *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff.; G. Stübner, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 ff.

42) Livy, 10.40, 4.

43) Livy, 35.55, 4. The whole process was started by the *Xviri s.f.*, but it is inconceivable that the augural college was not consulted.

44) Livy, 40.42, 8 ff., describes L. Cornelius Dolabella's affair in 180: „De rege sacrificulo sufficiendo in locum Cn. Cornelii Dolabellae contentio inter C. Servilium pontificem maximum fuit et L. Cornelium Dolabellam duumvirum navalem, quem ut inauguraret pontifex magistratu sese abdicare iubebat. Recusantique id facere ob eam rem multa duumviro dicta a pontifice, deque ea cum provocasset certatum ad populum. Cum plures iam tribus intro vocatae dicto esse audientem pontifici duumvirum iuberent, multamque remitti, si magistratu se abdicasset, vitium de caelo quod comitia turbaret, intervenit. Religio inde fuit pontificibus inaugurandi Dolabellae." The "vitium" is usually an unfavorable omen, lightning and thunder, which necessitated the immediate adjournment of the assembly. In the fact that the *pontifex maximus* (and possibly *Xvir s.f.*) C. Servilius Geminus, cos. 203, appointed C. Cloelius Siculus to fill the place of Dolabella, Münzer sees local patriotic reasons (RAAF, p. 134, n. 1), which is an attractive yet not necessarily acceptable suggestion. Better, the religious and political reasons given in Bleicken, "Kollisionen . . .", *loc. cit.*, pp. 452/453.

45) Val. Max., 1.1, 3; MRR, 1, pp. 441/442.

46) *i.a.*, Dio, 37, 52-54; 38, 1-12; Gell., *n.a.*, 4.10, 8; Livy, *per.* 103; Plut., *Caes.*, 11-14; for detailed sources, cf. MRR, 2, p. 187.

47) Livy, *per.* 105; Val. Max., 7.5, 6; Plut., *Cat. min.*, 42; for additional information, cf. MRR, 2, p. 216.

48) F. Münzer, *Hermes*, 71 (1936), pp. 222 ff.; MRR, 2, pp. 171/172, n. 4.

"Nam ut vere loquamur, superstitio, fusa per gentes, oppressit omnium fere animos atque hominum imbecillitatem occupavit." Yet, later he clearly stated that it had a place in society, (referring to his treatise on the subject in *de natura deorum*): "Nec vero (id enim diligenter intelligi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et majorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est..."

These, and other examples, show that those who held the government in their hands maintained and perpetrated in the name of *religio* a conglomeration of functions in order to achieve the uninterrupted continuity of existing institutions.

ZENTRALHEILIGTUM, GRENZHEILIGTUM UND 'HÖHENHEILIGTUM' IN ISRAEL*)

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In einer sehr instruktiven Zusammenstellung und Auswertung der Hauptergebnisse der israelischen Ausgrabungen auf tell 'arād, veröffentlicht im *Biblical Archaeologist* 31, 1968, vertritt YOCHANAN AHARONI die Auffassung, daß das dort wiederentdeckte Heiligtum aus der israelitischen Königszeit in einer bewußten architektonischen Abhängigkeit von dem Jerusalemer Tempel gestanden habe¹⁾ und dabei von einem „main room“ = **היכל** mit einer „projecting cella“ = **דביר**, in der sich u.a. eine kleine viereckige **במה** befand, sowie einem vorgelagerten „courtyard“ mit einem Brandopferaltar in der Mitte gebildet wurde²⁾. So zutreffend die erste Feststellung über eine bauliche Abhängigkeit von der Jerusalemer Tempelanlage sein dürfte, so problematisch erscheint mir bei der zweiten Behauptung die Verwendung der Vokabeln **היכל** und **במה**. Warum?

Bereits im Jahre 1930 wies T. OESTREICHER in einer gründlichen Untersuchung über die Begriffe **היכל** und **במה** überzeugend nach, daß das Wort **היכל** in der hebräischen Sprache ein Fremdwort ist. Es hat in dem sumerischen E-GAL = „großes Haus“ als Bezeichnung für den Tempel seinen Ursprung und bezeichnet über die akkadische Form ekallu, die in assyrisch-babylonischen Texten in der Bedeutung „Königspalast“ steht, sowie den ugaritischen Ausdruck hkl = „Palast“ im Alten Testament dann sowohl den königlichen Palast als auch den Königstempel = den sog. „Reichstempel“³⁾. Ganz offensichtlich hat für die Ausbildung dieser

*) Referat, gehalten auf dem XII. Kongreß der I.A.H.R. in Stockholm August 1970.

1) Y. Aharoni, „Arad: Its Inscriptions and Temple.“ In: *BA* 31, 1968, S. 2-32, bes. S. 18 ff.

2) Y. Aharoni, a.a.O. S. 19.

3) T. Oestreicher, „Reichstempel und Ortsheiligtümer in Israel“ (*BFChTh* 33, 3), 1930, S. 12 ff.—Zur Bedeutung im Ugaritischen vgl. jetzt auch J. Aistleitner, *Wörterbuch der ugaritischen Sprache*, 1963, S. 86 f.

Doppelbedeutung neben der Vorstellung, daß die Gottheit ebenso wie der König in einem „großen Haus“ wohnt, auch die Auffassung, daß der König in einer besonderen, sehr engen Verbindung zur Gottheit steht (vgl. Ps 2; 1. Sam 24, 7 u.a.), eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt,—wo der König wohnt, da wohnt, zumindest unmittelbar benachbart, auch Gott. Aus eben dieser engen Bindung zwischen König und Gott ergibt sich dann aber auch, daß dem ausschließlich der religiös-kultischen Seite vorbehaltenen Gebäude innerhalb der Residenz eine besondere Bedeutung und Geltung zukommen mußte, die diesem Heiligtum gegenüber allen anderen Heiligtümern eine besondere Stellung verschaffte: Es war das Heiligtum des jeweiligen Herrschaftsbereichs bzw. Staatsgebildes und seines Gottes, es war das Zentralheiligtum, das Hauptheiligtum. Dann aber ist es nur folgerichtig, daß diese Vorrangstellung auch in einem besonderen Namen zum Ausdruck gebracht wurde, durch den dieses Heiligtum von allen anderen Heiligtümern im Lande eindeutig abgehoben wurde.

Diese Annahme findet durch eine genaue Analyse sämtlicher Stellen des AT, an denen das Wort **היכל** begegnet, ihre klare Bestätigung. Es ergibt sich dabei nämlich einwandfrei, daß die Vokabel **היכל**—sofern sie nicht als Bezeichnung eines königlichen Palastes gebraucht wird ⁴⁾—nur im Singular steht und ausschließlich für den ab Salomo in Jerusalem existierenden Tempel sowie den in die Richterzeit gehörenden Tempel von Silo Verwendung findet ⁵⁾. Gerade diesen beiden Heiligtümern aber kam ja während der gesamten Zeit ihres Bestehens eine besondere Stellung in Israel zu; bildete der Tempel von Jerusalem mitsamt der Lade stets das Hauptheiligtum bzw. Zentralheiligtum eines entsprechenden israelitischen bzw. judäischen und später jüdischen Herrschafts-

4) So an etwa 20 Stellen im AT, wobei es sich, abgesehen von Jahwes himmlischem Palast, z.T. um israelitische Königspaläste, z.T. aber auch um ausländische Paläste handelt. Bezeichnenderweise treten Pluralformen des Wortes **היכל** nur in dieser Bedeutung (als Palast) auf.

5) Die Bezeichnung des Jerusalemer Tempels als **היכל** findet sich rund 60 Mal im AT (z.B. 1. Kg 6, 3.5.17.33; Jes 6, 1; Jer 7, 4; Ez 8, 16; Hag 2, 18; Sach 6, 12 u.ö.). Der Tempel von Silo wird 1. Sam 1, 9; 3, 3 als **היכל** angeführt; vgl. dazu auch Jer 7, 4-14. Ri 18, 31 bezieht sich dagegen nicht auf den Tempel von Silo, sondern das Heiligtum in Laish = Dan (vgl. dazu auch BH App. z. St.).

gebiets, so stellte der Tempel von Silo das zentrale Heiligtum des israelitischen Stämmeverbandes der Richterzeit dar, der m.E. in dem ebenfalls in Silo residierenden Richter eine oberste zentrale Führergestalt hatte ⁶⁾. Der Befund des AT ist also eindeutig: Das AT bezeichnet nur solche Heiligtümer als **היכל**, die mit der Residenz des Königs bzw. einer ihm vergleichbaren obersten Führergestalt verbunden sind und so den Rang eines Haupt- bzw. Zentralheiligtums haben ⁷⁾. Übersetzen wir nun das hebräische Wort **היכל** als Bezeichnung für ein Kultgebäude mit dem Wort „Tempel“, so sollte man dieses Wort um der klaren sachlichen Unterscheidung willen vielleicht besser allein auf derartige zentrale Heiligtümer beschränken.

Freilich erhebt sich hier nun gleich die Frage: Müßte dann nicht auch das Heiligtum, das während der israelitischen Königszeit in der Hauptstadt des Nordreiches Israel, in Samaria, bestand ⁸⁾, ein **היכל** gewesen sein? Vergleicht man die in Frage kommenden Stellen, so stellt man jedoch fest, daß hier nicht von einem **היכל**, sondern von einem **בית הבעל** gesprochen wird ⁹⁾. Wie ist dies zu erklären? Ich glaube, daß hier die Beobachtung weiterhelfen kann, daß das AT den **היכל** auch noch als **יהוה בית** bezeichnet ¹⁰⁾, eben dieser Ausdruck (bzw. seine Parallelen) dann aber auch noch für weitere Heiligtümer Verwendung findet, die kein **היכל** waren. So war nicht nur das Heiligtum des Micha auch ein

6) Zu diesem Verständnis des Richteramtes vgl. auch K.-D. Schunck, *Volume du Congrès Genève 1965*, 1966, S. 258 ff. Will man diese These, die m.E. gerade durch die Bezeichnung des Silo-Heiligtums als **היכל** eine wesentliche Bestätigung findet, nicht akzeptieren, so müßte man in der Anwendung der **היכל**-Bezeichnung auf das Heiligtum von Silo eine Rückübertragung der Benennung des Jerusalemer Tempels auf das Heiligtum, das vor Jerusalem ebenfalls schon die Lade beherbergte, erblicken.

7) Die von T. Oestreicher, a.a.O. S. 15 ff. gebrauchte Umschreibung als ‚Reichstempel‘ ist mißverständlich und sollte besser vermieden werden; auch die Heiligtümer in Bethel und Dan waren Reichsheiligtümer (vgl. H. W. Hertzberg, *RGG* III, ³1959, Sp. 158), insofern sie vom König direkt eingerichtet wurden und überlokale Bedeutung hatten.

8) Vgl. hierzu 1. Kg 16, 32; Hos 8, 5 f.; 2. Kg 10, 18-27.

9) 1. Kg 16, 32; 2. Kg 10, 18-27. In Am 8, 3, wo von einem **היכל** die Rede ist, ist m.E. die Bedeutung ‚Palast‘ vorzuziehen; vgl. dazu auch E. Sellin, *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch*, ³1929, S. 249. 252, der zugleich **שירות** als **שירות** = ‚Fürstinnen‘ liest oder T. H. Robinson in: Robinson/Horst, *Die Zwölf Kleinen Propheten*, ³1964, S. 100.

10) Vgl. Ps 27, 4; 65, 5; 5, 8 u.ö.

בית אלהים (Ri 17, 5), sondern es wurden auch das Heiligtum von Lais/Dan בית האלהים (Ri 18, 31 em.), das Heiligtum von Bethel בית ממלכה (Am 7, 13) und das Heiligtum von Mizpa בית יהוה (Jer 41, 5) genannt. Der Ausdruck בית יהוה (und Parallelen) stellt also einen über היכל hinausreichenden, noch weiteren bzw. allgemeineren Begriff dar. Wenn daher das sachlich einen היכל darstellende Zentralheiligtum des Nordreiches Israel im AT doch nur als בית הבעל bezeichnet wird, so ist dies einerseits nicht falsch, dürfte sich andererseits aber aus einer polemischen Tendenz des Südreiches Juda gegen das nicht Jahwe, sondern Baal dienende Zentralheiligtum in Samaria erklären und liegt so auf der gleichen Linie wie die Abwertung der von Jerobeam in Bethel und Dan errichteten Heiligtümer und ihrer Kultsymbole. Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang m.E. sehr aufschlußreich, daß das AT das Wort היכל auch niemals für irgend einen ausländischen, einer fremden Gottheit dienenden Tempel gebraucht¹¹⁾).

Stellt der Ausdruck בית יהוה (par.) nun aber eine über היכל hinausgehende Bezeichnung für noch weitere israelitische Heiligtümer dar, so erhebt sich die Frage nach der Art und der Abgrenzung dieser weiteren Heiligtümer. Sind diese vielleicht mit den במות, den sog. 'Höhenheiligtümern', bzw. den gelegentlich mit diesen in Verbindung genannten Gebäuden, den במות בתי¹²⁾, identisch? Eine derartige Annahme wird m.E. sogleich eindeutig bei einer Nebeneinanderstellung von Am 7, 13 und Jos 24, 26 neben Am 7, 9 ausgeschlossen. Wie Am 7, 13¹³⁾ und wohl auch Jos 24, 26¹⁴⁾ zeigen, konnten die als בית יהוה (par.) bezeichneten Heiligtümer ebenso gut auch mit dem Begriff מקדש erfaßt werden. Ein מקדש aber

11) Auch in Joel 4, 5, wo man früher gern an einen ausländischen Tempel dachte, ist ein Palast gemeint; so auch T. H. Robinson, a.a.O. S. 66 und H. W. Wolff, *Dodekapropheton, Joel* (BK XIV 5), 1963, S. 85.

12) 1. Kg 12, 31 u. ö., der Sache nach auch 1. Sam 9, 22.

13) Anders hier jedoch E. Sellin, a.a.O. S. 254.

14) Jos 24, 26 spricht von einem מקדש (יהוה) in Sichem, während Ri 9, 4 dort ein בית בעל kennt. Gegen H.-J. Kraus, *Oottesdienst in Israel*, 1962, S. 160 handelt es sich dabei um die gleiche Anlage, wie schon aus der Erwähnung der אלה (אלון) in Jos 24, 26 und Ri 9, 6 hervorgeht. Die Zuweisung an Jahwe in Jos 24, 26 erklärt sich dabei wohl aus der späteren deuteronomistischen Überarbeitung von Jos 24. Oder sollte die Überlieferung von Jos 24 ursprünglich überhaupt nicht mit Sichem, sondern mit Bethel verbunden gewesen sein?

war auf jeden Fall von einer **במה** zu unterscheiden; Am 7, 9 macht es ganz deutlich, daß die Worte **מקדש** und **במה** zwei parallel nebeneinander stehende, niemals aber miteinander identische Formen von Kultstätten bezeichnen, wenn es dort heißt: „Die **במות** Isaaks werden verwüstet, und die **מקדשי** Israels werden zerstört; . . .“.

Daraus ergibt sich, daß die schon genannten, mit dem Wort **בית** umschriebenen Heiligtümer auf keinen Fall mit einer **במה** oder dem in dieser gelegentlich errichteten Gebäude zu verbinden sind.¹⁵⁾ Diese **בית**-Heiligtümer müssen vielmehr eine Gruppe von Heiligtümern meinen, die in ihrer Anlage und Funktion weitgehend dem **היכל**-Heiligtum entsprechen, jedoch nicht dessen besondere Stellung als Zentralheiligtum und damit zugleich dessen enge räumliche Verbindung mit dem Palast des Herrschers aufweisen.

Welche Funktion hatten diese Heiligtümer? Im Gegensatz zu dem Heiligtum von Samaria waren die beiden bedeutenden Heiligtümer des Nordreiches Israel in Bethel und Dan mit Jahwe verbunden¹⁶⁾, obwohl sie in dem Kultsymbol, einem **עגל** = Jungstier, mit Samaria durchaus übereinstimmten¹⁷⁾. Beide Heiligtümer, das in Bethel wie das in Dan, waren ein **בית האלהים**¹⁸⁾; sie konnten aber auch, wie Am 7, 13 erkennen läßt, als **בית ממלכה** bzw. **מקדש מלך** bezeichnet werden. In diesem „Beinamen“ kommt zweifellos zum Ausdruck, daß es sich bei diesen Heiligtümern um vom König als dem obersten Leiter des gesamten Staatswesens selbst eingerichtete, in ihrer Bedeutung über die jeweilige Ortschaft bzw. ein örtliches Heiligtum weit hinausreichende Heiligtümer handelte. Wie bereits Y. AHARONI mit guten Gründen vermutete, bildeten sie staatliche Grenzheiligtümer, die—mit Grenzfestungen verbunden—den Zweck verfolgten, neuen Grenzen göttliche wie auch königliche Autorität zu verleihen¹⁹⁾. Neben Bethel und Dan dürften so in Juda auch Beerseba sowie Geba und Mizpa, für das

15) Vgl. dagegen auch Mi 3, 12.

16) Vgl. 1. Kg 12, 28-29, dazu Am 7, 13 und Ri 18, 31 wo statt **שלה** mit BH App. **לישה** zu lesen ist.

17) Vgl. 1. Kg 12, 28-29 neben Hos 8, 5-6. Es ist bezeichnend für die laxen, synkretistischen Religionsauffassung im Nordreich, daß ein Stierbild somit einmal mit Jahwe und ein anderes Mal mit Baal verbunden werden konnte.

18) Vgl. Ri 18, 31 (em.)

19) Vgl. Y. Aharoni, a.a.O. S. 29 f.

Jer 41, 5 ja ausdrücklich ein **בית יהוה** bezeugt, derartige Grenzheiligtümer aufgewiesen haben²⁰⁾; ein weiteres Heiligtum dieser Art wurde bei den Ausgrabungen auf tell 'arād, ostnordöstlich von Beerseba, an der Grenzstraße nach Edom, ausgegraben²¹⁾.

Gerade dieser von der Archäologie geleistete Beitrag macht es nun aber vollends deutlich, daß ein **בית יהוה (האלהים)** = „Gotteshaus“ und eine **במה** = „Kulthöhe“ niemals miteinander identisch oder miteinander verbunden sind²²⁾. Das auf tell 'arād freigelegte Heiligtum, unter König Salomo errichtet, war eindeutig Nachfolger einer älteren offenen Kulthöhe und bestand nun aus einem den Aufbau des Jerusalemer Tempels aufnehmenden Gotteshaus. Das heißt, auf dem Gelände der alten Kulthöhe war nun ein überdachter Breitraum, aus dessen westlicher Langseite eine erhöhte Cella hervorsprang, errichtet worden, eben das **בית יהוה** im engeren Sinne, während die östlich anschließende Fläche als Hofraum mit einem Brandopferaltar diente und zusammen mit dem **בית** den **מקדש** bildete²³⁾. Hier wird also ganz klar erkennbar, wie ein königliches Grenzheiligtum aussah: Es war eine dem Jerusalemer Tempel bzw. dem Zentralheiligtum analoge Anlage mit einem in ganz bestimmten Maßen angelegten Gotteshaus. Was diese Heiligtümer vom Zentralheiligtum unterschied, war die fehlende Verbindung mit der königlichen Residenz sowie im Bezug auf den Tempel von Jerusalem das Fehlen des Kultsymbols der Lade.

20) Geba und Mizpa werden 1. Kg 15, 22 als nördliche Grenzorte Judas seit König Asa von Juda genannt; Beerseba und Geba sind nach 2. Kg 23, 8 Grenzorte Judas in der Frühzeit König Josias. Von Amazja von Juda bis Josia gehörte Geba m.E. nicht zu Juda (vgl. dazu 2. Kg 14, 8 ff. sowie K.-D. Schunck, *Benjamin* (BZAW 86), 1963, S. 161), so daß in dieser Zeit allein Mizpa die Nordgrenze Judas bezeichnete. Geba ist mit dscheba' zu verbinden, nicht aber mit tell el-fül; ein Zusammenhang mit der **במה** von 1. Sam 10, 5 ff. enfällt daher.

21) Vgl. Y. Aharoni, a.a.O. S. 2 ff.

22) Wenn in 2. Kg 23, 15 von einer **במה** in Bethel, die Jerobeam errichtete, gesprochen wird, so handelt es sich hier m.E. um eine polemisch abwertende Korrektur; auch BH App. hält schon das den Text überladende Wort **במה** für einen späteren Zusatz.

23) Das Verständnis des Begriffs **מקדש** ist im AT wohl nicht ganz fest umrissen gewesen. Über den Sinai-Berg (Ex 15, 17) und die Lade bzw. das Zelt (Ex 25, 8; Num 3, 38; 10, 21; 18, 1) bezeichnet das Wort ein Gotteshaus oder den Tempel (Ez 8, 6; 9, 6; Kl 1, 10; Ps 68, 36; Lev 12, 4; Dan 8, 11 u. ö.) bzw. die Stätte dieses Gotteshauses (Jos 24, 26; Jes 60, 13; Jer 17, 12) sowie die heiligen Geräte darin (Jer 51, 51) und die heilige Gabe (Num 18, 29).

Ich bin daher der Ansicht, daß wir in diesen königlichen Grenzheiligtümern trotz Parallelen in Anlage und Funktion eine von dem jeweiligen Zentralheiligtum = **היכל** ebenso klar und eindeutig wie von den zahlreichen Ortsheiligtümern = **במה** zu unterscheidende dritte große Gruppe israelitischer Heiligtümer erblicken dürfen. Obwohl sie sich in den Bezeichnungen **בית יהוה** und **מקדש** eng mit dem **היכל** zusammenschließen, sollte man sie zur besseren Abhebung von dieser ersten Gruppe m.E. nicht als „Tempel“, sondern allgemeiner nur als „Gotteshaus“ bezeichnen.

Den von den Vokabeln **היכל**, **בית יהוה** (und **מקדש**) bezeichneten beiden Gruppen von Heiligtümern steht dann die unter dem Wort **במה** zusammengefaßte Gruppe der sog. Höhenheiligtümer bzw. Kulthöhen gegenüber. T. OESTREICHER umschrieb diese Heiligtümer im Gegenüber zum **היכל** = Reichstempel auch als Ortsheiligtümer²⁴). So sehr diese Bezeichnung auch der Tatsache Rechnung trägt, daß eine **במה** in fast jeder noch so kleinen israelitischen Ortschaft anzutreffen war, so wenig fängt sie doch den Sachverhalt in seiner ganzen Breite auf. Schon am Beispiel der sog. „Großen Bamah“ von Gibeon (vgl. 1. Kg 3, 4) wird dies deutlich: Dieser **במה** kam noch z. Zt. König Salomos eine über den lokalen Bereich weit hinausreichende Bedeutung zu²⁵), die sich m.E. aus einer zentralen Stellung der Kulthöhe von Gibeon in der Zeit König Sauls, als der Tempel von Silo zerstört und die Lade verloren war, ableiten dürfte²⁶). Aber auch die Tatsache, daß es in zahlreichen Königtümern vorisraelitischer wie israelitischer Zeit überhaupt nur eine **במה** als kultische Stätte gab²⁷), mahnt hier zur Vorsicht. Andererseits bringt freilich auch die Bezeichnung als „Höhenheiligtum“ bzw. als „Kulthöhe“ den Charakter der **במה** nicht hinreichend zum Ausdruck; es ist seit langem allgemein anerkannt, daß eine **במה** keineswegs immer auf einer Geländeer-

24) T. Oestreicher, a.a.O. S. 7 ff.

25) Vgl. 1. Kg 3, 4 ff.

26) Die These, daß die Bamah von Gibeon z.Zt. Sauls Zentralheiligtum gewesen sei, hängt eng mit der Annahme zusammen, daß Saul kurz vor seinem Tod seine Residenz nach Gibeon verlegte (vgl. dazu genauer K.-D. Schunck, *Benjamin*, 1963, S. 132 ff., auch A. Bruno, *Gibeon*, 1923, S. 48 ff.).

27) Das hat wohl auch noch für Hebron und Jerusalem z.Zt. Davids zu gelten. Im übrigen vgl. zur Anlage von Megiddo, die von ca. 2500-1700 v. Chr. in Gebrauch war, G. E. Wright, *BA* 13, 1950, S. 32 f.

hebung, einer Anhöhe, gelegen hat²⁸). Und bedenkt man hierzu noch, daß nach den Feststellungen von W. F. ALBRIGHT die **במה** in zahlreichen Fällen auch als Grabheiligtum diente²⁹), so sollte man hier vielleicht besser nur von einem offenen Kultplatz sprechen.

Gegen diese Umschreibung scheint nun freilich die Tatsache zu sprechen, daß das AT mehrfach von einem **בית במות** bzw. von **במות בתי במות** redet³⁰). Was ist damit gemeint? Ich bin der Ansicht, daß hier die Aussage von 1. Sam 9, 22 den Weg zum rechten Verständnis weisen kann, wenn hier nämlich von einer Halle (**לשכה**), in der man speist, die Rede ist. Dieser Raum aber lag, wie der Kontext in 1. Sam 9, 12-14.19 ganz eindeutig erkennen läßt, auf einer **במה** und diente zur Einnahme von Opfermahlzeiten (vgl. vv 12-13.23). Die **במה** wies also—zumindest in mehreren Fällen—als Bestandteil ihres kultischen Bereichs noch ein Gebäude für die Opfermahle auf,—ob dies eine Halle oder nur eine Hütte oder ein massiver Raum war, ist dabei von untergeordneter Bedeutung³¹).

Die Existenz eines solchen Opferspeiseraumes auf einer **במה**, etwa in einer Ecke des Kultplatzes, kann umso weniger überraschen, wenn man bedenkt, daß der wesentlichste Bestandteil einer **במה** immer ein Altar für die Opfer war³²). Nur am Rande sei hier darauf verwiesen, daß das griechische Wort **βωμός** wohl nicht nur rein zufällig an das kanaänisch-hebräische Wort **במה** anklingt³³), ja, daß das Wort **במה** im AT geradezu auch in der Bedeutung „Altar“ stehen kann, wenn man darunter eine Erhebung zum

28) Vgl. Jer 7, 31; Ez 6, 3; 2. Kg 23, 5.8.

29) W. F. Albright, *Volume du Congrès Strasbourg 1956 (SVT 4)*, 1957, S. 242 ff.

30) Vgl. 1. Kg 12, 31; 13, 32; 2. Kg 17, 29. 32; 23, 19.-1. Kg 12, 31 ist gegen Y. AHARONI, a.a.O. S. 28 keineswegs auf die Heiligtümer von Bethel und Dan zu beziehen; 12, 30 bezeichnet deutlich das Ende der darauf bezogenen Aussage. In 2. Kg 17, 29. 32 aber, wo von einem Gottesbild im **במות בית במות** gesprochen wird, handelt es sich gerade um ein Gottesbild der fremden Neuansiedler im Gebiet des ehemaligen Nordreiches.

31) Auch W. F. Albright, a.a.O. S. 248 lehnt eine Übersetzung von **בית במות** als „temple of high places“ ab; doch versteht er den Ausdruck dann wiederum als Bezeichnung für das aus Begräbnisstelen gebildete Heiligtum.

32) Vgl. 2. Kg 21, 3; 2. Chr 14, 2; Ez 6,6.

33) Vgl. dazu genauer R. de Vaux, *Das Alte Testament und seine Lebensordnungen II*, 1962, S. 289.

kultischen Gebrauch versteht³⁴). Altar und Opferspeiseraum auf der **במה** stehen also miteinander in sachlicher Beziehung; wie man einerseits den Anteil Jahwes beim **זבח שלמים** auf dem Altar verbrannte³⁵), so wurde ja andererseits der dem Opfernden zukommende Anteil an den Fleischstücken von diesem zusammen mit seiner Familie sowie Eingeladenen verzehrt,—das aber geschah doch an heiliger Stätte, eben auf dem Kultplatz.

Es ist damit wohl ganz deutlich, welcher grundlegende Unterschied zwischen einem **בית יהוה** bzw. einem **היכל** auf der einen Seite und einem **בית במות** auf der anderen Seite bestand: Das eine „Haus“ ist Wohnstätte Gottes, in der Gott Opfer dargebracht und in der Gott angebetet wird, das andere „Haus“ ist nur ein Raum, in dem man das mit Gott in Verbindung bringende Opfer ißt. Dieser Unterschied hebt freilich nicht auf, daß sie alle, Tempel, Gotteshaus und Kultplatz = **היכל, בית יהוה** und **במה**, die eine große Bestimmung verbindet: Heilige Stätte für Jahwe zu sein. Ja, gerade die **במה** dürfte es dabei gewesen sein, auf der allein Israel in Zeiten politischer Bedrängnis und Abhängigkeit seinen Gott verehren und so seine Religion bewahren konnte.

34) Vgl. dazu R. de Vaux, a.a.O. S. 101; 249. Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch zu beachten, daß das AT verschiedentlich auch von einem „bauen“, „umstürzen“ und „zerstören“ der **במה** sprechen kann (vgl. 1. Kg 11, 7; 2. Kg 23, 8; Ez 6, 3 u.ö.).

35) Vgl. dazu genauer R. Rendtorff, *Studien zur Geschichte des Opfers im Alten Israel*, 1967, S. 119 ff.

THE GEOGRAPHIZATION OF DEATH IN MELANESIA *)

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DESCENT IN STAGES TO NON-BEING

The experience of death in its minimal dimension may offer man only the prospect of reversal of life to non-being. A small number of Melanesian peoples submit to this fate. But, as if to cushion the shock of sudden extinction, they submit to it only gradually and in stages—by installments, so to speak. In mythical language this usually implies a gradual descent in vertical space to lower and lower levels of existence. The geographization of death has not yet become an option for these mortals.

One of man's greatest assets is his ability to use his mind in an analytic-scientific fashion. In practical life, if a year is too long to worry about, man settles for living one day at a time; if an entire field requires too much toil he divides his activity into acres and spadefuls. Such practical measures may at first glance seem unrelated to the mental processes of analysis and abstraction, but upon closer examination it appears that man's ability of conceptually dividing reality into particulars and of envisioning them together as a new whole is precisely what made him master over other creatures.

When this ambitious mortal faces death in terms of complete reversal to non-being, his analytic mind habitually attempts to break down this process into stages. Partial change is easier to face than complete extinction. There are in Melanesia sporadic instances where people have adhered to a pure analysis of stages towards non-being.

So for instance, in the afterworld of the Kai people, New Guinea, the life of ghosts proceeds in a fashion similar to life among the living.

*) This essay summarizes a portion of my dissertation, *Mythical Geographies of the Dead in Melanesia*, University of Chicago, 1969. Because detailed reference notes have been provided there, only a few important notations are made here.

Human continuity is asserted even to such a degree that mortality is copied there. The ghosts who die there drop to a lower level of existence, becoming cuscus or some other wild animals. When these animal bodies then die, they will sink to an existence of termites or other insects. Their next death is the end.¹⁾ The people of Little Mala continue to live as ghosts in their Malapa island afterworld. If their power is exhausted they turn into white ants' nests and so become food for the still vigorous ghosts.²⁾ This means that when their remaining powers have been surrendered to more recent and vigorous ghosts, they cease to exist. The Nguna dead go first to Pokasi, the uppermost underworld for ghosts. Pokasi is a place in which there is plenty of meat to eat. When the ghosts die away from this Place of Meat, they get entangled in the next lower Place of Roots. Another death lowers them to Stinking Place, where they are lost sight of.³⁾

Thus, gradual descent in vertical space to lower and lower levels of existence is often accompanied by mortal man's transformation into various shapes of animals—cuscus, eels, snakes, termites, ants. The idea of sinking downward in space is paralleled by the idea of sinking to levels of lower species. The first of these ideas involves spacial conceptualization, the second concerns the quality of existence. From a historical point of view these two modes of "descent" may be traced and studied separately. The transformation of human life into animal life can easily be traced to the wide-spread hunters' awareness of pre-human flux.⁴⁾ Descent in vertical space represents mortal man's hopeless groping for the continuation of his life in the wrong spacial direction.

PRE-HUMAN FLUX AND THE UNDERWORLD

Return to a condition of pre-human flux, if it is not defeated by descent in vertical space, represents mortal man's first victory in

1) Christian Keysser, „Aus dem Leben der Kaileute," R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-guinea*. Vol. III. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911, pp. 112, 149-155.

2) R. H. Codrington. *The Melanesians*. New Haven: Hraf Press, 1957, pp. 250, 260 ff., 288.

3) A. Capell, "The Stratification of Afterworld Beliefs in the New Hebrides," *Folklore*, XLIX (London, 1938), pp. 70 f.

4) In my dissertation, cited above, I have used the term "pre-anthropogonic flux." For general publication I now prefer the more simple "pre-human flux" without, of course, negating its association with the anthropogony.

struggling for the continuity of his life. "Pre-human flux" or "pre-anthropogonic flux" are terms which I have coined first in relation to hunter-fisher cosmogonies; and the basic myth which depicts the pre-human flux of the hunter-fisher world does not occur in Melanesia anymore in its pure form. There it has been overlaid by myths of the paleo-planters. Nevertheless, its basic theme is still identifiable: In the beginning, prior to the event which created the present world order, the differentiation between man and animals had not yet occurred; no distinction could be made between human and animal shapes, and men and animals still spoke a common language. The cosmogonic event has fixed both human and animal appearances, and/or their languages, to the shapes and forms in which they now occur.

By the use of two examples I shall try to illustrate the change which has come about in the cosmogonic narrative, when the myth was taken from the hunter-fisher context and adapted to the world of the paleo-cultivators. Since theriomorphic beliefs are found all over the world, I feel justified in looking for clearer examples outside of the immediate Melanesian realm where a variety of mixed beliefs now dazzles the researcher.

A rather pure hunter-fisher cosmogony has been recorded among peoples of the American Northwest Coast: In the beginning of the present world-order, Raven, formerly a white bird, released the sun. The pre-anthropogonic night was transformed into daylight. All the "people" fled apart. Those who at that moment wore furs, skins, scales, feathers, became fur animals on land and in water, fish and birds respectively. Moreover, the cosmogonic event even caught and fixed Raven himself in the black feathers he wore at the time.⁵⁾ The myth leaves no doubt that the common ancestors of men and animals lived in a state of pre-human, or for that matter, pre-animal flux. For a later comparison with planter cosmogonies it is significant that death occupies no important place yet in this hunter-fisher cosmogony.

In the world of the planters man was forced to realign his categories of existence. Man himself assumed more and more responsibility for the processes of creation. While the hunter had no direct control over the beginning of animal life—he generally depended on gifts from the

5) John R. Swanton, "Tlingit Myths and Texts," *Bull., Bureau of American Ethnology*, XXXIX (Washington, 1909), pp. 3 ff, 80 ff.

Lord of Animals—the planter assumed full responsibility over both the beginning and the end of life. In the case of tubers, the beginning of new plant life required dissection or “killing” before planting. Creation and death became thus identical, and man the planter accepted the power and responsibility over both. ⁶⁾ In this manner, a change in the human experience of life-sustaining reality has broadened the cosmogonic myth to where the creative significance of death could be included.

This broadening of the hunter-fisher cosmogony is best illustrated in a myth of the Wemale people, Ceram, which was made famous by Adolf Jensen. Hainuwele, a *dema*-divinity was killed. Her body was cut into pieces and the pieces, buried at different locations, grew into tubers. The arms of Hainuwele became the door which divided the *dema* from mortal human beings. Back then (*damals*) the leading *dema*-divinity, Mulua Satene, assembled all people by a nine-fold spiral maze. Each person who made it through and past the arms of Hainuwele was a human being; those who failed were the pigs, deer, birds, fish, or spirits who now live in the world alongside man. ⁷⁾

Significant for our understanding of the Hainuwele myth, as already stated, is the role of death in the creative event. From the dissected parts of Hainuwele's body grew the alimentary plants, and her arms thenceforth separated the *dema*-world from the world of mortals. Moreover, a single passing through the gate “back then” made all the difference between now being man or animal. Could this imply that present-day mortals who fail to pass through the door when they die become animals also? Or, more consistently, are *dema* and animals here in some sense identical? At any rate, death here means passing

6) Carl Schmitz has lamented the overgrowth of ancestor cults over Melanesian cosmogonies as a degeneration of religion. Understandably, he was led to this conclusion by his overly narrow definitions, of *Kultus* as appropriation of *Schöpfungskraft*, and of *Religionsmuster* in terms of the creation of cosmos, man, and culture. In my view this accounts for only half of Melanesian religiosity. Half of the planters cosmogony, as I shall demonstrate, is involved in the subject of death. I cannot join Schmitz in writing off this important half of Melanesian religion as *Schmarotzerpflanze* or *Stadium des Niederganges*. See Carl A. Schmitz. *Historische Probleme in Nordost-Neuguinea*. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1960, pp. 346-351.

7) *Dema* are divine creators and primordial beings from mythical times, assuming human, animal, and plant forms. See Mircea Eliade, *From Primitives to Zen* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 18 ff. Adolf Jensen, „Das religiöse Weltbild einer frühen Kultur,” *Studien zur Kulturkunde*, IX (Stuttgart: A. Schroeder, 1948), pp. 37 f.

through the door, means also transformation into another form, means at the same time return to the *dema*-world. Prior to his first passage through the door, the human being was neither man nor animal, but lived with the potentiality of becoming fixed as either. This state of affairs is completely identical with the pre-human flux depicted in our hunter-fisher cosmogony.

The hunter's awareness of pre-human flux is spacially neutral. The animals surround the hunter on all sides, and no fixed geographical frame of reference is possible in relation to them. The animal's whereabouts is always a matter of uncertainty. Quite different is the experience of the planter. Planting is an exercise in precise geography: the seed plant dies in a specific place, and the new plant rises at the same spot. Thus, it needs not surprise us when the Wemale planters become aware of a door to the underworld. Moreover, the geographical hope of the Wemale planter did not stop with knowing about the entrance to the underworld—a nine-fold spiral path has been developed which guarantees for the initiated a sure entry through the gate. A spiral path, even before the age of space travel, has been the surest spacial pattern for zeroing in on a particular point of hope.

Survivals of pre-human flux are very widespread in Melanesia, but they are remembered no longer in relation to cosmogonic myths. Rather, because of the planters' identification of death with the creation of new life the "creative" flux at the beginning of time has become associated with the "creative" flux which awaits man after the moment of his death. This association of ideas is logically consistent and in harmony with the planter's experience; and it is precisely this association of ideas which sent mortal man on his way toward groping for the continuity of his life in the geographical dimension. The path and the gate which lead to mortal man's next place represent this groping for geography in Melanesian eschatological thought.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURFACE EXISTENCE

"Life in space," conceived religiously by man as within greater-than-human space, can also be approached analytically as moments in places. From this perspective "life in space" appears as a composite of places. An individual mortal always knows himself as one who is presently at

his place; he encounters others as belonging to their places. A change from one condition of life into another is always associated with at least a minimal amount of movement in space. But in contrast to changes of conditions and emotions, a change of place is experienced much more vividly. While changes of conditions and emotions can only be recalled conceptually, changes of place are concretely retraceable. This is why geographical space rates so high in man's struggle for continuity. Geographical sites define man's fellow others during his life-time, they also define his own previous places of experience. In like manner, man's future existence is anticipated in relation to other places. Below I shall discuss such places, namely, glimpses of the other side by Melanesian peoples. But first it must be mentioned that man's encounter with his "other places" takes shape simultaneously in all directions—east, west, north, south, upward, and downward. All attempts in classification are somewhat arbitrary on this account. Nevertheless, different people in different sets of circumstances search primarily either earthward, skyward, or scan their horizons. This does not preclude the possibility that within certain cultures a variety of afterworld beliefs is represented. But once a people have gotten a sufficiently clear glimpse of their other place there is no need for them to scatter their attention any longer. Wherever the searching mortal sees some distinct outlines of the other side, he can begin developing a body of knowledge about this particular place.

Caves. — An exclusive belief in a cave-underworld, as a place for re-uniting after death with one's friends, is difficult to find anymore in Melanesia. Where it seems to be the only existing belief, our scanty sources do not justify a definite conclusion. Yet, its association with older customs or people leaves no doubt that formerly it belonged to a more popular system of beliefs. In most cases the cave-underworld has met with competition from surface afterworlds or, at least, from afterworlds which are reached by a surface journey.

Many people of New Ireland still believe in a large cave-underworld. But elsewhere the journey of the dead in geographical space has rendered many a cave-underworld obsolete. In northeastern Malekula the Vao dead still are met in a Cave of the Dead by their dead relatives, but their neighbors, the Atchin and Wala people, when they are dead no longer bother to receive new ghosts in the Cave of the Dead. Here a former cave-underworld has become a stopping-place along the way

to the volcano-afterworld of Ambrim. The Fijian abode of Ndengei, of the serpent who rules over the dead, has likewise been transformed from a cave-underworld into a stopping-place. The parting ghosts of western Melanesian immigrants hurriedly pass through Ndengei's cave in order to dive into the sea and swim westward.⁸⁾

The struggle for a life after death on the surface is well illustrated by the stratification of Paparatavan ghosts, New Britain. Ninety-nine per cent of all the people, and all commoners, join the *tabarans* in the underworld. Only a few privileged and prominent dead manage to remain on the surface.⁹⁾

Volcanoes. — As has just been seen, the cave-underworld of the north-eastern Malekulans has been reduced to a stopping-place, and the dead of Vao, Atchin, and Wala now journey across the sea to the Ambrim volcano. Quite clearly, a volcano afterworld has lured the dead away from a post-existence in caves. Thus, historically for these particular people the volcano afterworld came later.

Volcanoes are perhaps the most spectacular geographical features, and the most awesome. So it seems that in a given locality, if tradition has not been shaped elsewhere, the greatest mystery has received the honor of housing the mystery of human post-mortem existence. Volcanoes are well qualified to serve this function.

Thus, some Nakanai people on New Britain go to E-Pago, an after-world volcano. When a ghost arrives there, much cooking and feasting is going on in both worlds. In a similar fashion, the volcano Tupai (Balbi) of northern Bougainville contains the afterworld of the Buka people. Again the volcanic smoke and fire are interpreted to the effect that food is being cooked below. The poisons of magicians, causing internal fires and death, are also linked to the cooking activity inside Tupai. A discussion of Melanesian volcano afterworlds would be incomplete without the most conspicuous of them all, Bagana or Bareka of Bougainville. The dead from several Shortland Islands—Mono, Alu, Fauru—undertake an identical journey to Bagana, starting from Ilina

8) John Layard. *Stone Men of Malekula*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1942, pp. 226 ff., 230 ff. Also Basil H. Thompson. *The Fijians*. London: W. Heinemann, 1908, pp. 117 f.

9) P. A. Kleintitschen, „Mythen und Erzählungen eines Melanesierstammes...“, *Anthropos-Bibliothek*, II (Wien, 1924), iv, pp. 92 ff.

Island.¹⁰⁾ But among these Melanesian groups the volcano afterworld has already ceased to be a destination. It has become a stopping-place, a place of recovery and rest for the ghosts before they return to live again on their respective home islands.

Thus, the volcano afterworld, which on Malekula has won out over the cave-underworld and which has transformed the latter into a stopping-place, was forced to surrender in the case of Bagana some of its residents to the home islands of the living. The volcano, too, was reduced to function as a mere stopping-place. It has become clear, therefore, that no glimpse of the other side is forever guaranteed, not even that of spectacular volcano afterworlds. While an earlier stratum of Melanesian mortals seems to have gone to an afterlife underground, later movements of culture have affirmed surface travel or even surface existence after death. We shall therefore briefly observe a variety of glimpses of surface afterworlds—in rocks, woods, and ravines, on mountains and islands.

Rocks. — The belief that the ghosts of the dead reside in rocks is on record from a few places in Melanesia. But generally speaking, the restricted residence of ghosts in rocks does not seem to be a very appealing prospect to Melanesian mortals. At the same time, some rocky places have come to function as homes to which wandering ghosts may gravitate.

The *kaia*, ghosts of a few elect Paparatavan mortals of New Britain, reside in large boulders which are strewn over the countryside.¹¹⁾ It is significant to note that the Paparatavan people are still engaged in a struggle for continuity in vertical space. The *kaia* are ghosts quite superior to the mostly underground *tabarans* of the commoners. Here, life on the surface clearly implies superiority, and only a few elect ghosts attain this privilege. The struggle for horizontal and geographical continuity has not yet begun.

The Melanesian mortal, after having achieved an afterlife in a rock on the surface, does then continue his struggle in a geographical dimension. So for example, a minority opinion on Aneitum Island has it that the ghosts will go to reside in stones, from which small chips must be

10) Gerald C. Wheeler, "An Account of the Death Rites and Eschatology of the Bougainville Strait," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XVII (Leipzig, 1914), pp. 91 ff., 102 ff., 110 f.

11) Kleintitschen, pp. 304-317, 98 f.

broken to provide entrance ways. A commoner Arosi ghost of San Christoval, on the other hand, still chips off a bit from the rock Hauihaiha; he enters and finds that from this point the road continues and branches for different clans. While some geographical expansion beyond the rock is thus available to commoners, the chiefs anymore use their rock only as a platform from which to dive into the sea in order to swim to a distant island afterworld.¹²⁾ Thus, in varying degrees, the limited volume of the rock has been overcome by the geographical space which expands beyond it. Rocks, at the same time, are not only places in which Melanesian ghosts may feel constricted. Once a horizontal journey of the dead, the quest for geographical space, has been won, conspicuous rocks may still provide points in space where the wandering ghosts can find a place of rest, a home. Such is the case on Goodenough Island, where the ghosts of the Kutua people go to Taleba, a rocky point just outside their district.

The idea of rocks containing a home for the dead may seem curious to many a modern apartment dweller in a concrete city. We have learned to use rocks for exclusively materialistic purposes; moreover, we have learned to make artificial rocks. But precisely because our attitude toward rocks is conditioned by the use our culture makes of them, we must allow the premodern peoples of Melanesia to contemplate the mystery of their boulders. What other function could these silent blocks possibly have, aside from containing the silent mystery of human life and death!

Woods. — By looking at the prospect of an afterlife in rocks one may have observed two distinct functions. Rocks may restrict the living spaces of ghosts or they may serve to identify points at which the ghosts may find a home. With regard to the woods, the latter function appears to be the dominant one. In contrast to rocks, the woods are larger and their shadowy boundaries are more difficult to define. Moreover, people frequent the woods already during their lifetimes. A portion of the human self-consciousness literally "remains" in the woods.

The Mbowamb image-soul, which after death becomes a ghost, already dwells during a person's lifetime as a reflected image in pools of water or, alternately, it mingles as a playful shadow in the bush. A similar

12) Robert W. Williamson. *Religious and Cosmic Beliefs of Central Polynesia*. II. Cambridge: University Press, 1933. pp. 116 f. And C. E. Fox. *The Threshold of the Pacific*. London: Kegan, Trench, Trubner, 1924. pp. 234 ff.

awareness, where human existence blends at death into the blurred and shadowy twilight of the bush, is present among the Jabim people. Their knowledge about the afterworld is very vague, but they know that at night their woods abound in ghosts. ¹³⁾

The realms of the Middle Wahgi and of the Paparatavan ghosts are geographically better defined. The former go to ancestral, patrilineal cemeteries. These places must be kept thickly overgrown with trees and shrubs, for if they are kept otherwise the ghosts may refuse to stay there. The two places which are identified by the Paparatavan people as those of the middle-ranking *tutana-vurakit* ghosts, are overgrown with bushes and thorns. ¹⁴⁾ Thus, by being aware that not even ghosts can live "in general" and in all the wooded places at once, some Melanesian peoples envision their future homes in specific and geographically defined groves.

Ravines. — Ravines present mortal man with ambivalent meanings. It must be recognized from the outset that their primary significance lies not in providing a place for the continuance of human life, but rather, that ravines are encountered primarily as ruptures in geographical space. They are obstacles and perils on the road which threaten to engulf and to extinguish the ghosts. In the very few instances, where Melanesian ravines have been named as abodes of ghosts, they are extensions of a shadowy underworld. The misery of these places appears to have received its color from the ravine's primary meaning, engulfing those who drop there. Of three ranks among Paparatavan ghosts in New Britain, the lowest and most miserable ghosts are represented both in their underground realm and in certain deep ravines. The Usiai dead on Manus Island go to afterworlds which are located in deep ravines of the mountainous interior. The ghosts in these ravines lead a miserable life, being in constant danger of final extinction. ¹⁵⁾

Mountains. — Afterworld mountains in Melanesia are numerous if the conspicuous volcano afterworlds are counted among them. But in this essay I have chosen to maintain a distinction between surface and under-

13) Hermann Strauss and Herbert Tischner. *Die Mi-Kultur der Hagenbergstämme*. Hamburg: De Gruyter, 1962, pp. 138 f., 144 f. And Heinrich Zahn, „Die Jabim,” R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch-New-Guinea*. III. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911, p. 324.

14) Louis J. Luzbetak. "Worship of the Dead in the Middle Wahgi," *Anthropos*, LI (Wien, 1956), pp. 81-96. And Kleintitschen, pp. 228-243.

15) Kleintitschen, pp. 92-110. And R. Parkinson. *Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee*. Stuttgart: Strecker and Schroeder, 1907, pp. 386 ff.

ground realms. And since volcano afterworlds are generally underground, the number of afterworld mountains to be discussed in this section is relatively small.

Hill-tops are first of all close to the bright sky, and so they participate in its purity. Accordingly, the ghosts of the young Mafulu mountaineers, New Guinea, maintain on mountain tops a playful existence as shimmering lights; older ghosts settle there to a fungus-like existence. The wooded Normanby Island afterworld mountain, Bwebweso, features a surface afterworld also. There is implied a definite advantage for ghosts who live at the summit of this mountain. Not every ghost reaches the top. Evil ghosts are destined to wander; the aged, the ugly, and the sick are shaken into an abyss; diseased mortals slide into a swamp below this afterworld mountain.¹⁶⁾

The mountain itself does not necessarily determine the condition of the afterworld it houses. The proximity of the hill-top to the source of light may improve but not guarantee its quality. So for instance, the natives of isolated Rossel Island distinguish three realms for their dead: two hills and the floors of lagoons which surround the island. In contrast to the floors of lagoons, the two hill abodes are less desirable places; they are associated with cannibalistic modes of life. The lagoons, on the other hand, present a paradisiac alternative.¹⁷⁾

Whether the afterworld mountain is eventually understood as a good or as a bad place, it nevertheless serves to define a place of human destination. A mountain is a clearly visible landmark and its summit can easily be seen and contemplated. This visible presence in the distance, of mortal man's next place, sooner or later transforms for him his experience of death into some kind of surface travel.

Islands. — Perhaps the most distinct "other places" which mortal Melanesians have discovered on the surface are their island afterworlds. An island, if viewed from neighboring land, presents itself as man's "other place" *par excellence*. There is a chaotic rupture between the shore where the observer sits and the island which he envisions in the distance. The "other side" of his own anticipated death, too, lies

16) Robert W. Williamson. *The Mafulu Mountain People of British New Guinea*. London: Macmillan, 1912, pp. 267 ff. And R. F. Fortune. *Sorcerers of Dobu*. London: Routledge & Sons, 1932, pp. 180 ff.

17) W. E. Armstrong. *Rossel Island*. Cambridge: University Press, 1928, pp. 115 ff.

in the distance. Distant places and distant conditions tend to blend into one reality, and so mortal man discovers his other place. The experience of death blends into an encounter with the sea, and both together must be crossed as a rupture in an otherwise continuous life/space.

Not all islands of Melanesia have become afterworlds. But a number of small and generally uninhabited islands have attracted mortal man's attention and have been discovered as such. Not all Melanesian peoples are equally prepared or situated for discovering an afterworld on an island. Migration and nostalgic return of the ghosts of migrant peoples seem to have been instrumental for the unique popularity of a few of these afterworld islands—Kibu, Tuma, St. George, and Malapa. The Nakanai people of Eaea village, on the other hand, seem to have been attracted clearly by the sheer "otherness" of their afterworld island. They go to the "other Eaea" on Lolobao Island.¹⁸⁾ The latter is a small island off the New Britain coast, opposite Eaea.

It seems that some island afterworlds, like many other afterworlds in Melanesia, have become stopping places when more attractive places have lured the ghosts to move on. The Mono, Alu, and Fauru people, who were mentioned above in connection with volcano afterworlds, congregate after death at a small Shortland island Ilina. There is a possibility that Ilina is the place where the ancestors of these peoples have obtained a first foothold; but it is also possible that this island presented itself momentarily as their "other place." However, their afterworld having for a time become fixed to a Bougainville volcano, Ilina, could then have become incorporated as their common stopping-place into an already syncretistic afterworld journey.

GEOGRAPHIZATION OF THE DEATH EXPERIENCE

Not all peoples have learned to project their encounter with death into ruptures of geographical space. Some, especially those who hope to survive in the vicinity of the living, have surrendered to qualitative changes instead. Others, especially migrant peoples who have learned to change the conditions of their existence by changing their locales, will naturally prefer a change of places to an alteration of their being. They then envision their next home in the distance. But while their eyes

18) P. F. Hees, „Ein Beitrag aus den Sagen und Erzählungen der Nakanai“, *Anthropos*, X (Wien, 1915), p. 55.

focus on this future dwelling place in the distance, the intermediary space, which the yearning mortal ignores in the process, develops into a chaotic rupture. Death becomes geographized as a rupture in space.

Bodies of Water. — The most common rupture in Melanesian mythical geographies of the dead is the sea. Many a mortal thinks of his afterworld as being situated somewhere beyond the sea. This is the natural result if island peoples yearn to join their kin who have died before them at earlier homesteads.

The Torres Straits islanders, when they die, must cross the sea in order to go to some western afterworld. The Bwaidoga ghosts of southern Goodenough Island travel across the sea in order to reach Fergusson Island. Trobriand ghosts sail to Tuma Island. Bugotu people, as ghosts, fly across to their St. George Island afterworld; the Lau people of Big Mala do the same. Ghosts from Little Mala, those from Florida, Guadalcanal, and San Christoval, all cross the sea in order to reach their island afterworld at Malapa. Northeastern Malekulan ghosts are ferried across to Ambrim Island. And finally, the ghosts of Melanesians on Fiji, after diving into the sea, swim to their distantly remembered homeland in the west.

Rivers. — Rivers which must be crossed by the newly dead are less common in Melanesia than are lakes, lagoons, or stretches of the sea. Still, a few islands in Melanesia are large enough to develop significant rivers and, consequently, the dead of some Melanesian peoples must cross rivers.

The crossing which changes the Marind-anim departed into an officially dead person involves a river. In a similar way, before the dead from the Shortlands can arrive at their volcano afterworld, they cross the river Turino. No living man may cross this river. All instances where the dead must cross rivers are clearly related to large islands, to New Guinea and Bougainville. Small streams on small islands present for man no significant ruptures in geographical space and are therefore not very analogous with the momentous experience of death. But wherever rivers must be crossed after death, whether these be Styx or Jordan or some river in faraway Melanesia, they divide the living from the dead; consequently, these so-perceived ruptures in geographical space transform the experience of dying into the hopeful adventure of crossing a river. And rivers can be crossed.

Ravines. — In an earlier section I have shown how deep ravines

have on occasion been discovered as man's other places. Nevertheless, the primary significance of ravines in the mythical geographies of the Melanesian dead is that they represent ruptures in traversable space.

The Fijian journey of the dead contains, among other ordeals, the crossing of ravines. Aurora ghosts, at the crucial point of their journey, come to two rocks with a deep ravine between them. He who leaps across is forever dead. The Bugotu dead, when they have arrived at their afterworld island, have yet to cross a deep chasm. Those who bear the proper initiation marks succeed and need not fall into the abyss. The final difficulty which a new-arrival to the Bwebweso afterworld must overcome is a deep chasm; only the healthy and the noble are able to go across.

Thus it appears that ravines and rivers have for wandering mortals essentially the same meaning. Those who cross them must no longer be counted among the living. Failure to make it across may signify that persons are not yet actually dead, may mean judgment on the uninitiated, or it may simply reveal their general weakness. After-world geographies which contain ravines and rivers favor in themselves those mortals whose bodies are strong. But, in general, man's religious ceremonials have provided him with a destiny of greater equality. The proper initiation, accumulated merit, and friendly helpers from the other side, have lifted man above the mere condition of survival of the fittest in ruptured space.

Vertical Drops. — When mortal man comes to ravines which are too far across, having no auxiliary resources at his disposal, he must descend. His experience of death no longer can be stretched out in safe horizontal space; rather, he must contend with a vertical drop. In this manner the Usiai dead descend into dark ravines to a spatially and qualitatively lower level of existence.

Not all vertical drops entail the same consequences. It all depends on the level at which one starts. While the Usiai dead drop from surface level to the bottom of dark ravines, the souls of Buin people start a story higher. Their soul-bird flies to the tree of life, at death it plucks its leaf and subsequently descends to the bottom of the tree.¹⁹⁾ A drop involving the height of the tree of life brings the souls not

19) Richard Thurnwald. *Forschungen auf den Salomoinseeln und dem Bismarck-Archipel*, I. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1912, pp. 316 ff.

underground, but they reach the surface level at which their journey coincides with several stages in the funeral ceremony which the living conduct. Surface travel is still possible and consequently the Buin dead can reach a more pleasant abode than can the Usiai dead in their dark ravines.

Physical Obstacles. — After having found a large number of ruptures in the surface geography of Melanesian mortals, it would seem that obstacles which rise above the surface would be equally numerous. But this is not the case, and upon closer reflection this becomes quite understandable. While ruptures in the earth surface are seen only by those who come very close, the obstacles which rise above the earth's surface can be seen from afar; they do not surprise the wanderer as they can be contemplated in advance and bypassed. This is why, perhaps, of all the people I studied, only the Mbowamb, isolated and surrounded by mountain ranges, have encountered these as obstacles.²⁰⁾ Thus, for Melanesians, as for Westerners, the "valley of shadows" mirrors more adequately than the "climbing of mountains" their immediate encounter with death.

But obstacles there are; not natural obstacles, but their cultural modifications. Hills can be climbed, but man-made walls are built specifically to keep out intruders. Thus, walls blocking the journey of the dead are insurmountable by living men and they are very difficult for ghosts. Their function is to obstruct. This is why the Marind-anim *gova*, leaping across a fiery wall, burn their lower halves. The high-rising wall which the Kai ghosts face can only be climbed by those who have been washed and cleansed of blood and dirt.²¹⁾

Dilemmas and Riddles. — Man beats paths to travel on and, in doing so, he tries to bypass or overcome ruptures in the surface and obstacles which are in his way. But the subject of interruptions is not completely exhausted by looking at the vertical variations in a preferred horizontal path. A wellbeaten path may also rupture in the horizontal dimension. So, for instance, Dobuan dead come to a forked road: if they choose the wrong way they come to the Hill of Lice. Rossel ghosts, too, come to the crossroads, but their decision is made

20) G. F. Vicedom and H. Tischner. *Die Mbowamb*. Vol. II. Hamburg: Friedrichsen, De Gruyter & Co., 1943, pp. 310, 341 ff.

21) J. Van Baal. *Dema*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966, p. 806. Also Keysser, pp. 149 ff.

for them by the Guardian Woman who hurries them along on the road which they deserve.²²⁾

Forked roads and crossroads are not the only instances of paths ruptured in a horizontal dimension. At certain points, roads may simply come to an end. Sometimes the path is interrupted on purpose. So for instance, the Malekulan afterworld guardian, Temes Savsap, having traced before her in the sand the pattern of the path which an arriving ghost must go, wipes out half of the maze. Only the knowledge of the complete path will insure safe passage.²³⁾ Since both the passing of forked roads and of interrupted mazes depend on a ghost's broader geographical awareness concerning that which extends beyond the immediate road, the significance of geography for mortal man's salvation is well illustrated.

Accumulation of Ruptures and Obstacles. — Horizontal or geographical space is practically limitless. This is why it is possible for indefinite numbers of ruptures and obstacles to accumulate into one particular afterworld geography. The farther away mortals live from their final destination, or, the farther a people have migrated away from the place to which their ancestors went, the more possibilities of dangers and interruptions arise. Furthermore, as different tribes come into contact with other groups, their afterlife ideologies embrace new features. Their experience of death is thus not only projected into a rupture in geographical space but is exploded into a multiplicity of ruptures and obstacles.

In this manner the Marind-anim have accumulated a creek, a fiery wall, and several rivers. The last river is now the official dividing line between the living and the dead. Southwestern Malekulans must cross a channel, complete a maze, and swim across a lagoon. By far the most extensive accumulation, almost a compendium, of ruptures and obstacles is contained in the Fijian journey of the dead.

In all these examples, the journey of the dead involved is a journey in the known geographical space of the living. Each individual rupture or obstacle is associated with an identifiable place or region. The fact that the geography of the dead overlaps with the geography of the

²²⁾ R. F. Fortune. *Sorcerers of Dobu*. London: Routledge & Sons, 1932, pp. 181 ff. Also Armstrong, pp. 115 ff.

²³⁾ A. Bernard Deacon. *Malekula, A Vanishing People in the New Hebrides*. London: Routledge & Sons, 1934, pp. 552 ff.

living can assure those who face death that what they will encounter is just another journey along a familiar path. The many ruptures and obstacles allow mortal man then to endure his death piecemeal, spread thinly in a broader geography as a series of relatively minor nuisances.

MEANS FOR CONTINUITY

As natural geography presents mortal man with features that are analogous to his rupturous experience of dying, so it also provides glimpses of hope and survival. Even geographical features which ordinarily present themselves to man as ruptures in space, such as ravines and rivers, may occasionally become pathways to the afterworld. So for example, the Mbowamb of New Guinea, isolated between high mountain ranges, escape at death on the rivers and through the deep valleys which cut through the mountains into the outside world.²⁴⁾

The most common natural rupture in the Melanesian geographies of the dead is the sea. At first sight the sea might seem chaotic and a rupture *par excellence*. But the situation of a ghost who must cross a stretch of sea is not entirely hopeless. Beneath the surface, the Tubetube ghosts travel along submerged reefs; their neighbors, the Dobuans travel to their afterworld by skipping from one wave crest to another. Some living people from Tanga, in trance, have visited the underworld on a whirlwind. The Trobriand *baloma*-ghosts sail to Tuma Island, aided by southeasterly trade winds. In order to cross the large sea, toward the western world of the dead, ghosts from Tanga may "thumb a ride" from the sun who goes there daily. Tanga dead are laid in state under the open sun. When the dead man's eyes are in focus with the sun, the westward journey of his ghost begins.²⁵⁾ In this manner, the rupture of the sea is transcended with the aid of the sun which functions as a psychopomp. Yet, ambivalently, as are most of the aids of mortal man, the sun which supports man on his journey easily degenerates into a threat to the living who are not yet ready to come along. There is a belief, widely held in New Zealand and the New Hebrides, that a glance at the setting sun may induce death.

Until a rupture or an obstacle is encountered, the dead, like the

24) Vicedom and Tischner, pp. 310, 341ff.

25) F. L. S. Bell, "Death in Tanga," *Oceania*, VII (Sydney, 1937), p. 337.

living, prefer to walk. If the rupture or obstacle is actually confronted, men think either about removal or about detours. A hearty Malekulan warrior, skilled in archery, simply shot the guardian deity. In contrast, when Pentecost ghosts come to a stream which they cannot pass, they climb a tree and dive into the sea.²⁶⁾ Apparently, swimming there is easier. The dead, like the living, risk leaping across small ravines; if pursued by wild beasts they climb. They fight when monsters obstruct their path; they swim across bodies of water and, if swimming becomes too difficult, they build a raft and float or sail. Man's ability to build a raft, to float and to sail, is presumably not lost when he dies. This opens up the possibility of having ghostly ferrymen.

Natural geography is always supplemented by men with the achievements of their culture. In the realm of the living, man develops skills, beats paths, hews steps, lays ladders and bridges, and moves about with the aid of other men, on animals, and on vehicles. These modes of locomotion which human culture has developed are changed when man becomes a ghost only to the extent that they must then accommodate the natures and desires of ghosts. That is to say that the modes of locomotion and the implied geography are not changed in their essence when man dies. From the moment of death onward they merely belong to a ghostly kind of world. At the point where the experience of death is projected into geographical ruptures, there the human modes of travel must be magnified accordingly, by knowledge and cultic means, in order to match the magnitude of geographized death.

GEOGRAPHY TRANSCENDED

Geographization is not the last word in the development of Melanesian hopes for survival in death. The mortal mind which can hope for survival in spite of dying and decay can also go a step further. And some privileged Melanesians have dared to hope beyond the spacial limitations of commoners.

On Malo Island the underworld has received competition from the sky-world of the high-ranking members of the Supwe society.²⁷⁾ Still, as generally in Oceania, the belief in a sky-world is rare in Melanesia.

²⁶⁾ Deacon, pp. 555 f. and Codrington, pp. 287 f.

²⁷⁾ Capell, pp. 59 ff.

What skyward hopes there are signify the privileged destiny of warriors, hunters, members of cultic associations, and of chiefs. The ghosts of slain Orokaiva warriors go aloft into a sky region. The dead chiefs of San Christoval, who are buried in cut-off canoe coffins, are said to travel to the sun. Only on Santo Island has the sky-world become a place for everyone. On Efate, a developmental step further, the glamour of the sky-world has by contrast transformed the traditional underworld into a hell of continuous quarrels, fighting, and cannibalism.

Not all the ghosts of warriors have risen into a distinct sky region. Some still dwell in the atmosphere or have risen slightly higher. The ghosts of some New Ireland warriors, once they have escaped their bodies, will fly about in the shape of flying foxes. Some will have gone farther aloft and will fall in the sky, individually, as meteorites. Meteorites have been interpreted as omens of death by the Mono-Alu people of Bougainville Straits. One step further, in New Ireland, where meteorites are the falling souls of warriors, the less flashy stars are considered to be the souls of those who have died in a less spectacular manner. Dim stars are older ghosts; bright stars are those who have died recently.²⁸⁾ Obviously, the analogy between falling stars and falling warriors has associated non-warrior ghosts with the permanent stars in the sky. Sky-oriented beliefs in New Ireland, however, represent minority opinions.

Quite frequently, when a Melanesian mortal associates his destiny with the sun, no sky-world is implied. Rather, the sun becomes a vehicle on which the dead travel beyond the western horizon. The souls of deceased Tangans exit through their eyes and travel with the sun into the western underworld. The ghosts of some Torres Straits people go to Beig, the westernmost place to which the sun goes when it dives into the western sea. The sky-world of the Ipi people, Purari Delta area, is reserved for successful warriors and hunters. Ipi widows watch the setting sun; they wave their hands, and so bid farewell to the parting ghosts of their husbands.²⁹⁾

Thus it appears that many Melanesians, instead of speculating about invisible celestial realms, are rather fascinated by their concrete

²⁸⁾ Capell, pp. 52 ff., 59 ff.

²⁹⁾ J. H. Holmes. *In Primitive New Guinea*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1924, pp. 181 ff.

glimpses of meteorites, stars, and by the place at which the sun sets. Only people of distinguished rank or ceremonial status aspire to distinction in vertical and upward space. And only in the northwestern New Hebrides have a significant number of people perceived a definite sky realm. This much is certain—mortal man's geography can be exchanged successfully for celestial expanse.

LA METHODE COMPARATIVE : ENTRE PHILOGIE ET PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE

PAR

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On sait bien que nos temps se caractérisent par une réaction contre l'historicisme, qui fut typique d'une période précédente. Pour ce qui est de notre discipline, qui s'appelle quand même l'histoire des religions, cette tendance a abouti à la prédilection pour une sous-discipline systématique, non historique, la phénoménologie de la religion ¹⁾. On comprend très bien que tous ceux qui ont un intérêt particulier pour la recherche historique en matière de religion aient suivi avec beaucoup d'inquiétude ce développement, d'autant plus qu'il a été souvent promu par des phénoménologues qui avaient débuté dans leur carrière comme historiens et qui ont continué à écrire en tant qu'historiens des religions; ce qui explique le besoin qu'ils ont éprouvé de garantir une connexion entre l'histoire et la phénoménologie. C'est le cas de Raffaele Pettazzoni, dont nous célébrons le dixième anniversaire de la mort, en rappelant ses grands mérites en tant que phénoménologue de la religion.

Dans un article bien connu sur la méthode comparative Pettazzoni exprime son opinion, que les monographies et les manuels phénoménologiques négligent en général le fait qui s'appelle „développement” (*genomenon*) ²⁾. M. Bleeker, en discutant à son tour l'article de Pettazzoni, a admis que celui-ci a incontestablement touché par ses critiques le point faible de la phénoménologie ³⁾, en ajoutant qu'en effet — dans la plupart des cas — le fait d'examiner des phénomènes peut être comparé à l'examen de „photographies arrêtées” ⁴⁾.

Il est vrai qu'on ne saurait oublier que les phénomènes se présentent aussi comme enregistrés dans un film roulant: ils sont dynamiques

1) Pour l'histoire de cette discipline, cf. E. Hirschmann, *Phänomenologie der Religion*, Groningen 1940.

2) Cf. R. Pettazzoni, „Il metodo comparativo”, *Numen* VI, 1/1959.

3) Cf. C. J. Bleeker, „The phenomenological method”, *Numen* VI, 2 1959, 96-III.

4) Bleeker, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

aussi bien que statiques. Le problème est donc: comment percevoir un phénomène religieux à l'intérieur de son procès de développement. Ce problème va de pair avec un autre: comment présenter le dossier complet des faits relevant d'un même phénomène.

On ne saurait répondre à ces deux questions sans un aperçu rapide de l'histoire de la phénoménologie en tant que sous-discipline de l'histoire des religions. Car la phénoménologie s'est développée à partir de la discipline appelée religion comparée et de la méthode comparative. C'est donc pour cause que Pettazzoni, en discutant les questions méthodologiques relatives à la phénoménologie religieuse, intitule son article „La méthode comparative”.

Mais en ceci il se révèle le disciple d'une époque antérieure à la nôtre. En principe, on pourrait dire que la méthode idéale pour présenter et analyser un phénomène serait de comparer toutes les variantes de ce phénomène comme elles se trouvent dans les différentes religions; car, en évitant toute simplification dans la manière de présenter ces variantes, on éviterait aussi d'aboutir à un résultat final réellement faux. Mais il est évident que ce procédé, qui rappelle la méthode comparative comme elle était pratiquée autrefois (mais encore de nos jours), ne saurait être réellement pratiqué quand il s'agit d'un manuel de phénoménologie ou d'un traité ayant pour objet un phénomène assez étendu.

Considérons par exemple la monographie de Pettazzoni sur la confession des péchés ⁵⁾. Les trois volumes de cet ouvrage considèrent en ordre successif presque toutes les religions, ou groupes de religions. Pourtant, la grande synthèse phénoménologique manque, substituée par quelques articles considérés évidemment par l'auteur comme provisoires ⁶⁾. Un peu différente, à ce qu'il nous semble, est la méthode pratiquée par Pettazzoni lorsqu'il traite du thème de l'omniscience de Dieu. Dans son ouvrage fondamental 'L'onniscienza di Dio', dont il existe des traductions ou des rédactions en anglais et en allemand ⁷⁾, Pettazzoni passe sans aucune hésitation de la religion classique aux religions des peuples sans écriture, qu'il appelle les „religions primitives”

5) R. Pettazzoni, *La confessione dei peccati*, I-III, Bologna 1929-36.

6) R. Pettazzoni, „La confession des péchés; essai d'interprétation générale”, *Journal de Psychologie* 46/1953, pp. 257-68; „La confessione dei peccati: metodo e risultati”, *Scientia*, 31/1937, vol. 61, pp. 226-32; „La confession des péchés dans l'histoire des religions”, *Mélanges Cumont*, II, pp. 893-901.

7) R. Pettazzoni, *L'onniscienza di Dio*, Torino 1955; *The All-knowing God*, London 1956; *Der allwissende Gott*, Fischer-Bücherei 1960.

appellation qui ne saurait échapper à des réserves assez fortes ⁸⁾. L'ordre dans lequel les matériaux sont présentés est fort intéressant, du pont de vue de la recherche historique ⁹⁾. L'auteur commence par l'Ancien Testament ¹⁰⁾, pour en venir ensuite à la religion égyptienne ¹¹⁾, à la Mésopotamie, à la Phénicie ¹²⁾, aux religions de l'Inde et de l'Iran ¹³⁾ et aux autres religions indo-européennes ¹⁴⁾. Il examine ensuite les religions des autres peuples d'Asie ¹⁵⁾, entre autres la religion chinoise ¹⁶⁾, pour passer finalement en revue les peuples sans écriture ¹⁷⁾. Or, d'un point de vue strictement historique, cet ordre pose une réserve. Pour sauvegarder la perspective historique, on aurait dû commencer par les civilisations les plus anciennes, l'Égypte et la Mésopotamie, et par les cultures tributaires, celles des sémites de l'ouest, phéniciens, hébreux, arabes. Surtout, on bouleverse complètement l'ordre historique en traitant par exemple, la religion hébraïque avant celles de l'Égypte, de la Mésopotamie et de la Phénicie. La dernière, par accord universel, a exercé une influence profonde et manifeste sur la religion israélite. Après les religions de l'Ancien Orient, il aurait fallu traiter la religion chinoise ancienne, qui appartient, de par le niveau de son développement historique, à une „Hochkultur” qui suit, dans l'ordre chronologique, la Mésopotamie et l'Égypte. On ne saurait, en effet, ne pas considérer la religion chinoise avant de s'occuper des autres religions asiatiques: pratiquer l'ordre inverse signifierait négliger excessivement cette exigence historique qui ne peut être ignorée, même dans une recherche phénoménologique.

Après le traitement des religions asiatiques, on pourrait procéder à l'analyse des religions indo-européennes et, ensuite, des anciennes cultures américaines, avec leur prolongement dans les religions des peuples américains sans écriture. A ce propos, on pourrait remarquer dans le

8) Cf. G. Meinhof, *Die Religion der Afrikaner*, Oslo 1926. Il fut probablement le premier savant qui fit usage de ce terme (c.a.d. des peuples sans écriture.) Je dois cette référence au prof. S. Lagercrantz.

9) Je cite de l'édition mineure allemande, parce que sa méthode est plus facile à suivre dans ce petit volume.

10) Cf. *Der allwissende Gott*, pp. 24-28.

11) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 28 s.

12) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 29.

13) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

14) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 32-38.

15) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 38-40.

16) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 40-43.

17) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 43-69.

livre de Pettazzoni que l'omniscience du dieu Tezcatlipoca, qui appartient au panthéon aztèque, est traitée après que l'auteur ait examiné les idées des Pueblos ¹⁸⁾, peuple chez lequel on trouve incontestablement des traces d'influence aztèque, parfaitement explicable, d'ailleurs, à cause des affinités ethniques et linguistiques ¹⁹⁾. Il est donc évident que l'auteur n'a pas été complètement fidèle au principe auquel il avait déclaré de vouloir s'inspirer. Dans son article sur la méthode comparative Pettazzoni signale énergiquement l'importance du concept de développement historique ²⁰⁾. Mais si le phénoménologue veut tenir bon à ce concept, il lui faut tenir compte de l'âge respectif de cultures qu'il analyse; surtout, il lui faut prêter attention aux problèmes génétiques et ne pas négliger l'enchaînement historique qui lie certaines cultures et certains peuples; enchaînement qui est d'ailleurs assez facile à prouver grâce à la méthode historique. Les mêmes réflexions méthodologiques suggèrent une critique pour ce qui est de la façon dont Pettazzoni arrange les matériaux de sa vaste enquête sur la confession des péchés. Mais il est superflu de démontrer ici comment une telle enquête devrait être organisée pour satisfaire aux demandes historiques.

Pour en revenir à l'ouvrage sur l'Omniscience de Dieu, on peut citer des cas où l'auteur compare, sans aucune hésitation, des phénomènes appartenant à des religions absolument différentes, sans qu'existe une connection historique. Considérons, par exemple, une question spéciale, le cas où l'impie, qui est en même temps un fou, ne croit pas à l'omniscience de Dieu. A ce propos l'auteur, en traitant la religion iranienne, avance une comparaison entre Mithra et Yahweh, une comparaison purement phénoménologique, qui devrait avoir sa place propre dans les conclusions phénoménologiques ²¹⁾. Un deuxième exemple. En proposant quelques remarques, fort intéressantes d'ailleurs, sur la struc-

18) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62.

19) Les Pueblos vivent dans la partie septentrionale du Mexique et dans des territoires au nord de ce pays. Provenant du nord les Aztèques ont envahi la région méridionale du Mexique. Bien que les Pueblos ne parlent pas une langue aztèque, on ne saurait douter des liens culturels entre eux et les Aztèques. Les Pueblos ont donc hérité probablement de la culture dont les Aztèques étaient autrefois les représentants les plus typiques.

20) Cf. *Numen* VI, 1/1950, pp. 12-14.

21) Cf. *Der allwissende Gott*, p. 31 s. Il faut aussi remarquer que *apišman* n'est pas Mithra „sot”, mais Mithra „aveugle”, qui ne voit pas, cf. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran*, Uppsala 1938, p. 109, avec référence à *AirWb*, col. 85.

ture idéologique de la conception d'une omniscience divine, l'auteur n'hésite pas à comparer le Toré des Pygmées avec le Yahweh des Hébreux, pour en déduire une convergence phénoménologique ²²). Il est vrai qu'il s'agit ici de conclusions exclusivement phénoménologiques, qui ne portent pas atteinte aux principes de l'auteur.

Voici quelques remarques sur la façon dont Pettazzoni exerce l'analyse phénoménologique dans son volume sur l'omniscience de Dieu, sans nullement dévier de la méthode traditionnelle. Je ne trouve aucune différence entre sa méthode, et celle que j'ai pratiquée dans mon manuel phénoménologique qui vient de paraître en allemand sous le titre de „Religionsphänomenologie" — à propos de la présentation des matériaux concernant le „Grand Dieu" ²³). Mais Pettazzoni n'a pas voulu se limiter à la phénoménologie; il a voulu aussi s'attaquer à l'explication historique d'un phénomène donné, l'attribut divin de l'omniscience. Le succès d'une pareille entreprise dépend de la condition que l'enquête phénoménologique ait été exécutée avec un examen scrupuleux des faits. Or, la base des conclusions de Pettazzoni n'est pas toujours parfaitement solide, comme par ex. quand il affirme que, souvent, le Grand Dieu n'est pas un créateur, et qu'il existe un dualisme typologique entre le dieu caractérisé par une activité créatrice et le dieu caractérisé par l'omniscience ²⁴). Cela peut se vérifier, sans aucun doute, mais il ne s'agit absolument pas d'un phénomène universel. Par exemple. Pettazzoni affirme expressément que les Grands dieux des peuples indo-européens ne sont pas créateurs, mais bien des dieux omniscients et tout-voyants ²⁵). Or il n'en est pas toujours ainsi. Ahura Mazda, par exemple, est créateur, comme on lit dans l'inscription de Naqš-e Rostam ²⁶). Quant aux religions sémitiques, soit Yahweh soit Marduk sont des dieux omniscients et, en même temps, des créateurs ²⁷). Le dualisme prétendu n'est donc pas aussi strict que l'auteur ne le pense.

22) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 74, où l'on trouvera d'autres comparaisons avec des dieux de peuples sans écriture.

23) Cf. Widengren, *Religionsphänomenologie*, Berlin 1969, partic. pp. 46-92.

24) Cf. *Der allwissende Gott*, p. 75.

25) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 75.

26) Cf. Widengren, *Die Religionen Irans*, Stuttgart 1965, p. 117.

27) Le livre de Job, chap. 36 s., glorifie la sagesse et le pouvoir de Yahweh, tandis que le chap. 38 est une glorification de son activité créatrice. Yahweh est *te'mim dē'im*, „parfait dans sa connaissance", 37, 16, et en même temps il est toujours *qōneh šamayim wā'āræš*, Gen. 14, 19, 22, „le créateur du ciel et de la terre", un terme qui existait déjà dans un arrière-fond cananéen, cf. H. Geese, *Die Religionen*

Le point de départ est donc déjà un peu suspect. Suivons cependant l'auteur dans son effort historique pour passer des „formes” aux „formations”²⁸⁾.

Pettazzoni part ici de l'hypothèse que le stade de culture le plus ancien chez les tribus hébraïques ait été le nomadisme²⁹⁾. Or on admet en général que ces tribus, avant leur migration en Palestine, n'aient pas été des nomades mais des sémi-nomades. J'ai eu l'occasion ailleurs d'écrire que l'analyse des souches linguistiques sémitiques les plus anciennes rend cette hypothèse assez douteuse, et aujourd'hui je ne suis plus le seul savant à défendre cette opinion³⁰⁾. Mais acceptons provisoirement l'hypothèse que les anciens Hébreux aient été exclusivement des sémi-nomades. L'auteur en vient ensuite à une comparaison entre Yahweh et le dieu mexicain Tezcatlipoca. Ces dieux seraient susceptibles d'une comparaison, du fait qu'ils appartiendraient tous les deux à des traditions culturelles comparables: d'un côté la culture des nomades, de pasteurs sémitiques, et d'autre côté la culture des peuples barbares venus du nord (nahuatl). L'image d'un dieu céleste et omniscient s'adapterait facilement au modèle d'une culture de nomades et de pasteurs; dans la vie des pasteurs nomades se trouveraient les présuppositions de la foi en un dieu céleste, en un être suprême. Ainsi, l'uniformité phénoménologique entre Yahweh et Tezcatlipoca s'expliquerait, d'après l'auteur, par les mêmes conditions culturelles³¹⁾. Pour ma part, je n'ai rien à objecter contre la comparaison de la foi en un Grand dieu de la part d'un peuple de pasteurs nomades et d'un même type de religion près d'un autre peuple de nomades. Il y a plus de trente ans que j'ai fait, justement, cette comparaison entre la religion des tribus de l'Iran ancien et des tribus africaines modernes de pasteurs nomades³²⁾. Mais il faut tenir compte de deux circonstances. Premièrement, la comparaison était exclusivement d'ordre phéno-

Altsyriens, in: *Die Religionen Altsyriens, Altarabiens und der Mandäer*, Stuttgart 1970, pp. 113-115. C'est le cas aussi pour Marduk, cf. Tallqvist, *Akkadische Götterepitheta*, Helsinki 1938, p. 371 (*mūdū kalāma*, p. 86), qui est en même temps omniscient et créateur, p. 366 (*banū* ou *banū kibrātīm* p. 69, et *bañ šamē u crsēti*, p. 69).

28) Cf. *Der allwissende Gott*, pp. 77 ss.

29) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 81.

30) Cf. Widengren, *JSS*, 5/1960, pp. 397-410, et maintenant Henninger, *Über Lebensraum und Lebensformen der Frühsemiten*, Köln und Opladen, 1948.

31) Cf. *Der allwissende Gott*, p. 82 s.

32) Cf. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube*, p. 30.

ménologique; je n'ai tiré aucune conclusion historique. Deuxièmement, il faut qu'une comparaison semblable se rapporte à deux peuples qui soient incontestablement des pasteurs nomades, c'est-à-dire se trouvent au même stade de développement culturel.

Or, dans le cas en question, il n'en est rien. Le dieu Tezcatlipoca n'appartient nullement à un peuple de pasteurs nomades, vu que le nomadisme n'existait pas chez ces peuples avant l'arrivée des Européens ³³). En effet l'auteur lui-même s'exprime d'une façon un peu flottante; il ne parle pas de „peuple nomade”, mais bien de peuple „barbare” (que signifie d'ailleurs cette expression très curieuse, du point de vue de l'ethnologie?): un peuple barbare venu du nord ³⁴), — ce qui est toute autre chose et n'indique pas du tout un stade de nomadisme.

Pour en conclure: rien n'indique que Yahweh et Tezcatlipoca aient été adorés par deux peuples appartenant au même type de culture. Au contraire, on pourrait bien supposer qu'ils étaient adorés parmi des peuples appartenant à des civilisations très différentes.

Pettazzoni a voulu étendre son enquête sur tout le complexe des cultures, en essayant de trouver dans les cultures des pasteurs nomades l'origine historique de la conception du Grand Dieu. Mais c'est bien là franchir les limites d'une enquête phénoménologique. Dans son article sur la méthode comparative, en effet, Pettazzoni a observé opportunément que la phénoménologie présente seulement l'image fixe d'un phénomène. Il s'agit donc, d'après lui, d'une méthode qui a un aspect statique — ce qui est parfaitement vrai; mais si l'on passe d'une enquête phénoménologique à une hypothèse historique sans fournir pour autant une analyse historique satisfaisante, on ne donne pas une contribution à la méthodologie phénoménologique. Il s'agit ici en effet d'une *metabasis eis allo genos*. Pour cette raison on aimerait mieux voir que l'aspect dynamique d'un certain phénomène est pris en compte par la présentation des différents stades du développement de ce dernier, sans pour autant vouloir donner une explication historique du phénomène en question. Je m'empresse de dire que, dans mon ouvrage sur la phénoménologie, je suis tombé moi-même dans la même erreur. Je n'ai pas suffisamment tracé les lignes de démarcation entre la méthode historique et la méthode comparative, en traitant de sujets tels que les

33) Cf. Krickeberg-Trimborn-Müller-Zerries, *Die Religionen des alten Amerika*, Stuttgart 1961, p. 176, „der ab 1680 entstandene Reiternomadismus der Prärie”.

34) *Der allwissende Gott*, p. 82.

sociétés et les organisations religieuses, le sacerdoce, le prophétisme ³⁵⁾ etc., ou bien une idée religieuse, comme, par exemple, la notion d'un Grand Dieu ³⁶⁾. C'est le même motif que chez Pettazzoni qui m'a poussé en cette direction; mais aujourd'hui je trouve que ce mélange de méthode historique et phénoménologique constitue une erreur méthodique regrettable. Aujourd'hui je voudrais recommander de présenter seulement les stades successifs d'un phénomène, comme des images roulantes, sans en tirer des conclusions historiques. *Post hoc* n'est pas du tout *propter hoc*. En faisant cela, on pourrait satisfaire à la fois les exigences de Pettazzoni et celles de Bleeker, et éviter la confusion méthodologique dont nous venons de parler. Evidemment, c'est l'intérêt pour la recherche historique qui a causé une certaine erreur méthodique dont nous avons été coupables.

Dans ses notes sur les ouvrages de Mircea Eliade, qui traitent de différents aspects de la recherche phénoménologique, Pettazzoni a réagi vigoureusement contre l'attitude de ce savant, qu'il caractérise comme anti-historique ³⁷⁾. Pettazzoni s'oppose carrément à l'hypothèse qu'il a existé une humanité archétypique antérieure à un homme historique ³⁸⁾. Il va de soi que Pettazzoni a parfaitement raison. On ne saurait établir une différence entre un homme soi-disant archaïque et un homme historique. Tout homme à toute époque a été historique; seulement, la majorité des hommes ne sont pas du tout conscients d'être intégrés dans l'histoire. C'est un fait incontestable que la majorité préfère la légende ou les mythes à l'histoire. Eliade a montré comment le mythe triomphe sur l'histoire ³⁹⁾: un fait auquel moi aussi je me suis intéressé, mais ce phénomène est universel; il paraît partout, même de nos jours. Pettazzoni, en historien convaincu a réagi contre la tendance à voir les phénomènes religieux placés dans un milieu archaïque, archétypique, complètement isolé de toute histoire. En effet, il est bien douteux que l'usage de termes tels que 'archétype' et 'archétypique' soit utile, étant donné que ces termes sont difficilement définissables, et par conséquent obscurs et douteux. Les archétypes, même si l'on voudrait en admettre

35) Cf. Widengren, *Religionsphänomenologie*, pp. 559 ss, 618 ss.

36) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 46 ss.

37) Cf. „Gli ultimi appunti di Raffaele Pettazzoni”, *SMSR* XXXI 1960, pp. 31-55, partic. p. 35.

38) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 37: „Non esiste una umanità archetipica, anteriore all'uomo storico”.

39) Cf. Eliade, *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*, Paris 1949, pp. 63 ss.

l'existence, n'existent pas indépendamment de l'homme. Ils ne sont pas des entités possédant une réalité ontologique, comme l'a observé très justement Pettazzoni⁴⁰); les introduire dans la discussion phénoménologique ne sert qu'à créer une confusion regrettable dans l'analyse des phénomènes. L'excellent travail scientifique d'Eliade reste cependant indépendant de la validité de cette terminologie pour ainsi dire sectoriste. Inversément, dans la terminologie phénoménologique, le terme 'archaïque' est à mon avis de loin préférable au terme 'primitif', dont la méthode comparative a abusé au point qu'elle lui a fait perdre presque toute signification. On comprend difficilement pourquoi des historiens des religions se servent encore de nos jours d'un terme abandonné par les ethnologues. Utilisons plutôt, au lieu de ce terme, des appellations comme *Schriftlose Völker*, *Illiterate Peoples*, peuples sans écriture. Eliade en effet ne parle jamais d'une pensée „primitive”, ce que fait constamment Pettazzoni. On s'imagine difficilement ce qui se cache derrière ce terme, tandis qu'un concept comme celui de pensée „archaïque” est, du moins en principe, chronologiquement bien défini: il s'agit de l'homme préhistorique ou de l'homme historique appartenant aux périodes anciennes de l'histoire humaine. Cependant, chose remarquable, Eliade, sans le vouloir, reconstruit pour ainsi dire cette forme archaïque en ayant recours aux peuples sans écriture modernes, méthode que je trouve inadmissible⁴¹).

Si l'on prend son point de départ des faits appartenant à un passé lointain, reconstruit surtout d'après les religions des peuples dits „non-

40) Cf. Pettazzoni, „Gli ultimi appunti”, p. 38: „Come se, dunque, gli archetipi avessero una realtà ontologica a sé indipendentemente dall'uomo che li pensa e concepisce”.

41) Cf. p. ex. Eliade, *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*, Paris, 1949. Dans ce livre très suggestif, l'auteur se propose de traiter des problèmes concernant „l'ontologie archaïque”, p. 13. Il commence par les „archétypes célestes des territoires des temples et des villes”, p. 21, en passant des anciennes „hautes cultures” de l'Egypte et de la Mésopotamie aux peuples altaïques, p. 21. Or, il est clair que les peuples nomades altaïques et les peuples des civilisations urbaines d'Egypte et Mésopotamie ne sauraient être classifiés comme appartenant au même niveau culturel. D'autre part, comment des peuples à civilisation urbaine pourraient-ils être qualifiés d'archaïques? Pour ce qui concerne la Mésopotamie, on pourrait peut-être qualifier les plus anciennes civilisations préhistoriques comme archaïques, mais certainement pas les milieux culturels des périodes historiques. Ni ces peuples médiévaux ou modernes habitant l'Asie Centrale ne sauraient évidemment être qualifiés d'archaïques non plus. Il est donc évident que cet homme „archaïque” n'a pas eu d'existence historique réelle; il s'agit d'un être reconstruit, et donc pleinement hypothétique.

civilisés" (il va de soi que chaque peuple possède une civilisation), ou d'après les peuples appartenant aux anciennes civilisations de l'Égypte, de la Mésopotamie, etc., on présentera, de chaque phénomène, une image qui correspond à ce qui est valable à l'intérieur de ces religions, et une image qui est probablement exacte pour ces périodes anciennes de l'histoire, pour autant qu'on puisse la reconstruire, mais nullement pour les stades ultérieurs de la manifestation du phénomène en question.

On peut par exemple comparer la description de l'espace sacré, telle que nous la lisons dans le *Traité d'histoire des religions* de Mircea Eliade ⁴²), et la description, pourtant très incomplète, qui se trouve dans notre *Religionsphänomenologie* ⁴³). En traitant de l'espace sacré on ne saurait négliger les grandes religions de l'humanité. En faire autrement signifierait partager un héritage néfaste de la méthode comparative, qui trop souvent s'est concentrée sur les religions des peuples dits „non-civilisés", en ajoutant de façon sporadique quelques illustrations tirées de civilisations anciennes, classiques et orientales.

Encore une observation concernant les matériaux analysés. On a trop souvent consacré son attention aux phénomènes pour ainsi dire extérieurs, en oubliant que la manière d'agir constitue le symbole d'une manière de penser. Il ne faut pas oublier l'attitude spirituelle qui se cache derrière l'action rituelle. Pour cette raison, le même acte exprime souvent de différentes attitudes. Prenons par exemple, dans les différentes confessions chrétiennes, la communion comme action rituelle. L'interprétation donnée à la communion est un fait assez variable et pour cette raison l'attitude et l'atmosphère parmi les croyants sont variables elles aussi. Il faut à tout prix éviter une interprétation phénoménologique qui se concentre exclusivement sur l'action extérieure en oubliant les sentiments qui dominent les fidèles. Mais il a même pu arriver que, au contraire, la méthode comparative ait abouti à des interprétations magiques de la communion qui sont en général complètement inadmissibles ⁴⁴).

Un autre exemple concerne le développement du concept de temple à celui de basilique. Quels sont les facteurs qui ont conditionné le changement de temple à synagogue ou mosquée? ⁴⁵) On a prêté trop

42) Cf. Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions*, Paris 1949, pp. 315-331.

43) Cf. Widengren, *Religionsphänomenologie*, pp. 328-359.

44) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 353-359.

45) Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 353-359.

peu d'attention à de tels phénomènes, du fait que la phénoménologie a hérité des traditions de la méthode comparative, qui ne s'est pas intéressée à ces problèmes.

L'analyse de l'idée d'un Grand dieu pourra être faite sans tenir compte du développement historique à condition que les faits soient présentés d'une façon correcte du point de vue historique. Je voudrais bien illustrer cette condition par un renvoi à mon ouvrage phénoménologique *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran*. J'avais essayé de présenter dans cet ouvrage une typologie du Grand dieu qui le montre en tant qu'élévé au-dessus du bien et du mal et en même temps bisexué; c'est à dire élevé-au-dessus des tendances opposées. En effet, le bien et le mal sont souvent conçus comme ses deux fils. J'avais retrouvé ce type phénoménologique dans l'Iran ancien tout comme en Afrique Noire.⁴⁶). Or, après la publication de mon livre, en 1938, on a découvert la même typologie dans l'ancienne civilisation mexicaine des Aztèques, où le Grand dieu était un dieu bisexué, en même temps qu'au-dessus du bien et du mal, les tendances opposées étant représentées respectivement par les dieux Quetzalcoatl et Tezcatlipoca. Ces deux dieux sont conçus comme étant les envoyés du Grand dieu, ou même ses deux fils.⁴⁷). Ceci réalise le type: voilà le fait important, du point de vue phénoménologique, tandis que peu importe, de ce même point de vue, qu'un développement historique puisse être découvert à l'intérieur de ce type (Tezcatlipoca, comme on l'a observé plus haut, est un dieu immigré du nord). Pour la phénoménologie, il reste le fait essentiel que le même phénomène se montre dans l'Iran ancien, dans l'Afrique Noire moderne et dans le Mexique médiéval. Cette coïncidence montre évidemment une certaine universalité de cette conception de Dieu: voilà ce qui est important pour la phénoménologie.

Quelques réflexions d'ordre général suivront ici, qui concernent la nature de la méthode phénoménologique. Si banales qu'elles soient en partie, elles peuvent au moins provoquer près de mes auditeurs des réflexions ultérieures. M. Bleeker a formulé un principe auquel je donne ma pleine adhésion: la phénoménologie prend sur soi d'arranger les faits dans un ordre systématique, pour essayer ensuite d'en saisir la portée et le sens; somme toute, elle cherche à les comprendre en tant que faits religieux, sans les violer en aucune manière en tant que faits

46) Cf. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran*, *passim*.

47) Cf. W. Krickeberg et al., *op cit.*, p. 41 s., avec référence aux ouvrages de Dietschy et Haekel.

historiques 48). Je trouve cette formule excellente. Par ailleurs, j'hésite un peu à accepter l'affirmation de Husserl, citée par M. Bleeker, que la phénoménologie ne considère pas „le bleu individuel” mais bien „la nature du bleu”. Ceci, c'est la structure, le mécanisme, que la phénoménologie aura à analyser ou à présenter. 49). Mais il arrive souvent qu'il faut prendre un fait individuel comme représentant individuel d'un type général, d'une structure, d'un mécanisme. En effet, il est pratiquement impossible qu'on analyse tous les faits individuels pour en déduire la structure générale. C'est la raison pratique qui conduit le phénoménologue à ce que le Prof. Goldammer appelle des images impressionnistes, où un phénomène individuel représente la structure générale 50). Mais il y a une autre raison, la raison méthodologique. N'oublions pas que le phénomène est la chose qui se montre (*to phainomenon*). La structure se révèle donc seulement dans le phénomène tel quel. Mieux vaut illustrer un mécanisme, une structure, par un phénomène individuel que de présenter des formules générales sans aucune illustration individuelle 51). Ici la philologie a un rôle à jouer. La philologie découvre souvent les facteurs de conservation dans la langue religieuse et d'une telle façon elle nous représente la tendance à la continuité dans le monde des religions. Le même phénomène se présente à nos yeux dans des religions distinctes. La continuité est évidente, par exemple entre la religion mésopotamienne et la chrétienté syrienne, entre la religion juive et le christianisme, entre l'Islam et les deux religions bibliques, entre l'hindouisme et le bouddhisme, etc. Ici la philologie rend à la phénoménologie de grands services, en rendant plus pénétrante notre vue.

La méthode phénoménologique, en se basant sur la philologie et la méthode comparative, comprend donc les stades suivants: 1° la description des faits; 2° l'arrangement des faits dans un ordre systématique; 3° l'interprétation des faits pour en comprendre la signification; 4° l'essai d'établir un type, une structure, un mécanisme, sans violer en aucune manière les faits historiques, mais aussi sans confondre phénoménologie et histoire.

48) Cf. Bleeker, *Grondlijnen eener Phaenomenologie van den Godsdienst*, Den Haag, 1943, p. 21.

49) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 130.

50) Cf. Goldammer, *Die Formenwelt des Religiösen*. Stuttgart 1960, p. xxix.

51) Ou avec des caractérisations incorrectes comme le fait trop souvent Goldammer, *op. cit.*

INDOLOGY AS A CROSS-CULTURAL CATALYST

A New Task of Indological Studies: Cross-cultural Fertilisation

BY

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Indology as a discipline is now about two centuries old. During this time it has made considerable progress, but it has not changed its basic structure. It can look back on pioneering work of the eighteenth century, on astonishing achievements of the nineteenth, and on valuable and in one sense definitive insights of the first seven decades of the present century. This scholarship of the past has laid the foundations of all future work. Without minimising its importance I should, however, like to suggest that the time is now ripe for a new step, a re-orientation of indic studies as a whole, and a re-shaping of its fundamental patterns. In the past, these studies have been a highly specialised science relating to a strictly delimited geographical and historical area. Now, however, the social, political and cultural changes of our times make it imperative not only to broaden the scope of indic studies, but to be ready for a radical mutation in the self-understanding of indology itself.

It is with this conviction that the present writer has undertaken the project of preparing a *Handbook of Fundamental Terms of Indian Tradition* with the collaboration of experts from all over the world. This handbook, in lexicon form, will, it is hoped be a significant contribution, offering some of the materials needed in this task of reorientation—a task I should like to sum up in the following points.

1. *Time and History*: Indologists cannot ignore the fact that the civilisation of ancient India—unlike some other ancient civilizations (e.g. that of Egypt perhaps)—is still a living reality today. For this reason, study of any feature of Indian life or thought must necessarily pursue its evolution up to the present day, if arbitrary, lop-sided results are to be avoided. One can, if one so desires, limit oneself to vedic studies, for example, but is there any justification for considering Sayāna's interpretation of the Vedas while totally ignoring that, say,

of Dayānanda and Aurobindo? Would any modern study of the Bible be satisfied with Jerome's interpretations and with the medieval commentators?

I am not speaking from a merely cultural point of view and saying, for instance, that there was a time when—for certain historical reasons—indology was considered a kind of "curiosity" for musing specialists only. I am stating from a strictly scientific point of view that no adequate study of any idea, cultural pattern or human document is possible without taking into consideration all its possibilities. Similarly, no botanist can say he knows a seed until he knows the plant that grows from it. The real potentialities of a being appertain also to that same being.

My contention is not only that any study on the nature of the concept of *dharma*, for instance, is going to be incomplete if it does not consider the present day conception of the word, but also that the ancient conception is likely to be only partially understood if its further development up to modern times is not taken into account. Moreover, no writer studying any problem can isolate himself from the influence of the notions of his time: the very words he has at his disposal are already charged with the meanings and by-meanings of his own contemporary culture. This fact, that the time-factor is not merely accidental to any human manifestation, is even more relevant today, because we have become acutely aware of the fact itself.

2. *Space and Geography*: Classical indology is well aware that indian culture is not limited to the indian sub-continent and that it offers clues for the understanding of many cultures of Asia. The impact of buddhism on eastern and central Asia is too well known to need further mention here. The Rāmāyana and Māhābhārata have been part of the shaping forces in many countries south of Burma, and how Śiva has been worshipped in Indonesia may throw light on the nature of śaivism within India.

But indology must devote more attention than it has in the past to other areas in which cross-cultural contacts have taken—and are taking—place. In a more or less spurious form, many an indian value is asserting itself on the shores of California and in the universities of Europe. In return, western values have, for better or worse, deeply penetrated not only the great cities but also the remotest villages of India. In the face of these developments, can indology remain im-

soned in an ivory tower whose drawbridge was raised when the muslims arrived in India?

I am not referring only to the well known, but insufficiently studied phenomenon, of feed-back influence, i.e. to the fact that the interpretation of any information by the passive receivers has a repercussion on the original source of the idea. I have also in mind the fact that geographical boundaries are rapidly losing their importance as barriers to the spread of cultural values: not only are gadgets diffused all over the globe within a few years of their invention: popularised ideas from all the continents are now travelling literally at the speed of light to the furthest corners not only of the world but also of the human psyche. Indology can no longer self-complacently ignore this revolution in the mass-media.

3. *New hermeneutics*: Indology has always been aware that it was engaged in an interpretation of indian values. The newness I detect in present-day indological endeavours is the result of the combination, in a critical spirit, of the two principles governing any sound hermeneutical methodology. Let us consider first the two principles and then their critical coordination.

a) *The homological principle*: It was an ancient conviction, east and west, that only like could know like. In other words, only from an homogeneous context could a concept be properly understood and evaluated. Nothing is more harmful than overhurried syntheses and superficial parallelisms. Every cultural value has a definite sphere where it is valid and meaningful: any unwarranted extrapolation may only lead to confusion and misunderstanding. It is in this sense that the contribution of pandits and exegetes is invaluable. It has provided the internal understanding of the traditional point of view. Together with the scholarship of indologists it furnishes a fair picture of the philological, archaeological, historical and other phenomena of indian culture. It must be recognised that without this previous work we could not now undertake the new step we are advocating.

The homological principle, which is one of internal interpretation, springs from a criterion, which I consider to be the golden rule of hermeneutics, namely that any interpretation given from outside a tradition has to meet all the requirements of and at least phenomenologically coincide with the self-interpretation given from within. To

catalogue a *mūrtipūjaka*, for instance, as worshipper of an idol in the sense in which an idol is commonly conceived in the jewish-christian-muslim context, and not to start with what the idol means for the worshipper himself is to transgress this golden rule that the interpreted "being" should at least recognise itself in the given interpretation. A whole philosophy on the nature of *murti* is here at stake. It is perhaps one of the positive cultural achievements of our times to have arrived at the conviction that there are no absolute categories which can serve as absolute criteria for judging everything under the sun.

b) The dialogical principle: Utterly rigorous and exclusive application of this homological principle would, however, paralyse the critical faculties and prevent all progress. I may understand the world-view behind the practice of human sacrifice, yet I may find it unbalanced, immature and ultimately wrong. I may have developed forms of awareness and understanding that lead me to see the inadequacy, at least of certain conceptions, which I feel myself justified in criticising from my own perspective. I may be able even to detect incongruities in a given conception or the no-longer tenable assumptions on which it rests, and thus try to overcome that particular notion. The dialogical principle is here at work.

I find the name of 'dialogical principle' appropriate in as far as it is only through an internal or external dialogue that one becomes aware of uncritical or unwarranted assumptions which can no longer be held. Our present time is beginning to open up to a new conception of dialogue understood not as a mere source of information, but as a means leading to a much deeper understanding of the other, and also of self-understanding. We all are learning not to shun light and criticism which comes from other shores.

c) The co-ordinating method: We come now to the unique situation of our times, which permits a global communication and allows a constant two-way flow of ideas, thus making possible on a large scale a cross-fertilization of cultures and a harmonious application of the two principles outlined above. By themselves, each is barren and unsatisfying. Past or quickly passing are the days in which *māyā* could be simply translated as 'magic' or, for that matter, western civilisation could be equated with materialism. The so-called 'polytheistic' world, for instance, has not yet been fully admitted to the academic and 'civilised'

world, but once 'integrated', it will certainly wonder at our erudite anthropological discourses. No statement is valid and meaningful if it cannot be heard, understood and in a way verified by all the people concerned.

This is not the place and time to elaborate the guiding lines for the well-balanced use of both principles. We can, however, affirm that it cannot be achieved in isolation. It needs a truly interdisciplinary effort, not only of the traditional disciplines of 'academia', but also of the people whose cultures we are discussing: they are jull participants who have to be present with equal rights at the symposium.

Indologists from all continents are today sufficiently convinced that they must apply faithfully to their own studies the methodological principles of modern critical scholarship: at the same time they are also aware that neither science nor western categories have a kind of absolute value or even unlimited applicability in their own particular field of research. From these two insights, in combination, we may expect a new science of indology to emerge in the near future.

4. Scientific homology: It would be most unrewarding to indulge in mere "comparativisms" between indological concepts and their possible counterparts in other cultures. The notion of homology here suggested applies the geometrical notion of homology to certain series of concepts belonging to different cultures. In geometry homology stands for correlations between points of two different systems, in which one point of one system corresponds to a 'homologous' point in the other. This method does not imply, first, that one system is better than the other, nor, second, that a point can be interchanged, transplanted as it were, from one system to another. It discovers only homologous correlations.

A couple of examples may clarify perhaps what is meant here. It is obviously false to translate the upaniṣadic concept of *brahman*, for instance, by the biblical concept of *Yaweh*; yet it would be equally unsatisfactory to say that these concepts have nothing whatsoever in common. The perspective and the contents of both are utterly different: they are not mutually translatable, for they are not in direct relationship, but they are homologable; they play an analogous role within the two different cultural settings. They both refer to a highest value and absolute term — whereby the terms 'high' and 'absolute' are already used in an homologous way.

The concept of homology cannot be identified with the traditional concept of analogy, though it is related to it. It is not that the homologous terms show certain analogies as if the two notions were partially the same and partially different or as if both share in a 'tertium quid': the basis of the analogy. It is rather that they perform an equivalent function, that they occupy an 'homologous' place and fulfil an 'homologous' role within their respective systems. Homology is perhaps a kind of existential-functional analogy. In our example one cannot say, for instance, that *brahman* is provident or even transcendent, or that *Yahweh* is all-pervading, without attributes. *Brahman* does not need to be 'personalised' nor *Yahweh* regarded in an ontological way in order to be correlated. And yet both have an homologous function: The role and place of each within their respective cultures is homologous.

This applies not only to the past or to merely traditional notions. There is much to be said, for instance, for homologizing the indian traditional notion of *karman* with the modern notion of *historicity* as that temporal ingredient of the human being which transcends its individuality.

5. *Existential fertilisation*: This process of homologizing not merely by discovering resemblances or parallelisms, but by detecting the homologous place of a notion in the whole structure of a given culture is not merely academic function, nor a purely theoretical activity of the mind. The task of discovering homologies has direct practical consequences: while it gives no licence for uncritical translations, its main function is to prepare the ground for a mutual fecundation of the homologous notions. Few steeped in the indological world, to continue with the *brahman-Yahweh* example given above, will be satisfied with a merely personalistic notion of the divine, just as few of those who are at home in western culture will easily dispense with the personalistic character of the ultimate dimension of reality, by whatever name it may be called. Indology is today at the cross-roads: if it understands rightly its own situation it may become an effective factor in the shaping of the coming human civilization, which in spite or perhaps because of its pluralistic character will also need very many cross-cultural relationships.

Two further examples may be useful. The concept of non-violence, so important in the modern world, cannot be said to be a mere trans-

lation of *ahimsa*, which conveys an indian, particularly (but not exclusively) jain notion; neither can it be said that the concept of non-violence has no indian roots. It is a symbiotic notion, very weak still not only from the practical but also from the theoretical point of view, as is shown when it is faced with present day accumulated tensions; it is nevertheless a new living concept of our times. On the other hand, the concept of social justice, or of egalitarian parliamentary democracy, in so far as it is a foreign ideal based on an essentially aristotelian world view, is not likely to strike deep roots in India, unless it can be assimilated to homologous elements already present in indian culture.

It is here that the perhaps cryptic title of this communication may be understandable: indology, as a science between two worlds, performs a catalytic function of accelerating a process of mutual fertilisation between cultures and traditions, through which a healthy pluralism may be preserved without falling into anarchy.

It is not imprecisely that I have used the chemical metaphor of catalysis. Indologists may go on with their specific work; catalytic substances either do not enter into the chemical reaction or are recovered intact at the end of the process. There is no question of denying the special field of indology. Nevertheless, in a world of increasing specialization, indologists, like experts in every other discipline, must give some thought to their overall function in the world. This is an arduous task and challenge which indian studies will face in years to come. Recognition of the significant role which indian studies may play in our times can lead to a renewal of these studies not as a more or less esoteric discipline, but as an integral part of a more civilised and harmonic conception of life.

SIVA AND DIONYSOS—VISIONS OF TERROR AND BLISS

BY

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It will be our purpose in this essay to describe and interpret certain 'divine modalities' or 'modes of manifestation' which two deities possess in common—Rudra-Śiva in India and Dionysos in ancient Greece. It is our belief that the character of these gods whose worship sprang out of and was nurtured by cultures which are widely divergent in time and place, form homologous or parallel structures of religious experience and expression. It will be our contention that these two divine modalities manifest certain *religious* significances which are at once historical and transhistorical, traits which are both Greek and Indian, on the one hand, and fundamentally human, on the other. We feel that by providing such a phenomenological and structural analysis of their personalities, deeds and cults as manifested in their respective mythologies, we shall augment, not diminish the religious significance of each.

The precise reasons and causes for this parallelism are profound and complex. Like any other formative and long-lived religious tradition, the roots of these two cults, the socio-religious causes of their appearance, and the laws governing their development elude the grasp of the scholar. We might suggest, however, that such a parallelism arises, in part, from the fact that the cults of both gods developed in similar fashions at the earliest stages, that they sprang up among peoples having attained approximately the same type of cultural and social level, and that, reflecting as they do certain religious truths which their devotees cherished, they represent similar or homologous apprehensions of Divine and human reality.

We freely admit that the use of the method of structural comparativism or comparative phenomenology in interpreting religious data (where no signs of cross-cultural influence are forthcoming) will inevitably lead to a certain distortion of the material. We maintain,

nevertheless, that such an approach, if used advisedly and with due caution, will elucidate certain religious meanings in the material which otherwise would not come to light.

I. GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING ŚIVA AND DIONYSOS

The Vedic god Rudra of whom 'Śiva' (Auspicious One) was used in the beginning either as an euphemistic epithet or a laudatory invocation of his more benevolent side, appears in the Rig Veda as a slightly exaggerated form of Varuṇa. Varuṇa, the god of law and order in both the cosmic and human realms, inspired in his devotees both dread and delivery from the dreadful, both fear and redemption from the fearful. Rudra, by contrast, inspires, for the most part, only fear and in a most curious manner, a paradoxical fascination for the terrible. He is, in the famous nomenclature of Rudolf Otto, the *numinous* par excellence, the *mysterium tremendum* who provokes feelings of *tremendum* as well as *fascinatum*. As god of the tempest, he is father and leader of the Maruts or Rudras, gods of the storm-winds who are as destructive as they are creative. Rudra, a name interpreted by the great Vedic commentators, Yāska ¹) and Sāyana as meaning "the Howler", is closely associated with the Vedic rain-god Indra and with the highly venerated god of fire, Agni. ²) In connection with all manner of meteorological phenomena, Rudra is the awful and terrifying god of the tempest who crackles and howls in the wake of the monsoon rains. He is the Divine Archer ³) (*Śarva*, RV I.114.10; 2.33.14) who sends his shafts (*śarva*)

1) Nirukta 10.8: "Rudra is (so-called) because he bellows (*rauti*) or because he runs about (*dravati*) vociferating (intens. of √ru) or is derived from the causal of *rud*, to roar." See Sāyana's list of six native etymologies for Rudra on RV I.114.1 in John Muir's *Original Sanskrit Text on the Origin and History of the People of India, their religions and institutions* (5 vols.; London: Trubner & Co., 1868-74) IV, 301.

2) For a complete presentation of the theories concerning the etymology of the name "Rudra", see Jan Gonda, *Vedisme et Hindouisme Ancien*, Vol. I of *Les Religions de L'Inde*. Paris: Payot, 1962, pp. 106ff.

3) Śarva is a new name assigned to Rudra in V.S. XVI 18.28. The AV refers to Śarva with destructive lightning four times. This Rudra-Śarva of Vedic religion is markedly reminiscent of a deity who appears in the *Zend-Avesta* as "Saurva" who occupied the Indo-European "third function" in providing moisture and fecundity in both plants and animals according to the tripartite system of George Dumézil. On the basis of the fact that both Rudra-Śarva and his Indo-Iranian predecessor both carry the same weapon (*śarva*=arrow), provide moisture for all growing things and cause feelings of awe and even insecurity in all men

streaking through the atmosphere, bringing sickness, 'fever, cough and poison' (AV 2.2.22) and disaster upon whomever it strikes. He is invoked as 'the great Asura of Heaven' (RV 2.1.6) ⁴) because of the fact that he instills even in the other gods the fear of ruin and death. So wrathful and unpredictable is he that even the propitiations of his devotees may provoke his anger if not performed with meticulous accuracy. ⁵)

While in the Rig Veda, Rudra is a ferocious anti-god 'spitting like a wild beast' (RV 2.33.2) in the later Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, his ferocious nature is even more accentuated. For example, in the Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā of the Śukla-Yajurveda (Sect. XVI) there is a famous litany traditionally known as the Śatarudriya, addressed to Rudra in his hundred forms surrounded by his ghoulish retinue. ⁶) He appears in this text as a killer whose form is 'black, swarthy, murderous and fearful'; a robber, cheat and deceiver; the lord of thieves and robbers'. He is also a deliverer and saviour. His arrows are said to bring with them both diseases of all sorts and antidotes for those diseases. He has a healing (*beṣaja*) and an auspicious (*śiva*) body, which makes its powerful presence felt in all departments of the natural world. As is evident Rudra is described here as incorporating a startling collection of paradoxical and incongruous, grotesque and terrifying attributes. ⁷)

In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (a text in which Rudra-Śiva is unambiguously identified with the Brahman of Vedānta) the name 'Śiva' ceases to be used euphemistically and comes to designate Rudra's total essence as High God. ⁸) His most important modes of appearance in the Mahābhārata are: *Pásupati* (Lord of Cattle), *Śmaśānavāsīn* (In-

(even in their respective devotees), we feel led with R. C. Zaehner (*Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, New York, 1961) in viewing this name as designating the same deity in Iran and India as expressive of the daemonic side of Divinity.

4) Whether the term "asura" indicated an anti-god or demon at this time is difficult to determine.

5) RV II.33.4: "Let us not anger Thee with imperfect worship."

6) The fact that this litany dedicated to Rudra is still chanted today, makes it one of the most ancient and long-lived hymns in the history of religions.

7) Many of these character traits were undoubtedly assimilated by Rudra from various local folk or tribal cults during the period intervening between the Rig Veda and the Upaniṣads.

8) Rudra is addressed as the High God Śiva for the first time in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. In this text he has allocated to him all the appellations, traits and functions of Brahman and is himself identified with the impersonal, all-embracing divine principle of Vedānta.

habitant of the Burning Ground), *Mahāyogin* or *Yogeśvara* (Lord of Yogins and Ascetics). In the Purāṇas and Āgamas, the bi-polar nature of Śiva becomes even more definite and more central to the meaning of his character. He appears to his followers in an androgynous and ithyphallic form as *Umāpati* (Consort of Amā, daughter of the mountain) and *Ardhanārīśvara* (Lord Who is Half Female). He incorporates within his own complex person the marks of both male and female sexes, a Divine Totality who procreates, sustains and destroys the universe by his own powers without the necessity of resorting to any agency outside himself. He is called *Hari-Hara* (a composite form of Viṣṇu as Creator-Preserver and Śiva as Destroyer), a divine modality which embodies another type of bi-polarism—that of creation and destruction. He is *Śiva-Śakti*, a form in which the two genders are merged with the female element taking the dominant role. Finally he is a mighty warrior and a valiant leader of the divine troops (*gaṇapati*), universally exalted for certain heroic feats: (1) consumption of poison left over from churning the ocean, (2) destruction of the citadels of the three demons (*tripurāsuramardini*), (3) destruction of Dakṣa's Horse Sacrifice (*Dakṣayajñamardini*), and (4) support of the goddess of the Ganges in his flowing locks (*Gaṅgādharam*). What had begun as mere ambivalence and unpredictability in the character of Rudra, is transformed in the Śiva of the Epics and Purāṇas, into a complete coincidence of contraries.

Briefly, Dionysos is taken by most scholars, both ancient and contemporary,⁹⁾ to be a Thracian god of fertility and procreation whose cult was introduced to the Greek mainland between the 7th and 6th centuries B.C.¹⁰⁾ As the source and dispenser of fecundating powers, his mysterious presence was felt in all segments of the natural world.¹¹⁾ His vocation in the Hellenic world was begun as god of vegetation in general and was particularly associated with trees of various sorts (the pine, the spruce and the fig.)¹²⁾ Along with other Hellenic deities he is addressed as Δευδρίτης or Ἐνδεύδρος, 'he who

9) W. F. Otto being the single interesting exception. See his *Dionysos. Myth and Cult*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965, pp. 52-65.

10) L. R. Farnell. *Cults of the Greek States*. V, 109 ff.: E. R. Dodds *Euripides Bacchae* (Edited with Introduction and Commentary) Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1944, xviii ff.

11) Otto, *Ibid.*, 152-60; Farnell, *Ibid.*, V, 123-25.

12) Otto, *Ibid.*, 157-59; Farnell, *Ibid.*, V, 118-19.

lives in the tree'. In Boeotia he is called, 'he who lives and works in trees'; ¹³⁾ but his lordship over procreation and nutrition was extended to include all living things: animal, plant and mineral. The special accouterments which he himself carried and which were borne by his followers during festival time, give clear testimony to this facet of his personality; among them are: the *thyrsus* topped with sprigs of ivy and a pinecone; branches of various types of trees; the phallus; *kraters* or chalices filled with wine; and his many animal emblems.

As his cult became more and more firmly established in Greece, he became more specifically identified as the wine-god. ¹⁴⁾ He was the raving god whose appearance drove his devotees mad and incited them to perform ghastly actions, even ritual murder. Mysterious dedications invoked him as Lord of Souls, and as the confidant and guide of the Dead. ¹⁵⁾ He was the god of most blessed ecstasy who, by means of the gifts of dance, drink and music, brought his worshippers into closest mystical union with his spirit. He was the embodiment of ecstatic joy and dementing terror, of animal wildness and untamed vitality, the god of terrifying presence and of most blessed deliverance, an enigmatic god whose character showed a dual nature. Born of a human mother and a divine father, he incorporated in his person the most incongruous and unpredictable sets of contraries. Finally, Dionysos, as inhabitant of the lower world and of all sorts of subterranean regions on earth (pools of water, caves, etc.) also performed services of divination. Euripides proclaims that 'the god is a great prophet, for madness and the Bacchic inspiration have great power of soothsaying'. ¹⁶⁾ His service was clouded by mystery and his priest delivered oracles in a state of ecstasy; but the god communicated with his devotees more directly through the medium of dreams. ¹⁷⁾

II. STRUCTURAL PARALLELS IN THE CHARACTER AND CULT OF ŚIVA AND DIONYSOS

A. *Syncretistic deities and alien cults*

It has long been recognized by students of Greek and Indian religious

13) Διόνυσος Συκίτης in Laconia: Athenaeus, p. 78c.

14) Farnell, *Ibid.*, V. 118.

15) Farnell, *Ibid.*, V, 128-32.

16) *The Bacchae*. Trans. by William Arrowsmith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), lines 297-300.

17) Farnell, *Ibid.*, V. 132.

history that Śiva and Dionysos are highly complex and syncretistic deities,¹⁸⁾ whose characters embody numerous traits and properties which previously had belonged to other gods. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find that such gods manifest within themselves various facets and guises which are difficult to interrelate according to any rational pattern. We can explain this diversity of aspects only by viewing them as products of a lengthy evolution in which many local or territorial gods were “universalized” or grafted onto the “parochial” forms of divinity in the composition of their multifaceted characters.¹⁹⁾

The debate as to whether Rudra-Śiva’s origins were Aryan or non-Aryan, Vedic or non-Vedic has been raging for years. The study of the origins of Śaivism has been aided but little by many of the theories which have been spun out to settle this perplexing issue. While North Indian Hindi-speaking and European scholars have argued that Rudra-Śiva’s roots lie within the context of the Indo-European, Vedic, Sanskrit religious tradition and that the roots of both ‘Rudra’ and ‘Śiva’ are to be derived directly from the Sanskrit, South Indian Tamil-speaking scholars have asserted that his roots lie in south India and that the name ‘Śiva’ is derived from a Tamil root.²⁰⁾ The situation was complicated greatly with the discovery of the famous steatite seal at the Indus-Valley site of Harappā which shows a figure seated in a “yogic” position, surrounded by various animals and sporting what appear to be three faces—all of these traits characteristic of Śiva from the time of the Mahābhārata onwards.²¹⁾ We find it most difficult to place full credence in the view of Sir John Marshall that this figure on the seal is a so-called “proto-Śiva”. As J. Gonda has so convincingly argued in his *Change and Continuity in Indian Religion*,²²⁾ while we

18) Many of these character traits undoubtedly were assimilated by these gods from various local folk or tribal cults as their worship became more popularized and geographically widespread.

19) McKim Marriott, “Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization”, *Village India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 171-222.

20) Those scholars who seek to derive the names Rudra and Śiva from Sanskrit sources, harken back to such native scholars as Yāska and Sāyana, in tracing Rudra to *√rud*, to cry or wail and Śiva to *√śiv*, to be gracious or auspicious. Those who favor a Tamil derivation trace the name Śiva back to a root *√śiv*, red or ruddy.

21) Sir John Marshall, *Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization*. 3 vols., London, 1931.

22) Jan Gonda, *Change and Continuity in Indian Religion*. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965, pp. 7-37.

may not be justified in rejecting completely the notion that this figure is a "proto-Śiva", there are too many questions and difficulties involved in giving the theory full acceptance.

Nor do we find convincing the essay by R. N. Dandekar, entitled, "Rudra in the Vedas",²³⁾ in which the proposal is made that Rudra was originally a non-Vedic, Dravidian "God of the Dead" whose cult was accepted with great reluctance by the priests of the Vedic hierarchical religion when they were confronted with a militantly advancing cult which threatened to overshadow the accepted Vedic system. He attempts to fortify this contention by invoking Rudra's irascible and terrifying nature, his capacity to inflict with disease and death and the supposed Tamil derivation of the name "Śiva". He also makes mention of the fact that whereas most of the other Vedic gods are linked in pairs for specific purposes, Rudra is unrelated to any other god except Soma in a single hymn. (RV VI. 74).

To attempt a refutation of all these points would take us far beyond the limits of this paper. Suffice to say that, point for point, there is opposing evidence to indicate an Aryan and a Vedic origin for Rudra and evidence which is more sound, less speculative than that which Dandekar brings forth. One thing seems to us to be decisive. One of Rudra's principle modes of manifestation in the Vedas is 'Śarva' or 'the Divine Archer'.²⁴⁾ This Rudra-Śarva is markedly reminiscent of 'Śarva' or 'Saurva', the god of the divine sheath in the Avesta.²⁵⁾ This god, like Rudra-Śarva shoots arrows which bring disease and death and betrays a most ambivalent attitude towards mankind. On the basis of these two facts, we are led to argue that the Avestan and the Vedic Śarva indicate one and the same god, the latter being merely an "Indianized" version of the former. If this, in fact, is the case, then the picture which emerges is that the core of his character is Indo-Iranian and that as early as the Śukla-Yajurveda (ca. 1100-1000 B.C.) the somewhat strange and apparently non-Vedic elements were adopted by him from certain local non-Aryan peoples, possibly Dravidian and tribal.²⁶⁾ By assimilating these traits which may have been foreign

23) *Journal of the University of Poona* (1953), pp. 94-148.

24) I.114.10; II.33.10, 14; V.42.11; VI.16.39; VI.74.4.

25) R. C. Zaehner, *Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, p. 35.

26) One might even speculate that the ecstatic and erotic elements in the Rudra-Siva cult were drawn from such non-Aryan, indigenous layers of society.

to the Vedic cult, Rudra's position was solidified in the new environment and the native peoples who were conquered by the invading Aryans were placated and accommodated by this more comprehensive and 'elitist' religious system.

The fact remains, however, that although Rudra is essentially Aryan and Vedic in character, he is often given a less hospitable reception by the Vedic priesthood. He seems on occasion to be more feared than loved. It may have been the early and rapid assimilation of the elements of indigenous cults and the baleful and destructive side of his nature that accounts for the discrimination against him in the Vedic texts.

The presence of many non-Brahmanical elements in his nature is supported by the testimony of the texts that he inhabited hills and forests belonging to various tribal peoples (notably the Niṣadhas) and that he was addressed as the patron of thieves, outcasts, cheats, land-grabbers and highwaymen.²⁷⁾ Again, he is represented as the lord of both beasts and cattle (*mṛga* and *paśu*) and was closely identified with a wild tribe of hunters (*Niṣadhas*) who also were robbers and fishers. Many textual references link him with certain non-Brahmanical cults, such as the *munis* and *yogis* and in the fifteenth chapter of the Atharvaveda, he is said to be the lord of the "Vrātyas". Finally, he is often associated with serpent worship and fertility and water spirits such as Yakṣas—all common features of non-Brahmanical worship.²⁸⁾

Even though Rudra emerged from obscurity in the post-vedic times and took on many features of a 'High God', he was not, even then, venerated unambiguously as a 'high-caste' deity. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (I.7.3.1) states that the other gods (*devas*) went up to heaven and ignored Rudra (= *paśupati*); whereupon, this Paśupati rose up in anger, raised his weapon in the north (the direction which is sacred to him as Girīśa, lord of mountains) and struck them with terror. So terrified were the other gods that they finally resigned themselves to admitting Rudra to the *yajña*-offerings, for previously he has been restricted to receiving the *bali*-offerings only. In the *Gṛhyasūtras*²⁹⁾ there is a bull sacrifice called 'Sūlagava', the after-effects of which were

27) Cf. Tait. Samh. IV.5.1-11; Vāj. Samh. XVI.

28) Henry Whitehead, *Village Gods of South India*. Madras, 1917, p. 17; A. B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upanisads*. [Harvard Oriental Series, Vols. XXXI and XXXII.] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914, p. 145.

29) Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra. IV.8.40.

so polluting that the devotees were commanded to perform the rite outside the limits of the village and bury the residue there.

The most convincing evidence for the late adoption of Rudra-Śiva into the Brahmanic pantheon and his tardy acceptance by the priesthood, is found in the story of Śiva's rejection from the great Horse Sacrifice (*Hayamedha*) of Dakṣa, his father-in-law in the Epic.³⁰) All the gods (*devas*), demi-gods (*Gandharvas* and *Apsaras*), and even the anti-god (*Daityas* and *Danavas*) had been invited to the festive event on the "breast of Himavat". Only Śiva had been excluded. Enraged by this blasphemous act, Śiva created from the white-hot potency of his own being, a demonic creature, *Virabhadra*, who in turn, destroyed Dakṣa's sacrifice and threatened to consume the entire world with it. In fear for the preservation of the world, Dakṣa performed penance to Śiva and sought his blessings by intoning his 1008 divine names; at which time Śiva was invited to partake in the fruits of Dakṣa's sacrifice which had been restored.

Except for a few slight deviations, we find much the same situation obtaining in the introduction of the cult of Dionysos on the mainland of Greece. The main difference is that while the 'non-Establishment' elements in Śiva's character were native to the indigenous tribes of India, the non-Olympian elements in Dionysos were imported into Greece from the outside—Thrace and Phrygia to the north and Asia Minor to the east. Most scholars agree that Euripide's *Bacchae* is a dramatic representation of the folly which fell on all those in Greece who turned their backs on Dionysos and refused to accept him as a legitimate son of Zeus.³¹) Dionysos himself declares, "the men of Thebes blasphemed me. They slandered me; they said I came of mortal man. These crimes his people whom I cherished well did from malice to their benefactor. Therefore, I now disclose the sufferings in store for them."³²) Again, he shouts as he enters the palace courtyard at Thebes, "For I have come to refute that slander spoken by my mother's sisters (who) said I was

30) *Mahābhārata* (Trans. by P. C. Roy) Calcutta: Oriental Publishing Co., *Sabhāparvan*, sect. 285.

31) Dodds, *op. cit.*, p. ix; Arrowsmith, "Introducing to the *Bacchae*", in Vol. IV of *The Complete Greek Tragedies* (Ed. by David Grene and Richard Lattimore) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 530 ff. All quotations in the paper from this drama are taken from the Arrowsmith translation.

32) *Bacchae*: Lacuna between lines 1328 and 1330.

no son of Zeus but Semele had slept beside a man in love and fathered off her shame on Zeus." 33)

The people of Thebes were forced to undergo these tortuous ordeals, for the city had to "learn its lesson; it lacks initiation in my mysteries; that I shall vindicate my mother Semele and stand revealed to mortal eyes the god she bore to Zeus." So Dionysos, enraged by these slanderous rejections of his cult, vowed to prove to every man in Thebes, by whatever means necessary, that he is divine and that his cult is holy.

All these facts and many more indicate that Dionysos is not native to the Greek mainland. This fact is recognized by almost every scholar, ancient and modern—W. F. Otto being the single interesting exception. 34)

In two places in the *Bacchae* 35) he is referred to as a Divine Stranger, as though he had recently arrived from alien parts. Pentheus himself declares that he will drive Dionysos and his revel rout from Thebes by military might "whoever Dionysos may be". By his own admission in the opening lines of the drama, Dionysos is returning to his homeland in Thebes, after having journeyed from Lydia and Phrygia across the steppes of Persia, "through Bactrian fastness and grim waste of Media, to rich Arabia and to Greece". 36)

In Homer Dionysos is not yet an Olympian divinity. On the Parthenon frieze he takes his place among the seated, rather than the standing, gods. Somewhere between the time of Homer and Pheidias, his acceptance into the fold of Greek civic religion had been completed. 37) In the *Iliad* (VI. 130ff.) we read that Lycurgus, a Thracian king, son of Dryas, was "not long in life, he of old who raised 'gainst gods his hand". The Nursing Nymphs of Dionysos first blinded him with their holy wands and then 'plunged him 'neath the salt sea wave'. The essential thing in the story of the murder of Lycurgus, the factor which recurs again and again, is the rage against the dominance of a new god, "the blind mad fury, the swift helpless collapse at the touch of a real force." 38)

33) Il. 25-30.

34) Consult footnote number 9 above.

35) Il. 233 and 1042.

36) *Bacchae*, 13-15, 86.

37) Jane E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*. Cambridge: University Press, 1903, p. 365.

38) *Ibid.*, p. 369.

The testimony of Greek historians (most notably Herodotus, VIII. 110) confirms the view that Dionysos was a late immigrant to Greece by linking him with certain barbaric hill-tribes in Thrace,³⁹⁾ Herodotus identifies the Satrae as a wild, unconquered hill-tribe, whose livelihood consisted in highway-robbery, land-grabbing and brigandage of all sorts. Strabo⁴⁰⁾ knows them as the fiercest of robber-tribes who lived on and around Mt. Haemus and reports that they were "called brigands by the brigands". Here among those splendid unconquerable savages in their mountain fastnesses was the real home of the god Dionysos.

One final piece of evidence must be mentioned. Jane Harrison⁴¹⁾ describes a design from an amphora of the 6th century B.C. which pictures eight gods in a line, four on either side of Zeus, the latter deity being in the process of giving birth to Athena. Dionysos is situated at the extreme left side of the picture, "markedly aloof from the main section". She attributes great significance to the subordinate position of Dionysos and notes that "Hermes seems to come as a messenger to the furthest verge of Olympus to tell him the news. At the right, the other Northerner, Apollo, occupies the last place."

As we noticed in the case of Rudra-Śiva, so with Dionysos: the introduction of his cult into the mainstream of the Hellenic religious tradition created great social and spiritual upheavals. His ambivalent nature, the mystical nature of the experience to which he led those who surrendered their wills in his, and the wild, uncultured orgiastic rites which were employed to achieve the desired union with the god appear to be aberrant and untamed when placed within the context of Olympian civic religion. Just as the cult of Rudra-Śiva, with its worship of phallic and serpent deities, its connection with groves and local cult-places did not belong originally to the mainstream of Brahmanic tradition, but to the alien

39) Although the traditional scholarly opinion is that Dionysos migrated to the mainland of Greece from the Thracian hills in the north and from Asia Minor to the East, there is that most perplexing appearance of his name in the listing of deities in Linear B. Whether he was a god of vegetation or fertility in general, whether he had any connections with bulls or serpents (as did the Cretan Zeus), or whether there was an independent cult to Dionysos, is not clear. We know only that a certain deity called Dionysos had sufficient status in Crete between the 12th and 10th centuries B.C. to be included in a pantheonic list. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*. London: Methuen & Co., 1934, pp. 110-13.

40) VII. 318.

41) Harrison, *Ibid.*, p. 365.

and 'atheistic' peoples (*mleccha*), even so the germinal roots of the cult of Dionysos lay with those peoples who were considered by the Greeks to be rough and uncivilized (*barbaroi*). In each instance, the god and his cult was adopted by the established tradition (Brahmanic and Olympian) only after some of the more radical, irrational and aberrant traits and practices had been softened or deleted entirely by the hierarchical priesthood.

B. Their Modes of Manifestation

The Sacred or the Holy never appears in the natural and finite world in its pure and primal essence. In order for it to appear at all, for it to express its nature and meaning, it must necessarily become embodied in or speak through a form or structure within the temporal-spatial world. Conversely, mankind cannot encounter or become conversant with the Sacred except by becoming open and sensitive to those media through which he is addressed. Once he has been addressed by the Sacred and has discovered that his own small world is not closed off from the cosmos, that man is compelled to give expression through myths and symbols to that "word" which he has received from powers lying beyond the limits of his immediate environment and, thereby, make its nature and meaning known to the wider community. In order to preserve this privileged meeting with the Sacred Powers and to keep it from being lost in the shades of forgetfulness, the one who was addressed seeks to invest this 'faceless Power' with a name, with personal characteristics such as ideas, values and attitudes—in a word, to anthropomorphize the Sacred. Thus, the media through which the Sacred first spoke to him are 'solidified,' so to speak, and are established objectively in symbols, myths and ritual gestures to serve as points of encounter in the future.

Hence, we can derive a great deal of insight into the nature of a people's religious beliefs by analyzing the modes or forms through which their god appears to them and, on the other side, those forms in which men symbolize that experience. In like manner, we can determine the nature of the deity—whether he is kind and generous, or wrathful and niggardly in his dealings with men—and in what ways his devotees relate to him. Once again we find a great many points of similarity between the natures of Śiva and Dionysos with respect to their modes of manifestation.

In the Rig Veda, Rudra has attributed to him the traits of brilliance, effulgence and radiance that are given to all the other divinities. He charges through the middle region of the universe seated on a chariot (II. 33.11), an image which presumably indicates that he rides on the back of the winds as lord of the tempest. His limbs are firm and his lips are beautiful. (II. 33.9) Like Pūṣan, another god with solar attributes who is lord of paths and guide to travellers, Rudra has strands of long flowing hair, braided and rolled up on top of his head to form a cowrie-shell configuration. This latter trait is reminiscent of the fashion in which many non-Aryan, tribal peoples and the ascetic *munis* wore their hair. He carries various weapons which possess the same ambivalent powers to heal and destroy as he himself does: the thunderbolt, a club, bow and arrows, and an unspecified 'sharp weapon' (VII. 29.5; X. 125.6). He possesses all the martial virtues that one normally associates with military deities. He is said to be vigorous (I. 33.4,8), fierce (II.33.9), youthful (II. 33.11), impetuous (II. 33.14), swift (V. 52.16) and a mighty bull (II. 33.6). In numerous hymns he appears as the awesome (*ugra*) form of Agni, blazing in the sky like a hundred suns.

In the Śatarudrīya litany mentioned earlier, he manifests himself in the most awful and grotesque fashion. He is yellow-haired (as is Dionysos), ruddy, tall and dwarfish at the same time. He encompasses all forms and has the power to appear in any form that he wishes. He is invoked as 'mountain dweller' (*giritra*) and 'lord of the mountain' (*giriśa*). He is described as fierce and deformed (*virūpa*) as he is seen running about madly through the forest in the company of wild animals, wearing the skins of those which he has slaughtered—especially tigers, elephants and buffaloes. Again, he carries in his hands various weapons of destruction, such as the thunderbolt (*vijaya*), the trident (*triśūla*), an iron lance (*ayaśūlikāḥ*), a noose (*pāśaḥ*), and a battle axe (*paraśu*). As the form of *Bhairava* ('the Terrible') he is surrounded by wild, howling dogs which swallow their victims without chewing them.

In the Mahābhārata his ambivalence and unpredictability are even more pronounced. He is blue-throated from performing the salutary act of consuming the poison left over from the churning of the cosmic ocean. 42) As Mahāyogin ('Great Yogin' he has three eyes (representing

42) Mahābhārata, Adiparvan, sect. 18.

the sun, moon and sacrificial fire respectively), the central of which is both the eye of spiritual insight and divine wisdom on the one hand, and of terrifyingly destructive power, on the other. It was from this eye on the forehead that he shot the 'cosmic ray' which consumed to ashes Kāma, the God of Love, for disturbing his yogic-meditation.⁴³)

Again, he is the god who inhabits the burning ground (*Śmāśānavāsin*) whose appearance with his ghoulish retinue is sudden and horrifying, causing pandemonium and panic among his devotees. His coming is often announced with the mysterious sounds of drums, flutes and cymbals. Around his neck is a necklace of skulls which he gathers from the funeral pyres. A single skull sits at the base of his platted locks. He rubs his body with the ashes of the dead when performing the ferocious and destructive Tanḍava dance in the crematoria and commands his attendants to do likewise. As the embodiment of the powers of creation and dissolution, he is Hara-Hara (a composite of Śiva and Viṣṇu) whose body is terrific (*ghora*) on the one side and benign (*saumya*) on the other. He rides in procession on a bull named *Nandi* ('Blissful One') and may himself appear in bull form (*vr̥ṣamūrti*). He is the god of the phallus (*liṅgam*), the organ through which he performs all activities in promoting the natural process—creation, preservation and destruction. In the middle ages (ca. 6th or 7th centuries A.D.) the phallus became his most pervasive forms of manifestation and one of his sects (the Liṅgāyats) wear the *Liṅgam* around their necks as an emblem of their faith.

In summary, Śiva is said to possess many faces which he employs at different times to fulfill various purposes. In the hymn of 1008 names, the sage Upamanyu declares,

Thou hast a face like that of Nandi,
 Thou has a face that is terrible, (*ghora*)
 Thou hast a handsome, thou hast an ugly face, (*virūpa*)
 Thou art without a face. (*niṣmūrti*)
 Thou hast four faces, and
 Thou hast a fiery face when engaged in battle.⁴⁴)

Dionysos, like Śiva is a composite of many contraries—in appearance and in personality. In Euripides' *Bacchae*, he appears in the guise of a young man; he is handsome, youthful and courageous. In the stage

43) Mahābhārata, Anuśāsanaparvan, sect. 140, 23 ff.

44) Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan, sect. 285. 84-85.

directions he is described as having "a soft, even effeminate appearance."⁴⁵) His face is beardless and he is dressed in the customary fawn-skin which he wears in the company of the frenzied dancers who attend him. In his hand he carries the *thrysus* (a stalk of fennel) tipped with ivy leaves and a pine cone. It is this concealment of a pine cone or spear-point beneath the sprigs of ivy which is used to injure or kill those who provoke his wrath, which indicates most clearly the ambivalent mixture of benevolence and malevolence in his nature. His head is draped with a wreath of ivy or a snake (Śiva also wears serpents draped around his head, neck or body) and a cascade of long blond curls ripple down his shoulders, which, like the long flowing braids of Śiva, twirl about his head as he performs the whirling cultic dance. Throughout the drama he wears a smiling mask which, again, conceals his truly ferocious and demonic nature.

King Pentheus, who now occupies the throne of Thebes and vows to conquer the drunken followers of Dionysos with his military might, provides a most vivid account of the appearance of this god from Thrace,

I am also told a foreigner has come to Thebes
from Lydia, one of those charlatan magicians
with long yellowish curls smelling of perfumes,
with flushed cheeks and the spells of Aphrodite
in his eyes. His days and nights he spends
with women and girls, dangling before them the joys
of initiation in his mysteries.⁴⁶)

Dionysos may appear with a bull or in the form of a bull. The wine cup, a cutting of ivy and a phallus may serve as his emblem. His appearance is both pacific and terrifying, is known by his devotees to be both beneficent and malevolent, both loving and hateful towards whomever he chooses. Like Śiva, he carries a noose for the purpose of ensnaring his enemies or gaining military advantage by force.⁴⁷) Again, we get a picture of him that is very reminiscent of Śiva as he dances with wildest abandon through the forests and glens and on the sides of mountains, clothed in the skins of animals which he and his retinue have devoured (e.g. fawn, he-goats, bulls). With the light of flaming

45) Arrowsmith, *Ibid.*, p. 543; see also lines 234-40, 353, 453.

46) lines 233-38.

47) *Bacchae*, 1019.

torches opening a path through the darkness, he and his revelers race and dance to the accompaniment of the thunderous beat of the kettle-drum, the shrill cry of flutes and the savage shouts of his comrades.

C. *Places of Residence*

Since some mention has been made of the abodes of these gods in other connections, we need only touch on the topic here. As we noticed before, in the Śatarudrīya hymn Rudra is invoked as *Giritra* ('he who lives in the hills') and as *Giriśa* ('lord of mountains'). Elsewhere, he is seen abiding in the woods, forests, glens, in both wooded and deserted wastes far from human settlements; he haunts lonely roads and encounters travelers at intersections (which are, in India, as elsewhere, most inauspicious places frequented by evil spirits and robbers). He is both lord and comrade of such outcasts as thieves, scoundrels, cheats and land-grabbers. In the same hymn, he is said to be "seen by herdsmen and young girls who come to the wells to draw water" out from the village. We should also recall that the bull-sacrifice (*Śūlagava*) was to be performed at a great distance from places inhabited by human beings and domesticated animals so as to guard such places from the evil effects of this rite. He shares with Pūṣan the lordship over paths and roads to distant places and over travelers who busy these routes. Finally, in the Great Epic, Śiva as Mahāyogin, is the patron deity of those who abide in the forest (*vanaprasthas*) and of wandering ascetics. He lives with his consort, Pārvatī, on Mt. Kailāsa (elsewhere, Mt. Meru) in the north where, along with their attendants, they engage in frivolous play (*līlā*) and ascetic penances (*tapas*). Again, he is seen dancing in the crematoria (*śmaśāna*) which always lie in lonely and deserted areas, in the company of ghosts and goblins.

Like his Indian counterpart, Dionysos lived on mountains and hill-tops, in forests and grassy glens. He allured his female devotees from the 'shuttle and the loom' and from their household duties to idyllic shaded spots beneath the jagged rocks of rugged cliffs. In such places Dionysos and his Maenads ('mad' or 'holy' women) danced and sang to the pandemonius accompaniment of drums, flutes and cymbals and feasted on the still-warm flesh of a goat or fawn which they had slaughtered with their bare hands. The scene of his residence is vividly described in the *Bacchae* as the Chorus calls the women of Thebes to the revels of the wine-god,

...O city,
 with boughs of oak and fir,
 come dance the dance of god!
 Fringe your skins of dappled fawn
 with tufts of twisted wool!
 Handle with holy care
 the violent wand of god!
 And let the dance begin!
 He is Bromius who runs
to the mountain!
 to the mountain!
 where the throng of women waits,
 driven from shuttle and loom,
 possessed by Dionysos! ⁴⁸⁾

Again, he is depicted in this drama as 'lord of hunters', 'master of the chase'; it is he who hunts wild animals and delights in their raw-flesh. As noted earlier, he was probably the god of a war-like tribe called the Satrae who lived in the remote hills of Thrace and maintained their livelihood by brigandage.

D. *Animal and Serpentine Associations*

The particular animal with which a god is associated or in which he is embodied depends, in part, upon those animals to which the people pay particular heed either in the form of fear or veneration. As students of comparative mythology have long recognized, the nature and actions of a deity do often reflect directly the life-style and values of those who worship him. If a people is most fascinated by the eagle, most frightened by the lion or most ingratiated by the cow, it is most likely that this Divinity will present himself to men in that animal guise. In India, Śiva most generally is associated with the buffalo, the elephant or the tiger; but, from Vedic times on, he was most particularly related to the bull. In Greece, Dionysos, on different occasions, might appear in the form of a bull, a leopard or a lion, though he is also known to take up abode in a he-goat or an ass as well. ⁴⁹⁾

In an article entitled, "Śiva and Dionysos", ⁵⁰⁾ Willibald Kirfel, drawing upon the thesis of Franz Altheim ⁵¹⁾ that in prehistoric times a cult of the bull was dominant throughout the Mediterranean world,

48) ll. 109-19.

49) Otto, *Ibid.*, 165-70.

50) *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*. LXXVIII, 83-90.

51) *Italien und Rom* (2nd ed.) Amsterdam-Leipzig (1943).

stretching from Asia Minor to Spain and A. K. Coomaraswamy's⁵²⁾ contention that parallels exist between the iconography of ancient India and that of the Mediterranean Sea area and Western Europe in general, raises the question: is it not possible that by comparing all these iconographic forms we might not discover a connection between the cults of Śiva and Dionysos by way of a common association with this ancient bull cult? He supports an affirmative answer to this question by citing various types of evidence in literature and iconography which link both Śiva and Dionysos to the bull. He concludes that the crescent moon which Śiva always wears in his hair, originally designated not a lunar, but a bovine, symbolism. He reasons that, "Die Mondsichel auf Śiva's Haupt hat ursprünglich mit dem Monde nichts zu tun, sondern stellt die weiss schimmernden Stierhörner dar, eine Erklärung, auf die, soweit ich sehe, seltsamerweise bisher noch niemand gekommen zu sein scheint. Es handelt sich also um ein charakteristisches Merkmal, das sich seit unvordenklichen Zeiten bis auf den heutigen Tag erhalten hat und Śiva uns ursprünglich als einen Stiergott kennzeichnet."⁵³⁾

Since it is not the object of this paper to debate the possibility of some historical linkage or cross-cultural influence between Śaivism and Dionysianism, we shall by-pass the temptation to refute Kirfel's arguments, though, frankly, we do find them far-fetched and unconvincing. All we need grant Kirfel to serve our purposes is that both Śiva and Dionysos, from earliest times, have been associated with the bull and with a more comprehensive bovine symbolism which is expressive of such virtues as strength, prowess and fertility. We will comment on this matter only as it relates to the topic of morphological parallels between the two deities.

As is well-known to Indologists, there appears on the coins and seals of ancient Indian rulers a white bull (i.e. Nandi?) which serves as the vehicle, servant and friend of Śiva and its likeness is revered by Śiva's spouse, Umā-Pārvatī and by his later devotees.⁵⁴⁾ In the iconographic chapter of the *Agniṣpurāṇa* (L. 39), Nandi appears with the attributes of a rosary and a trident as the door-guardian (*dvarapāla*) of Śiva's

52) *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*. New York: Dover Publications, 1965, 13 f.

53) Kirfel, *Ibid.*, p. 86.

54) A. Cunningham, *Coins of Ancient India*. 1891, section dealing with the development of Śaiva iconography on coins.

shrine: here in contrast to the majority of cases, his cult image is drawn in anthropomorphic form. On all the coins of Wima Kadphises (ca. A.D. 78-ca. 110), Śiva appears attended by the predecessors of Kaniška and by his worshippers "with or without the bull, with two arms and a nimbus".⁵⁵) Certain gold pieces have been found dating from the reign of Vāsudeva I (ca. A.D. 185-220), the last of the rulers of the Kuṣāna-dynasty, showing the three-faced and four-armed Śiva with the bull as his attendant.⁵⁶)

Not only in the plastic arts but in legend, poetry and drama as well, Śiva's connection with the bull is registered. For example, in two places in the Mahābhārata⁵⁷) he is called "*vr̥ṣavāhana*", or in III.84.129, "*vr̥ṣadhvaṇa*", "he who rides with a bull on his banner". Kālidāsa, in his play entitled *Kumārasambhava* (V. 80) invokes Śiva as "*vr̥ṣena gacchatah*" ('he who rides about upon the bull') or at V. 84 he is, "*vr̥ṣarājaketana*" ('the king who has the bull as his characteristic mark'). Similarly in the *Garudapurāṇa* (Adhy. 55.11) Śiva is addressed with the epithet, "*vr̥ṣabhadhvaṇa*".⁵⁸)

As early as the Rig Veda, Rudra possesses the appellation 'the great bull' and 'the wild bull of heaven'. Like Indra, the other storm god, he is constantly referred to as a 'bull', as well as a ram (*meśa*).⁵⁹) If it is ever confirmed that the seated figure at Harappā is, in fact, a prefiguration of the Hindu Śiva, then his close bond of kinship with the animals will have been pushed back to prehistoric times.

In the Śatarudriya, Rudra is again "the great bull" and "lord of cattle" (*paśupati*). Mention should be made in this context of the bull offering (*Śūlagava*) recorded in the *Gṛhyasūtras*. The evidence need not be multiplied further.

Śiva's association with serpentine figures as seen in both literature and iconography, is ancient and enduring. On the faces of early coins and in early stone sculpture he is represented as wearing serpents as body ornaments around his platted hair, on his diadem, over his right shoulder as a surrogate for the Brahmanical sacred thread (*upavīta*)

55) Coomaraswamy, *Ibid.*, p. 75.

56) Coomaraswamy, *Ibid.*, p. 55, l. 30, fig. 126.

57) (Bombay Edition), *Ādiparvan*, sect. 197.21.

58) Also at 55.3 and 57.8.

59) RV I.51.

and around his waist as a girdle.⁶⁰) The dwarf (*apasmāra*, lit. 'non-recollection'; Tamil, *muyalaka*, 'forgetfulness') on which he dances as Naṭarāja, holds a cobra in his hands.⁶¹) The ring of fire which surrounds his dancing body originates at either end from the mouths of two reptiles (*makaras*).⁶²) He is frequently invoked as 'lord of the *nāgas*' and is prayed to by many peoples at the beginning of the rainy season to protect them from the death-dealing venom of the snakes and to fecundate the cattle and the married females.⁶³) Elsewhere he is said to abide with the snakes which stand guard over the Divine Treasure of Kubera at the heart of mountains or at the bottom of ant-, mole- or snake-holes.

Dionysos quite often manifested himself as the embodiment of the "powers of procreation" and the "powers of nutrition" by assuming the specialized form of the bull. There was nothing unusual in this, for so closely had the bull and fecundation come to be identified in ancient Greece that gods of the river and of moisture came to be known generally as taking on this bovine mode appearance. Dionysos' bovine form reminds us again of his association with water, fecundation and procreation in general, (see next section) for the bull was considered to be the bearer of such powers in divine form. The association of the bull and water is clearly set forth by his cult, for in Argos the Bull Dionysos (βουγενής Διόνυσος) was summoned out of the deep by trumpet blasts.⁶⁴)

Dionysos was known to appear to his devotees in bovine guise, not only because of his association with the element of moisture and the powers of fertility, but because of the frenzied and terrifying manner in which he appeared to his followers and the "divine madness" and

60) Consult such standard works on Hindu Iconography as A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*; T. A. Gopinatha Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography*. Madras, 1914-15, or H. Zimmer, *Art of Indian Asia*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955.

61) T. A. G. Rao, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Pt. 1, pp. 221-70.

62) See Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Siva*. New York: The Noonday Press, 1957.

63) J. Ph. Vogel, *Serpent Lore*. London, 1926, p. 11; M. Winternitz, "Der Sarpabali, ein Altindischer Schlangenkult". *Mitteil der Anthropologische Gesellschaft in Wien*, 18 (1888); Wm. Crooke, "Serpent Worship". *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* XI, 418 fff

64) Plutarch, *Mor. De Is. et Os.* 35 (364F).

"holy horror" with which he struck them by his very presence.⁶⁵⁾ According to a passage in Athenaeus⁶⁶⁾ Dionysos was compared to a bull because of the mania which intoxication by wine provokes.

Furthermore, Dionysos is addressed as "lord of animals" and as "master of the hunt". In the *Bacchae*⁶⁷⁾ Agave, after slaughtering her son Pentheus, calls upon her Lord Bacchus as 'fellow huntsman,' 'comrade of the chase crowned with victory' and later expresses hope that she may convert him to the Dionysiac cult by making an inspired hunter out of him—obviously an ideal to be realized by every follower of Bacchus. He assumed the form of a bull in the jail in which Pentheus had thrown him earlier in the guise of a young man. Again, after Dionysos had persuaded Pentheus, disguised as a Maenad himself, to witness the Bacchic revels of the crazed women, he seized the King's mind and forced him to cry out, "...you are a bull which walks before me there. Horns have sprouted from your head. Have you always been a beast? But now I see a bull."⁶⁸⁾ After Pentheus has been slaughtered and dismembered by the Maenads, led by his mother, Dionysos leads the King along the path to Hades in the form of a bull-calf.⁶⁹⁾

This was not Dionysos' earliest appearance in bull-form. Bull statues were not an uncommon sight in Greece according to Plutarch.⁷⁰⁾ Athenaeus⁷¹⁾ remarks that Dionysos was frequently depicted with horn and was called the 'bull' by many poets. Zagreus is overpowered and dismembered by Titans after he has undergone numerous transformations and has appeared in the form of a bull.⁷²⁾ In the *Bacchae* again the women invoke their god in the woods in words reflecting an ancient incarnation, "O, Dionysos, reveal yourself a bull! Be manifest, a snake with darting head, a lion breathing fire! O Bacchus come!" They wore crowns of horns on their heads in imitation of the deity. On a vase-painting, located in the Wurzburg Museum,⁷³⁾ he is pictured riding on a black bull and pouring wine from a pitcher to water the plants below. Poseidon, the bull-god of the waters, appears on the

65) Otto, *Ibid.*, p. 166.

66) Ath. 2.38E.

67) l. 1145.

68) lines 920 ff.

69) line 1159.

70) Plutarch, *Ibid.*, 35.

71) ll. 476A.

72) Nonnus, *Dionysus*. 6.19 ff; Farnell. *Ibid.*, V, 126.

73) Harrison, *Ibid.*, Fig. 134, p. 435.

reverse side with a trident riding a white bull. With the juxtaposition of the bull, river-god and the bull-formed Dionysos as god of wine, the symbolic complex is complete: Dionysos-bull-wine-plants-fertility.

Finally the most vivid expression of this mystical relation between Dionysos and the bull is what was known in the Bacchic rites as 'Omophagia'. The women, once they had become fully possessed by the spirit of the god, became Bacchoi by ravenously devouring the raw flesh of a bull (sometimes a goat or fawn). In this way, they acquired all the powers and properties of the god which resided for the moment in that animal. The women of Elia, who called upon him in a song ⁷⁴) saw him appearing as a bull, for he came only "to be killed and butchered by the mad Thyiads so that they could appropriate the power of the god to themselves". ⁷⁵)

His connection with serpents is equally informative. In *The Bacchae*, we learn that 'the bull-horned god was born of Zeus and Zeus crowned his head with snakes.' (101) Snakes were draped around the heads and waists of the dancing Maenads and were carried about in their hands as a cultic instrument. In some cases, these serpentine headbands are entwined with sprigs of ivy or fir branches. Both the snakes and the ivy represent chthonic powers of life and death, or procreation and destruction. As elsewhere, so in Greece, snakes lived in subterranean groundswells, near pools, lakes or tombs and were seen by the religious imagination as overseers of the divine treasures of life and death.

E. *Properties as Fertility Gods*

To the Greeks of the Classical Age, Dionysos was not solely or even primarily the god of wine. Plutarch says as much and confirms the claim with a quotation from Pindar (frag. 140). He was predominantly linked, in the early period of the development of his cult, at least, with forces of fertility and procreation. Some of his titles and powers attest to this function. As 'Dendrites', he is the god of vines and trees, of fir and ivy. ⁷⁶) He is called 'Anthios', god of blossoming things and 'Phytalmios', god of growth. ⁷⁷) He was, again, 'Karpios', the fruit bringer,

⁷⁴) Dodds, *Ibid.*, xvii.

⁷⁵) Plutarch, *Mor. Quaest Graec.* 36 (299b).

⁷⁶) M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung mit ausschluß der Attischen* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 292. (Ba. 25, 79, 81, 105-10).

⁷⁷) *Bacchae*, 25, 79, 81, 105-10. Cf. Farnell, *Ibid.*, V. 118-20, 123-25.

and 'Phleus' or 'Phleos', the abundance of life. His domain was every reservoir of vital energy. Plutarch again assigns to him lordship over the 'wet-element' in all living things: the running sap in the trees, the life-blood surging through the veins of young animals and the liquid fire in the grape. He was identified, in brief, with all the mysterious and uncontrollable forces which ebb and flow in all forms of life. ⁷⁸⁾

As the son of Semele, a Thracian goddess of procreation, Dionysos was the Earth, which goes through the cycles of death and rebirth annually. Most classical scholars ⁷⁹⁾ (among them Harrison and W. Otto) argue that the act of waking the baby Dionysos who is sleeping in a watery crib, performed by his nurses or Maenads, is symbolic of the resurrection of the young god who had been killed and eaten by the Titans. As 'Liknites', he is an Osiris-type god who is ritually slain and dismembered and then reborn as a small boy. The Liknites which was both a winnowing fan and a threshing floor, becomes the cradle in which the slain god is reborn. Thus, he joins such religious figures as Adonis and Osiris, Tammuz and Baal in passing through the agonies of death and the joys of resurrection with all of plant life in the natural order. ⁸⁰⁾

We need only remind the reader that Śiva, like Dionysos, was closely identified with all sorts of vegetation — trees, vines, plants, flowers, forests and groves. In the Śatarudriya it is said of him that he, "Haunts the hills and is closely related to trees on which he deposits his weapons when he lays aside" (TS. IV. 5.10.4). Herman Oldenberg ⁸¹⁾ finds a similarity between Rudra and such figures as mountain and wood deamons, sprites like Mars Silvanus, the Fauni, etc. He is the 'bull of heaven' whose fertilizing rains (i.e. male semen) fecundate the female earth. It is clear that this broad extension of Rudra's power is due to a deliberate tendency to see in him a god with a comprehensive control over nature and as the vital energies in all living things. ⁸²⁾, ⁸³⁾

⁷⁸⁾ Harrison, *Ibid.*, p. 426.

⁷⁹⁾ Farnell, *Ibid.*, V, 123-25; Otto, *Ibid.*, Chaps. 13 and 14.

⁸⁰⁾ Harrison, *Ibid.*, 388 ff.; Otto, *Ibid.*, 171 ff.

⁸¹⁾ *Religion des Veda* (3rd ed.) Berlin, 1923, pp. 215-24.

⁸²⁾ Keith, *ibid.*, p. 145.

⁸³⁾ We may have a somewhat surprising link with fertility in Rudra's possession of a blue neck as *Nilagriva* or *Nilakanṭha*. While I have yet to find mention of this specific fact in the ancient texts, Rudra-Śiva's dark neck may be derived

Although Rudra's properties of fertility and life are removed from their more 'naturalistic' expressions and are given a more philosophical status in the Upaniṣads, he remains, for all that, the god who gives birth to and sustains all living things.⁸⁴ He is called "Bhava" (a derivative \sqrt{bhu} =coming into existence, birth, production, origination). As was the case with most other Hindu divinities in the later literature, Śiva came to be identified with Prajāpati, 'lord of creatures' (who created the universe by means of a cosmic sacrifice) and with Mahāpuruṣa (primeval man from whose body the world was made). He came to embody both male and female elements of procreation, in either one of two modes of appearance. First, as Śiva-Śakti, he appears only as a male support of the female power of fecundation. Second, as Ardhanarīśvara, half male and half female, he symbolized both duality and unity of the generative act and the production of the universe for the union of two principles (Prākṛiti and Paraṣa, Māyā and Brahmā). This coalescence of the male and female principles was further represented in his appearance in South India as Naṭarāja, Lord of the Dance. He wears on his ears two earrings (*Kuṇḍalini*), one of them an elongated female earring and the other a circular male earring. Here we have the merging of opposites in a single personage, self-subsistent and self-generative.

The emblem under which he particularly delights to be worshipped in this androgynous manifestation is the *liṅgam* or phallus, which is always erect. The *liṅgam* and the female sex organ (*yoni*) represent the totality of his nature and the totality of all created existence. The

in part from his early association with the peacock (who is blue-necked) and the monsoon rains. Not only is Rudra the traditional lord of monsoons in the Vedic literature, but he is consistently seen by Kālidāsa in his lyric poem *Meghadūta* as presiding over various storm phenomena. Furthermore, it may have been from his father Rudra-Śiva that Kumāra-Skanda received his association with the peacock as a vehicle. In any case, since Rudra traditionally made his power and presence most forcefully felt in the monsoons and since the peacock, which delights to prance about and cry at the first sign of rains, is considered to be the harbinger of the monsoons, then Śiva may have obtained his blue throat by association with the peacock. (I am indebted to Professor J. A. B. van Buitenen of the University of Chicago for this suggestion).

84) In the Śvetāśvatara, remarkable for its spirit of personal theism, Rudra is extolled as "the One... only, they do not allow a second, who rules the worlds by his powers." He is creator and destroyer of the cosmos, who is Iśa, the Lord, hidden in all things and embracing all thing. "He who knows Him (Rudra) to be Brahman, becomes immortal". (III.&)

vast created universe is the fruit of the creative of Śiva in embrace with his consort, Pārvatī. (MBh. XIII. 14.212; 14.227; 14.289; 14.304). So powerful an embodiment of the surging energies of life was this phallic aspect of Śiva, that it was believed to have the capacity either to create or annihilate the cosmos, depending on how it was utilized.

G. Parallels in the Structure of the Rituals

If we grant that the devotees of a god usually imitate the actions of the god in some way, we may judge that a knowledge of the rituals dedicated to Śiva and Dionysos may be gathered from a study of their characters. We should not therefore be surprised to discover many strange and 'aberrant' ritual activities dedicated to both gods, given their ferocious and ambivalent natures. From the literature of both traditions we learn that the cultic acts dedicated to them included singing, dancing, drumming, fluting, drinking wine and perhaps even ritual intercourse, cannibalism and human sacrifice.⁸⁵⁾ Such rites were performed among the hill tribes in ancient Greece and were still performed by such tribes in India even into the last century.^{86), 87)}

M. Eliade⁸⁸⁾ has shown decisively that orgiastic rites were performed by two Śaivite subsects in ancient and medieval times in India. The Aghoris (lit. "not terrific") worship Śiva as Śmaśānavāsin ("dweller in the crematoria") by imitating the actions of their Lord. They gird themselves with animal skins and a necklace of human skulls, smear their bodies with the ashes of the dead, dance wildly through the burning grounds shouting the syllable *OM* with thunderous voices (cf. Dionysos as βρόμιος below) and perform ritual cannibalism upon the corpses waiting to be cremated. Such revels were, no doubt held at night, as were those of Dionysos, for Śiva is addressed as *niśa-caraṇ* ("Night-walker"). The sounds of their voices is compared with the roar of the drum, the clap of thunder and the bellow of the bull. The other subsect, called the Kāpālikas ("those of the skull") venerated Śiva

85) R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*. Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1965, pp. 112 ff; Otto, *Ibid.*, p. 113.

86) J. Campbell, *Oriental Mythology*. New York: Viking Press, 1962, pp. 5-6.

87) In the MBh. (Sabhāparvan, chaps. xiv-xv, xxii) King Jarasandha desiring to win sovereignty over all the Kṣātryas, sacrificed 100 princes to Rudra-Śiva and incurred Kṛṣṇa's wrath for this bloody deed.

88) *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*. (Translated from the French by Willard R. Trask, New York) Pantheon Books, 1958, pp. 296 ff.

as *Mahākāla* ("Time the Great Destroyer") and as *Kapālabhṛt* ("he who bears the skull"). They also participate in orgiastices rites and carry ritual cruelty to the extreme. Both sects were much in evidence from the 6th century on as proved by references to them by the Chinese traveler Hiuen Tsiang (ca. A.D. 630-645).⁸⁹⁾

In the lyric poem *Meghadūta* by Kālidasa,⁹⁰⁾ the cloud who is carrying word of encouragement from an exiled Yakṣa (fertility daemon) to his forlorn mate at home, is asked to serve as "praiseworthy drum at the evening worship of Śiva" (34). The poet says, "Thereby thou shalt attain perfect reward of thy deep rumbling thunder". The correlation between the Śaivite and the Dionysiac cults is no more certain than at this point—nocturnal rites, the use of drums and dancing. Again the poet says, "When the dance begins, supply Śiva's need for the bloody elephant's skin," (36) (referring to Śiva's act of first killing the elephant demon which threatened to destroy the lives of his followers and then dancing in his skin while warm and wet) and "If thy thunder should rumble in glens as on a drum, Surely there thy music would be meet for the symphony of Śiva." (56)

That the ultimate goal of the Dionysiac mysteries was union with the god himself cannot be doubted. The Maenads (lit. 'mad women') who formed his *θιάσος* were often summoned suddenly and without warning by the haunting call of the god's voice, by mysterious sounds of flutes, drums and cymbals and by the light of flaming torches fled into the darkness of the woods to "dance the dance of god". The roar of Dionysos—at once, frightening and enticing—is likened to the sound of the drum, the roar of thunder and the bellow of the bull. His name Bromios⁹¹⁾ (from *βρέμω* 'to make a confused sound') makes him 'the God of a loud cry' (Pindar, frag. 45). In some texts he is connected with the thunder (*βροντή*) and in *The Bacchae* he is said to be 'thunder-born', 'a god of mysterious voices', and connected with strange orgiastic music which he brought with him from the Northern hills.⁹²⁾

89) Eliade quotes extensively from a 17th century Persian work by Muḥsin-i-Faḥrī entitled *Dabistān* which provides graphic descriptions of such rites at that time. See *Yoga*, p. 299 f.

90) Translated from the sanscrit by Franklin Edgerton. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964.

91) Otto, *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 133.

92) Harrison, *Ibid.*, 413 ff.

The dancers used the 'bull-voiced mimes' in imitation of the voice of their lord.

The female worshippers go clad in the usual attire (σκευή) of Dionysos. Over their regular cloaks, they fling the skin of a newly slain animal (usually a fawn or goat), loosen the locks of their hair, bind their heads with the headband of a serpent and carry in their hand any one of a number of instruments associated with the cultus—a slain fawn or tiger, the thyrsus-staff, a bowl of wine or a serpent. They take on the look of the wild things they have become.

Dionysos is always surrounded by these maddened women who are his nurses and loved ones. They combine in themselves (as does their Lord), both the loftiest and the basest qualities of womankind. They are, on the one hand, nurses and mothers, sweethearts and consorts of the god. They nursed him when he was orphaned from Zeus, just as they gave suck from their breasts to the young animals of the forest. But the beastiality which lies in every woman is quickened in the Meanads as their minds are seized and carried away by the god. In this state of superhuman passion, they cavorted without restraint with the god in the woods, chasing down, tearing to pieces and eating raw the flesh of these same animals which they previously had nursed. This ogress-character of women is no more dramatically and pagnantly expressed than in *The Bacchae* where Agave, in the heat of drunken exaltation, slaughters and decapitates her own son, King Pentheus, all the while believing him to be a lion cub.

These are other ways of becoming 'entheos' than by drinking wine. The other way of the Bacchae was the 'oreibasia' or mountain dancing described in the lacuna portion (between 11. 1129-30) of *The Bacchae*. This was a celebration performed by women's societies at Delphi which took place in mid-winter in alternate years.⁹³) In many societies the dance provides a religious experience which is not possible by any other means than by use of their bodies. The dance gave them the sense that they were possessed by an alien personality and that their own minds and bodies were nothing but a vehicle for the actions of that divine or daemonic spirit. The 'oreibasia' or mountain dancing described in *The Bacchae* depicts "hysteria subdued to the service of religion".

One final thing that strikes us about the cults of Śiva and Dionysos

93) *Bacchae*, 133.

is their democratic attitude toward the admittance of devotees. These cults represent a departure from the customs of the established, hierarchical cults (Brahmanical and Olympian) of restricting membership to the social or religious elite. They were accessible to all who sought to serve them, not through intermediaries but directly and powerfully in the gifts of song and dance and through membership in the religious community. E. R. Dodds' ⁹⁴⁾ suggestion that Dionysos' cult may have appealed originally to those who were denied the right to full membership in the socio-religious community because of low birth and status and were hence excluded from the cults associated with the religious 'establishment', may also be true of the cult of Śiva. It is well known that such Śaiva cults such as the Kāpālikas, Aghoris and Liṅgāyats gathered vast numbers of the 'disenfranchised' during the Indian middle ages (ca. 7th-9th centuries). An ode in praise of Dionysos in *The Bacchae* expresses beautifully the impartiality of both cults:

The deity... loves the goddess Peace, generous of good, preserver of the young. *To rich and poor he gives the simple gift of wine, the gladness of the grape.* But him who scoffs he hates, and him who mocks his life, the happiness of those for whom the day is blessed but doubly blessed the night; whose simple wisdom shuns the thoughts of proud, uncommon men and all their god-encroaching dreams. *But what the common people do, the things that simple men believe, I too believe and do.* [emphasis added] ⁹⁵⁾

There is evidence in Aristophanes' *The Frogs* ⁹⁶⁾ that his cult enjoyed widespread popularity in the Classical Age and for later periods we have inscriptional evidence that even slaves might be admitted to membership in Dionysos' *θεῖος*. ⁹⁷⁾ In a word, Śiva and Dionysos dispense their grace to all who were willing to receive it and to confess them as Lord.

III. COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORUM IN ŚIVA AND DIONYSOS

What Śiva and Dionysos mean to suffering mortality is the sudden and direct eruption of Divinity in the miracle of blessing and damnation. Both gods are ambivalent and unpredictable in their actions in the world and in their responses to devotees. Now they appear as benevolent

⁹⁴⁾ Dodds, *Ibid.*, notes to lines 421-23.

⁹⁵⁾ lines 416 ff.

⁹⁶⁾ lines 405 ff.

⁹⁷⁾ Cited in Dodds, *Ibid.*, p. 121.

liberators from bondage to the limitations of bodily existence and from finitude itself, then as terrifying daemons who, once they have possessed the soul of a person, threaten to destroy natural life itself.

As we discovered earlier, what appears in the Vedic Rudra as a mere ambivalence of character, becomes in the Epic and Purāṇic Śiva a coincidence of opposites. In the early period, Rudra's wrathfulness and impetuosity seems at times to overshadow his benevolence and graciousness. So irascible is he that even the prayers and offerings of his worshippers were thought to provoke his anger if not properly performed. He is at once god of disease and misfortune and the divine physician whose medicines heal all infirmities. He even presents a paternal aspect to his devotees as they bow before him "as a boy bows to his father as he blesses him".⁹⁸) Once this deity comes to be called Śiva in the Epics, he retains this ambivalent and multifarious nature and expresses the contraries of raw impetuosity and unpredictable wrathfulness together with his boundless benevolence to a more radical degree. He both terrifies and fascinates. He is at once, a Divine Warrior and the Master of Yogins. He incorporates in his person the essence of male and female potency. He is both finite time as destroyer of all things and Eternity as the destroyer of time. As Hari-Hara, he is Creator and Destroyer, the embodiment of the duality and the unity of the entire cosmic process.

Of Dionysos, one commentator says, "The mysterious Stranger is not simply an idealized being from outside man's world; he is Dionysos, the embodiment of those tragic contradictions—joy and horror, insight and madness, innocent gaiety and dark cruelty—which are implicit in all religions of the Dionysiac type. From the standpoint of human morality, he is and must be an ambiguous figure."⁹⁹) Plutarch, in his life of Antony, reminds us of this when he speaks of Antony's entrance into Ephesus as the new Dionysos who is acclaimed by many as if he were Dionysos, "the friendly god who lavishes blessings" (χαριδότης καὶ μειλίχιος) even though he was for most "the bestial and wild one" (ὤμηστής καὶ ἀγριώνιος). As Otto notes, even the animals who accompany him and in whose form he often becomes incarnate stand in sharp contrast to one another—the bull, goat and ass symbolizing "fertility and

⁹⁸) RV II. 33.12.

⁹⁹) Dodds, *Ibid.*, xiv.

sexual desire", on the one side; the lion, panther and bull representing "the most bloodthirsty desire to kill", on the other.¹⁰⁰⁾

His ambivalence is projected into the *thyrsos* which he and his worshippers carry; it produces milk and honey for the devotee and a sword for the enemy. As one scholar remarks, he is "the incarnate life-force itself".¹⁰¹⁾ As such he is not subject to the laws of morality but like Moira and the Fates, simply exists as inevitable and unalterable. When Cadmus complains that Dionysos' sentence of exile is too harsh, Dionysos replies, "I am god. I was blasphemed by you . . . Long ago my father ordained these things."¹⁰²⁾

What exactly Śiva and Dionysos were to their devotees by should be clear: they were the incarnation of *elan vital* itself, the uncontrollable, chaotic eruption of raw force from the bowels of nature, capable of creating or destroying, liberating or damning. As such, they are amoral or transmoral, free from conventional distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong. They are awe-inspiring embodiments of necessity itself (*dharma* in India, *moira* in Greece), capable of blessing those who worship them and of utterly destroying, physically or psychologically, those who deny them. "For divinity divested of morality becomes daemonic (not devilish but the reality of awful, inscrutable, careless power),"¹⁰³⁾ The wisdom (*prajña* in India, *sophia* in Greece) which comes from union with or worship of these divinities is such that the devotee experiences that coalescence of joy and sorrow, blessing and damnation, exaltation and terror which is the nature of life itself.

100) Otto, *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.

101) Arrowsmith, *Ibid.*, p. 537.

102) lines 1345-49.

103) Arrowsmith, "Introduction", p. 537.

ON THE NATURE OF THE DEMONIC: AFRICAN WITCHERY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of witchcraft has been generally treated as peripheral to the phenomenological study of religion. Indeed, it has often been explicitly excluded from serious consideration as mere "magic" without genuine "expressive" content. It is one aim of this essay to demonstrate the "expressiveness" of witchcraft practices, and to show that they not only are directly related to the essential realities of the religious life, but that they disclose new meanings and aspects in those realities.

At the same time, I think, one cannot help but misunderstand witchcraft if one applies to it traditional phenomenological methods and categories. It is not merely a matter of the inanity of the intellectualistic term "magic", which so effectively separates knowing from doing. It is a part of phenomenological method itself to locate the unitary "essence" behind all historical appearances of a phenomenon. This in itself is valuable, and this essay will attempt much the same thing, but it has not been sufficiently understood how easily this approach tempts the researcher to ignore actual cognitive contexts, and to separate insight from action, "religion" from life. The result has been that the researcher is quick to disregard the unique contexts shaping and determining such a phenomenon as witchcraft in order to assimilate it to some other more "spiritual" or congenial "essence" as its perversion, degeneration, or meaningless "application". The whole problem of "survivals" has not yet been adequately dealt with in the research into the history of religions, due to this manner of understanding essence.

The same basic structures can express many "essential meanings": this does *not* mean that only one of them is "the true one" and the others are "degenerations"; each must be understood on its own terms from within the particular structure or patterned meaning it creates or sustains. Witchcraft can be shown, for example, to possess structures

relating closely to the most archaic hunting-and-gathering religions known to us, and again to such explicitly religious phenomena as divination or ancestor reverence. Yet these essential contributory structures do not "degenerate" into witchery or lose meaning, but take on quite different and profound meanings in their new context. The *context* determines meaning, and it may be the context is so meaningful, so well understood, it needs no consciously philosophic or "spiritual" indigenous interpretations. This is the case with witchcraft, which integrates such intimately experienced realities as sexuality and ingestion, bodily exuviae and human social existence, into a meditation on ultimate matters concerning Self and Other, freedom and evil, and the limits of the human condition.

All this is likewise so basic to us that we, too, ignore it while reactualizing it constantly. Witchcraft ideologies have deeply affected the West. It has been estimated that over one million "witches", most of them women, were killed between 1500 and 1700, the vast majority in Germanic lands, using methods quite similar to those adopted by the Third Reich against the Jews and Gypsies.¹⁾ Country and mountain folk in the U.S. and Europe still cling to witchery practices, and various youth cults in America center on a Romanticized "witchcraft". But the most penetrating studies of witchery have been done in Africa, to which this study turns.

II. AFRICAN WITCHERY

A. *Functionalistic Interpretations*

There are many African societies in which witchcraft, or *witchery*, a word I use to include both sorcery and witchcraft,²⁾ is practically non-existent or quite unimportant. There are many others where such ideas have profound consequences.

Most of those who have studied witchery in Africa are British

1) Cf. Adolph Leschnitzer, *The Magic Background of Anti-Semitism* (N. Y.: International Universities Press, 1956).

2) The distinction between sorcery and witchcraft first made by E. E. Evans-Pritchard merely for the Azande in his *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), was extended into a dogma by later social anthropologists, but is now admitted to be inapplicable in many cases. See, for example, Victor Turner, *The Forest, of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 118-24.

social anthropologists, and their interpretations have tended to explain such differences between various cultures through sociological factors. A by now traditional axiom of this school is that if a given trait exists in a society, it must serve a useful purpose, even if not evident to those who assign "manifest" meanings to it within the culture. The social function of a cultural trait is even its real "latent" meaning. Following this line of reasoning, many anthropologists have devoted considerable ingenuity to proving the social excellence of witchcraft and sorcery beliefs, where they appear. As the American anthropologist, Anthony F. C. Wallace has stressed in his recent work, *Religion: An Anthropological View* (N.Y.: Knopf, 1966): "...the practise of witchcraft, and the fear of it, tend to curb precisely those trespasses which the social structure fails to prevent."³) Working with such theories, these researchers have agreed that witchcraft accusations reflect social tensions and probably increase with progressive acculturation (this link has not been irrefutably demonstrated), and that they are basically positive attempts to deal with such tensions when no other approved methods are available.⁴) This last assertion is, however, problematic and paradoxical, if not self-contradictory. If one thing is certain about witchcraft beliefs, it is that it encourages hatreds,

3) *Op. cit.*, pp. 196 f. This view coincides remarkably with Wallace's view of religion in general, as a method of overcoming gaps in the social structure, or tying up the loose ends of logic and behavior left dangling by the social process. From this viewpoint there is little to choose between worship and witchery. Wallace's view is clearly inadequately elucidated, though we too shall argue for a similarity and even identity between witchery beliefs and religious ones.

4) For an extensive bibliography (which if presented here would too greatly expand these footnotes), cf. *ibid.*, pp. 196 ff. and the references there; also see a similar discussion with references and bibliography in the excellent "Introduction" by John Middleton and E. H. Winter to the important volume edited by them, *Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa* (N.Y. and London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1963), pp. 1-26 (hereinafter this work will be referred to as *Witchcraft and Sorcery*); the thorough discussion of the literature by M. G. Marwick in his article, "The Social Context of Cewa Witch Beliefs," *Africa*, XXII (1952), esp. pp. 120-30, and the annotated bibliography at the back of his *Sorcery in Its Social Setting* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965), pp. 305-20. For a statistical "scientific" approach to the subject, see also Guy E. Swanson, *The Birth of the Gods: The Origins of Primitive Beliefs* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 137-52, a work not mentioned in the above discussions. See also the critical review of the material on witchcraft and the theories by Edward Norbeck, *Religion in Primitive Society* (New York and Evanston: Free Press, 1961), pp. 188-212 and elsewhere. Also see Lucy Mair, *Witchcraft* (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969).

spreads suspicions and divisiveness, often culminates in murder of suspected witches and even of widespread purges, frequently brings social process to a total halt, a paralysis of fear and terror, and often results in the splitting off of large groups in an atmosphere of enmity.⁵⁾ We may wonder whether or not, in fact, the functionistic method in general is not subjected to a *reductio ad absurdum* here, a product of a fanatical insistence that whatever occurs in society, and thus is a social fact, is by that same facticity at base merely social, and so necessarily positively functional. Therefore we find the assertion that sorcery suspicions in some societies "help break up" family groups or villages or clans because these groups had become "dysfunctional": they must have been too dense, too competitive, or what not. But this can win our assent only if we refuse to beg the obvious question: "Why dysfunctional?: is density as such, or competition, always to be found as a social evil, or is not in fact the lack of functionality merely presumed by the presence of divisive witchcraft?" Nor is it proven by the functionalists that witchcraft is really the only or the necessary method for expressing and resolving social strains, that other less terrifying methods were not available to the collective imagination of the culture if it had looked for them. There is something of Dr. Pangloss' "Whatever is, is right" in such assertions. The root of witchcraft beliefs cannot be merely social, nor merely for the benefit of society, but lie at a deeper, spiritual level.

5) Accounts of periodic witch-purges which grip entire cultures and bring all work to a halt have been recorded from all parts of Africa, and such movements, which often revealed in the colonial period definite anti-Western elements, have received the general name of "witch-finding movements"; for some representative articles specifically on such cults, see Aubrey I. Richards, "A Modern Movement of Witch-Finders," *Africa*, VIII (1935), 448-61; M. G. Marwick, "Another Anti-Witchcraft Movement in East Central Africa," *Africa*, XX (1950), 100-12; P. Morton-Williams, "The Atinga Cult among the South-Western Yoruba: A Sociological Analysis of a Witch-Finding Movement," *Inst. Français Afri. Noire, Bull., Series B* (1956), 315-34; Barbara E. Ward, "Some Observations on Religious Cults in Ashanti," *Africa*, XXVI (1956), 47-61; Paul Bohannon, "Extra-Processual Events in Tiv Political Institutions," in *Cultures and Societies in Africa*, ed. Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg (N.Y.: Random House, 1960), 328-41; and the stimulating cultic approach of Mary Douglas, showing that witch-finding movements had a periodicity and a cultic importance going back to pre-colonial times that proves them to be traditional, in her essay, "Techniques of Sorcery Control in Central Africa," in *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-141, and her analysis, "Witch Beliefs in Central Africa," *Africa*, XXXVII#1 (Jan. 1967), 72-80.

One thing, for example, that is notable about witchery beliefs is that they often represent severe but submerged, and even if one likes subconsciously projected, criticisms of the society in which they appear. The anthropological studies themselves often demonstrate this. For example, Monica Wilson has shown that amongst the Pondo of Zambia, where family groups cluster in exclusive territories and so make the incest taboo and the exogamous norm strongly conscious inhibitions, witches are conceived of especially as persons indulging in incestuous relations, often with their animal familiars who are their alter egos of the opposite sex: this classifies their incest as synonymous with sexual bestiality. On the other hand, Wilson shows that among the not far distant Nyakyusa of Malawi, where exogamy is not such a heavy burden since village life is highly heterogenous, and rich and poor clans live in close proximity, witches tend rather to be conceived of in terms of miserliness: they are individuals so greedy for their own produce, milk and meat (especially human meat or flesh), that their lust for flesh drives them to feast cannibalistically on relatives and neighbors. Despite wealth differentiation, it is a Nyakyusa norm to invite neighbors to feasts. Yet neighbors are not kinsmen, and often are excluded from each other's meals. This social irresponsibility and the very fact of mysterious differences in wealth are rationalized in witch ideology.⁶⁾ In other words, the pan-African conception of witches as incestuous and cannibalistic beings receives varying emphases in particular societies in accordance with the strains within each.

The sex image of witches may be similarly understood, according to another British social anthropologist, S. F. Nadel. In an essay entitled "Witchcraft in Four African Societies: An Essay in Comparison,"⁷⁾ Nadel followed up Wilson's article by demonstrating that the sex most commonly associated with witches in the societies he studied reflected sexual tensions felt by them: among the Gwari, where marriages were harmonious, witches could be of either sex, but among the Nupe, a Nigerian people otherwise culturally similar, women were independent of the men, and male resentment and helplessness expressed itself in emphasis on female witches. Useful and interesting

6) "Witch Beliefs and Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVI (1951), 307-13.

7) In *Cultures and Societies in Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-20.

as such conclusions may be, however, the very sociological emphasis given these constructs limits their insightfulness, as I shall attempt to show later in dealing with the sexual image of witches. One is always left, after reading such studies, with the nagging question of what has been left out.⁸⁾

But it cannot be denied that witchery beliefs do in some manner become involved with conflicts implicit in given social systems, if only because such conflict-oriented beliefs involving real people necessarily have social consequences. But witchery, too, involves the divine order which is the pattern of life, the web of norms and actions that go together to constitute the way of life handed down from the Creation.⁹⁾ Approaching witchery from the perspective of the divine order, as a *religious* not magical apprehension of man's position in the cosmos, discloses an internal logic to witchcraft and sorcery beliefs not accessible to a functionalistic analysis.

8) For example, Nadel relates the economically independent and dominating position of Nupe women in the market-place directly to their being charged often with witch activities. But it is possible to assert that it is not the power of the women *vis-à-vis* the men which is at issue here, but the symbolically ambivalent significance of *trading* and market-places in West Africa and beyond. The market-place is cosmologically a dangerous point where incompletely controlled alien forces penetrate our society, our divine order: it is a center for transactions *par excellence*, but where we may well be victimized by aliens and our very substance cheated from us. We may be hypnotized by a smiling stranger into utter failure. Witches and demonic beings are often believed in West Africa to haunt market-places, or to have compact with the strangers who come there (cf. Geoffrey Parrinder's remarks concerning the Ibadan, Nigeria market plaza in *Witchcraft: European and African* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), p. 195). This attitude throws a revealing light on the slaughters of the Ibo tradesmen throughout Nigeria but especially in the Hausa north in 1967, and which helped drive the Ibos into proclaiming themselves independent; the ferocity of the war with Biafra can only be understood in such a light. But such conceptions should least of all surprise Westerners: the medieval stereotype of Jews as usurers, the witches of the market-place, was fed by the fact that in economically backward Europe, the Jews were the most prominent and even the only traders in many places. Such suspicions led to all too recurrent bloody massacres, and, to judge from Nazi stereotypes of 'wealthy Jewish financiers,' profoundly influenced modern history. The slaughter of the Chinese in Indonesia had similar roots, for there the Chinese were not only the main tradesmen in the area, but were hated for it by many.

9) I am indebted to Hans Schärer's penetrating applications of the concept of the "Divine Order" in *Ngaju Religion: The Conception of God among a South Borneo People* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), for much of my own understanding of the concept, though modified and deepened through contact with the thought of Mircea Eliade.

B. Religious Homologies: Shamanism

There are a number of important similarities between the fundamental structures of witchery symbolisms and clearly religious structures and rituals among hunting-and-gathering cultures, for example. The symbolisms of shamanic flight, to give one instance, are constantly predicated of witches: they can leave their hut or house at night and fly through the sky magically, or even transform themselves into owls or other carrion birds and sail through the night swiftly, silently and with evil intent to their assemblies far out in the dark bush, on some secluded mountain top, or in a deserted grave-yard. Such symbolisms, so familiar to us, are widespread in Africa, too; they are indeed world-wide, indicating a pervasive necessity for such structures. Everywhere we find witches linked with the wild and the dark "outside" world, though resident amongst us in the human form, outwardly a member of human society. Witches, with their animal familiars (likewise practically a pan-African conception), have peculiar links with the animal realm. The Temne of Sierra Leone link together the witch's familiarity with the forest realm and with animals, the witch's ability to assume many shapes (just as shamans are often reputed to do), and the demonic character of witchery: they say bush demons cooperate with witches in their mutual hatred of and hunt for human beings, and that at the moment of bewitching the witches' faces turn into those of animals.¹⁰) Like shamans, the witch everywhere can wield the power of invisibility, and only the special eyesight of the "witch-doctor" can see such a witch, or detect a witch-person in the day-time in a crowd. The witch is often believed to be specially immune to heat, indeed the witch's element is fire, and he can often be seen at night in the bush as a ball of fire floating through the air. Contrast all this with the typical attributes of shamans: according to Eliade,

Because of his ability to leave his body with impunity, the shaman can, if he so wishes, act in the manner of a spirit; e.g., he flies through the air, he becomes invisible, he perceives things at great distances, he mounts to Heaven or descends to Hell, sees souls and can capture them, and is incombustible.¹¹)

10) James Littlejohn, "The Temne House," in *Myth and Cosmos: Readings in Mythology and Symbolism*, ed. John Middleton (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1967. p. 338.

11) *Rites and Symbols of Initiation: Birth and Rebirth* (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 95.

The shaman is distinguished by his closeness and familiarity with the animals (he knows their languages and can talk with them, etc.; can assume their shape and generally has animal familiars or alter egos); from this comes his control over hunting. The shaman too is "hot" and can even handle burning coals. His initiation takes place often in the bush, far removed from human society, where he attains unity with the non-human sources of reality. He thus becomes a member of a larger shamanic society which sometimes mysteriously convenes far away; the gathering of shamans in a village is an awesome and frightening thing for those who live there. The initiation of a shaman may involve his being *torn apart* or *eaten alive* by divine beings, or by ancestral shaman spirits, and thus assimilated to the divine and to the shamanic circle.¹²⁾ In witches' circles, we may see the memory of this, and its inversion, through the dismemberment or slow devouring of the *victim's* body by the witches; a novice witch must often provide the victim for this initiation from among his own kinsmen, his own "flesh". Through this feast he joins the witch society.

That there is a strange similarity between witches as commonly imaged and shamans, may be accepted, but what is the meaning of this? In the passage cited just above, Eliade goes on to isolate the essential motivation of the shaman, which determines all his modalities and symbolic powers:

They all express a break with the universe of daily life. The twofold purpose of this break is obvious: it is the transcendence and the freedom that are obtained, for example, through ascent, flight, invisibility, incombustibility of the body.... The desire for absolute freedom—that is, the desire to break the bonds that keep him tied to earth, and to free himself from his limitations—is one of man's essential nostalgias. And the break from plane to plane effected by flight or ascent similarly signifies an act of transcendence; flight proves that one has transcended the human condition, has risen above it, by transmuting it through an excess of spirituality.¹³⁾

We may anticipate ourselves by saying that it is the *demonic* and *negative aspect* of this nostalgia for absolute freedom that witchery is the meditation on. The full significance of this will be suggested later, in our concluding remarks. But it is already clear that witchery symbolism embraces a deep-rooted desire to achieve the status of the

¹²⁾ See the full discussion by Eliade in his *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (Bollingen Series LXXVI; N.Y. Pantheon Books, 1964).

¹³⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

Other which confines man, limits him and masters him. The witch is one with that threatening Other, in the popular conception. If the shaman represents the Otherness which infiltrates humanity in its benevolent aspect, the witch represents Otherness in its resolutely anti-human mode, despite its penetration of the human cosmos. The problem of freedom involves a dialectic between the personal will and the cosmic order which, in witchery, realizes mankind's worst nightmares.

C. *Religious Homologies: Divination*

That witchery belongs to that same Other that presents shamanism as a possibility is proven by the genetic similarity of their symbolic structures. The same can be shown for the relationship between divination and witchery. There is relatively little shamanism in Africa in the classic forms defined by Siberian, Amerind and Australian religions. This is doubtless at least partly due to the prevalence of agricultural religions and cultures all over the African continent; the shamanic structure which achieves its full form only in hunting cultures is refracted into various priestly and mediumistic specialties in agricultural religions; witchery, which is relatively little developed as a specific form in the most archaic hunting-and-gathering societies but which is often pronounced among agricultural peoples, is no doubt one of these refractions, as we have seen. Divination is another, and is widely spread in Africa and is even brought to extremely philosophical heights in many societies. Like witchery, divination involves a dialectic between personal will and the cosmic order. In a brief formulation, divination resolves a crisis in the divine order by submitting the personal will to the cosmic ordained pattern, i.e., by discovering Destiny. This discovery of Destiny is not a merely passive process, but a creative one, in which one actively *changes* one's lot in life by *conforming* it to the divine order: divination allows one to experience anew one's inclusion in a larger process which sustains the whole of the universe. Events which before seemed disintegrative, meaningless and random are now disclosed as meaningful, the result of a hidden and now revealed Demand being made on one, and so even part of a healing process when the remedies of divination are applied. Witchery, on the other hand, is a response to crisis which retreats from any Demand hidden in the divine order, into personal desires, and which refuses to rejoin the flux and reciprocity controlling the cosmos. Divination is

practically universally brought to a close with a sacrifice from the client, in which he reestablishes harmonious contact with the powers which are now known to govern his life or this moment in it.¹⁴⁾ Witchery, however, centers on a sacrifice in which the client (that is, the witch, who like the divinatory client is seeking redress for "bad fate") immolates, so to speak, his enemy, while giving up nothing of himself. Witchery pulls away from the ongoing change and mutuality of things, and insists on the necessity of personal will and passion. Only on its own terms will it relate to the divine order.

Yet one of the striking things about divination is the frequency with which it is connected with witchery in many cultures. Both procedures involve the same dialectic; divination gone wrong can easily become witchcraft. Often the diviner is suspected of being a witch by his clients, and this is even one of the reasons that they come to him: if he knows how to curse powerfully, he must also know how to lift the curse of others; he who can harm can also heal. The same powers are involved in both the diviner's and the witch's art. One sees this often in African cultures. The Mbugwe of Tanzania, for example, have over each of their sub-tribes a rain-chief, who is both political leader and spiritual intermediary and diviner for his people. By the power innate in him, as well as by learned skills, he causes the rain to fall on the fields of his people, but by the same token deprives rival groups of the heaven-sent waters. The rain-chiefs compete each year for the rains. By his own group the rain-chief is regarded as a beneficent and powerful diviner and "witch-doctor"; by other groups he is thought to be a sorcerer, or witch.¹⁵⁾ Similarly, as Robert LeVine remarks, for the Gusii of southern-western Kenya

The diviner groups seems to be a socially accepted version of the witch group, or, conversely stated, the conspiratorial witch group may represent a deviant dangerous and perhaps fantastic version of the actually functioning group of diviners.¹⁶⁾

14) So intimately linked is divination with the act of sacrifice that often sacrifice is the whole of the divinatory session: from the entrails of the victim, the cracks in its heated bones, or even the manner of its staggering and fall, the verdict of Destiny and the Divine is "read".

15) Robert F. Gray, "Some Structural Aspects of Mbugwe Witchcraft," in *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 f., 146, 154 f., 170.

16) "Witchcraft and Sorcery in a Gusii Community," in *ibid.*, pp. 232 f.

Among the Gusii, however, diviners were not themselves considered witches. A closer and even more striking rapprochement is evident among the Azande, where occasionally one finds diviners (or "witch-doctors") who are commonly regarded as witches, and thus credited with even more power to effect cures; Azande whisper that certain diviners may act in collusion with witches¹⁷). There are many reasons the Azande might have such suspicions. It is known by them, for example, that witches have within them *mangu*, witchcraft substance, which they inherit but increase in power through their cannibalistic initiation and regular diet of human flesh. Part of the initiation of the *witch-doctor*, however (and a climax to it), is the physical transfer of the master's *mangu* to the initiate his novice, through the process of coughing up the *mangu* like phlegm, and forcing the novice to eat it.¹⁸) Afterwards the new witch-doctor must continue to feed his *mangu* with strong medicines, for it is very much due to his internal power of *mangu* that he effects cures, and not merely by external manipulation of charms. Periodically the witch-doctors gather in a private place to celebrate the feeding of their *mangu*; like the Zande witches who reputedly convene in sinister covens out in the bush or near graves to eat human flesh which they boil in cauldrons with curses and spells, the witch-doctors too cooperate in stirring the cauldron of their "hot" medicines, uttering charms and spells which direct the medicines to intensify their powers. In these spells the doctors name as kinsmen only animals, very much as the witches have animal familiars; but Evans-Pritchard explains that these medicines are so powerful that they demand the life of the kinsmen of the cooks: thus the doctors name animals. But at such moments they may also name rivals or personal enemies, who will surely be afflicted in consequence. "I dance, a man dies," goes their traditional initiation song, recalling to us the obscene dance Zande witches are said to make in the dark of night in the compounds of their victims before blighting them and their household with death and disease.¹⁹)

17) Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*, *op. cit.*, pp. 192 ff., 225.

18) *Ibid.*, pp. 224-9.

19) *Ibid.*, pp. 207 and 228.

D. *Religious Homologies: Nemesis and the Ancestors*

Analysis of the sources of the Zande witch-power indeed leads to the sources of the witch-doctor's power; both have the same root in the High God, Mbori. The medicines which both use are said to grow under the special care of the Supreme Being, for example, and the diviners are able to use these herbs with Mbori's mandate to counter the excesses of the witches.²⁰⁾ The Mandari, a tribe to the north of the Azande, in the Sudan, say likewise of witches that:

'They are God's creatures, like lions and other preying animals which harm people, and their nature is to spend their time harming'. Although said to be 'God's servants in bringing death', they are also said to be hated by God. 'Because they harm good people, their end is planned, and after a time they die'.²¹⁾

The implication is that they should only harm bad people. The destructiveness given witches, though it is random in its maliciousness, is not entirely arbitrary, for many peoples believe that witches serve the larger purposes of Deity in singling out as victims those who genuinely erred, who through excessive pride or selfishness have elevated themselves over their fellows, for example, or who have otherwise violated divine norms. Widespread through West Africa is the belief that there are certain of the most powerful witch-medicines that refuse to harm an innocent person; if a witch attempts to misuse in this way such a medicine, its malicious powers will recoil in full strength upon the sender. In a recent study of the Cewa of Zambia, we read:

As to victims of sorcery, two-thirds of the 118 cases involving beliefs in sorcery—including those of vengeance on sorcerers—were one in which anti-social or socially inadequate behaviour was attributed either to the victim or to someone closely associated with him... (that were)... violations of widely accepted Cewa norms, including those violated by the sorcerers in the sample.²²⁾

Among the Nyakyusa of Malawi one of the most powerful sanctions for morality and harmonious participation in the social order is the widespread fear of "the breath of men", i.e., witchcraft.²³⁾ Witches

20) *Ibid.*, 36, 215-17, 390, 441 f.

21) Jean Buxton, "Mandari Witchcraft," in *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

22) Marwick, *Sorcery in its Social Setting*, *op. cit.*, pp. 245 f.

23) Monica Wilson, *Good Company: A Study of Nyakyusa Age-Villages* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), pp. 91-120.

pick out those who offend them personally, of course, but such offenders have very likely harmed many before occasion brought them into contact with a witch; the very randomness of the resentment of witches insures the "objectivity" of their hatreds: considerations of friendliness, personal favor, or even family blood, will not stand in the way of a witch's ferocious and spontaneous (even quite involuntary) vengeance. Among the Shilluk of the southern Sudan, the witch is often known as such from birth, and is avoided by others throughout his life, but the power that is innately his is thought to come from Jwok, God, and thus to have a certain justice in its application; these black magicians are said to make the following tormented prayer at night before commencing their spells:

You who are God (Jwok) give me this person to kill.
Why was I created thus if it was not that I was to kill? ²⁴⁾

In this way the witch plays a role amongst many African peoples that in Greece is represented by the power of *nemesis*, whose agents were the dread hags, the *Erinyes*. For the Nuer, neighbors of the Shilluk, to break a taboo is to act to destroy the divine order in which Kwoth, God, directly participates. The result is *nueer*: God blasts the one who causes the knot in the flow of Divinity through the cosmos. Lightning does not strike randomly, according to the Nuer and many other African peoples, but selects particularly the houses of the prosperous who are full of wealth, who have refused to share their bounty with others and have otherwise violated the basic divine norms. ²⁵⁾ In the same way the sometimes quite involuntary power of witches and of the evil eye can fall upon those who refuse in general to share things with others, especially with the witches or hexers themselves (but since these are often unknown before the event, one ought to share with all).

In such matters the witches seems to perform for the *general* society, between neighbor and neighbor, what the ancestors do for the family group, between kinsman and kinsman. There are further similarities between the ancestors and witches. The ancestors of a kinship group generally intervene actively in the human order only when one of their

²⁴⁾ Rev. D. S. Oyler, "The Shilluk's Belief in the Evil Eye—The Evil Medicine Man," *Sudan Notes and Records*, II #2 April, 1919), 131.

²⁵⁾ E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Nuer Religion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 182-95.

descendents has transgressed a norm of family life, threatening the collapse of its structure. Then, using spiritual powers received from their participation in the divine order, they can cause the illness or even death of the victim, or those close to him, unless restitution is made to the ancestors and through them to the divine order, just as one can release oneself from witchcraft by obtaining from the witch his forgiveness and establishing a mutuality and reciprocity with him (signalled by the witch blowing water on a fowl's wing, from the victim's domestic fowl, or having him share a feast with one, or otherwise). Joining in a communal meal with the witch is especially similar to the communal sacrifice with the ancestors. Ancestors and witches are both "Other" to the day-time world of mankind: they inhabit the night, and may embody themselves in animals, often of the same species: lions, leopards, snakes. Evil ghosts, that is, rejected ancestral shades, may go further and feast on corpses, cast spells on night travellers, and haunt secret places in the bush, all just like witches.

E. Witchery as Negative Otherness

But while it is important to stress parallelism between witches and the more benevolent religious levels of Otherness in the cosmos, in order to demonstrate the fact that we must understand witchery in terms of a spiritual logic, and not merely as sociological nor as merely magical "degenerations", it would be a clear travesty of the facts to leave the matter there. For witches, for example, are quite evil and repulsive, while the ancestors are benevolent; witches attempt finally to destroy the divine order, and if their activities occasionally work for its support it is, so to speak, in spite of the witches themselves. The witches belong to a separate realm of the cosmic order apart from the ancestors, or perhaps we can say that the witches belong finally quite outside the cosmic order. The honored dead, for example, who will become ancestors and assure for their descendents the fertility of family fields and of the women of the clan, who will constantly work for harmony and peace in the family, are buried in a consecrated place; the witches are thrown into the bush, or buried without rites far off in the wilderness, near or under a stream perhaps that shall eternally wash their polluted bodies and souls far away, "cooling" the land. Nor do the witches work even when alive for anyone's fertility; rather do they continually cause universal sterility and barrenness. While the

ancestors are so closely and intimately linked with the cultivated, "purified" land that Earth and ancestors often seem modalities of each other in many African cultures (in Bantu Africa especially it is often impossible to make a valid dichotomy between nature spirits and ancestor spirits ²⁶) the witches are the enemies of the cultivated Earth, and many witch-ordeals (tests to single out the guilty witch from a group of suspects) involve confronting the suspects with Earth representatives. Widespread in West Africa, for example, is the use of iron-smiths as witch-finders, for iron is linked with the Earth, and the Smith has the secret of transforming the alien natural substance into a humanized one, and getting it to work for man. Witches and iron therefore are antipathetic; the witch will not touch iron, or iron will burn the witch, etc. The Smith is in actuality an Earth-priest, and often leads the ordeals. Many societies shared with the LoDagaa of Ghana, to mention but one specific rite, the traditional practice of forcing a suspected witch to drink a mixture of soil and water at the Earth-shrine; a true witch's body would so rebel against the mixture his belly would immediately begin to swell up, finally causing death, while the innocent suffered no harm. ²⁷) The witches do not love the cultivated Earth, but the wild and chaotic Bush, the non-human side of Earth. Their sphere is the forest or jungle, darkness, all that is anti-human and threatening within the general category of the Other; they isolate in themselves this horrible aspect of the non-human Otherness, and represent it among men. They form the inversion of the divine order, and thus their mirroring of the ancestors, of the diviners, and even more archaically, of the shamans, is by way of reversed image and antithesis. The very similarity of the structures we have outlined, however, points to a further important conclusion. The witches too obtain their powers from the same sources as the benevolent forms of the divine order do, but they turn those powers backwards upon that order. Witches are conceived of as parasitic, gaining their power from the very divine flow they block and reverse. One of the most striking images of this symbolic status of witches can be found in medieval Europe: the central rite of the witch-covens, held on distant

²⁶) Cf. Olaf Pettersson, "The Spirits of the Wood," in *Supernatural Owners of Nature*, ed. Åke Hulkrantz (Stockholm, Uppsala: 1961).

²⁷) Jack Goody, *Death, Property and the Ancestors* (Stanford and London: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 64.

mountain tops in the darkest hour of the night, was the recital of the Latin Mass—backwards. Witches relate to the inversion of holiness. In a certain sense witches *must* be more pious than we are, for it is the token of their satanic holiness that it is so intense it becomes even unholy and anti-human, removing witches from the ranks of true (and mere) humanity. Witches are so given over to their own reality, in the popular conception, that they are “obsessed” with evil, they are “compelled” to do evil, it is even “involuntary” with them: it is this very *piety* which so de-humanizes them that they lose contact with mankind and so can no longer be argued with, but must simply be either avoided or killed.

The pattern of inversion and of assimilation to a structure of “negative Otherness” mirroring in reverse image “positive Otherness” can be shown to hold throughout African religions, and to explain many puzzling features of witches in Africa. For example, witches belong to the “Outside”: they are marginal, come from an alien background, or live far off. It is as an alien that they penetrate the divine order of good humanity. As John Middleton first systematically demonstrated for the Lugbara of Uganda-Congo, the divine order of humanity is established in the center of a field of social structure and traditional patterns, beyond whose horizon all relationships and powers become inverted:

In the centre of the field, relations and persons involved in them are ‘good’; the further from the centre the more ‘evil’ and inverted they become. In other words, orderly relations of authority, unchanging from the time they were created by Divinity and the founding ancestors, are ‘good’; relations purely of force are ‘evil’.²⁸⁾

But witches are not merely the inversion of the divine order through their use of force; their inversion is systematic and thorough-going. Normal people are active in the day but sleep ‘the sleep of the just’ at night. Witches are active at night, quiescent by day. Normal people, *good* people, marry exogamously, eat foods other than human flesh, kill the enemies of their village in warfare, work to increase the crops or improve hunting, wear clothes, walk on their two feet, and so on and on. Witches, however, commit incest, eat human flesh, kill their own

²⁸⁾ John Middleton, “Witchcraft and Sorcery in Lugbara,” in *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, *op. cit.*, p. 272; also see *idem*, “Some Social Aspects of Lugbara Myth,” *Africa*, XXIV (1954).

kin and their own neighbors (and may band together in a 'conspiracy' with enemy villages' witches to feed on their own kith and kin); they blight the crops and ruin hunting, go about at night quite naked, stand on their heads and even walk upside down on their way to bewitch victims, rest dangling like bats from trees, eat salt when thirsty, transform themselves into animals in order to devour their victim or to sneak into his compound, cause nightmares, disease and death.²⁹⁾ Ordinary people walk to their destination, but witches have everywhere the power to overcome space and fly, either in the form of a carrion bird or on an animal familiar like the proverbial "nightmare", or on some object like a filth-collecting broom (another memory and parody of the shaman's drum or *axis mundi* tent-post on which he makes his ecstatic ascent, perhaps). Witches therefore construct an antithetical order. We might again think of the frequent African motif (found widely elsewhere among highly localized peoples³⁰⁾ of the land of the dead being patterned precisely the reverse of life here below, but the difference is that the latent ambiguity in this reversal is in the case of the witches made explicit: the witches are pure evil.

F. *Witchery as Isolation*

This reversal of the divine depends above all on one thing: the breakdown in the divine flow through the cosmos. The fertile women must be made barren, the fecund land blighted and the crops "magically" stolen. At points of transformation in the divine order the witches cluster and focus their withering hate. Initiates, while in the delicate liminal stage of their training, are especially vulnerable to witches, who will seek to bewitch and damn up the budding sexual generativity of the initiate. Newly-weds are similarly especially vulnerable, and like pregnant women are especially surrounded by restrictions and safe-guards to protect them from the envious witch's curse or evil eye. The favorite prey of the witches are a hated person's infant children and fertile

29) See above note; also E. H. Winter, "The Enemy Within: Amba Witchcraft," in *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, *op. cit.*, p. 292, and other essays in this volume.

30) The term "highly localized peoples" replaces here the prejudicial use of "primitive peoples", "natives", or worst, "savages", still commonly found. "Non- or illiterate cultures" is unsatisfactory since in point of fact certain cultures of Africa and elsewhere have scripts or the equivalent of hieroglyphs, generally reserved for religious and divinatory purposes just as in early Sumer, Egypt, and China.

wives, the open cultivated fields and the herds, for in these the victim has continued creativity and strength, in these the hated person shares himself with the cosmos. This sharing must be broken or twisted.

At the root of the symbolism of witchery, one can even say, is a meditation on the significance of *sharing*. A very basic concept found amongst highly localized peoples all over the world is that the universe is built up through sharing: that through the intermingling of divine forces, through economic exchange, through wife-giving and marriage, through ritual sacrifice and the very act of eating, through the initiatic transformation of a family's child into an adult whose work and creativity will be shared with the whole society, the entire cosmos is continually being regenerated anew. And correspondingly, almost all the cases of witchcraft in the literature, not only in Africa but also elsewhere, can be understood as centering on a break-down in the flow of reciprocity; the actions and predilections of witches can be understood also as an extension of this symbolism of aborted reciprocities. It is jealousy that drives a man to witchcraft, the Lugbara say, and it springs from the refusal of neighbors to share their feasts with one, or from envy when another more seductive man draws all the eligible girls to him, leaving one alone, or when another is prosperous and one has nothing.³¹⁾ It is the person who keeps to himself, withdrawing from the social round and refusing to "share himself with others", who is everywhere suspected of hidden resentments and dark tendencies. Very many sorcery accusations spring up within the family circle when it appears that the inheritance and power will not be equitably shared. The barren co-wife, who willfully withholds herself from sharing her fecundity with the household, who at the same time resents the fertility of others, is a prime suspect as a witch. All these figures recur again and again in the witchery symbolisms of African cultures. It is the co-wife's "evil eye" that kills the other women's children, and the youngest son's sorcery that causes the eldest son's inheritance to come to ruin.³²⁾ The witch is one who has been isolated and pained, but who takes malicious umbrage at this isolation, and attempts to make

31) Middleton, "Witchcraft and Sorcery in Lugbara," *op. cit.*, pp. 262 ff.

32) It is not hard to see in such ideas the symbolization of guilt feelings felt by the fertile co-wives, or the eldest son, who contrast their own success with their fellow's misfortune uneasily, and who with the coming of bad fortune to themselves accuse the fellow as almost a self-exoneration and justification.

one share that painful excommunication from the divine order that the witch has felt. Or, as we have already seen, the witch can be a powerful medicine-man, a rainmaker or a chief, who does not share his power equitably with those who are dependent on him.

G. *Bodily Metaphors of Witchery*

In the same way the actions and rituals of the witch repeat this symbolism of aborted transformations. The two most intimate ways people relate to the world beyond themselves is by eating and the sexual act. But perhaps the most characteristic signs of the full witch symbolism are the persistent *cannibalistic* and *incestuous* motifs. The witch does not assume full humanity through eating non-human meat, rather he turns on his own kind, and devours human flesh. He refuses the encounter with the true Other. The same is true of his incest. He mates with himself. One often reads of the transmission of witchery power through an incestuous act. The Nso of the West Cameroons are unusual in that they clearly distinguish between witches of incest and witches of cannibalism. The first are called 'witches of the sun or day', and are innocuous enough; only the kin suffer. Any incest warrants the appellation witchcraft. But 'witchcraft of the night', *virim ve vitsë'ë*, is the completely malicious type, whose cannibalistic practitioners will stop at nothing in their lust for human flesh.³³) The African witch however, is above all a spiritual cannibal. Among very many peoples his cannibalism is not understood to be physical as such; the witch devours the soul bit by bit, and as the meal proceeds through the days and weeks, the victim visibly weakens and sickens, until there is no more life left in him and he utterly dies.³⁴) The image of the vampire is not limited to European horror tales. It is the same lust that drives the witch to exhuming corpses; this ghoulish feast, too, is however often a spiritual one, and the grave may appear entirely undisturbed by

33) Phyllis M. Kaberry, "Witchcraft of the Sun," in *Man in Africa*, ed. Kaberry and Mary Douglas (London, N.Y.: Tavistock Publications, 1969), pp. 175-95; the danger to the kinspeople from the incest of a pair is very real to the Nso: "It is like 'witchcraft of the night' because *it is as though the culprits were eating one another* and they would, unless action were taken, not only die or go mad but in some cases bring death to their children and other members of the compound involved. It is described not merely as bad... or dreadful..., but as revolting or disgusting (*ko'oi*, a term also applied to a corpse found in decayed state, to excrement, suicide, and leprosy." *Ibid.*, p. 179 (italics mine).

34) Cf. Parrinder, *Witchcraft: European and African*, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 ff.

the light of day. Often only the medicine-man can "see" the macabre activities of the witches.

The preference of the witch for animal bestiality and other forms of sexual perversity is also proverbial through Africa. For the witch belongs in essence to the animal world; such acts are like incest for him. Even in his eating habits is the witch animalistic or bestial, for he sides with the animals in making man his prey. Thus in the most bodily kinds of metaphors the witch announces his rejection and hatred of the human pattern of social interchange and sharing. The same kind of symbolism informs witchery *spells* and *ritual*.

Witches fasten their attention on other people's eating and sexual relations, and, gaining access to their victim's inner spirit during precisely these vulnerable moments of interchange and transformation, seize the "life" of the person or blight it. One of the most reliable symptoms of a society deeply concerned with witchcraft anxieties is a multiplication of taboos around the act of eating; among the Mbugwe, for example,

It is thought that witches cast the evil eye on a victim's food just as it is about to enter his mouth... The only reliable precaution against the evil eye is to eat privately or only in the presence of absolutely trustworthy people. The Wambugwe actually try to safeguard themselves in this manner, by maintaining meticulous privacy in eating. Meals are always taken inside the house, even in the hottest weather. Children commonly eat first while a parent stays outside to watch for intruders; then the parents eat while the children stand guard.³⁵⁾

Moreover, the great importance of exuviae (blood, sweat, urine, vomit, hair, toe-nail parings, excrement, menstrual blood, clothing permeated with the victim's sweat, etc.) in the making of charms, effigies, or potions to be used against the victim, can also be understood in terms of such symbolism. Exuviae provide the most potent medicines of the witch. They are the symbols and the very evidence of man's mortality and submission to change, his constant entry into the ongoing transformation of things. These are the very signal of man's involvement in time. The witch uses these same elements of transformation against the victim, forcing them back on him and stopping up, so to speak, the channels of ebb and flow that permit man to live in the world. Often the witch places the victim's exuviae back in his food,

35) Robert F. Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

or buries it under his threshold or in the thatch of his compound. The exuviae works then to *dissociate* the victim entirely from this world. The witch, it is often said in Africa, comes in the dark of night to one's hut area, and there he or she dances naked a wild obscene dance until blood comes out of the anus, or vomit appears. This blood or vomit is the medicine; many witches defecate at the door-way of their enemies, or in their compounds — even if they bury the exuviae to hide it, the power in it works to kill the victim.³⁶)

In the same way, exuviae are generally the absolutely necessary prerequisites to the shaping of an effigy, since they most securely anchor the effigy to the victim's soul. Spells and chants may duplicate or replace this use of "contagious magic", but the underlying intention is the same. The victim is through the use of such techniques torn from his inclusion in the divine order and isolated under the power of the witch-sorcerer. Such concepts are dramatically embodied in the belief in the "zombie" or soul-slave, who is subdued to the will of the hexer through the use of an effigy in most instances. For example, the Gã of Ghana declare that the sorcerer does much the same thing in each of the following three methods: he can call up through spells the victim's *susuma* (soul), making it appear in a bowl of water, and there he impales it, causing pain or death to the victim; or the sorcerer can tie the victim's *kla* (life-essence) with string, thus withdrawing the victim from the cosmic order and causing the victim's withering away; or the sorcerer can draw the *kla* into a miniature of the victim lying on a tiny sleeping mat through concentration, then "nurse" the figure through its "illness", enacting an unsuccessful cure, finally

36) For a convenient series of references demonstrating the pan-African belief in the above techniques, see, for East and Central Africa, *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 100 f., 165, 197, 227 f., and 262, etc.; for South Africa, see the survey, by A. Winifred Hoernlé, "Magic and Medicine," in *The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa*, ed. Isaac Schapera (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1937), pp. 241 ff.; no single adequate survey of West African usages is available, but for the purposes of this brief note it is sufficient to refer to Geoffrey Parrinder, *West African Religion* (2nd. ed.; London: Epworth Press, 1961), pp. 163 f. For the importance of exuviae for the Gã of Ghana, whose use of effigy sorcery is discussed in the next paragraph of our text, see the vivid description in Margaret J. Field, *Religion and Medicine of the Gã People* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 128; this work is, together with the same author's *Search for Security* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960), our best West African-centered ethnological rescription of witchery. Also see H. Debrunner, *Witchcraft in Ghana* (Kumasi: 1959).

burying it—and as this ritual is dragged out, the victim simultaneously sickens, worsens, and dies.³⁷⁾ A very similar ritual to this latter one is enacted amongst the Central African Rotse peoples of Zambia. Witches there are believed to seek always to increase the number of “familiar” they have working for them. One common way of getting such servant souls is to steal the soul and body of a villager, making him into a true zombie, while replacing the absent villager with a charm that seems to all his neighbors to be the person. This “person” sickens and dies, is buried, and finally the charm is dug up by the sorcerer; meanwhile, the real victim is forced into utter spiritual slavery.³⁸⁾ In such rituals, the effigy and the victim are interchangeable. The entire significance of such practices is to isolate the victim from his normal participation in the cosmos, and so to reduce and master him.

H. Witchery and Hunting Symbolisms

We might ask, where did such practices come from? We must not be surprised that the answer is, from the same hunting-and-gathering milieu that we know shamanism’s home to be in. It has been well established that at least a certain percentage of Paleolithic cave paintings were the product of a kind of belief in effigy sorcery: by depicting the game, and perhaps going so far as to ritually spear it after it had been drawn (numerous such pitted figures remain to us), the ancient hunters achieved power over their prey.³⁹⁾ The parallels with modern hunting-and-gathering peoples are too numerous for us to mention more than a few random examples. In Siberia, for example, we find that the Tungus carved figures of the game they sought and take these with them on hunting trips; like the Ostyaks, Voguls and many other Siberian tribes, they believe the effigy to carry the soul

37) Field, *Religion and Medicine of the Gã People*, loc. cit.

38) Cf. Barrie Reynolds, *Magic, Divination and Witchcraft among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 33-4; also see the more detailed accounts in Frank H. Melland, *In Witch-Bound Africa* (London: Seeley, Service & Co., 1923), pp. 214-17.

39) See the extensive recent discussion by J. Maringer, *The Gods of Prehistoric Man* (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 110-52; a critical review of modern evaluations of such cave art is given in Peter J. Ucko and Andrée Rosenfeld, *Paleolithic Cave Art* (World University Library; N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 123-37, et passim. Also see K. J. Narr, “Interpretation altsteinzeitlicher Kunstwerke durch völkerkundliche Parallelen,” *Anthropos*, L (1955), 513-45.

of the quarry and place it under the hunter's power. Rituals involving the effigy are not uncommon.⁴⁰⁾ Rock paintings remarkably similar to Paleolithic art and perhaps genetically related to such southern European art has been found in a wide arc through Africa from the once-green Sahara down along East Africa to the desert hills of the Kalahari, where ritual painting was still practiced by the Bushmen within living memory.⁴¹⁾ Clear-cut effigy hunting ritual has been reported of the Pygmies of the Congo, and indeed practices that in other cultures are clearly "witchery" are again and again repeated in a fully religious context by the Congo Mbuti, often as part of rituals linking mankind and the *Supreme Being* ruling the forest and all the game.⁴²⁾

I. Witchery and the Female Image

It is important to stress again the religious structure that we find at the roots of witchery beliefs. The forms that we find in outright witchcraft symbolism are still, therefore, a meditation on fundamental questions of human existence, even if here as in other ways an inversion of the normal. It is well to remember this also in connection with the persistent linkage of witchery to women. Again, we can do little more here than throw an undoubtedly too rapid light over a vast field of evidence. It has long been noted as a curiosity that among hunting-

40) Ivar Lissner, *Man, God and Magic* (N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), p. 245; also see detailed accounts in Eveline Lot-Falck, *Les Rites de Chasse chez les peuples Sibériens* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953).

41) The subject has been well-documented. See Sonia Cole, *The Prehistory of East Africa* (N.Y.: New American Library, 1963), pp. 220-44 and the bibliography; for a recent discussion, see J. Desmond Clark, *The Prehistory of Africa* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1970), pp. 182-84. The remarks of H. Baumann are perhaps historically too sweeping a unification of the Bushmen with the European Paleolithic, but much is still obscure: see Baumann, *Les Peuples et les Civilisations de l'Afrique* (Paris: Payot, 1970), p. 104.

42) Leo Frobenius' report of elaborate effigy hunting ritual is, however, still unique: *Das Unbekannte Afrika* (Munich: Oskar Beck, 1923), pp. 34-5. But obviously similar, and here emphatically religious, practices are related by Colin Turnbull, *Wayward Servants* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1965), pp. 130 f., 155; also see Paul Schebesta, *Die Bambuti-Pygmäen vom Ituri* (Mem. Inst. Roy. Col. Belge, Sect. Sci. Mor. et Pol., Coll.-in-4°; Bruxelles: Georges van Campenhout, 1941 & 1950), t. II, fasc. 1, p. 113, and t. II, fasc. 3, pp. 110-1. These discussions must be viewed together with such rituals of the chief game animal, the elephant, as are related by Noël Ballif, *The Dancers of God* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1955), p. 166.

and-gathering peoples, and indeed, among very many agricultural peoples too, hunting taboos often weigh more heavily upon the wife of a hunter than upon the hunter himself. In the usual collections of taboos made by ethnographers, long lists of such taboos are often given, from widely dispersed societies from the far north to the densest tropical jungles, always torn out of context and advanced as evidence of "magical" thought and "savage" non-rationality. Sir James Frazer, for example, in his always useful compilation *The Golden Bough*, notes that

In Laos when an elephant hunter is starting for the chase, he warns his wife not to cut her hair or oil her body in his absence; for if she cut her hair the elephant would burst the toils, if she oiled herself it would slip through them. . . .

Elephant-hunters in East-Africa believe that, if their wives prove unfaithful in their absence, this gives the elephant power over his pursuer, who will accordingly be killed or severely wounded. . . . An Aleutian hunter of sea-otters thinks that he cannot kill a single animal if during his absence from home his wife should be unfaithful or his sister unchaste.

Many of the indigenous tribes of Sarawak are firmly persuaded that were the wives to commit adultery while their husbands are searching for camphor in the jungle, the camphor obtained by the men would evaporate.⁴³⁾

What is striking in these examples is the clear symbolic equation made between women and the natural realm of forest and game; what one does effects a change in the other. This is apparently especially true in regard to women's sexuality and fecundity: the unfaithfulness of the wife is immediately expressed in a similar "unfaithfulness" of the animals who are truly engaged with the hunter in a *liebestod*. That this equation goes deeper than a "mere" homology of woman and game animals is seen in the last instance given involving *camphor*: somehow women and the *entire* realm of the natural divine order equally confront man as Other; both women and the forest are metaphors for each other. Both are a spiritual reality above all, with which man must necessarily be joined in a dialectic which involves life out of death, food out of a "penetration". That women and forest however are not the *same* symbolic reality is shown in the clearest possible manner by the insistence amongst such hunters of a preparatory *chastity* between husband and wife before the hunt commences: such a prohibition affirms that the relation of hunter to wife is similar to,

43) *The Golden Bough*, Abridged Ed., 1 vol. (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 26-27.

and *therefore* must not interfere with, the relation of hunter to prey. The separation of women from animals is, after all, the guarantee of human culture. We have not here a "pre-logical" identification of women with the game, but, precisely by the taboos, a recognition of the distinctions between nature and culture which establish the human condition. Taboos deal not with a literalism but with symbolism.

At the same time, it is very significant that it is precisely the witch who is thought to confound the symbolic and physical through her bestiality: for the witch the animals are mates and true society, while mankind is the prey. The witch is given over entirely to the Otherness of life; she belongs to the wild and hates society. It is also no doubt for this reason at least partly that witches are so often conceptualized as female. We have seen that the forest and the feminine are closely associated in the thought of the hunting peoples who first develop the structures later cultures relate to witchery. But just as, for so many agricultural peoples, the forest and the wild beyond the cultivated fields are revalorized as demonic and populated with dark, evil beings, from which not food but only death comes, ⁴⁴) so too the link between women and the wild is in the witch figure wholly dark and negatively complements the positive meaning of the femininity of the food-producing cultivated Earth. Hunting-and-gathering peoples seldom develop the witchery concepts that so often pervade agricultural societies, it would seem; the splitting of the religious Other into a clearly demonic and clearly benevolent realm is perhaps part of a general increased complexity of cultural forms amongst farming peoples. ⁴⁵) Women possess

44) The difference in cultural valuations of the forest comes out strikingly in Turnbull's description of the views of the village patrons of the Mbuti Pygmies, and those of the Mbuti themselves: see, for example, Turnbull, "The Mbuti Pygmies of the Congo," in *Peoples of Africa*, edited by James L. Gibbs, Jr. (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 288 f.

45) Turnbull stresses that the Mbuti do not practice outright sorcery or witchcraft themselves; cf. *ibid.*, p. 304, or *idem*, *Wayward Servants*, p. 297; H. Trilles, *L'Âme du Pygmée d'Afrique* (Paris: 1945), writes: "Il importe de noter que les Pygmées de race pure ne connaissent pas les sorciers" (p. 128). Yet the data amassed by Paul Schebesta (see specific references in the earlier citation from Schebesta) show at least some such practices among the Mbuti, which are according to Turnbull village Bantu influences. Lorna Marshall, the major authority on the !Kung Bushmen, writes that their medicine men are not sorcerers nor witches, but solely devote themselves to curing and work together without rivalry: "The !Kung are not a witch-ridden people": "The !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert," in *Peoples of Africa*, op cit., p. 271. Yet H. Baumann insists in his earlier

a natural creative power denied to men, a power of fecundity absolutely necessary for the continuance of the culture; their lifegiving powers are also clear in their close association with the domestic fire and the cooking of food. But this natural generative power so essential for sustaining the divine order is in some ways uncontrollable, despite the masculine attempt to guide it ritually, and so it may break out of cultural boundaries and even act to destroy the divine order. As Lévi-Strauss has shown, culture has built itself up out of a complex fabric of wife-exchange. But if the inexplicably creative and divine power within women refuses to cooperate, the entire pattern of sharing and social transformations is destroyed at the root. (Nor has this anything to do with merely patrilineally-caused fears of the stranger women who marry into the clan from "outside": some of our most striking descriptions of female witches come from matrilineal societies.⁴⁶) The women, apparently passive and dominated (in most matrilineal societies, too), are felt to be for that very reason dangerous, for it is their formidable and largely involuntary powers which culture harnesses for its own perpetuation, which can so easily turn against all culture and humanity. Added to that is the weaker position of women, for that in itself draws in its train condemnations of witchery. Again and again in human culture we note that the weaker are suspected of hidden powers of resentment and hatred. The very passivity of nature itself before man, a passivity which seems to increase with improving technology and the development of agriculture, makes it a demonic and

cited work that both the Pygmies and the Bushmen practise sorcery to some degree, and it is remarkable that the use of "projectile" sorcery, widespread throughout Central and South Africa, has been traced to Bushmen hunting usages; "magic" bows and arrows are used by the Bushmen both for love charms and against rivals: the symbolic homologies between sexual polarities, man-animals, and man-inimical Other, are striking. See Reynolds, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-41, 59, 79-83, etc., and Isaac Schapera, *The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa* (London: Geo. Routledge & Sons, 1930), pp. 195-201. The archaic homology between women and the natural animal realm for hunting peoples is brilliantly demonstrated by A. Leroi-Gourham, *Les Religions de la Préhistoire (Paléolithique)* (Paris: 1964), and *idem*, *Treasures of Prehistoric Art* (N.Y.: Abrams, n.d. [1967]).

46) See, for example, B. Malinowski's remarks concerning the matrilineal Trobriand Islanders' "flying witches", in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (N.Y.: E. P. Dutton, 1961), pp. 236 ff.; also see the discussion of the matrilineal Navaho views, in the classic by Clyde Kluckhohn, *Navaho Witchcraft* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, 1967).

untrustworthy realm: in the bush roam foul demons and ghosts always ready to leap upon or seize travellers or wanderers in the night.

But, in any case, it is now clear how identical are the accusations everywhere leveled against witches that they commit incest (or sexual bestiality) and cannibalism. Sexual and hunting perversions are modes of each other. Both practices abort proper life-giving and -sustaining transformations. In incest as in cannibalism, and in the sheer malice witches are supposed to have, man turns away from the proper reciprocity with the Other which sustains the cosmic order. The relations of man and animal, culture and nature, village and forest, day and night, and man and woman, are broken and turned back on themselves, creating the various forms of witchery symbolism. Instead of marrying the truly Other, the witch commits incest or has relations with animal familiars. Instead of eating the not-Self, the witch has a lust for human flesh.

III. CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE DEMONIC

It is for this reason that witchery is the expression of the demonic, not simply because of the anti-social tendency of the symbolism. The demonic is the attempt to define man only by himself, an incestuous, cannibalistic urge. In breaking the fundamental taboos of culture, the witch exults in the isolation, freedom and power that this reversal of divine norms gives him. The witch is thought to accept and desire this inhumanity, and so is not destroyed by it; but his victims are. In this way we can explain the efficacy of many witchery practices. As we have seen, one common way of bewitching a victim is to slip some human flesh or bodily exuviae into his food, or even into the area of his hut compound. Flesh or exuviae are forced back on the victim, "stopping up" his life, so to speak.^{46a}) Thus the same way that constitutes the delight of the witch destroys the ordinary human being whose life is woven into

^{46a}) So powerful and deep-rooted are these and other witchcraft symbolisms, that modern languages still vividly retain them in "obscenities". We know without needing or wanting it to be fully conscious that in them we are in effect uttering witchery accusations or curses; such expressions as "Eat shit," or "Fuck yourself," have the same rudimentary power and symbolism. "Up your ass" condemns the victim to an utterly severed and inhuman life to the same degree as "Mother-fucker," since in the first curse all defecation is prevented or is associated with perverted sexuality, while in the second the victim-witch is cursed with incestuous isolation from humanity.

mutuality. Breaking the taboos releases a terrific force which can destroy the ordinary person. But for him who can absorb this power, the result is an intensification of life. Thus the divine king also inaugurated his reign almost everywhere in Africa (and often elsewhere), with a ritual marriage with his sister. This ritual incest immediately raised him above the common lot of humanity, bestowing upon him a terrific blighting power which he could also turn to good; but this power affected his essence henceforth, and isolated him from the common run of mankind. 47)

It is a consequence from all the above that the same order of divine power which sustains and shapes human society is also the order that bestows power on the witches and sorcerers. Witches feed on the normal by turning it back on itself, inverting it, and refusing to permit the interflow of the divine order to continue. Above all the witch refuses to allow his personal inclusion in the reciprocities of the divine order. The Wholly Other is rejected, and the confrontation with that Otherness is avoided by the witch's own obsessive drive to reduce all beings to his own finite and isolated position. To succeed in his own self definition, the witch must reduce especially those who in their successful integration into the cosmic flow have obtained wealth, fecundity, and prestige, and also those who are in the midst of a liminal transition to a heightened, more divine stage of the cosmic order, such as initiates, pregnant women, newly-weds, and so on. All these threaten the witch's own freedom and self-determination by their integration into an order

47) Cf. the penetrating comments by Jan Vansina, *Le Royaume Kuba* (Annales, Mus. Roy. de L'Afr. Cent., S. in-8°, Sci. Hum., # 49; Tervuren: 1964), p. 111. For a review of these and other forms of African divine kingship, with bibliographic references, see V. van Bulck, "La place du Roi Divin dans les cercles culturels d'Afrique Noire," in *The Sacral Kingship* (Studies in the History of Religions, *Numen* Spl. IV; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), pp. 98-134. The following passage is interesting from this perspective: (concerning the Cewa of Zambia) "Some informants assert that a sorcerer does not achieve any power until he had sexual intercourse with his sister. ... In preparing his 'medicines', the maize-sorcerer is said to make use of activating agents ... such as the caul from his sister's child or his mother-in-law's loin cloth ... Similarly, some owners of muzzle-loaders are believed to increase the accuracy of their shooting by persuading their sisters to sleep with their bullets in contact with their private parts. These practices are referred to as *ufiti* (sorcery)." Marwick, *Sorcery in Its Social Setting*, *op. cit.*, p. 80. The bullet gains in its ferocity of penetrative power, its phallic power, by its participation in its owner's symbolic incest with his sister who links him with the wild.

larger than and independent of the witch. They must be brought low. One recalls the figure of the lawyer-Satan in Camus' *La Chute*.

The witch exults in a perverse but total freedom to break all boundaries, to permit any impulse no matter how chaotic. But this very need to break boundaries destroys the witch's freedom, for he is always dependent on those norms he violates to define his isolation anew. He is reduced, that is to say, to an obsessive perversion of norms, a frozen refusal to enter into the mutual interaction with the Otherness of life which the norms modulate and the divine order represents. Those impulses in the witch that lead to fruitful relationships with the Other of life, with marriageable women, with non-human food, etc., the witch must refuse, for these impulses make him conditioned by that Otherness, and ultimately liable to failure and death. Again and again we are told that witches must offer up their own kin, even their own children, in their initiations and subsequent feasts in their covens. Witchery is a willed and desperate finitude which does not stop at assaulting all moments in the universal transformation of things in order to preserve itself and its intentions eternally inviolate. This finitude is achieved through the construction of an antithetical order and the inversion of the normal, in order to sustain the abnormality of itself. There can be permitted no true Other in such a system. To give the matter a paradoxical twist, the witch is demonic *precisely because he is so resolutely finite, banal*, self-determined, and even, as we have seen, free. His freedom is the freedom of obsession and denial, based on a continual hatred of the *beyond* quality of existence.

It is an old paradox that true freedom and spontaneity can be won only by the submission to the commandments of the divine order which spring out of and express the Otherness of life. Otherwise man remains self-defined and self-determined, locked into personal and ultimately destructively obsessive finite systems. It is that very refusal to recognize the controlling power of Otherness which is at one and the same time the extreme of banality and the extreme of demonic evil.

The striking thing about the symbolism of witchery that we have just finished reviewing, is that these structures have without question not sprung from any organized religious movement, and so have not their source in any kind of preliminary historical facts: this complicated and profound structure has evolved spontaneously out of the very structures of consciousness itself, as a kind of fantasy and meditation

on the limits of finitude and on the nature of the relationship between self and Other. This "fantasy on evil" is deeply ingrained into the human awareness as is shown not only by its structural indebtedness to the earliest forms of hunting religion and symbolism, not only by its appeal to rudimentary libidinal experiences, but also by the amazing similarities in witchery symbolism in all stages of later history and in the most varied cultures. The evidence we have concerning confessed witches (that is, accused witches who are brought to "confess" their crimes, often sincerely ⁴⁸), is that far from being convinced adherents of any cult, whether in medieval Europe or elsewhere, these unfortunates are as much victims of a universal psychosis as are their accusers who project their own spiritual rejection of the human condition onto them. The witches are scapegoats for our universal guilt.

48) For some remarkable confessions along this line, see the works cited in an earlier note by Margaret J. Fields. A study of medieval witch trials will also disclose a number of such documents, many extracted under extreme torture. Yet as Fields' work shows, some accused witches could genuinely come to believe in their own guilt. My remarks above also indicate my rejection of the thesis of Margaret Murray, *The Witch Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), and other works by the same author, that European witch-cults actually existed continuing genuinely positive pre-Christian pagan cults in a Christian environment. Those pre-Christian pagans also believed in witches who did much the same negative things as medieval witches. It is there that the continuity must be sought, if anywhere. See Parrinder's comments, *Witchcraft*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

IN MEMORIAM

Just after having received the second proofs of this fascicule of Numen, I was alarmed by the dreadful news of the sudden death of Professor. S. G. F. Brandon, the newly elected secretary general of the IAHR. He had been on a study tour in Egypt in order to collect material for his iconographic studies. There he contracted an infection which led to his death on board the plane bringing him home.

This surely is a tragic end of a life devoted to the study of the history of religions.

Time is too short to write an obituary which would do justice to the merits of Professor Brandon. It is hoped that the next issue will contain an evaluation of his work. Moreover I have only this last page of the fascicule at my disposal.

However, in this case the last page is transformed into the most important page. I am sure that I am expressing the feelings of his many colleagues, friends, admirers and pupils, when I say that a distinguished scholar, a loyal friend and a good, warm-hearted man has to our great distress passed away.

Our sincere condolence goes out to Mrs Brandon. We feel truly thankful for the splendid contribution which Professor Brandon has bestowed on the branch of learning to which this journal is dedicated.

C. J. BLEEKER